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Abstract 
This thesis argues that a literary hermeneutic based on a mythology of autism offers a 
significantly validating reading of apophatic and a-theological texts. Instead of a 
disability, this mythologised autism is read as a valid and valuable poetic theological 
thinking.  
The thesis argues that a mythological autism could be envisioned as a trinity, analogous 
to the three-in-one Godhead of Christianity. This means that each facet of the 
mythological autistic trinity is indissoluble from the others, are all are equally autism.  
The first element is termed Mindfulness of Separation, and this entails absence and 
unknowing as has been conceptualised in Baron Cohen’s theory of Mindblindness. 
Thought theologically, Mindfulness of Separation is a privileged entry into the 
(non)spaces indicated by apophatic and a-theological discourse.  
The second element is termed autistic fascination, and is drawn from the clinical 
conceptualisation of Restricted and Repetitive Behaviours and Interests (RRBI’s) as 
described in the American DSM-5. The thesis argues that Uta Frith’s explanation of 
repetitive, stereotyped behaviours as those of a ‘sensory connoisseur’ can be thought 
theologically as a capacity for reverence and wonder. Coupled with Frith’s thinking of 
the sensory, the thesis argues that autistic special interests are equally part of autistic 
fascination in their sense of revelling in praise of their special objects. Theologically, 
this autistic fascination can be seen as a haecceic and poetic presence-in-absence 
made possible only within autism’s particular separation, and this is a paradoxical 
coincidentia oppositorum which sheds a new light on the similar absent/present 
paradox of apophatic theology.  
The third element is termed literal metaphor, and it can ultimately only exist when it is 
thought theologically, as what is termed incarnational metaphor. This draws on the 
autistic phenomenon of taking figurative language ‘literally.’ Theologically, this is a 
strength inasmuch as its stance towards language is not to decode it pragmatically, but 
to stay within the paradoxes of a poetic language expressing theological thinking. The 
thesis develops the term ‘apophatic fiction’ to express the way in which incarnational 
metaphor reads poetic, mystical texts by honouring them as simultaneously both poetic 
and theological thinking. The ‘literal’ meaning is the incarnational meaning of poetic 
sacrament, both absent (from pragmatic appropriation) and present (in the power of 
the word). 
At the heart of this trinity, making it possible, is kenotic autistic affective empathy. 
This is drawn from Baron Cohen’s thinking of autism as a ‘zero degree positive’ of 
unimpaired affective empathy within impaired cognitive empathy. It is kenotic because 
it pours itself out in affection which has no cognitive safeguards or conditions. It is the 
wisdom of the holy fool.  
These are theological, not clinical concepts, although they are a mythologization of 
clinical constructs. They can be thought theologically in terms of what the thesis terms 
universal, conscious and absolute autism. Universal autism draws on Baron Cohen’s 
model of the autistic spectrum as a continuum across human variations, and it is an 
autistic streak permeating existence. Conscious autism is the knowing adoption of 
autism as a theological strategy. Absolute autism is the theological thinking which 
imagines what a total autism would be, in absolute Mindfulness of Separation, absolute 
autistic fascination, absolute incarnational metaphor and absolute affective empathy. 
As such, the autistic trinity is the autism of God, offering a powerful way to understand 
apophatic and a-theological texts. In conclusion, readings of Hopkins’ poetry and 
Pirandello’s novels are ‘case studies’ for an autistic a-theological hermeneutic. 
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Introduction  
 Aims and methodology 
This is an inter-disciplinary thesis, situated in the territory of Literature, 
Theology and the Arts (‘LTA’). It is grounded in the ‘Glasgow School’1 of 
thought, which could be described as having worked, from the mid-to-late 
twentieth century onwards, to explore theology poetically and poetics 
theologically. In effect, this creates possible new hermeneutics which are 
simultaneously both literary and theological. New, creative literary-theological 
hermeneutics can emerge in this arena. The agenda of this thesis is to bring 
autistic perception into this inter-disciplinary arena in order to argue for the 
legitimacy of an autistic-literary-theological hermeneutic.  
The central argument of this thesis is a theological one. It is that an 
autistic literary-theological hermeneutic can function as a legitimate theological 
voice. From a consideration of the different facets of autistic perception styles, 
a possible autistic stance can be put forward as a way of understanding an 
equally particular literary-theological discourse. This takes on real discursive 
power as a new hermeneutic mode in its own right, by becoming a distinct 
theological thinking. It will be argued that ‘autism speaks,’2 as a powerful and 
                                          
1 See below on Literature and Theology; because of the significant contribution of the Glasgow 
Centre for Literature, Theology and the Arts, largely developed by David Jasper and following on 
from his pioneering ‘LTA” work in Durham in the 1980s, the term ‘Glasgow school’ became 
current to describe a particular thinking of LTA. 
2 An ironic phrase, subverting the pathologising of autism; in 2006, the American charity ‘Autism 
Speaks’ notoriously, obscenely, even, campaigned for a view of autism as the ‘enemy invader’ 
of the archetypal happy family, to be eradicated (by ‘finding a cure). See 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9UgLnWJFGHQ  See also 
http://autisticadvocacy.org/2009/09/horrific-autism-speaks-i-am-autism-ad-transcript/  
To see an articulate response from the autism community see 
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ez936r2F35U  ).  
An undercurrent of a eugenic agenda has been attributed by many people to the organisation. 
The autist Cisco Bultron writes about Autism Speaks’ distressing “I am autism” campaign (which 
portrayed autism as an enemy): ““I am Autism” painted our neurotype as an enemy, in no 
uncertain terms declaring war on the way we are. Make no mistake, they want us gone.” 
(http://askcisco.blogspot.co.uk/2015/07/the-war-on-autism-is-now-crusade-autism.html)   
The phrase “autism speaks,” then, is used in this thesis ironically and subversively, because the 
intent in this thesis is completely opposite, namely to validate autism as a legitimate and 
insightful tool for reflection and mode of theological thinking. 
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insightful, divergent and creative mode of seeing, but at the outset it needs to 
be clarified how, and where, autism speaks in this thesis.  
Crucially, in much of what follows, a theology of disability exists by 
means of discerning ways to a theology of sacred disability. Nancy L Eiesland’s 
The Disabled God3 and John Swinton’s Reflections on Autistic Love4 will be an 
important underpinning. This is because a theology of autistic validation is 
implicit in this thesis’ reading of its interdisciplinary project. This is not a 
thesis, primarily, of disability theology in terms of politics or pastoral issues. It 
is rooted in questions about language, as theological language and poetic 
language. It becomes a theological politics of disability, only in the sense that it 
asks for autism’s idiosyncratic, creative voice to be heard in the arena of 
theological thinking. Language itself is also, in fact, a deeply pastoral and 
political concern, as Swinton also makes clear in his writing on Stephen, a 
teenage boy with Down’s syndrome: 
It is interesting to reflect on the possibility that it may 
be those of us around Stephen who have learning 
difficulties, in that our cultural, economic, rational and 
medical assumptions and priorities prevent us from 
prioritising the development of the forms of 
communicational skills that would enable us truly to 
begin to understand and learn the holistic 
communication that is natural to Stephen.5 
Similarly, the theologian Christine Trevett has coined the expression “the 
autistic cruelty of the neurotypical”6 to indicate that it is the non-autistic 
community who fail to empathise with the distinctive world view of autistic 
perception. The emphasis would be, in this vision, not initially on “talking to,” 
but in “listening to” and “learning from.” The conviction at the base of this 
thesis is that theology might be enriched twice over; by listening to the poetic 
                                          
3 Eiesland, Nancy, The Disabled God: Towards a Liberatory Theology of Disability (Nashville, 
Tennessee, USA; Abingdon Press,1994); see also Tataryn, Miroslaw & Truchan-Tataryn, Maria, 
Discovering Trinity in Disability: A Theology for Embracing Difference (New York; Orbis books, 
2013)    
4 Swinton, John, Reflections on Autistic Love: What does Love Look Like? (Practical Theology 
vol. 5, 2012, issue 3), quoting John Swinton, Disability Theology, in Ian McFarland, David 
Fergusson, Karen Kilby and Iain Torrance (eds.), Cambridge Dictionary of Christian Theology 
(Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
5 Swinton, John, Building a Church for Strangers (Edinburgh; Contact Pastoral Trust,1999) 
p.4; see also Grainger, Strangers in the Pews and Simpson, Troubled Minds, for examples of 
Christian concern to relate meaningfully to people with mental health problems. 
6 Christine Trevett, Private conversation, ASPARRG UK conference, Cardiff, 2010 
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register, and by listening again, in that poetic space, also to at least the 
possibility of an autistic register.  
To create this imaginary space, the following inter-related 
methodological approaches are used: 
1. The creation of a mythological telling of autistic being, which can 
function as a sacred myth 
2. The development of this mythic framework into a hermeneutic 
with distinct features 
3. The bringing of this mythic autistic hermeneutic into dialogue with 
the thinking of the “Glasgow school” of literature and theology 
which has emerged during the late twentieth/early twenty-first 
centuries 
4. The use of the resulting literary-theological autistic hermeneutic in 
a radical re-visioning to critique and subvert norms, both of 
theological thinking and of narratives which pathologise autism. 
The methodological approach is to develop an interdisciplinary 
conversation, where different perspectives reciprocally listen to each other to 
create a new, inter-disciplinary hermeneutic with possibilities for each to re-
envision a coming together into something new. Poetic and mythological 
thinking will be the hermeneutical tool for the different perspectives to read 
each other. The three perspectives, or hermeneutic conversation partners, are 
the literary, the theological, and the autistic, each one metaphorically and 
mythically envisioned. This autism will, therefore, be a poetically and 
mythically thought autism, stemming from the clinical narrative but operating 
very otherly, as a mythic, literary-theological narrative.  
Is this legitimate? A way to explain the inter-disciplinarity which creates 
hermeneutical conversations and syntheses is as follows. 
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An inter-disciplinary situation: ecceitas 
One metaphor for this thesis is that of being on, and as, an 
interdisciplinary bridge7 – in fact, stretching the metaphor, a three-way bridge. 
The bridge adds something in fact not only to each discipline but perhaps also 
something new in its own right. Certainly, LTA has done this. Creating this 
particular bridge is a venturesome exploration, and can also be considered as 
follows.  
Another illustration of what the inter-disciplinarity of this thesis attempts 
is the rhetorical device of creative neologism, in particular, as discussed in 
chapter four, the poet-priest Gerard Manley Hopkins’ term ecceitas.  
The word ecceitas is used only once in the extant corpus of Hopkins’ 
writing. Could it not be a slip of the pen, when he really meant haecceitas? Slips 
of the pen can often reveal more of the writer’s real intent than the words that 
were on the surface intended, shaping poems in unexpected, deeper 
connections. Writing ecce when you mean haec would betray exactly such a 
meeting of two strands of thought at an unconscious level. So ecceitas emerges 
as a powerful neologism, fusing ecce [‘behold’] with haecceitas [‘this-ness’], 
and it becomes such a powerful concept that it can express an entire poetics, as 
chapter four will discuss.  
However, this need not be only a ‘happy accident.’ Ecceitas can certainly 
be seen as a conscious word play. One of Hopkins’ most distinctive rhetorical 
devices is his innovative creation of neologisms, formed by pushing two words 
together to form a new compound word. He does this frequently, to create new 
ways for paired words to inhabit each other. For example, in The Candle 
Indoors, the neologistic pairs “beam-blind” and “deft-handed” create new, 
polyphonous possibilities. Is “beam-blind” to be as blind as a beam of wood, or 
blinded by a beam of wood, or blinded by a dazzling beam of light, or the 
blindness of a beam of light which shines but is not shined upon? There is a new 
                                          
7 Similar, in a way, to Elwood Reid’s 2013-14 TV series The Bridge, where the autistic 
character Sonya Cross creates her own, idiosyncratic way of being on the bridge of personal 
relationships (“Showrunner Elwood Reid said that they have a specialist 'autism consultant' (Alex 
Plank) for Diane Kruger’s character, Sonia. He is on set and will comment on every script and 
episode.”) see http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2406376/  
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world of possibilities simply by bringing these two words together. Ecceitas as a 
‘behold-this-ness’ could be read as an inter-disciplinary, revisionary new 
creation in Christ.8 
Similarly, this interdisciplinary thesis is a speculative venture for new 
possible worlds. Hopkins’ neologism “deft-handed” might suggest that “left-
handed” has been transformed into a new deftness. Similarly, in the inter-
disciplinary field of Literature, Theology and the Arts,9 art is read theologically 
and theology is read as poetic discourse. This is not a ‘definitive’ project where 
art “is” theology, or theology “is” art, ‘QED.’ Rather, it is the offering of one 
possible hermeneutic strategy, to be brought into the space which Robert 
Detweiler calls “reading religiously,”10 where voices speak and listen in 
reverence to each other’s perspectives. A literary-theological hermeneutic is a 
reading strategy which reads the theological and the poetic/artistic in mutual 
harmony to create a new literary-theological thinking. 
The second level of ‘speculative venture’ in this thesis is to bring another 
voice, marginal and divergent, into the conversation. This is the voice of 
autism, to argue for a “deft-handedness” of an autistic perceptive style of 
thinking. The project imagines a new “deft-handedness” of a possible autistic-
literary-theological hermeneutic. This is a creative speculation, and can only be 
a tentative suggestion for possible new directions. Its aim is to draw on threads 
from understandings of three sides of a triangle – art, theology and autism – to 
create a new tapestry. There are many discourses to choose from in each side of 
the triangle: aesthetic thinkings, theological positions, and ways to envision 
                                          
8 1 Corinthians 5.17; also, as chapter three will discuss, in terms of Heideggerian disclosure and 
Becoming; ‘theo-poetic’ refers to  
9 This venture of new conversations has been pioneered largely at the University of Glasgow’s 
Centre for Literature, Theology and the Arts: “Literature, Theology and the Arts at Glasgow 
(LTA) is an innovatory, multi-disciplinary space for the study of the intersection of religion and 
culture.  … LTA was founded by Professor David Jasper. Although LTA’s base is Theology and 
Religious Studies, within the School of Critical Studies, it has close links with other subject areas 
within the University of Glasgow, particularly English Literature and Art History. … has close ties 
with the International Society for Religion, Literature and Culture … LTA was the inspiration for 
the founding of the Oxford University Press journal Literature and Theology, of which Professor 
heather Walton is the editor.” [Literature, Theology and the Arts at Glasgow,  
http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/critical/research/researchcentresandnetworks/literaturetheolog
yandtheartsatglasgow/]  
10 Detweiler, Robert, Breaking the Fall: Religious Readings of Contemporary Fiction (San 
Francisco; Harper & Row, 1989) 
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autism. The author of this thesis has practised a creative art in selecting forms 
of discourse, in an attempt to listen sensitively [‘reading religiously’] for 
possible ways of thinking which might be particularly hospitable to each other. 
The thinking is that each side of the triangle is informed by listening to itself 
and equally to the other two sides. Hopkins’ neologistic synthesis is a 
transgression of the dictionary in creative ‘erring,’11 and choosing ways to bring 
elements of autistic, poetic and theological thinking is a similar, transgressive 
‘erring,’ in the hope of ‘travelling into’ a fruitful new territory. Detweiler’s 
‘reading religiously’ has a gentle, playful quality, ‘trying things out’ to see what 
happens, and ‘what happens’ in the literary-theological-autistic hermeneutic 
developed in this thesis hopes to have listened, and perhaps also to be heard. 
 
Why poetry? 
Temple Grandin has created a dominant narrative as she describes a 
characteristic of her autistic relationship to the world as ‘thinking in pictures.’12 
Similarly, Steven Wiltshire’s astonishing line drawings replicate city-scapes in an 
amazingly accurate representational picture on the page.13 The other narrative 
which has major currency is autists perceiving the world in terms of 
mathematics, computer code and systems.14 However, autists known to the 
writer of this thesis find meaningful and creative interactions with the world in 
other ways –movement (roller blading), crafting (felt art) gardening (interaction 
with nature) – no doubt there are many other modes of autistic being in the 
world. What about words? Is it possible for autists to revel in words as a special 
interest and an inner mode of representing the world? In fact, contrary to the 
prevalent narrative of autists invariably as ‘computer geniuses’ or 
mathematicians, autists are often poets, and autism community websites often 
                                          
11 This refers to the double meaning of ‘erring’ as a mistake or a wandering into new territory, 
as it will be discussed in reference to its use by Hölderlin, Blanchot and Mark C Taylor. 
12 Grandin, Temple, TED talk 
http://www.ted.com/talks/temple_grandin_the_world_needs_all_kinds_of_minds?language=en, 
accessed 16/11/2014 
13 http://www.designboom.com/architecture/stephen-wiltshire-draws-manhattan-skyline-from-
memory/). 
14 See Baron-Cohen, et al., The autism spectrum quotient (AQ): Evidence from Asperger 
syndrome/high-functioning autism, males and females, scientists and mathematicians. Journal 
of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 31, 5-17 
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include poetry posted by members.15  In her TED talk (see above), Grandin also 
mentions hyperlexia as another autistic trait, and Hermelin and Frith also 
discuss autistic poetry.16 For the creative space of LTA to listen to autistic 
perception, and possibly vice versa, seeking creative possibilities to create a 
tapestry of autistic-poetic threads in Christian belief involves following tangled 
threads. The treads are tangled, because this is not an easy choice and not, in 
fact, for the autist herself, an easy situation to live in. This thesis will argue 
that it can, however, unlock a real and new creative potential. Autistic 
perception, ‘taking things literally,’ is an unchosen given which transgresses the 
rules of how language is received and expressed. Being autistic in the territory 
of poetry is difficult, and resisting its lure is all too easy, but if words ‘call’ to 
the autist, the effort to listen to them might yield an authentic fulfilment of 
being.  
In what follows, it will be evident that examining metaphor as a 
rhetorical strategy is crucial in the thinking of this thesis. Immediately, this 
raises the question of how an autistic writer can negotiate metaphor. This is in 
fact precisely what this thesis itself sets out to examine. In the conclusion, the 
“I” of the text speculates on learning to read (and by implication, write). For 
now, it stands that some autistic people like words, and some autistic people 
have, or long to have, faith. 
 
The faith of the autistic author 
What about faith, expressed in a quest for theological vision? This is even 
more daunting and difficult. In terms of the theological journey of the “I” 
writing this thesis, an important distinction needs to be made, between a ‘good 
autism’ and a ‘bad autism.’ ‘Good autism’ is the integrity of autism seeking 
ways to respond to the divine, choosing, by faith, to inhabit (not ignore) the 
difficulties. In this thesis, a ‘bad autism’17 is a theological fundamentalism 
                                          
15 eg, https://ravenswingpoetry.com/autism-and-asperger-poetry/ 
16 See Hermelin, Beate, Bright Splinters of the Mind: A Personal Story of Research with Autistic 
Savants (London, UK; Jessica Kingsley Press, 2001), and Frith, Autism: Explaining the Enigma 
pp.121ff, discussing “Peter, Peter, pumpkin eater” and the delight in words. 
17 This is an echo of the autism writer Christine Trevett’s expression ‘the autistic cruelty of the 
neurotypical [non-autistic];’ a ‘bad autism’ which ironically seems autistic through adopting a 
non-reflective stance, missing other possible hermeneutic dimensions. “Good” and “bad” autism 
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which ‘takes words literally’ without allowing for any need for other 
hermeneutic strategies, such as a poetic dimension of the text. Fundamentalist 
literalism is one of a range of hermeneutic strategies, but for the purposes of 
this thesis, which seeks to envision an autistic inhabitation of the literary-
theological, it is rejected because it lacks the “three-dimensionality” of the 
holism aimed for here. A “good autist” would approach a literal reading of 
Scripture and say, “but this is nonsense; God didn’t make the world in seven 
days – the earth formed over billions of years.” A “good autist” would most 
likely resemble what Paul Tillich calls the “honest atheist,”18 and this is, as will 
be seen, a key to this thesis’ furnishing of the literary-theological-autistic room. 
Atheism can be an authentic response to theology when, as Tillich writes, 
In making God an object beside other objects, the 
existence and nature of which are matters of argument, 
theology supports the escape to atheism … the first step 
to atheism is always a theology which drags God down 
to the level of doubtful things. The game of the atheist 
is then very easy. For he is perfectly justified in 
destroying such a phantom and all its ghostly qualities.19 
As a good autistic atheist, Christopher, the protagonist in Mark Haddon’s 
The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-time debunks religion and the 
supernatural. After his mother’s (apparent) death, he asks the vicar about God, 
heaven and the afterlife, and when his questions become too probing, the vicar 
is easily out-manoeuvred:  
And I replied, ‘But where is God?’ 
And the Reverend Peters said that we should talk about 
this on another day when he had more time.20 
Discussing Spiritualism and the Cottingley Fairies photograph allegedly of 
“fairies,” Christopher’s logic leads him to conclude that “fairies are made out of 
paper and you can’t talk to someone who is dead.”21 
                                          
will be discussed further in the conclusion. They will also be compared, in the glossary following 
this introduction, to the “good” autistic zero degree of empathy as proposed by Baron Cohen. 
18 Honest atheism is a fundamental starting point for each chapter, and how they work as a 
whole; see Mindfulness of Separation in the glossary. Chapters one and three discuss Christian 
atheism, and chapter three discusses the absence of God encountered in mystical theology; 
chapters four and five see poetic presence as a freedom to absent itself from propositional 
narrative.  
19 Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations pp. 52-3 
20 Haddon, Mark, The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night Time (London, UK; 
Penguin/Vintage 2004) p.43 
21 ibid. p.113 
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There is, however, a literary-theological reading of Christopher’s honest 
atheism which lifts faith into the realm of “fairies made out of paper,” and this 
is to read his atheism in the light of poetic faith. Where the Reverend Peters has 
left in defeat (he never does find more time on another day), Haddon’s 
narrative in fact offers a space for the reader to become the vicar. There are 
narrative possibilities which make it tempting to perform a slip of the pen (see 
below) and discern a “Curious case of the God in the Night-time,” and in a real 
sense this could be a valid alternative title for this thesis.22 “Fairies made out of 
paper” are the power of paper – the image, the book – to bring the image into 
being, not in a superstitious belief but in Coleridge’s poetic “willing suspension 
of disbelief.”23 In fact Christopher himself does this, becoming poignantly and 
perhaps unconsciously contemplative and lyrical when he thinks of the 
molecules of his mother’s cremated body: “Sometimes I look up into the sky and 
I think that there are molecules of Mother up there, or in clouds over Africa or 
the Antarctic, or coming down as rain in the rainforests in Brazil, or in snow 
somewhere.24 He is, in fact, imaginatively creating an afterlife of his mother. 
At another level, the reader can become a vicar by vicariously acting for 
the vicar, answering Christopher’s question. The narrative resurrects his 
mother, when the deception of her death is unmasked, and her resurrection 
body is more glorious in their new relationship, mediated by the tenderness of 
her letters to him. Even, and perhaps because, of her disingenuously illiterate 
letters, she is able to forge a deeper bond with him. The reader, as vicar, 
answers “where God is,” by replying that God is in the providence of the text. 
Fairies are made of paper, and seeing fairies correctly means seeing them in the 
paper. This is the enormous leap of faith demanded by a literary-theological 
hermeneutic, which operates from the conviction of honest atheism and yet 
affirms a kind of faith. 
To use another metaphor, an autism-literature-theology hermeneutic 
strategy is a bridge-building exercise between these three modes of being and 
seeing. It is perhaps a supremely difficult bridge to build, given the “oddness” 
                                          
22 A future project will develop this reading of a “Curious Incident” more fully, but it is only 
outlined here. 
23 Coleridge, S T (eds. James Engell & W Jackson Bate), Biographia Literaria in Collected Works 
vol VII (Princeton, USA;  Princeton University Press, 1983) part 2.6 
24 Curious Incident pp. 43-44 
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of travelling from autism into literature and theology, or poetic theology. This 
writer approaches precisely these difficult territories, from a conviction that if 
brought to these places, precisely in and as its difficulties, autism could offer a 
radical new view from on the bridge – perhaps even a new place in its own right. 
This ‘place’ is a discourse intended as a refuge for the autist-poet-
believer who, like Hopkins and, in different but related ways, examined in this 
thesis, exists on the margins of mainstream poetics and theology and yet, are 
also on the bridge. For Hopkins, the bridge is the creative tension of his being, 
as poet-priest and priest-poet. Perhaps the Glasgow University CLTA would have 
been a refuge for Hopkins, and as a priest in an inner-city Glasgow parish, he 
might have been a frequent visitor. A refuge for autistic faith is, similarly, 
intended to be a space of discourse, a place of particularly comfortable 
hospitality. The ‘room’ designed for it aims to meet its requirements, and the 
thinking of these will be discussed below. 
The refuge might find few autistic ‘takers,’ because it is so extremely 
hard to reach and so ‘out of the way.’ Even if so, it would still be of value. The 
voice of what this thesis calls a universal autism [see glossary], even were there 
no autists here (bar one) to speak it, would be offered to theological thinking, 
and specifically a poetic theological thinking, as a way of seeing what one can 
perhaps even learn from an autistic view. The reason for bringing these 
particular literary, theological and the autistic modes of seeing together arises 
from the uniquely situated perception of a situation where, this thesis will 
argue, “deep calls to deep.” 
 
“Deep calls to deep:” echoing metaphors 
The locus for listening to autism in this thesis is the inter-disciplinary 
area of literature and theology. Before exploring the contours of this territory, 
it needs to be stated at the outset that the origin of this thesis is a sense of 
being where Psalm 42 says “deep calls to deep.”25 A ‘depth’ of the thinking 
where literature and theology have met in the twentieth/twenty-first centuries 
                                          
25 “Deep calls to deep in the roar of your waterfalls; all your waves and breakers have swept 
over me” (Psalm 42.7); this is also a sense of overwhelming, which will be considered in terms 
of art/theology/disability. 
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meets a ‘depth’ of autism. Both are conceived in the double metaphoric 
meaning of depth; a place of descent (“I’m in at the deep end”) and a place of 
value (“deeply meaningful”).26 
Another metaphor, akin to this depth and overwhelming, (“all your waves 
and breakers have swept over me”) is darkness, but it is also dually conceived, 
being a paradoxical darkness which is also dazzling light.27 Autism will be 
represented as this ‘darkness’ which is paradoxically also dazzling light, but it 
meets with depth and darkness, primarily at least, not within the discourses of 
practical theology or theology of disability.28 The particular understandings of 
depth and darkness which are invited into conversation are drawn from the 
inter-disciplinarity of literature and theology, because it is the thesis of this 
author that autism calls out to them, illumining them and perhaps also being 
illumined by them, but always, in this paradox.  
A third metaphor for the common ground in this conversation is 
liminality. Together with the paradoxes of ‘the deep end’ being ‘deeply 
meaningful’ and the darkness being dazzling light, the third paradox this thesis 
wants to establish is that of the marginal being the true centre. This means that 
ex-centricity is in fact the true centre, and consequently, the ‘eccentric’ 
perception will be validated as both deep-end meaning and dazzling darkness. 
Metaphoric or mythic narratives of autism in these terms will be constructed. To 
contextualise this, the territory of literature and theology needs to be explored 
briefly, and then possible reasons for listening to autism can be explained. The 
aim is that each of all three: autism, literature and theology, should be 
honoured and validated in the light of each other. 
 
 
                                          
26 This also echoes Tillich’s existentialist sermon The Depth of Existence, where his texts are 1 
Corinthians 2.10 (But God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit: for the Spirit searches all 
things, yea, the deep things of God) and Psalm 130.1 (Out of the depths have I cried to thee, O 
Lord) (Tillich, Paul, The Shaking of the Foundations (Harmondsworth, UK; Penguin, 1963 (1949) 
p.59 
27 This is the ‘self-consuming’ metaphorical language of Dionysius the Areopagite’s mystical 
theology, which will be explored in chapter two. 
28 Practical theology and theology of disability are relevant, especially in the light of the ‘Autism 
Speaks’ controversy (see footnote 1). Practical theology and theology of disability will be 
discussed in the next section, but this thesis does not strictly operate within these disciplinary 
fields. 
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Literature and Theology – an inter-disciplinary space 
If autism knows, par excellance, how to live ‘on the margins,’29 perhaps 
it is no accident that it enters conversation with literature-and-theology, as 
another discourse of marginality. David Jasper writes, perhaps not entirely 
humorously, that  
In recent times the study of ‘literature and theology’ or 
‘literature and religion’ has been granted, if often 
somewhat grudgingly, its place in the curriculum of the 
academy, often uncomfortably suspended between 
academic departments of literature and theology.30 
Being “uncomfortably suspended” is not an accident which should be too 
hastily dealt with by the administrative policies of the academy, at least in 
terms of how it is thought – although, of course, at that level, being given a 
place is very important. Glasgow University’s Centre for Literature, Theology 
and the Arts [‘CLTA’] was an important and extremely fruitful development, in 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, as was the emergence of the 
journal Literature and Theology. Without this hospitable, creative academic 
environment, this thesis could not have been written.31 
However, the creativity of this research space perhaps depends on the 
fact of being “uncomfortably suspended.” The depth of the twentieth/twenty-
first century ‘Literature, Theology & the Arts’ (LTA) conversation could be seen 
to stem from its conscious existence within the depth of an abyss of a post-
Christian, paradoxical theological thinking. The American a-theological thinker 
of LTA, Mark C Taylor, uses two powerful images which express the nature of 
this abyss. Barry Moser’s untitled lithograph,32 as the frontispiece to Taylor’s 
1984 book Erring: A postmodern A/theology, shows a huge, underground, 
rugged crevasse, with widening fissures splintering out from it. The landscape 
above conceals this crevasse from view, if it were seen from the surface, but 
                                          
29 In the sense that autists, with divergent thinking styles and difficulties in the social and 
communicative domains, are frequently ‘on the outside,’ as will be discussed. 
30 Jasper, David, The Study of Literature and Theology, in Hass, Andrew, Jasper, David & Jay, 
Elizabeth (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Literature and Theology, published online 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/ DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199544486.001.0001, 
September 2009 
31 see 
http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/critical/research/researchcentresandnetworks/literaturetheolog
yandtheartsatglasgow/ and http://litthe.oxfordjournals.org/  
32 see frontispiece artwork, Taylor, Mark C, Tears (New York; State University of New York Press, 
1990) 
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that landscape itself is being struck by a lightning bolt. The abyss, in theological 
terms, has always been there, as the mystics’ apophatic writings indicate. 
However, it is the ebbing of the sea of faith might burst the landscape open to 
reveal it; and it is art which dis-closes it.33 The abyss figures also in Taylor’s 
second frontispiece art work, this time in his 1989 book Tears. This image is a 
black and white photo of Enrique Espinoza’s art installation The Silence of 
Jesus. 34 
Espinoza’s installation is of two jagged black shapes which, when seen 
from a certain angle, as in the photo, reveal a profile where the empty space 
between them is the shape of the crucifix. The statue could be called an anti-
statue, since its object, the image of Christ, is a non-object: it is an absence, 
and a void. Christ is ‘not there,’ and in fact is the not-there. The moment you 
move, to walk around or walk away, “he’s gone.” The abyss is of Christ emptied 
into nothingness,35 and, as Taylor writes, “in the postmodern world, the Disaster 
takes place (without taking place) in art as art.”36 It is understood as an 
absence, where Christ is ‘not there,’ yet the ‘not there’ is Christ, if seen from a 
certain viewpoint. This is a ‘two-fold’ abyss, as an abyss of theology and an 
abyss of literature and the arts; and this abyss offers a salvific (post-holocaust) 
space for their meeting. 
David Jasper argues that the nature of this abyss lies in the way LTA 
(Literature, Theology and the Arts) inhabits the ‘failure’ of religion (but a 
‘failure’ which remains at the heart of the Christian tradition itself, which will 
be a profound (deep, again) understanding of “the [salvific] foolishness of the 
gospel” [1 Corinthians 1.18]). Jasper quotes Terry Eagleton: 
In his book Literary Theory: An Introduction, Terry 
Eagleton offers as a ‘single explanation’ for the rise of 
the study of English literature in the nineteenth 
century, ‘the failure of religion’. From the early 
twentieth century Eagleton (1996, p.20) quotes from the 
inaugural lecture of a Professor of English Literature at 
                                          
33 The role of art is also the ‘disaster’ of the ‘unpresentable before,’ which Taylor also sees in 
Paysage Foudroyé (Taylor, Tears p.7) 
34 see frontispiece art, Taylor, Mark C, Erring: A Postmodern A/theology (Chicago; University of 
Chicago Press, 1984) 
35 A kenotic Jesus of non-being is crucial to an absolute thinking of the disabled God which 
develops Eiesland’s thinking by bringing it into the arena of a literary-theological sensibility of 
disability as abyss. 
36 Taylor, Tears p.10 
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Oxford, George Gordon: ‘England is sick, and … English 
literature must save it. The Churches (as I understand) 
having failed, and social remedies being slow, English 
literature has now a triple function: still, I suppose, to 
delight and instruct us, but also, and above all, to save 
our souls and heal the State.’37  
Eagleton’s, and Gordon’s argument for the apparent eclipse of “religion” 
and its replacement by the novel would suggest that LTA would more accurately 
be “LA-T” (Literature and Art minus Theology). However a “more nuanced” and 
thought-provoking mutuality of theological and literary thinking is traced by 
Jasper in the writing of Austin Farrer, in the early twentieth century. Farrer, 
Jasper argues, offers “a generally more sophisticated debate about the 
relationship between literature and theology,” so that the recovery of an 
authentic LTA “has its roots in the work of an Oxford New Testament scholar 
and theologian, Austin Farrer.” Farrer explores the relationship between “‘the 
sense of metaphysical philosophy, the sense of scriptural revelation, and the 
sense of poetry.’”38 This is an offense to theology, inasmuch as Farrer reads 
Scripture “as if it were literature rather than a record of historical facts.”39 
However, when the critic Helen Gardner respects Farrer's ‘profoundly poetic 
and Christian imagination’40 the possibility of poetry thought theologically and 
theology thought poetically opens up. Jasper has already discerned this thinking 
in Coleridge.41 Further ‘heretical’ creative moves such as Farrer’s are argued by 
Michel de Certeau to be at work in the sixteenth century mystics, in the context 
of a similar ferment of creative writing.42 In the light of Eagleton’s thinking of 
literature in the context of the eclipse of theology, LTA can be seen in the light 
of the abyss of that eclipse where Scripture moves into literature rather than a 
record of historical facts.”43 It is also abyss in the sense of poetry itself, where 
                                          
37 Jasper, David, The Study of Literature and Theology, 9 
38 Farrer's Bampton lectures for 1948, published as The Glass of Vision p.ix, quoted in Jasper, 
The Study of Literature and Theology (citation not given)  
39 Jasper, The Study of Literature and Theology 
40 Gardner, Helen, The Limits of Literary Criticism: Reflections on the Interpretation of Poetry 
and Scripture (1956), p.36, quoted in Jasper, ibid. 
41 see Jasper, David, Coleridge as Poet and Religious Thinker (Pittsburgh, USA; Pittsburgh 
Theological Monographs, 1985)  
42 In The Mystic Fable, de Certeau argues that in the thirteenth century the influence of the 
courtly love genre works for the “mythification of love,” accompanying the “demythification” of 
religion (p.4). This could be seen as a parallel to Eagleton’s confluence of the novel’s advance 
and theology’s erosion. De Certeau argues for a similar ‘creative abyss’ situation emerging from 
this, where finally in its shadow the sixteenth century mystics can write what this thesis will 
term apophatic fiction (see chapter two). 
43 Jasper, The Study of Literature and Theology 
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poetry can occupy the site of the disaster as witness. When theodicy becomes 
obscene in post-holocaust thought, and the demise of Christendom silences 
theological discourse, the bottomless claims of metaphor can become the 
powerful poetry of the cry of dereliction.44 Heather Walton discusses this 
possibility in When Love is Not True, writing: “My own journey into 
interdisciplinarity was largely provoked by the inadequacy of theological 
responses to the age-old problem of evil.”45 Walton continues, quoting David 
Jenkins: 
The dreadful thing about so much theology is that, in 
relation to so much of the human situation, it is so 
superficial … Theologians need to stand under the 
judgements of the insights of literature before they can 
speak with true theological force of and to the world this 
literature reflects and illuminates.46 
This is a real, kenotic and vulnerable ‘disabled’ theology; Walton writes 
elsewhere that “literature resists being assimilated by theology in order to 
communicate the insights of faith … it cannot be simply and effectively 
appropriated in this way and is as likely to confound our understandings of faith 
as to confirm them.”47 This is a vulnerability involving “wrestling long and hard 
with intractable problems and (recognising) that there is spiritual value in facing 
ambivalence without denying religious and political obligations … through 
discomforting processes of radical critique.”48 This is a discourse of a searching 
for authenticity, and the territory it leads to in this thesis is the a-theological 
and the apophatic, as will become clear. When theology becomes a-theology, 
the abyss of the a-theological text can be thought as a reading of this poetic 
                                          
44 Maurice Blanchot writes that “The poem is the answer’s absence.” (The Space of Literature 
p.247) (Blanchot, Maurice (trans. Smock, Ann), The Space of Literature, (L’espace littéraire) 
(Nebraska; University of Nebraska Press, 1982 (Editions Gallimard, France, 1955)) 
45 Walton, Heather (ed.)  Literature and Theology: New Interdisciplinary Spaces (Surrey, UK;  
Ashgate, Surrey, England, 2011) p.45 
46 David Jenkins quoted in Jasper, David,  The Sacred Desert: Religion, Literature, Art, and 
Culture (Massachusetts, USA; Blackwell Publishing, 2004) p.4, quoted in Walton, Literature and 
Theology p.44; Jenkins, the scandalously radical bishop of Durham, gained infamy by stating 
publicly that he did not believe in the Virgin Birth or the Resurrection. The Bible was literature, 
not history, to Jenkins, and the gospel was at heart the compassion resulting in the concern for 
social justice. Uncannily, days after Jenkins’ scandalously ‘heretical’ public remarks in 1984, 
Durham Cathedral was struck by lightning. Perhaps this was the backdrop (or the zeitgeist hand 
of God) when in 1990, Mark C Taylor C in the USA similarly wrote about radical theology in the 
figure of the Paysage Foudroyé (see footnote 11). Jenkins died as the final draft of this thesis 
was being written, in September 2016. 
47 Walton, Introduction, in Literature and Theology p.2 
48 ibid. 
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abyss.49 In this sense, a theology of disability is shifted to a disability of 
theology, and a deeply theological disability, of the kenotic Christ. In all of this, 
authenticity in the face of the abyss is brought under the scrutiny of a particular 
autistic integrity, which will be developed as a paradoxical (dis)ability.  
Liminality and abyss are two of the metaphors for this conversation. The 
third is darkness, and the paradox of a dazzlingly bright darkness will be an 
essential metaphor where LTA and autism can converse. In terms of LTA, this 
‘darkness’ will be seen in the eclipse Michel de Certeau argues for, where 
writers of mystical theology become poets as an apophatic theological strategy. 
In the framing of ‘deep calls to deep,’ the liminal space of darkness will be 
explained, in the conclusion of this thesis, as lived experience where a thesis 
journey has been sited precisely in darkness, not negating or annulling it. In this 
darkness Dante’s journey also begins, with its understanding of Inferno, 
Purgatorio and Paradiso, where  
nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita, 
mi ritrovai per una selva oscura, 
ché la diritta via era smarrita. 
[Midway in the path of our life 
I found [rediscovered] myself in [by means of] a dark 
wood 
Whose right path was lost]50 
 
In the light of LTA’s liminality, abyss and darkness, the conversation with 
autism can now be framed. This will be developed in the following chapters, 
once the terms for understanding autism have been established. It begins with 
what will be seen as another intimately related metaphor, which is the 
narrative of autistic separation. To create a mythic framework for this, the 
paradoxical nature of all these metaphors can begin from the inversions at work 
in the ‘holy fool’ archetype. 
 
                                          
49 Mark C Taylor performs these readings in Erring: A Postmodern a-theology (1984) and Tears 
(1989), and Taylor’s thought will provide a vital narrative, which will appear in chapter one. 
50 Dante Alighieri, La Divina Commedia [The Divine Comedy] – Inferno 1.1 [this writer’s own 
translation]; mi ritrovai suggests, perhaps (another direction to be reserved for future research) 
re-finding the self is as per the wood, rather than by seeing the wood as an unfortunate error. 
This would be a Dantean forerunner of Taylor’s Erring 
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Creating a mythical autism: “Making Fools of us All” 
This thesis brings an autistic hermeneutic to bear on theological thinking. 
It argues that sharing marginal spaces with similarly “abnormal” narratives, an 
autistic theology can be viewed as “the wisdom of God [which] is wiser than 
human wisdom.”51 This draws on the holy fool narrative, where the “fool” 
ironically enacts God’s narrative where “He catches the wise in their 
craftiness.”52 Autism, which seems foolish to the non-autistic world offers a 
narrative which enacts the wisdom of God.  
Uta Frith describes this as the power to “make fools of us all,” and the 
context of her remark is a good place to start, because it offers a way in to 
seeing dimensions of this power. Frith describes Peter Sellers’ character Chance 
(‘Chauncey’), in Hal Ashby’s 1979 film Being There, as an “autistic hero,”53 and 
speculates that his autism challenges the norm, exposing qualities of the non-
autistic world, so that this encounter with autism “makes fools of us all.”54 This 
is a profound, ironic exposure of the folly of the non-autistic, which inverts the 
idea of foolishness. This thesis explores this inversion, to argue that autistic 
“foolishness” can be conceived of as the wisdom of the holy fool.  
The title of Ashby’s film is a reference to Heidegger’s Dasein, which in 
English is translated as “Being there,” and this authentic being of Dasein is a 
good way to approach how the autist as “holy fool” is viewed in this thesis.  
Chance is a simple-minded gardener, unable to fend for himself when he 
thrust out into the world from a mysteriously sheltered life. He really is a fool, 
ignorant, naïf, and misunderstanding much of what he sees, but his simplicity 
and literal-mindedness is a liberation from the constructions of what Heidegger 
calls Das Man, the voice of conformity in a culture where people don’t think for 
themselves. His exclusion from Das Man is Heideggerian by giving him the ability 
to think more truly. In front of the White House, looking in towards the epitome 
of worldly power, Chauncey turns away to look at a tree, and tells the guard at 
the gates “this tree is sick.” This “true seeing” need not be (exclusively) a 
                                          
51 1 Corinthians 1.25 (NIV) 
52 Job 5.13 (NIV) 
53 Uta Frith, Autism: Explaining the Enigma, (Massachusetts, USA; Blackwell Publishing, 2003) 
p.106 
54 Ibid., p. 133 
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metaphorical, ironic social commentary on the ‘organism’ of political power, 
although this is an important good reading of it, as an early example of how 
Chauncey “makes fools of us all,” repeatedly throughout the film. However, it 
can also be read, at a deeper level, as a reference to Heidegger’s essay What is 
called Thinking? Heidegger also writes about what it is to gaze at a tree:  
when we think through what this is, that a tree in bloom 
presents itself to us so that we can come and stand 
face-to-face with it, the thing that matters first and 
foremost, and finally, is not to drop the tree in bloom, 
but for once to let it stand where it stands." 
Why do we say "finally?" Because to this day, thought 
has never let the tree stand where it stands.55 
Heidegger’s description of truly seeing the tree, beyond the constructions 
imposed by “thought,” means an ability to outwit the thinking of Western 
metaphysics, to access the tree’s pure “being there.” 
Sellers’ character, then, operates as a “wise fool” in two senses. Firstly, 
his naïf truth-telling cuts through the artifices of the “sickness” of 
contemporary society, as represented by the tree. Secondly, his ability as a 
simple gardener truly to see the tree indicates a simplicity which is in fact the 
kind of deeply seen philosophical wisdom Heidegger is alluding to when he 
writes, “the day may come when someone will find the sentence (“being is”) 
astonishing.”56 Everything is astonishing to Chauncey, who lives in a state of 
amazement of what to others is commonplace. 
A third level of understanding Sellers’ character is to consider him as a 
Biblical archetype. As the gardener who is cast out of the garden, he is Adam, 
then meeting his Eve (the temptress educating him in the ways of the world). 
However as Christ, the “second Adam,” he is a mysterious figure, who, when he 
is evicted from his home, leaves the lawyers’ questions about his identity 
unanswered.57 Finally, establishing his Christ-like nature, the film ends with the 
image of him walking on water.  
                                          
55 Heidegger, Martin (trans. Gray, G & Wieck, F), What is Called Thinking? (Wass Heisst 
Denken?), (New York; Harper & Row, 1968 (1954)), p.44 
56 Ibid., p.180 
57 “Then they asked him, "Where is your father?" "You do not know me or my Father," Jesus 
replied. "If you knew me, you would know my Father also."” (John 8.19, NIV) 
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Social critique by the purity of autistic “naivete” is an important area 
worth exploring, and this will feature at points in this thesis. However, thinking 
of autism in terms of Dasein and the Christ-like holy fool narrative forms the 
basis of this thesis, which takes autism into the thinking of the marginal spaces 
of “foolish” narratives in literature and theology. The argument of this thesis is 
that an autistic hermeneutic can breathe new life into theological thinking, in 
its re-visioning of marginal narratives where the marginal figures of the autist, 
the mystic and the Christian atheist are mutually empowering. 
 
1.  Hear my voice: a theological approach to the 
margins 
A Neurotribal Approach – Steve Silberman 
The approach of this thesis can also be considered as asking the question, 
as a thought experiment: what would happen if theological hermeneutics were 
to make a conscious effort to re-focus as an autistic epistemology? Could this be 
an ‘inter-faith’ exercise in celebrating diversity? Could it even be, as this thesis 
argues, that the divergent perception style of autism offers a valuable 
theological insight? This is in keeping with the philosophy set out in Steve 
Silberman’s 2015 ‘Neurotribes: The legacy of Autism, and how to think smarter 
about people who think differently.’ Silberman defines neurodiversity as  
the notion that conditions like autism, dyslexia, and 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) should 
be regarded as naturally occurring cognitive variations 
with distinctive strengths that have contributed to the 
evolution of technology and culture rather than mere 
checklists of deficits and dysfunctions.58  
 
Thinking about autistic people as a “tribe” who “think differently” with a 
“distinctive strength” would offer the possibility of moving autism out of a 
narrative of pathology into celebration of its contribution to a pluralism of 
world views. Silberman adds that “the idea of neurodiversity has inspired the 
                                          
58 Steve Silberman, Neurotribes: The legacy of Autism, and how to think smarter about people 
who think differently (London, UK; Allen & Unwin, 2015) p.16 
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creation of a rapidly growing civil rights movement,”59 and in accord with this 
recognition that ‘being different is not being inferior,’ a term used often in this 
thesis is ‘validation;’ affirmation of validity.  
 
A theological approach: John Swinton 
A theology of love, approaching the lived experience of autists, would 
seek to honour neurodiversity, and this approach is put forward in John 
Swinton’s 2012 Reflections on Autistic Love: What Does Love Look Like? Swinton 
defines disability theology as a seeking “to give theological voice to people and 
experiences that have not been taken seriously in the construction of 
theology.”60 In the case of autism, this voice, for Swinton, “may be counter-
cultural and perhaps counter-intuitive, but … nonetheless authentic.61 The 
scope and aim of Swinton’s research here is  “listening to the stories of people 
with autism,” so that this “may actually be the beginning of opening up a new 
discourse about the nature of love.”62 
Swinton puts this listening into practice, and as a result is able to 
challenge the perception that autists are “thin” people, lacking in emotional 
depth and incapable of meaningful forms of love. Instead, in listening to autistic 
people he discerns radically different ways of experiencing and expressing love. 
This is a powerful ‘antidote’ to the hateful rhetoric of attempts to silence and 
discount autism’s very being. (As voiced, notably, in the “I am Autism” 
campaign of Autism Speaks [see footnote 1]). It is deeply theological, both as 
the practical thinking of the gospel in the loving act of listening to autistic 
people; but also, perhaps more deeply theological, in an open-ness to new 
modes of theological thinking which consider autistic love as a valid mode of 
human experience. This is a powerful statement, seeing autistic being as a 
valued part of creation and not an ‘enemy.’63  
                                          
59 Ibid. 
60 Swinton, John, Reflections on Autistic Love: What does Love Look Like?  (Practical Theology 
vol. 5, 2012, issue 3), quoting John Swinton, Disability Theology, in Ian McFarland, David 
Fergusson, Karen Kilby and Iain Torrance (eds.), Cambridge Dictionary of Christian Theology 
(Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
61 Ibid. p.275 
62 ibid. 
63 As a literary-theological project, this thesis does not explore the politics of disability within 
the Church, but assumes that an authentic gospel honours diversity including disability. Although 
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Autism as gift  
This thesis acknowledges that some aspects of autism function as a 
disability in the everyday life of people with autism, and that the clinical 
narrative is useful in elucidating how autism manifests itself, for diagnosis and 
designing appropriate support. However it also draws on the thinking of the 
autism advocacy movement which sees people with autism not as disabled but 
as differently abled.64 Taking insights from both perspectives, it views autism as 
both a challenge and a strength. However, this is not simply challenge-and-
strength, but challenge-as-strength.  Autism as a challenge (‘disability’) is 
inverted by thinking the disability itself, theologically, as a gift, also as the gift 
of disability itself. Firstly, this is a spiritual gift because it offers insights into a 
theological understanding of ‘disability’ as a way of envisioning the human 
condition in terms of creaturely status and the Fall. Recognising this very 
disability as a universal truth (on the autistic spectrum) is a new form of 
thinking a Barthian Krisis, not as the separation of human sinfulness but as an 
existential need for grace in the face of a universal human autistic separation 
from God. This can engender a new level of self-knowledge and humility in the 
outworking of faith. Secondly, at a deeper level, however, it also speculates on 
an autism of God as transcendence. Thinking of an autistic God as disabled 
makes sense at Calvary, where total disability becomes total ability in kenotic 
sacrifice. Ultimately, this will be a separation within and from God, expressed 
in the mythological narrative of Thomas Altizer’s gospel of Christian atheism.  
This thinking of transcendence as mindfulness of separation co-exists, in 
the paradox indicated by apophatic theology, with a thinking of immanence as 
autistic fascination. Like two sides of a coin, these two modes of thought are 
envisioned together at a mythical, metaphoric narrative level. They co-inhere in 
the mythical personhood of autism, mirroring the paradoxical co-existence of 
                                          
Nancy Eiesland’s The Disabled God: Towards a Liberatory Theology of Disability focuses more 
on physical disabilities and adopts a more sociological approach, her narrative to some extent 
underpins the kind of validation project of this thesis. For example, she criticises elements in 
Christian attitudes which “have treated people with disabilities as objects of pity and 
paternalism” (p.20); “the dissonance raised by the nonacceptance of persons with disabilities 
and the acceptance of grace through Christ’s broken body necessitates that the church finds 
new ways of interpreting disability (p.23). Crucially, “In presenting his impaired hands and feet 
to his startled friends [Luke 24.36-39] the resurrected Jesus is revealed as the disabled God” 
p.100). This is echoed, in chapter three of this thesis, as the autism of God. 
64 For example, Steve Silverman’s Neurotribes, as discussed earlier. 
27 
 
 
absence and presence in mystical theology. The giftedness of autistic dis/ability 
is expressed at the deepest level of poetics when absence and presence co-
inhere in the thinking of an autistic abnormal literal-mindedness. Instead of 
being seen through a clinical narrative as a pathology, literal-mindedness is 
viewed as a theologically privileged way of seeing.65 The term for this will be 
kenotic Incarnational metaphor which expresses both sides of the ‘autism coin.’ 
Its aim will be to read itself most profoundly in mystical theology. In summary, 
the aim is to argue for the marginal discourses of autistic being and mystical 
and a-theology to validate and support each other as legitimate theological 
thinking of the privileged status of dis/ability. 
In an important sense, this thesis is built on Swinton’s thinking of a 
listening to the voice of autistic love. The argument for a radical autistic 
hermeneutic rests on the conviction that honouring the modes of autistic 
perception can lead to a validation of a theological voice which attempts to 
listen to autism. Recalling Heather Walton’s words about the need for 
authenticity, this would be an authentic listening to authenticity. 
 
An autistic voice ‘from the deep’ 
The aim of this thesis is deeply in sympathy with Swinton’s, which is to 
listen to autism, to discern its value in all its unique and atypical glory. To 
construct a mythic hermeneutic is not however to ask about autistic people’s 
religious experience, or even theological perspectives as such. Instead, it starts, 
as it were, from the other end. That is to say, it is to begin with an intuitive 
sense of autistic perception illuminate a kind of innate autism inherent in 
poetic, a-theological and mystical discourse. This is the attempt to address an 
intuitively felt need of a theological listening to autism, in this area, where 
deep calls to deep. Its aim is to explore how a literary-theological hermeneutic 
might work if it were to adopt a new perspective, using concepts drawn from 
the clinically observed traits which will be described in the introduction. It is a 
                                          
65 This thinking of autism as a privileged theological epistemology differs in essence 
from the thinking of Olga Bogdashina and William Stillman, who view autistic being in terms of 
privileged spiritual experience. The two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but 
where Bogdashina and Stillman see perceptual/sensory traits as the mystical experience of 
spiritual gifts, autism and mysticism are brought together in this thesis at the level of discourse, 
where autism functions at the level of story, not lived experience. 
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‘thought experiment’ in how theological hermeneutics could adopt autistic 
epistemology at a theoretical level, not a practical one. This does draw on 
autistic people’s constructions of experience, as a starting point for thinking of 
what autism is. However the point is for the theory of theological hermeneutics 
to consider autistic modes of seeing as a radically different theoretical-
theological lens. An autistic hermeneutic might be taken by theological thinking 
as another strategy in its own array of hermeneutical possibilities. This could be 
expressed as an elucidation of a ‘hidden autism,’ not of the reader per se, but 
in the world of the text. To adopt this autistic hermeneutic would be a project 
to discern that inner autism in theology as a conscious strategy.  
This project within the field of literature and theology works by seeking 
out narratives where an autistic perception might offer its strongest potential to 
amplify and elucidate. As the search has progressed, what has seemed most 
compelling has been to see a strange, divergent autistic perception as a 
theoretical embodiment of the radical and marginal spaces of mystical theology 
and a-theology. Put differently, a ‘theoretical’ autism of the text could be 
called a mythology of autism, seeing autistic traits as archetypes, present in the 
text, which can be discerned by entering into a theological autistic 
hermeneutic. This autistic perspective will be validated as a strength, and a 
legitimate, and even privileged hermeneutic, of real value to theology. Taking 
autistic perception as a privileged theological strategy means that an autistic 
search for authentic discourse leads to bringing atypical theological languages 
under scrutiny. The aim is to find a language in which an autistic theological 
hermeneutic can express its authenticity of ‘being there.’ This is an authenticity 
that “speaks to our condition” as we, as readers, enter into the workings of an 
autistic mode of being. 
To do this, this thesis argues that a mythology of autistic epistemology 
can create a radical and legitimate hermeneutic, to elucidate and validate the 
discourses of absence, or more accurately, an absent presence, within mystical 
theology and a-theology. In a conversation between autism and its conversation 
partners of mysticism and a-theology, they read each other hospitably in a 
hermeneutical sympathy. Mythological autism’s first aspect is termed 
‘mindfulness of separation,’ and it offers a privileged reading of absence in the 
text.   
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2.  Stories of separation 
Universal stories of separation 
The Punjabi poet Batalvi’s poem Separation, You are King begins and 
ends with the quatrain 
Let us speak of separation, 
Separation is king. 
A body that does not feel separation, 
Is dead body.66 
 
Robert Scharlemann writes: 
The very universality of being is appropriable only not in 
the form of something common or general but in the 
form of the singular: inevitably, everyone asks the 
question of the meaning of being, but everyone must 
ask it as an "I."67 
 
Batalvi’s love poem and Scharlemann’s essay express solitude, distance 
and difference as essential to all individuation and relationship. This is a 
universal separation. The essential basis of this thesis is that a particular 
theological thinking of a universal separation takes on a new power when it 
comes into dialogue with autism. Autism is the radical experience of separation; 
when “separation is king,” in theological terms, an autistic hermeneutic can 
envision this universal reign as an autistic perspective. 
 
 Stories of autistic separation  
The idea of the autos as an individual entity separated from the other is 
described in a reading of fairy tales by Lorna Wing: 
Perhaps they (ie, autistic children) were the reason for 
the ancient legends of ‘fairy changeling’ children, in 
                                          
66 Shiv Kumar Batalvi (1936–1973), Separation is King, translated from Punjabi, Suman Kashyap, 
online access http://www.apnaorg.com/suman/batalvi_poems.html accessed 11/08/2013 
67 Scharlemann, Robert P, Inscriptions and Reflections: Essays in Philosophical Theology 
Charlottesville, Virginia; University Press of Virginia, 1989), p.33. 
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which the fairies were believed to steal away a human 
baby and leave a fairy child in its place. In some 
versions of the story the changeling was remarkably 
beautiful but strange and remote from human kind.68 
Similarly, Uta Frith sees in the fairy tales Snow White and The Sleeping 
Beauty a way of representing autism’s separateness – the sleeping beauty is 
enclosed in a glass coffin, and Snow White is sleeping behind a hedge of thorns: 
The hedge of thorns or the glass coffin are perfect for 
representing the impossibility of reaching the child. In 
the case of autism, however much the child’s 
appearance seems to indicate that it is normal and 
healthy (“awake”), the child’s social isolation shows 
after all that it is not (“asleep”).69 
These archetypes form a story of autism that can be told as the myth of a 
cosmic, universal autism, which an autistic hermeneutic is in a privileged 
position to discern. A cosmic autism functions in this thesis as a radical and 
revivifying reading of the marginal theological, where separation asks 
demanding and important questions.  
 
3.  A trinity of mythological autism 
The myth as hermeneutic framework 
At its base this thesis argues that when stories of autism and separation 
come together they can provide a powerful framework for a new, mythically 
thought theological hermeneutic. This hermeneutic, drawing on an autistic 
mythical thinking, reads itself in hospitable discourses (which might be said to 
‘understand’ autistic separation), and thinks in terms of an autism of the text. 
The power of this mythical autistic hermeneutic can give a radical, new reading 
of apophatic narratives of Christian mystical theology, and of a-theology. 
Reading these theological narratives in an autistic hermeneutic will be argued to 
create a new and legitimate way of theological thinking. Taking these stories of 
separation together, mystical/a-theological narrative becomes an autistic 
discourse, and autistic perception becomes a mystical/a-theological 
                                          
68 Wing, Lorna, The Autistic Spectrum, p.17 
69 Frith, Autism: Explaining the Enigma, p.17 
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hermeneutic. Apophatic story-discourse and the autistic story-hermeneutic 
elucidate and validate each other. Operating as art/literature (with its own 
implicit separations from the propositional norms), a mythology of autism is 
drawn from new, poetic terms of reference for autism.70 These are outlined in 
the glossary of original terms. The framework for developing these original 
terms is drawn from a range of clinical concepts of autism, and these are 
explained in the brief review of relevant terms which follows. The ‘trinity’ of 
mythical autism is as follows. Separation is fundamental to this story. 
Mindfulness of separation: the hermeneutic of autistic separation 
The archetypes given in the fairy tales above indicate that autism is 
isolation, and this is the first way the mythical autistic hermeneutic frames 
itself. By discerning narrative strategies which embody and convey distance, 
absence, isolation and fundamental separation, the autistic hermeneutic reads 
narratives of absence by using the term ‘mindfulness of separation.’ 
Autistic fascination: the hermeneutic of wonder  
The second aspect of autistic being is the sense of wonder which is 
termed ‘autistic fascination.’ This mythology of autistic fascination combines 
the wonder when autists are fascinated by the world experienced in abnormal 
sensory sensitivities with the wonder expressed by obsessive special interests. 
This is considered as a mythology of presence, and paradoxically this presence is 
possible only in the absence of separation: when the autist is in rapt communion 
“in a world of her own.” This recalls the example of Chauncey Gardiner’s ability 
of simply “Being There.” Olga Bogdashina describes this as “Simply Being,” and 
being “absorbed in” a flower or a leaf, “simply staring.”71 Ways of comparing 
this to poetic and religious contemplation will be important in subsequent 
chapters. 
 
                                          
70 Later, the deeply counter-intuitive nature of this move will be discussed; for now, it 
stands as an experiment of art refiguring the spiritual (Mark C Taylor’s term in his book of that 
title; Taylor, Mark C, Refiguring the Spiritual: Religion, Culture and Public Life (New York; 
Columbia University Press, 2012)) might listen to autism. 
71 Bogdashina, Olga, Autism and Spirituality: Psyche, Self and Spirit in People on the Autism 
Spectrum, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London/Philadelphia, 2013, p.191 
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 Literal metaphor: the hermeneutic of ‘foolishness’ 
A third, related mode of autistic being which gives the autistic 
hermeneutic its power is not only the interplay of absence and presence 
represented in language, but also the operation of language itself. Looking at 
the epistemological foundation of language, this third autistic mode of being 
comes into focus. This third autistic trait taken from the clinical narrative is 
what this thesis terms ‘literal metaphor.’ This refers to the issue of 
interpretation, where autistic people encounter metaphor and ‘take it literally.’ 
In the clinical narrative, this is a pathology because it is disabling for people 
interacting in everyday conversation. However, taking the issue of literal 
mindedness into a mythological autism does the very opposite, seeing it as a 
powerful and radical asset. This is because in terms of a radical theological 
thinking of language, being ‘literal’ can become a poetic strategy for apophatic 
discourse. The particular theologically thought autistic hermeneutic developed 
in this way can approach discourse in a radical divergence from norms of 
propositional and pragmatic usage. This is an argument for an autism of 
apophatic theological thinking, which is a privileged reading of it. For ease of 
reading, and in an existential sense of inhabitation which will be explored in 
section 9, the ‘abnormal autistic processing which interprets metaphor literally’ 
is from now on described in the shorthand phrase ‘literal metaphor.’ As it is 
increasingly refined theologically, ‘literal metaphor’ will be rethought as 
‘incarnational metaphor.’  
The autistic reader, who ‘takes things literally,’ will be discussed in 
terms of the holy fool tradition, where apparent foolishness is ironically true 
wisdom, in the sense that “the foolishness of God is wiser than the wisdom of 
the [“normal”] world.”72 
 
The trinity of autistic being 
 These three inter-dependent facets of mythological autism, ie., 
mindfulness of separation, autistic fascination, and literal metaphor, work 
together as a reading strategy. This is a trinity following a theological Trinity of 
                                          
72 1 Corinthians 1.25 
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God, where Persons are named separately but work consubstantially, as follows. 
Firstly, literal metaphor operates as an absence from signification, which is a 
mindfulness of separation. Secondly, that absence from signification is, for that 
very reason itself, the self-enclosed (absent) site where presence can be 
realised in the wonder of autistic fascination. Fascination, divorced from the 
need for pragmatic signifying usage, delights in the image as presence. Both the 
attributes of absence and separation therefore engender and are engendered by 
literal metaphor. Absent-present-literal modes of this hermeneutic trinity will 
be considered in interweaving ways through each chapter of this thesis. At the 
heart of this trinity is Love, envisioned as the kenotic power of the ‘zero degree 
positive’ of autistic affective empathy.73 
 
5.  Mythical autistic metaphor as theological 
hermeneutic 
The theological hermeneutic employed in this thesis reads mystical 
theology as a mythical narrative, working as poetic form. Similarly, it reads 
deconstructive a-theological thinking as a poetic telling of the myth of the 
death of God. With this mythological theological hermeneutic in place, the 
autistic mythological hermeneutic can enter into conversation with it. Autistic 
literal metaphor is an ‘abnormal’ or ‘disabled’ perception of figurative 
language, and this disability, ironically inverted into ability, will be able to act 
as a poetic hermeneutic of unexpected power. Investing autistic ‘literal 
metaphor’ with power means that this project can achieve its goal of bringing 
an autistic hermeneutic to bear on these narratives as poetic myth. Crucially, 
the autistic trinity operates most deeply by means of this abnormal autistic 
processing of metaphor. This ‘literal metaphor’ will be demonstrated as a 
powerful way to read the paradoxical language of mystical theology and a-
theology. What is also implicit in literal metaphor is that myth, as ‘literally’ 
                                          
73 This is to build upon Simon Baron Cohen’s thinking of autism as a ‘zero degree 
positive’ of unimpaired affective empathy combined with impaired cognitive empathy. This is 
the converse of psychopathy, which is a ‘zero degree negative’ of impaired affective empathy 
and unimpaired cognitive empathy (Baron Cohen, Simon, Zero Degrees of Empathy: A New 
Theory of Human Cruelty and Kindness (London, UK; Penguin books, 2011).  
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true, is ‘literal’ in the sense of enunciating the phenomenological bracketing of 
epistemology by Mircea Eliade: 
In imitating the exemplary acts of a god or of a mythic 
hero, or simply by recounting their adventures, the man 
of an archaic society detaches himself from profane 
time and magically re-enters the Great Time, the sacred 
time.74 75 
In summary, literal metaphor is therefore an autistic re-mythologising 
epistemology where the literal truth of the sacred narrative surpasses the literal 
truth of post-Enlightenment epistemology. It invites autism to experiment with 
entering myth, and myth to experiment with entering autism. If this seems 
impossible, in fact it is, as an ultimate, radical ability of ultimate, radical 
disability.  
This requires a new theological language to re-think theological 
discourses in terms of autistic perception, and the autistic-theological term this 
thesis has created is ‘incarnational metaphor.’ [see glossary of original terms]. 
Incarnational metaphor is the goal towards which this thesis’ theological autistic 
hermeneutic travels, building a case for it chapter by chapter. It is a particular 
theological thinking, of an ‘abnormal’ autistic metaphoricity implicit in 
theological language and seen most powerfully in radical theologies which 
subvert theological norms, just as the autistic holy fool does. The sites where 
incarnational metaphor can be most fully discerned are those which can be seen 
as sites of conscious autism. 
One doesn’t need to be a woman or a gay person to assimilate the 
perspectives of feminist or queer theology. Similarly, a non-autistic reader can 
consciously enter the hermeneutic exercise of an autistic world view to learn 
how its revisioning of theological issues sheds a new light on questions of faith. 
Whenever terms like ‘autism of’ is used in this thesis, it is assumed that 
this means an autism as seen by an autistic hermeneutic. This does not mean 
that this is only the view of a minority, disabled group. This thesis claims that 
                                          
74 Mircea Eliade, Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, (trans Philip Mairet) (New York; Harper 
Row,1967), p. 23 
75 This understanding of myth as sacred in contrast with profane will be re-envisioned as the 
concept of Altizer’s ‘sacred profane’ mythology in chapter four. 
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the perception of a literary-theological ‘autism of’ narratives is a legitimate 
hermeneutic in its own right. It has relevance for the neurotypical theological 
community. An absolute, most extremely envisioned autistic hermeneutic, 
interpreting theological thought autistically, sees autism in the world, and in 
particular in the text, in the light of an impossible, autistically gifted 
perception which demands the ultimate emptying of the self. The mythical 
autistic reader76 would be no-one. The consciously autistic reader, however, 
could, in principle, be everyone or anyone.  Crucially, it is not (necessarily, 
probably, or ultimately at all) the hemeneut who is autistic, but the 
hermeneutic. This is a conscious theological strategy, which operates only by 
means of a particular theological thinking of autistic categories of being. 
At the heart of this thesis is also a strange double irony – the irony of 
“irony.” Frith sees the autistic relationship to irony as one where “for autistic 
people the literal meaning of words does not change in different settings.”77 
The irony here is that Frith herself is betraying arguably a ‘bad’ neurotypical 
autistic78 naiveté. She is in fact “taking things literally” in the sense that she 
assumes that an unproblematic “literal meaning of words” can be intuited 
without taking cognizance of any hermeneutical issues. This is a heuristic 
complacency when it is interrogated at a level beyond the everyday and 
pragmatic. This is the crucial distinction which will be discussed in chapter one, 
when deconstructive analysis considers the naivete of a simple “change” of 
“literal meaning” (in fact, a puzzling term in itself, hermeneutically speaking). 
The crucial irony this depends on is the naivete of Frith’s words about a “literal 
meaning” which can “change.” The subversion of success/failure truly to 
understand “literal meaning” will mean, in chapter one, that at the deepest 
theological level, “literal meaning” is understood better by using the gift of 
autistic perception. 
                                          
76 Thought in terms of Wolfgang Iser’s ‘implied reader’ (see chapter one) 
77 Frith, Autism: Explaining the Enigma p.127 
78 Christine Trevett describes the “autistic cruelty of the non-autistic” as the unconscious 
prejudices of dismissive attitudes towards autism as an ironic “autism” lacking empathy to enter 
the world of autistic people’s realities; [in private conversation, ASPARRG UK conference, 
Cardiff, 2011]. I term this a “bad autism” of thoughtlessness and indifference, in keeping with 
the UK National Autistic Society’s slogan, “accept difference, not indifference.” [Don’t Write Me 
Off, UK National Autistic Society, 2015]. See also Baron Cohen in ‘affective/cognitive empathy’ 
discussed above. 
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6.  Conscious autism 
It is critical for the autistic theological hermeneutic that it operates by 
means of conscious autism. A good way to illustrate what conscious autism is, is 
to explain how conscious autism does and does not operate in a reading of Being 
There. Crucially, it must here be emphasised that this kind of conscious autism 
is not the autistic consciousness of autistic protagonists. The point of using 
Chauncey Gardener as an autism archetype is not to construct an identity for 
autistic people as imbued with spiritual wisdom, so that, in the final scene, the 
character Chauncey, walking on water, is Christ. This kind of reading would be 
akin to Olga Bogdashina and William Stillmann’s thinking of actual, lived autistic 
experience as the site of spiritual giftedness.79 Bogdashina and Stillmann’s 
concern is with autistic people’s lived experience, and ways in which it can 
feature a conscious, autistic spiritual giftedness. This is a very different 
approach. Instead, this thesis’ conception is of an autistic hermeneutic which 
draws mythologically on archetypes, not the actual psychological content of 
lived experience. Lived experience is not the sphere where a literary-
theological conscious autism operates. Conscious autism is a consciousness 
where the discernment can be made of autistic archetypes as used by the text. 
The character Chauncey is not (necessarily) Christ as a holy fool (although he 
might be). His walking on water can be read as a satirical game the text plays 
with the reader. At the end of the day, Chauncey’s ability to walk on water is 
only a story, a game played between author (director) and reader. It is within 
this game that the possibility of conscious autism emerges, as the reader can 
appropriate a consciousness of autism. It is where the text, and not 
(necessarily) the protagonist, generates an autism to offer to the reader.  
For example, when Chauncey says to the dying Ben “I’m sorry you’re so 
sick, Ben,” the reader can perform an operation where Chauncey’s words are a 
                                          
79 See Bogdashina, Autism and Spirituality, and Stillmann, William, Autism and the God 
Connection: Redefining the Autistic Experience Through Extraordinary Accounts of Spiritual 
Giftedness (Illinois, USA; Sourcebooks Inc., Illinois, USA, 2006) 
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metaphor for Ben’s, and society’s, greed and spiritual poverty. We as readers 
see Chauncey’s words, as Uta Frith says, “making fools of us all,” but it is we, 
along with the film’s other characters, who create the power of Chauncey as an 
autistic seer. In fact Chauncey is only a gardener who mistakes television for 
reality, so that he imagines that he can use a remote control to make things and 
people go away. He is deluded, and his insight belongs to his audience, so that 
when, at the funeral, the pall bearers are plotting for him to replace Ben as the 
magnate king-maker, the film is setting him up to be the miracle-worker who 
can walk on water - according to their construction, not his.80 And the act we 
make, as readers, of standing outside the ridiculous delusions of the pall 
bearers, is our consciousness of autism in the text. In other words, the text 
offers us a conscious autism. 
Conscious autism discerns textual strategies at work in its conversation 
partners as opportunities for autism to offer spiritual and theological insight, 
but this may or may not involve an autistic protagonist. In the case of Being 
There, the title’s allusion to Heidegger’s Dasein alerts the autistic reader to a 
possibility of conscious, theological autism. The conscious autism of the text, 
not of Chauncey, is the real theological power. Dasein is not about being or 
imitating Chauncey, but about occupying the space which his simplicity opens 
for opposing and resisting the constructions of Das Man. The crucial distinction 
defining conscious autism is that it is the film, as Dasein, and not the character, 
which articulates a narrative where conscious autism becomes possible as a 
theological power. Dasein belongs to the text’s ironic deconstructions of the 
fools who metaphorise Chauncey’s words. So it is Heidegger really, and not 
Chauncey, who has made conscious autism a serious possibility. Conscious 
autism takes a strategy offered by reading the film’s Heideggerian overtones to 
deconstruct metaphor. So conscious autism is much more theologically alert 
than if it were solely a social critique. It is a reading which seizes the possibility 
                                          
80 Of course the character Chauncey is also very alluring as a Christ archetype. It’s possible to 
read his walking on water as a game which teases the reader with the possibility that Chauncey 
really us Christ, and by implication Christ really is Chauncey. This draws on the holy fool 
archetype, but it falls short of a Christ who is truly insightful and not the constructions of insight 
create by his hearers. This reading would be a critique of religion. Another reading could see 
Chauncey as Christ who pretends to be the autistic fool, but in that case his simplicity achieves 
nothing because his hearers don’t take his simplicity as detachment from construction, but 
merely distort it to validate these very constructions. Chauncey as Christ is also the truth-teller 
who, in Ben’s words, “doesn’t play games with words to protect himself,” yet Ben misses the 
fact that he, Ben, then proceeds to use Chauncey’s words and plays his own games with them.  
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of deconstruction offered by culture, here in the example of a Heideggerian 
awareness. The chapters of this thesis will each, in different ways, argue for 
certain narratives as hospitable environments where conscious autism can see 
itself emerging. In looking at the thinking of Mark C Taylor and Thomas Altizer 
in chapters one and three, the argument will be that a cultural evolution 
emerging in Modernist and Postmodernist awareness can be read as offering an 
ever clearer conscious autism, but only at the level of being discourse which is 
hospitable to a theological autistic hermeneutic.  In looking at the mystics of 
chapter two and the poets of chapters four and five, similarly, it is in each case 
the text, not the writer or protagonist, which offers the possibility of conscious 
autism, however much its protagonists embody autistic archetypes. 
 
7.  Terms from the clinical literature 
The following is an alphabetical guide to terms from the clinical 
literature, which will be relevant to developing a mythological autism. 
Affective and cognitive empathy 
Lorna Wing describes an autistic boy as not uncaring but unaware of the 
suffering of others. He is 
unable to acquire the skills necessary for social 
interaction. Nevertheless, he is kind and gentle and, if 
he realises someone is ill or unhappy, he will be most 
sympathetic and do his best to help.81 
Cognitive empathy is the ability to ‘read’ the other person and 
understand what they are feeling. Affective empathy is the ability to care about 
how the other person is feeling. Baron Cohen argues that people with Asperger’s 
Syndrome have a ‘zero degree’ of reduced cognitive empathy but unimpaired 
affective empathy.82 It is suggested in this thesis that autists have high affective 
empathy, as part of Intense World Syndrome. 
                                          
81 http://www.mugsy.org/wing2.htm accessed 21/10/2013 
82 People with Asperger Syndrome have ‘zero degrees of empathy’ (although this is not an 
absolute ‘zero’), but they are zero-Positive for two reasons. First, their empathy difficulties are 
largely restricted to the ‘cognitive’ component (also called ‘theory of mind’).82 Their ‘affective’ 
empathy is frequently intact. We know this because – when it is pointed out to them that 
someone is upset – it often upsets them. Unlike people who are type P (psychopathic personality 
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Asperger’s Syndrome 
The original conceptual model of autism as described by Hans Asperger, 
describing relatively high functioning autism. People with Asperger’s sometimes 
call themselves ‘Aspies.’ 
Autism 
The UK National Autistic Society’s definition of autism is that 
Autism is a lifelong developmental disability that affects 
how a person communicates with, and relates to, other 
people. It also affects how they make sense of the world 
around them.83 
The American Psychiatric Association’s 2015 edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM-5) redefines autism as a dyad of impairments [see also 
triad of impairments] of 
- social communication and interaction, [see also Mindblindness] 
- restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests or activities [see also 
RRBI’s]. 84 
 
Autistic personality types 
Uta Frith’s categories of HFA/Aspergers people’s behaviour types and 
styles, as aloof, passive or odd.85 
                                          
disorder), Someone with Asperger Syndrome is very unlikely to hurt their pet (Unlike type P). 
Many people with Asperger syndrome rescue stray cats or dogs because they feel sorry for them. 
I have met people with Asperger Syndrome who have ended up with a large collection of stray 
dogs (a dozen or more) because of their strong affective empathy. In an imaginative study, 
Berlin neuroscientist Isabel Dziobek and colleagues found that people with Asperger Syndrome 
did not differ in how much concern they felt for people who were suffering, compared to typical 
individuals, even though they struggled to identify what others were feeling or thinking, This 
suggests people with Asperger Syndrome are the mirror image of those with type P. Psychopaths 
have intact cognitive empathy but reduced affective empathy, whilst people with Asperger 
Syndrome have intact affective empathy but reduced cognitive empathy. The result is that 
people with Asperger Syndrome do care about others, whilst struggling to ‘read’ them. Those 
with type P don’t care about others, whilst ‘reading’ them with ease. [see Simon Baron Cohen, 
Simon, Zero Degrees of Empathy: A New Theory of Human Cruelty and Kindness (London, UK; 
Penguin books, 2011), p.81] 
83 http://www.autism.org.uk/about-autism/autism-an-introduction/what-is-autism.aspx, 
accessed 16/05/2015. See also Baron Cohen, Simon, Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and 
Theory of Mind (Cambridge, UK; Bradford/ MIT Press, 1995) pp.60ff 
84 DSM-5 quoted by autism UK http://www.autism.org.uk/about-autism/all-about-
diagnosis/changes-to-autism-and-as-diagnostic-criteria.aspx, accessed 18/10/2014. A third aspect 
of autistic profile which is absent from DSM-5’s criteria is extreme sensory sensitivity [see Intense World 
Syndrome]. 
85 Frith, Autism: Explaining the Enigma, p.62 
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Autistic solitude 
In Uta Frith’s translation, Hans Asperger sees autism as “a disturbance 
(which) results in severe and characteristic difficulties of social integration.”86 
Asperger makes explicit the gap which excludes the autist from the non-autistic 
world and indeed from all others: 
Human beings normally live in constant interaction with 
their environment, and react to it continually. However, 
‘autists’ have severely disturbed and considerably 
limited interaction. The autist is only himself (cf. the 
Greek word autos) and is not an active member of a 
greater organism by which he is influenced and which he 
influences constantly. 87   
 
Leo Kanner describes an autistic child in the following terms: 
He seems almost to withdraw into his shell and live 
within himself … (h)e never looked up at people’s faces. 
When he had any dealings with persons at all, he 
treated them, or rather parts of them, as if they were 
objects.88 
Leneh Buckle writes “I was happier when I couldn't communicate,” 
describing her childhood as an ASD person.89  
Autistic spectrum 
Judith Gould writes: 
The concept of a spectrum of autistic disorders fitted 
the findings better than the categorical approach.  This 
does not imply a smooth continuum from the most to 
the least severe.  All kinds of combinations of features 
are possible.90 
                                          
86 Hans Asperger, ‘Autistic Psychopathy’ in childhood (trans. Uta Frith), in Autism and Asperger 
Syndrome, ed. Uta Frith (Cambridge, UK; Cambridge University Press,1991), p.38 
87 ibid. 
88 Kanner, Leo, Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact, 1949 in Acta Paedopsychiatra 35(4): 
100-36, 1968 at http://simonsfoundation.s3.amazonaws.com/share/071207-leo-kanner-autistic-
affective-contact.pdf  quoted in Baron-Cohen, Mindblindess p.61 
89  Buckle, Leneh K, Is increasing functionality always good? (British Academy/ Kings College 
London Conference ‘Autism, Ethics and the Good Life, London UK, 2 April 2012) 
90 Judith Gould, The Triad of Impairments, Past, Present and Future, The NAS Lorna Wing 
Centre for Autism: PowerPoint presentation, online access at  
http://www.awares.org/pkgs_files/librarydoc_869.ppt, 24/04/2012. See also Lorna Wing, “The 
Autistic Spectrum,” (London, UK; Constable & Robinson, 1996) 
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Simon Baron Cohen has also argued that the autistic spectrum is a 
universal human category, with the general population existing on a normal 
distribution between autistic and neurotypical extremes.91   
Black and White Thinking 
Black and white thinking is both literal mindedness [see below] and the 
refusal to compromise – a thing is either true, or it is not, and similarly, it is 
either right or wrong.  
Clinical narrative 
The clinical narrative is the overall body of thinking supplied by the 
community of medical, psychiatric, psychological, pedagogic, and other 
disciplines. It is heterogeneous and evolving.92  
Executive Dysfunction (ED) 
Executive dysfunction, a theory of neural abnormality making 
independent living and functioning difficult. 
Empathy/systemising quotient (E/SQ) 
Baron-Cohen argues for a ‘systemising versus empathy’ phenomenon 
whereby autistic people who are poor at cognitive empathy have a high score at 
systemising (being drawn to, and extremely good at understanding systems.)93 
Effectively, this means understanding ‘things’ better than people.  
High Functioning Autism (HFA) 
High Functioning Autism, with impairment of communication, possibly 
also ED, WCC and Intense World Syndrome, but relatively able to function and 
live independently; sometimes with great success 
                                          
91 Baron-Cohen et. al, The autism spectrum quotient; see also Baron Cohen, ed, Uta Frith 
festschrift, Online Article Only, The Psychologist August 2007. Vol.20, 
https://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/volume-20/edition-8/online-only-article-uta-frith-festschrift 
accessed 20th August 2016 
92 See Gil, Eyal et al., The Autism Matrix - The Social Origins of the Autism Epidemic 
(Cambridge, UK; Polity Press, 2010) 
93 See also Attenuation of Typical Sex Differences in 800 Adults with Autism versus 3,900 
Controls, Baron-Cohen et al, PLOS One, July 2014 Volume 9 issue 7. Baron-Cohen identifies brain 
differences between males and females and plots an empathy/systematising/graph for males 
and females, both with and without autism. The results suggest that people with autism, male 
and female, are largely skewed towards the ‘systematising’ part of the graph; supporting his 
thesis of an ‘autistic male brain.’ 
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Intense World Syndrome 
Makram & Makram94 have coined the phrase “intense world syndrome” to 
argue for a new and controversial understanding of autistic sensory and 
relational abnormalities. According to their theory, autism is not a lack of 
empathy but an excessive empathy in terms of sensitivity.  
Literal mindedness 
 “For autistic people the literal meaning of words does not change in 
different settings … autistic individuals need to make an intense effort to learn 
to recognise subtle or shifting meanings that depend on the speaker’s attitudes 
and intentions.”95 Taking metaphors ‘literally.’ 
Mindblindness and Mindreading 
Simon Baron Cohen has conceptualised autistic social and communication 
difficulties as an impairment of what he terms mindreading. It is synonymous 
with impaired cognitive empathy.96 Baron Cohen’s argument for autism as 
Mindblindness is argued from clinical psychology, evolutionary biology and 
neuroscience, and his conclusion is that “in autism there is a genuine inability to 
understand other people’s different beliefs.”97 
Neurotribal 
The term used by Silberman, as discussed above. Thinking of the autistic 
and the non-autistic as different ‘tribes’ of the human race, with different 
cultures. This is to argue for the legitimacy of autistic modes of being, as a 
distinctive, neurally divergent and creative perception style producing a culture 
deserving respect and equality.  
Neurotypicality 
Neurotypicality, in contrast to the culture of the autistic neurotribe, 
means being ‘neurally typical.’ ‘Neurotypicals’ are non-autistic people.  
 
                                          
94 Makram, K & Makram, H, The intense world theory - a unifying theory of the neurobiology of 
autism, in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, vol. 4, p. 224, 2010.  
95 Frith, Autism: Explaining the Enigma pp.127-8 
96 See Baron Cohen, Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind 
97 Baron Cohen, Mindblindness p.71 
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Ostensive language 
Ostensive language is language which conveys an intent to elicit a 
response from the listener. For pedagogical and clinical purposes, an autistic 
hermeneutic is an impairment of the ‘normal’ pragmatic hermeneutical ability 
to discern the ostensive intent and respond appropriately98  [see also relevance 
theory, incarnational metaphor]. 
Pathologising 
To pathologise autism means to see it in the medical model, in terms of a 
pathology, ie. a problem to be overcome, or a disabling condition to be cured.  
Profound Autism 
Autism which presents more severe difficulties in daily living and 
communication. 
Relevance theory 
Relevance theory is a model created by of how meaning is 
communicated. Whereas a ‘decoding’ model would see a semantic message to 
be coded in language, relevance theory argues that “the expectations of 
relevance raised by an utterance are precise enough, and predictable enough, 
to guide the hearer towards the speaker’s meaning.”99  
Restricted and Repetitive Behaviours and Interests (RRBI’s) 
Restricted and repetitive behaviours are patterns of repeated body 
movements such as rocking or hand flapping, and unusual attachment to and 
pleasure in specific sensory and motor activities, eg, stroking a piece of velvet, 
watching spinning shiny objects in a hanging mobile. Special interests are also 
considered as RRBI’s.  
Savantism 
                                          
98 Happé, Francesca G E, Communicative competence and theory of mind in autism: A test of 
relevance theory, Cognition, 48 (1993) 101-119, p.103 
(http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~lds/readinggroup/Happe%201993.pdf, accessed 25/04/2015 
99 Relevance Theory, Deirdre Wilson & Dan Sperber, pp.249-250, UCL Papers, 
http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/publications/WPL/02papers/wilson_sperber.pdf, accessed 
25/04/2015 
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The autistic savant is a person with an incredible talent, often with 
numbers or memory but also art. This is exemplified in the ‘Rain Man’ 
archetype.100 In the past the term ‘idiot savant’ was used, and now the term 
‘islet of ability’ is preferred.101 
Sensory connoisseur 
Happé and Frith’s Introduction in their 2010 Autism and Talent describes 
“the beautiful otherness of the autistic mind,” and this beautiful otherness is 
suggested by their interpretation of RRBI’s as something potentially beautiful. 
They write: 
Repetition is not repetition, for example, if you have 
expert levels of discrimination … a connoisseur, seeing 
minute differences between events that others regard 
as pure repetition.102 
Special Interests 
Asperger’s description of autists includes the observation that they 
display “egocentric preoccupation with unusual or circumscribed interests.”103 
He gives examples: 
railroad telegraph pole line insulators, personal 
information about all the members of Congress, and 
knowledge of the passenger list of the Titanic, weather 
information, and various models of deep fat fryers.104 
Similar examples are: 
I could sit and stare at a drawing of a futuristic city all 
day long. Come to think of it, I have.105 
... specific items ... the lids of tubes of Smarties ... the 
labels from bottles of beer ... butterflies or keyrings ... 
yellow pencils, vacuum cleaners or toilet brushes.106    
 
                                          
100 Rain Man (director Barry Levinson, 1988) 
101 See Happé, Francesca & Frith, Uta (eds.)   Autism and Talent (Oxford, UK; Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society, Oxford University Press/The Royal Society, 2010 
102  Ibid. p. xvii, quoted in Clarkson p.4.  
103 Hans Asperger, ‘Autistic Psychopathy in Childhood. in Autism and Asperger Syndrome, Uta 
Frith 
104 Ibid., p.37 
105    http://thinkingautismguide.blogspot.co.uk/2011/07/special-interests.html, accessed 25 
April 2012. 
106 Attwood, Tony, Asperger's Syndrome: A Guide for parents and Professionals (London 
UK/Philadelphia, USA; Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1998), p.89. 
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Theory of Mind Mechanism (TOMM) 
Theory of Mind mechanism: a psychological mechanism proposed by Baron 
Cohen to explain Mindblindness. 
Triad of Impairments 
The triad model was developed in the 1970s by Lorna Wing and Judith 
Gould: 
The abnormalities of social interaction, verbal and 
nonverbal communication, and imaginative activities so 
consistently occurred together (Wing & Gould, 1979) 
that they could be referred to as "the triad of social and 
language impairment."107 
Weak Central Coherence (WCC) theory 
Weak Central Coherence (WCC) theory is the model of autism which 
suggests that attention to fine detail takes precedence over perceiving the 
global view, and that this could be due to atypical neural connectivity. It is 
suggested (see Frith et al, Autism and Talent) that this fine discrimination could 
be linked to autistic talent, including savantism. 
 
8.  Glossary of original terms  
The following are original terms which this thesis develops as ways to 
understand what its central argument for Incarnational metaphor means. They 
are not listed alphabetically, as the previous terms were above, but as 
progressions of logic. They form the basis on which the construction of a 
mythological autistic hermeneutic is proposed. 
 
 
                                          
 107 Wing, Lorna, Language, social, and cognitive impairments in autism and severe 
mental retardation, in Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders March 1981, Volume 
11, Issue 1 p.17 
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Mythological autism 
A conceptual model which uses aspects of autism as a way for theology to 
envision itself autistically in archetypical, mythological terms, using the thought 
experiment of an autistic hermeneutic. 
Person-specific autism  
The lived experience of autistic people, in ways that can be observed 
clinically. 
Universal autism 
The concept of autism as something which pervades human existence 
according to a question of person-specific degree. In mythical terms, the 
presence of the autistic trinity as an existential reality. 
Absolute autism 
In mythical terms, the naked phenomenon of pure autism as the absolute 
being of the autistic trinity. 
Conscious autism 
In mythical terms, an autistic potential which has been realised in 
discourse. This is thought of as an evolutionary journey of autistic awakening, 
not (necessarily) where a person or culture becomes aware of autism in clinical 
terms, but where the working of the autistic trinity can be evident in cultural 
discourse.108 Where conscious autism is present, its resistance to neurotypical 
norms can be seen either as pathology (‘inability’) or power (‘refusal’). 
Therefore the term ‘inability/refusal’ will be used to describe how conscious 
autism operates.   
Autistic trinity 
The inter-dependent facets of autistic being as envisioned for the 
purposes of a mythical theological autistic thinking; mindfulness of separation, 
autistic fascination and literal metaphor. Mindfulness of separation is the 
theological space where autistic fascination can realise itself, and as absence 
                                          
108 This is akin to Altizer’s thinking where he argues that Modernism made it possible for 
the death of God to come into view, although the death of God as a cosmic event has always 
been a latent mythical possibility. 
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and presence they co-inhere in absolute autism as a paradoxical coincidentia 
oppositorum. Literal metaphor exists as the embodiment of an autistic absence 
in metaphor, and an autistic presence in metaphor. Its inhabitation of the image 
is the pure love of costly autistic affective empathy. 
Autistic hermeneutic 
The conscious strategy of appropriating the mythological view of autism 
as a lens for interpreting discourse. The exercise of seeking to ‘see through an 
autistic eye.’ 
Mindfulness of Separation 
Conscious discernment of distance and isolation as absence in discourse, 
which take on the power of the archetypes of Mindblindness as autistic solitude. 
Applied to literal metaphor, the inherent Mindblindness of universal or absolute 
autism in discourse, in the breakdown of ostensive communication. A 
theologically and poetically privileged insight into apophatic discourse. 
Autistic fascination 
Conscious awareness of wonder and reverence, which is thought of as the 
embodiment of the sensory connoisseur’s reality, but also as the delight of 
obsessive focus in autistic special interests. This is the realisation of presence in 
affective empathy, possible only, paradoxically, in mindfulness of separation. 
Also, in literal metaphor, fascination is the quality of pure presence, realised in 
poetic departure from pragmatic discourse.  
Autistic integrity 
Autistic affective empathy as a spiritual quality which loves the other 
unconditionally in the face of impaired cognitive empathy; as such, its extreme 
would be an autistic quality of saintliness. Also the refusal/inability to 
dissimulate or collude, because of seeing morality in terms of black and white 
thinking.  
Incarnational metaphor 
A theological understanding of literal, autistic metaphor. Literal 
metaphor as a poetic concept embodies autistic absent presence. Thinking this 
literal-absent-presence theologically, literal incarnational metaphor offers its 
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mythical autism narrative to the literal-absent-presence myths of a-theological 
and mystical theology. 
 The theological autism myth in this reading becomes the mythological 
kenotic death of God, which is the outpouring of the incarnate, crucified Jesus. 
This is an autistic Incarnation myth [see also literal metaphor]. 
Literal metaphor 
Shorthand for the understanding of figurative language in a non-
pragmatic sense, ‘mistaking’ the image itself for its conventional interpretation. 
This is the crucial concept which is inverted from pathology into privileged 
epistemology in this thesis, as chapter one will argue. [see also incarnational 
metaphor]. 
Ostensive metaphor 
Ostensive metaphor is shorthand in this thesis for the successful, 
pragmatic reception of ostensive language. This is communicative activity which 
successfully reads both the intent of the other’s communication and the 
pragmatic use of figurative language in everyday settings. Francesca Happé 
gives the clinical understanding of autism’s ‘failure’ relating to ostensive 
language: 
If most autistic individuals cannot represent a speaker’s 
intention, then communication should break down most 
noticeably where the speaker’s attitude must be taken 
into account in modifying the literal meaning of the 
utterance. Without the principle of relevance to guide 
them, the transparency of intentions that allows humans 
to use language in a truly flexible way is not open to 
autistic communicators. In the face of the puzzle that 
ostensive communication must pose them, they may 
have no choice but to adopt a rigid interpretation - a 
default value of the propositional form of the 
utterance.109 
Ostensive language is pragmatic, and “ostensive metaphor” in this thesis 
means the pragmatic stance which treats metaphor as a tool for conventional 
shorthand colloquial usage. It is essentially prosaic, lacking in poetic potential, 
and it will be contrasted with the idea of autistic literal metaphor’s gifted 
                                          
109 Happé, Communicative competence and theory of mind in autism p.103  
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divergence. Chapter one inverts the clinical narrative by de-pathologising literal 
metaphor and, in theological terms, pathologising ostensive metaphor as lacking 
richness of theological insight. 
 
9.  Chapters as journey - summary 
The narrative of this thesis is constructed as a theologically and 
poetically thought journey, through an autistic hermeneutic, towards the 
mythological concept ultimately of an absolute, autistic incarnational 
metaphor. It is written so that each chapter is a stage on this journey, arguing 
for the validity of both the destination and the means of travel towards it.   
The categories outlined above in the glossary of original terms have 
provided the basis of how theological thinking can be attained in this autistic 
way. In principle, these categories all apply universally, at least to a degree. 
However not all narratives are equally hospitable to an autistic hermeneutic 
seeking insight into an autism of the text. Some narratives are simply too 
neurotypical, offering little space for the creative thinking of an autistic 
envisioning.110 Most narratives, however, hold the potential for autism within 
them, as this thesis will discuss, according to the autistic categories which are 
explained below. Some narratives are so rich in autistic potential that an 
autistic hermeneutic can be argued as a special form of insight into what makes 
their character problematic and challenging. The key argument of this thesis is 
that these narratives receive a strong validation from being read as an 
embodiment of autistic categories. Autism, as a mythologically thought insight 
in its own right, revivifies these particular forms of theological thinking.  
It is no accident that the narratives richest in autistic potential are, like 
autistic perception, also marginal ways of seeing. They are departures from 
                                          
110 In practice, an autistic hermeneutic will be on constant alert for traces of autism in 
textual worlds, but recognises that some ‘autisms’ are more profound than others. For example, 
the self-contained worlds of the community in a Jane Austen novel could be read as an autistic 
archetype of mindfulness of separation in its complete isolation from the harsh realities of the 
world outside. However, the world of her novels is less amenable to an actual autism of the 
text, because it is too tightly woven as illusion to admit of gaps where, for example, the implied 
reader would break open the text. There is little possibility for a theological reading where the 
world of the circumscribed milieu is all. Its drama is psychological, and one could read Emma as 
an exercise in Mindblindness; there is always potential for an autistic hermeneutic. However, 
relative to novels like Pirandello’s [chapter six] this is not as fruitful. 
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common sense norms, creative and original. They make demands on the reader. 
Similarly, seeing autistically is difficult and demanding, accepting disability as 
ability without discounting that it remains disability. This demanding 
hermeneutical project is explored in the chapters of this thesis as a journey 
towards realising its full theological potential in the concept of autistic, literal, 
incarnational metaphor. 
Chapter one lays the foundation by examining what autistic literal-
mindedness could bring to poetics. It defines a concept of literal metaphor as an 
autistic hermeneutic, arguing that it might be more deeply poetic than 
neurotypical reading. It also sets out the way in which literal metaphor operates 
as absence and presence, when they are thought of as the mythical attributes of 
an autistic hermeneutic. An autistic literal-absent-present hermeneutic can 
then critique metaphor and argue for an autistic quality of radical, authentic 
poetic reading. Literal metaphor, thought as a deeply ‘abnormal’ poetic power 
in this way, can then be capable of approaching theological thinking. Its strange 
power becomes a way to envision theological language as poetic excess. This re-
envisioning thinks of an excess inherent in religious language and reads it as the 
‘oddness’ of autistic metaphor. In this light, it then takes this autistic oddness 
of language as a reading of deconstructive theology. It argues for a 
deconstructive theology of literal metaphor as a move towards a conscious 
autism in cultural discourse. An autism of culture does not mean that people are 
becoming more autistic, or even necessarily that there is a greater awareness of 
autism.111 It means that, in Postmodernism, a cultural discourse developing 
towards both emancipation and collapse is a way in which autism can read 
increasingly powerfully in terms of mindfulness of separation. This (post)modern 
moment means that, increasingly, an autistic theological hermeneutic can not 
only validate its own perspective in Postmodern narratives, but also, 
reciprocally, speak truth to these narratives and elucidate them. The autistic 
                                          
111 Gil and Eyal, and Silverman, discuss the so called “autism epidemic” of people 
receiving an autism diagnosis in terms of increased awareness of autism. So the idea of an 
emerging autistic consciousness is valid, for example in the way that this thesis has emerged 
from conscious awareness of autism by the writer. However it is the theological and mythical 
journey of autism which is being envisioned, as a way to express a cosmic autism unfolding 
mythically. A parallel with Altizer’s thinking would be that Altizer sees Modernism as a cultural 
and historical moment which enables the death of God to be envisioned, but the death of God is 
an eternal and cosmic myth, beyond the confines of a Modernism in which it is articulated. 
Similarly, the diagnostic moment of twenty-first century awareness of autism enables an autistic 
hermeneutic to be heard, but does not create the cosmic event of a universal autism. 
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hermeneutic travels towards incarnational metaphor by tracing the emergence 
of deconstructive theology and reading it autistically. This makes a 
deconstructive theological thinking of literal metaphor a step closer towards the 
emergence of a fully theological thinking of incarnational metaphor in 
subsequent chapters. 
Chapter two is an archaeological project, travelling back from chapter 
one’s destination in deconstructive theology, to trace its theological roots in 
apophatic theology. In this chapter, the journey again takes a step closer to the 
goal of incarnational metaphor, by considering it as the paradoxical absent 
presence of the sacred in mystical theology. This is particularly the case 
because a reading of the poetics of apophatic discourse opens up a way for 
literal metaphor to recognise its own absent presence, in terms of the poetic 
metaphorical strategies of apophatic discourse. As this theological poetic 
strategy is increasingly brought into contact with literal metaphor, by the end 
of the chapter a more explicitly theological incarnational metaphor can be 
indicated. Again, this is a reciprocal reading. An autistic hermeneutic can 
discern articulations of its myth in an apophatic poetics, to validate its insights.  
Equally, this theological autistic hermeneutic elucidates and can even 
rehabilitate mystical theology. 
Chapter three draws on the postmodern thought of chapter one and the 
mystical theology of chapter two to consider how they combine in the a-
theological thinking of Thomas Altizer. Altizer’s a-theological narrative is read 
in an autistic hermeneutic which can now offer a way to conceptualise a fully 
theologically thought incarnational metaphor. Altizer’s myth of the death of 
God will be read as the myth of the autism of God. Again, the argument is for a 
reciprocal validation of both discourses. 
Chapter four approaches incarnational metaphor by considering how a 
theological poetics (which is equally a poetic theology) can outwit propositional 
discourse to ‘catch’ the kenotic incarnation of a sacred autism. To achieve this, 
this chapter examines the concept of Gerard Manley Hopkins’ ecceitas in the 
light of an autistic hermeneutic, to emphasise the poetic nature of the autistic 
theological hermeneutic’s incarnational metaphor. 
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Chapter five is a case study in how the autistic hermeneutic reads the a-
theological and mystic theological potential in two anti-religionist novels by 
Luigi Pirandello. It is an example of an autistic thinking of Altizer’s myth of the 
sacred profane. 
The conclusion summarises what the autistic hermeneutic has achieved to 
bring incarnational metaphor into being as a way to think theologically. Its post-
script reflects on the process of the thesis and its destination. 
 
10. Literature Review 
Constructing the three-way bridge has necessitated literature reviews in 
each camp. In terms of theology, radical theologians were reviewed (see 
overview, chapter three) and Thomas Altizer and Mark C Taylor were selected 
as strong exponents of a literary-theological narrative which seemed strongly 
faithful both to Christian theology and to literary sensibility. Both these writers 
also showed promise as a hospitable environment for an autistic hermeneutic, 
inasmuch as their narratives of absence and abyss might speak to autistic 
mindfulness of separation. This happened in the context of the supportive and 
creative environment of the Glasgow University CLTA, where seminars and 
conversations opened out views of the diverse potentialities of LTA. The 
concept of theo-poetics as developed by Catherine Keller and Roland Faber was 
another possibility, but its political, pragmatic context in process theology 
removed it from the immediate focus of developing a particular theological 
poetics not, in itself, political.112  
In terms of autism, Uta Frith’s Autism: Explaining the Enigma and Simon 
Baron Cohen’s Mindblindness were foundational, opening out into the research 
directions of work such as that of Happé, Wing, and Gould. Also useful as a 
historical overview was Gil and Eyal’s The Autism Matrix. Thinking of metaphor 
and autism drew on research by Baron Cohen and Rundblad et al113 to clarify the 
                                          
112 Hulbert, Steve & Slettom, Jeanyne, Poetics, Post-Structuralism, and Process, in process 
perspectives Volume 29 Number 1 Summer 2006  
113 Rundblad, Gabriella & Annaz, Dagmara  The atypical development of metaphor and 
metonymy comprehension in children with autism in Autism 2010, 
DOI:10.1177/1362361309340667  
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pathologising narrative regarding autism and metaphor. Frith’s and Attwood’s 
clinical accounts of autistic everyday dealings with metaphor also established 
how autism and metaphor are related. This clarified the contrast between these 
clinical and sociological hermeneutics and the mythical hermeneutic adopted by 
this thesis. 
At the same time, ways into thinking of definitions of autism were 
strengthened through involvement with ASPARRG, AJC, SWAN, AAT, and ARC,114 
where supportive contacts helped to guide a rigorous literature search. From 
ASPARRG, an appreciation of disability theology became focused on Swinton, 
exemplifying the concept of validation of the autistic person’s mode of being, 
perceiving and relating. Reading Bogdashina’s Autism and Spirituality, it was 
clear that her thinking suggested that religious concerns are relevant and in 
need of consideration, and that this is possible. Equally, it also was clear that 
this thesis was doing something different. Here, the project is a literary-
theological one which aims to listen to autistic perception, whereas 
Bogdashina’s project is to construct a phenomenology of autistic religious 
experience. Paul Howell’s thinking on autism and metaphor115 considers how in 
film and TV, autistic characters feature as a metaphor for the human 
reclamation of mathematical intelligence from a threatening dominance of AI. 
This is a territory in one aspect similar to this thesis, in that autistic characters 
become champions so that autism is validated. This thesis also aims for a 
validation of autistic being, through the use of metaphor. However this thesis is 
also different. Howell takes autism as a metaphor ‘for,’ but this thesis 
investigates metaphoricity itself in autism, using literary theory and theological 
thinking. 
Rowan Williams’ Gifford lecture Intelligent Bodies: Language as Material 
Practice discusses the severe impairment of communication in profound autism, 
and is disturbing, challenging reading. His point is not dissimilar to that of this 
                                          
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Dagmara_Dimitriou/publication/41399590_The_atypical
_development_of_metaphor_and_metonymy_comprehension_in_children_with_autism/links/0fc
fd50de1d32c131e000000.pdf    http://aut.sagepub.com/content/14/1/29  
114 UK ASPARRG (Autistic Spectrum People Religion and Research Group); AJC (University of 
Glasgow department of psychology & Neuroscience Autism Journal Club); SWAN (Scottish 
Women’s Autism Network); AAT (Greater Glasgow Health Board Adult Autism Team); 
115 Howell, Paul, From Rain Man to Sherlock: Theological Reflections on Metaphor, in Practical 
Theology vol.8, 2015, issue 2, pp.143-153 
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thesis; that what this thesis terms a universal autism uncovers, by its example, 
the inherent challenge in language and relationship which he calls 
impenetrability,116 and which this thesis terms mindfulness of separation. Like 
Williams, 
Our consideration of both the excesses and the gaps in 
language will underline the importance of 
acknowledging “learning difficulties” in our unfolding 
sense of what language is – and also the importance … of 
learning difficulty itself as a key to much of this.117 
For the aim of developing incarnational metaphor, a radical, literary 
theological thinking led to death of God theology as supreme absence. To look 
for mythical thinking to bring to a mythical autism, de Certeau’s work on the 
Sixteenth century mystics. Turning to mysticism as a possibility of ‘heretical’ 
idiosyncratic literary-theological form led to considering atypical uses of 
metaphor, and this was found in Denys Turner’s thinking of mysticism as an 
apophatic literary form, and de Certeau’s reading of Teresa of Àvila, whose 
work then looked back to Dionysius the Areopagite and forward to John of the 
Cross. From there, the Postmodern reading of an implicit apophatic theology by 
Maurice Blanchot’s  The Space of Literature could be seen as a link to the death 
of God theologies of chapters One and Three, which offer rich potential for the 
autistic a-theological hermeneutic. 
These sources, when combined, constructed the case for, and nature of 
what became the fully thought literary-theological autistic hermeneutic of the 
mythical incarnational metaphor. The remaining stage was to select case 
studies, one focusing on presence and the other on absence. In theory, literary 
writing offered an unlimited array of possibilities. To some extent, narrowing 
down the field was to rely on this author’s experience of hospitable narratives. 
For a hospitable environment for chapter four, where autistic absence could 
recognise itself in an autistic hermeneutic, theologically minded poets 
suggested the possibility of the kind of presence Blanchot articulated in chapter 
two. The metaphysical poets such as Donne and Herbert were theological but 
lacked a texture of image and sound instantiating poetic presence. In contrast, 
                                          
116 Williams, Rowan, The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language (London, UK; 
Bloomsbury, 2014) p.116 
117 ibid. p.125 
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the poet-priest Gerard Manley Hopkins was selected. For chapter five, the 
modernist and postmodernist literature discussed in chapter one was similarly 
drawn on to focus on absence. The theatre of the absurd, and quintessentially 
Beckett, might have been a choice, but the author decided that Luigi 
Pirandello, as an idiosyncratic, proto-postmodernist, would yield perhaps a 
novel and particularly rich environment to match creative, idiosyncratic autistic 
reading. 
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Chapter One: The Autistic 
hermeneutic - pathology or privilege? 
Introduction 
This chapter develops the concept of autistic ‘literal’ metaphor to argue 
that it can function as a radical hermeneutical strategy. For ease of reading, 
autistic ‘literal metaphor’ and ‘incarnational metaphor’ are used as shorthand 
for ‘the autistic perceptive style of processing or relating to metaphor. 
Throughout, autistic ‘literal metaphor’ means ‘that realisation of metaphor 
which is created in the autistic hermeneutic.’ This means that an autistic 
hermeneutic, which interprets the text ‘literally,’ will produce a ‘literal’ 
metaphor. This ‘literal’ metaphor will be developed as living metaphor, with 
implicitly theological consequences termed incarnational metaphor. It needs to 
be emphasised, again, that this autistic hermeneutic is a particular theological 
one, as an experiment in bringing the tropes of autistic perception styles to 
bear on particular, hospitable discourses. This experiment in no way rests on 
claims that this is ‘the only’ definitive autistic hermeneutic, but it does rest on 
the premise that ‘the’ autistic hermeneutic suggested by this thesis can work 
theologically.  In fact, ultimately it will be a hermeneutic which only works 
theologically. Its aim is to bring out the potential of its particular autistic 
reading for theological thinking. It will be seen that, in the end, this literal 
metaphor is a theological one, which will be termed incarnational metaphor. 
To work towards this goal of incarnational metaphor, this chapter will 
discuss firstly how an autistic hermeneutic style contrasts with neurotypical 
norms, and in particular with the ‘common sense’ neurotypical relationship to 
metaphor. Secondly, literal metaphor will then be demonstrated to be a mode 
of theological thinking, and thirdly, one which works most fully as a mode of 
deconstructive theology. 
The introduction presented Frith’s work on Grice’s relevance theory, and 
suggested that Frith’s distinction between neurotypical and autistic stances 
towards metaphor could provide grounds for a distinctive autistic hermeneutic. 
It was suggested that this hermeneutic could offer a radical new perspective on 
literary-theological ideas of absence and presence. This chapter now develops 
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this idea of a ‘literal’ metaphor which, in a theological reading of its nature, 
holds radical theological power as the ‘(non)sense’ of incarnational literal 
metaphor. 
‘Literal’ metaphor with a theological ‘incarnational’ potential, as it is 
developed in this chapter, also embodies the duality of absence and presence 
which was described in the Introduction as Mindfulness of separation and 
fascination coexisting in autistic perception. Mindfulness of separation is the 
awareness that there is no union of communication. It is apparent ‘failure’ in 
the cognitive inability to configure meaning by the pragmatic decoding of 
metaphor. This is the awareness of the ultimate lack of adequate relationship 
between the writer’s intent and the reader’s reception in order to create a 
definitive configuration of meaning. In terms of presence, Fascination is the 
intuitive realisation of otherness as a literary space. Presence is realised where 
the image itself is inhabited in an enhanced way by ‘literal’ reception. 
Similarly, presence is realised autistically by affective empathy which relates to 
the image in an excess of erotic devotion, and this is in precisely the same 
moment in which the ‘zero degree’ of cognitive empathy involves the greatest 
separation.118 The qualities of absence and presence in these terms are 
completely interdependent. Absence and presence are both part of the 
‘pathology’ of literal metaphor. Before considering the ‘pathology’ of autistic 
metaphor, it is worth asking to what extent autistic perception and being are, 
or are not, a pathology, when thought theologically.  
1.1  Who’s missing the point? Holy Fools and Autism 
The narrative of this thesis is to develop an argument that autistic 
thinking of metaphor can be a legitimate, even privileged literary-theological 
hermeneutic. To establish how this might be a privileged view point, 
Gernsbacher and Pripas-Kapit’s argument in their article Who’s missing the 
point? gives a way in. They subvert the pathologising of autism: 
                                          
118 This will be the theological underpinning of an absolute autism of incarnational 
metaphor in chapters two and three, where apophatic and a-theological discourses envision the 
mystical coincidentia oppositorum of total absence and total presence. Total, affective 
empathy in the moment of a zero degree of cognitive empathy will be an autism of saintliness. 
It is a privileged theological thinking of these terms. 
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We imagine that most non-autistic people tend to find 
social situations with autistic people “confusing;” that 
non-autistic people also “find it hard to know what to 
do in a social situation” populated solely by autistic 
people; that non-autistic people are not very “good at 
predicting” what autistic people will do; and that non-
autistic people can’t always “easily work out” what an 
autistic person might want to talk about. Should we 
deem that a lack of empathy?119 
Like Silverman, they argue that different is not inferior, but their concern 
is with language. Their article reviews studies which suggest that the received 
wisdom about autism and figurative language could be mistakenly attributing 
autistic divergence to inability. They see autism as a different ability. This 
different ability has been conceptualised by a number of writers who compare 
the autist to the holy fool. 
 
  The ‘Holy Fool’ 
Russian and European traditions of the Holy Fool 
Philip Gorski writes about examples from the Russian Holy Fool tradition120 
through his reading of Nikolai Leskov.  Leskov recounts the story of Alexander 
Afenas’evich Ryzhov, the police chief who refuses to take bribes and is 
described as “having gone as far as Christ” in his literal-minded honesty, and 
therefore receives the verdict from the archpriest that “it’s all up with 
him.” 
Christine Trevett comments that 
The Russian traditions of the fourteenth through 
sixteenth centuries in turn owed much to the Byzantine 
traditions. Those texts used holy folly with its ascetic 
pretence of foolishness as explanation for gullibility, 
oddity, and shocking unconventionality (see Challis and 
Dewey, 1977; Kobets, 2007; Lunde, 1995; Thompson, 
1987). More than 30 such saints are to be found in the 
canon of Russian Orthodoxy and St. Basil’s cathedral in 
Moscow has as its patron one such “blessed” person’—a 
                                          
119 Gernsbacher M A & Pripas-Kapit S R, Who’s Missing the Point? - a Commentary on Claims that 
Autistic Persons Have a Specific Deficit in Figurative Language Comprehension, in Metaphor and 
Symbol 2012;27(1):93-105. doi:10.1080/10926488.2012.656255. 
120 www.incommunion.org/2007/02/02/holy-fools-in-russian-literature/  accessed 2012.09.25 
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practitioner of yorodstvo, i.e., he was a fool of the holy 
kind. 121 
 
Thinking of the Holy Fool as an archetype for autistic ‘oddness,’ Trevett 
surveys both the Russian tradition and the Western Church’s use of the idea: 
Christian Holy Fool literature developed in late antiquity 
as a tradition of deviant piety that was not for direct 
imitation. Laurence Freeman in his introduction to 
Rowan Williams’s 2003 work described the Desert 
Fathers of the late-third century onwards as “monastic 
oddballs” and as “not very well-adjusted individuals” 
(Williams (2003, pp. 42–43). With their rags and narrow 
food preferences, they had been concerned with 
simplicity, regardless of whether those who 
encountered them were disconcerted by their non-
communication and did not want to be left alone with 
them. The earliest references to holy folly came out of 
the setting of such desert monasticism.122  
 
Peter Happé's article, Staging Folly, looks at how the trope of the fool 
was used in early sixteenth century English language theatre. He notes that in 
response to Erasmus' contemporary publication In Praise of Folly (1511), the 
ambiguous status of the fool becomes more complex, as Erasmus' ideas of 
universal folly within a humanist framework can be seen, and the tension 
between fools as evil and as innocent leads to greater complexity and ranges of 
satirical possibility: "... the idea that fools are innocent, and as such they are 
embodiments of divine grace and protected by it, but also the belief that they 
are ignorant and that this ignorance may be a form of sin and potentially 
damnable."123 
Happé sees in Heywood's plays, particularly Witty and Witless, that folly 
"may be part of a more positive and perhaps specifically religious conception of 
the universe."124 
                                          
121 Trevett, Christine, Asperger’s Syndrome and the Holy Fool: 
The Case of Brother Juniper, Journal of Religion, Disability & Health, 13:129–150, 2009, DOI: 
10.1080/15228960802581537, accessed 10/12/2015 
122 Ibid. 
123 Peter Happéé, Staging Folly, in Fools and Folly, ed. Clifford Davidson (Kalamazoo, Michigan, 
USA; Medieval Institute Publications, Western Michigan University,1996), p.105 
124 ibid. 
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Trinity Stores and ‘jongleurs de Dieu’  
Trinity Stores comments of the ‘holy fool’ tradition: 
 St. Paul speaks of foolishness for Christ's sake in his 
letters to the first Christian churches. Holy foolishness, 
at its heart, is a prophetic path. It names the lifeless 
idols we worship in place of the living God--things like 
our possessions, our social status, and anything else we 
use to prop up our egos125 
and places St Francis within this tradition: 
Francis of Assisi embraced holy foolishness when he 
began his life of penance. Having once admired the 
elegant troubadours of southern France, he now called 
the motley band of his first followers jongleurs, instead. 
The jongleur did somersaults, stood on his head, and 
juggled assorted objects to entertain royal folk in 
between the troubadour's songs. Francis and his 
followers were to be jongleurs for God's people and the 
heavenly court.126 
 
Saint Francis and Brother Juniper 
Finally, Chesterton shows the power of the ‘holy fool’ nature of St 
Francis, and how an (autistic?) holy fool can have great influence on the world: 
... the coming of St Francis was like the birth of a child 
in a dark house, lifting its gloom; a child that grows up 
unconscious of the tragedy and triumphs over it by his 
innocence. In him it is not only innocence but ignorance 
... it was such an amnesty and reconciliation that the 
freshness of the Franciscan spirit brought to the 
world.127 
 
Christine Trevett speculates on the similarity between Francis’ early 
follower Brother Juniper and autistic traits, while cautioning against too ready 
                                          
125 https://www.trinitystores.com/store/art-image/st-francis-jongleur-de-dieu, accessed 
20/11/2014 
126 Ibid. 
127 Chesterton, G K, Saint Francis of Assisi, p.178 
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equating the two. Trevett is developing Frith’s idea of Brother Juniper as an 
autistic holy fool,128 to consider the role of autists in the Church. Trevett writes:  
Holy Fools afflicted the comfortable and the AS-ish129 
Juniper did the same. His person and his actions 
challenged fear-driven choices. He made manifest 
everyone’s horror of being labeled “abnormal” and the 
stories about him were a question mark over excessive 
regard for the regard of others. Juniper challenged 
people’s desire to see themselves reflected back when 
they engaged with someone. He offered no such 
reflection and in his peculiarity he was iconic. So just as 
the Franciscans’ message implied that there should and 
could be no grounding for the Christian in humanly-
based security, so the Juniper stories implied, in 
addition, that there should and could be no grounding in 
the security of others being predictable and 
conformist.130 
Trevett explores brother Juniper’s abnormalities and see many features which 
could have similarities with autism. Like trinitystores, she points out that the 
‘foolishness’ of divergence is in fact spiritual wisdom. If this is so, then there 
might be also the quality of innocence, which Happé suggested earlier: “fools 
are innocent, and as such they are embodiments of divine grace.”131 
 
 Autistic ‘foolishness’ as ‘innocence’  
On innocence in autism, there are numerous accounts. For example, in 
the autism community website wrongplanet.net, the blogger JustElliot – Snowy 
Owl writes: 
So I’ve been told most of my life that I am naïve in a lot 
of ways …I’ve also been told that I come across as so 
innocent, like someone who would never hurt a fly.132 
and the blogger Webster comments, in aspergersthealien.blogspot.co.uk: 
                                          
128 see Frith, Autism: Explaining the Enigma 
129 AS = Autistic Spectrum 
130 Trevett, Christine, Asperger’s Syndrome and the Holy Fool: The Case of Brother Juniper 
131 Happé, Staging Folly p.165 
132 http://www.wrongplanet.net/postt166182.html, accessed 20/11/2014 
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I am naive. And I know it. One of the conundrums of 
Aspergers is an almost childlike innocence and way of 
looking at the world.133 
The parent of an autistic child gives this explanation, in her website 
autisticbean.wordpress.com:  
Bean isn’t cunning, he has little or no guile and he does 
not manipulate others because he simply does not have 
the necessary theory of mind to do so.  … But Bean has 
never even attempted (being manipulative) because his 
autism prevents him from making that very basic 
inference about how his action will affect another 
person’s behaviour. So when Bean cries it is because he 
is hurt and that’s all there is to it. This applies to other 
forms of manipulation as well, crying for attention is 
perhaps the most basic manipulation possible other 
more sophisticated types are completely beyond our 
boy. This purity of purpose and intent is actually quite 
beautiful if you think about it!134 
In fact, for an autistic hermeneutic, something similar and yet very 
different is happening. Bean, as a small child, lacks the theory of mind to 
develop the skill of manipulativeness. Webster, on the other hand, is 
‘innocent,’ ‘childlike,’ and ‘naïve,’ and yet s/he knows it. Webster is capable of 
choosing to learn whether s/he might or might not choose to develop strategies 
to overcome this naivete. The autistically thought literary-theological 
hermeneutic is a conscious autism, a strategy adopted consciously, to enter into 
the spiritual nature of this ‘innocence.’ This conscious hermeneutic is adopting 
an autistic mode of being in order to explore, in a new way, the words and 
nature of Jesus regarding innocence and childlikeness.135 When Webster says, ‘I 
am naïve and I know it,’ an autistic theological hermeneutic approaches the 
text in an acquired naivete (as will be discussed below) where the reader 
‘knows’ perfectly well that s/he is learning’ what s/he knows perfectly well to 
have already ‘known.’ 
                                          
133 http://aspergersthealien.blogspot.co.uk/2011/11/naivety-innocence-of-aspergers-
autism.html, accessed 20/11/2014 
134 https://autisticbean.wordpress.com/the-beautiful-and-dangerous-innocence-of-the-autistic-
mind/, accessed 20/11/2014 
135 “Except ye become like little children, ye cannot enter the Kingdom of God” (Matthew 18.3); 
when Pilate declares Jesus innocent, is Jesus choosing an “innocence” which refuses to play the 
game of a court of law? (John 19.4-8) 
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This ‘acquired naïveté’ is the return to a ‘childlikeness,’ paradoxically 
anything but ‘childishly naïve,’ which Paul Ricoeur describes as ‘second 
naïveté.’ Ricoeur writes, regarding the problem of critical awareness of the 
hermeneutic circle: 
In every way, something has been lost, irremediably 
lost: immediacy of belief. But if we can no longer live 
the great symbolisms of the sacred in accordance with 
the original belief in them, we can, as modern men, 
aim at a second naivete in and through criticism. In 
short, it is by interpreting that we can hear again. Thus 
it is in hermeneutics that the symbol’s gift of meaning 
and the endeavour to understand by deciphering are 
knotted together … the knot where the symbol gives 
and criticism interprets – appears in hermeneutics as a 
circle … we must understand in order to believe, but we 
must believe in order to understand136 …  
 
I believe that being can still speak to me – no longer, of 
course, under the practical form of immediate belief, 
but as the second immediacy aimed at by hermeneutics. 
This second naivete aims to be the postcritical 
equivalent of the precritical hierophany.137 
In a different way, decades earlier, Gerard Manley Hopkins writes about 
it being ‘a hard thing to undo this knot,’138 and Hopkins is considering the ‘knot’ 
of a problematized poetic subjectivity. Yet there is a similarity, since Hopkins’ 
subjective/objective dilemma is also a kind of circularity. As chapter four will 
discuss, Hopkins ‘undoes the knot’ through a literary-theological poetics. 
Here, an autistic literary-theological hermeneutic might be suggested to 
‘undo the knot’ of the hermeneutic circle by standing outwith it, consciously, as 
an ‘honest atheism’ of faith, where the symbol does not precritically fall short 
of interpretation, but the need for critical resolution is suspended by a second 
naivete of awe. This ‘awe’ is similar to T S Eliot’s poetic moment where 
the end of all our exploring  
Will be to arrive where we started  
And know the place for the first time.”139 
                                          
136 Ricoeur, Paul, The Symbolism of Evil (trans. Emerson Buchanan) (Boston, Massachusetts; 
Beacon Press,1969) p.351 
137 ibid., p352 
138 see chapter 4  
139 T S Eliot, Little Gidding, The Four Quartets 
66 
 
 
The nature of this autistic ‘second naivete’ can be seen in different 
lights. Bogdashina and Stillmann propose one mode for seeing autistic naivete, 
and this thesis’ autistic hermeneutic argues instead for an autistic ‘naivete’ 
more like Ricoeur’s second naivete, in the a-theological ‘honest atheism’ 
described earlier in this chapter. What this hermeneutic shares with Bogdashina 
and Stillmann’s narratives, however, is to see the theological significance of 
Makram & Makram’s ‘intense world syndrome,’140 as follows. 
 
Autistic ‘Spiritual Giftedness’ and Intense World Syndrome  
Olga Bogdashina and William Stillmann see an almost supernatural quality 
to autistic divergent perception, akin to a child-like ‘innocence.’ Stillmann 
writes: 
Every one of us is a spiritual being, and perhaps no one 
knows this better than parents of children with autism. 
So many individuals with autism seem to "vibrate" at a 
frequency different from others because they are 
inherently gentle and exquisitely sensitive. They may 
more readily perceive all things seen and unseen. 141 
In Autism and Spirituality, Bogdashina, in her reading of Stillmann, adds: 
It has been noticed that some people with what was 
once known as a ‘mental deficiency’ or mental illness 
have profound spiritual and religious awareness 
(Bissonnier 1965); people with temporal lobe epilepsy 
have strong emotional and déjà vu experiences (Mullan 
and Penfield 1959); people with psychosis are prone to 
powerful spiritual (whether positive or negative) 
experiences (Clarke 2010). Sensky and Fenwick (1982) 
reported a strong connection between epilepsy and 
religious experiences. Mysticism has often been linked 
to schizophrenia (Wapnick 1981) … (and) individuals 
with autism.142 
Although this thesis approaches the question of ‘autism and spirituality’ 
differently than Bogdashina or Stillmann do, there is a similarity of discerning 
value in the ‘intense world theory’ narrative Bogdashina develops from her 
reading of Makram & Makram. For the literary-theological autistic hermeneutic 
                                          
140 Makram & Makram, Intense World Syndrome p.77 
141 http://www.williamstillman.com/autism-god-connection.php, accessed 15/11/2014 
142 Bogdashina, Autism and Spirituality p.51 
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at issue in this thesis, ‘intense world’ is part of how the fascination quality of 
literal metaphor works, so it needs briefly to be explained here.  
Makram & Makram propose an ‘intense world syndrome’ model as an 
alternative theory of autism, and although it is very novel (at this time of 
writing, 2016), it accords well with the sensory issues which will be discussed 
below. They write: 
the world may become painfully intense for autistics 
and we, therefore, propose autism as an Intense World 
Syndrome …143 
 
 … We, therefore, propose that the autistic person may 
perceive its surroundings not only as overwhelmingly 
intense due to hyper-reactivity of primary sensory 
areas, but also as aversive and highly stressful due to a 
hyper-reactive amygdala, which also makes quick and 
powerful fear associations with usually neutral stimuli. 
The autistic person may well try to cope with the 
intense and aversive world by avoidance. Thus, impaired 
social interactions and withdrawal may not be the result 
of a lack of compassion, incapability to put oneself into 
some else's position or lack of emotionality, but quite to 
the contrary a result of an intensely if not painfully 
aversively perceived environment.144 
They conclude that 
The Intense World Syndrome suggests that the autistic 
person is an individual with remarkable and far above 
average capabilities due to greatly enhanced 
perception, attention and memory. In fact it is this 
hyper-functionality which could render the individual 
debilitated.145 
 
 
 Fascination in the autism literature 
Bogdashina tests out intense world syndrome in the light of earlier (more 
‘canonical’) clinical narratives and finds a great deal of supporting evidence 
from Bregman & Escalona, who record that “variations in sensory impression 
                                          
143 Makram H, Rinaldi T, Makram K. The Intense World Syndrome  
144 ibid. P.33 
145 ibid. p.42 
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that made no difference to the average child made a great difference to 
(autistic spectrum) children.” 146  
The twentieth century clinical narrative from Wing and Frith also records 
similar sensory sensitivities. Frith describes “sharply uncomfortable sensory and 
strong emotional experiences … out of the ordinary;’147 and Lorna Wing also 
describes sensory abnormalities, using the language of fascination and distress 
as signs of intense reaction to the sensory: 
(an autistic) child may be fascinated by some sounds 
such as that made by friction drive toys or the ringing of 
a bell. They may find some sounds intensely distressing 
and will cover their ears and cringe away from, for 
example, the roar of a motor bike … or even some 
comparatively quiet sounds … odd responses to sounds, 
especially … oversensitivity. 148 
She makes the same observation about visual stimuli as either fascinating 
or distressing. In particular, she describes the fascination with bright lights 
which is the “most common.” 149 Bregman records the same features, and also 
uses the word fascination 
Among those with a more classic form of autism, a great 
deal of sensory exploration may occur, often involving 
minor details of parts of toys or objects. Often there is 
a fascination with subtle physical characteristics of toys 
and objects, such as texture, shading and hue.150  
 
The key word is fascination. He gives the example of “the intense visual 
scrutiny of light diffraction patterns when a prism-like stone is twirled in the 
sunlight.”151 
 
                                          
146 Bergman, P, Escalona, S.K, Unusual sensitivities in very young children in Phyllis Greenacre 
et al (eds), The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child (New York; International Universities Press, 
New York, 1949) p. 333, quoted in Bogdashina p.55; see also Definitions and Characteristics of 
the Spectrum, Joel D. Bregman, in Autism Spectrum Disorders: Identification, Education and 
Treatment, ed. Dianne Zager (London/New Jersey; Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2005), p.13, 
where they are also using the language of sensory fascination. 
147 Frith, Autism; Explaining the Enigma p.14 
148 Wing, The Autistic Spectrum, p.50 
149 Ibid. p. 51 
150 Bregman, Joel, Definitions and Characteristics of the Spectrum, in Autism Spectrum 
Disorders: Identification, Education and Treatment, ed. Dianne Zager (London/New Jersey; 
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 Fascination and Creativity 
The argument in this thesis for a literary-theological autistic hermeneutic 
does not use the approach of Bogdashina’s and Stillmann’s ‘spiritual giftedness,’ 
but it does draw on this idea of fascination as an exceptional quality which 
enables this hermeneutic to draw on its enhanced perception. This can be seen 
as an intensely creative mode of being in the world. Frances Tustin gives an 
outstanding example of fascination: 
The controls of an autistic child are of an all-or-nothing 
variety … he is either devoid of sensation, or he is 
flooded by it. Such floods of heightened consciousness 
seem to have much in common with those produced by 
hallucinogenic drugs in which the subject feels that 
colours and shapes are apprehended with ultra-vivid 
clarity and there is the sense of being actually inside a 
colour or a shape. Autistic children who have become 
articulate have shown me that they experience things in 
this way. For example, an autistic child called Peter, as 
he left the therapy room, pointed to a tall yellow daisy 
and said, ‘I’m inside that yellow flower – it’s the 
yellowness I’m inside.’ He was at a loss to describe his 
experience any further. His whole body was taut with 
heightened responsiveness, the pupils of his eyes were 
dilated and his eye shone with preternatural 
brightness.152  
When Peter says “It’s the yellowness I’m inside,” he is in the territory of 
autistic fascination. Michael Fitzgerald writes: 
‘Hans Asperger wrote about ‘autistic intelligence’ and 
saw it as a sort of intelligence hardly touched by 
tradition and culture – ‘unconventional, unorthodox, 
strangely “pure” and original, akin to the intelligence of 
true creativity.”153 
This “strangely pure” way of relating to the world can give rise to 
intense, immersive responses which are expressed as musical, artistic and 
literary sensibility [subverting the narrative of autists as ‘prosaic’ and 
‘pedantic;’ although these qualities too will be discussed below]. The autist 
Temple Grandin speaks about ‘thinking in pictures’ in her Ted Talk and points 
out that autistic people tend to have particular fascinations and abilities with 
                                          
152 Tustin, Frances, Autistic States in Children (London, UK; Routledge, 1992) quoted in Eyal et 
al, The Autism Matrix, p. 149 
153 Asperger, Autism and Aspergers Syndrome, pp. 37-92, cited in Fitzgerald, Michael, The 
Genesis of Artistic Creativity (London, UK; Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London, UK, 2015), p.5 
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pictures (art), words (hyperlexia and reading/writing) or mathematics, and that 
these can generate particularly creative interactions with the non-human 
world.154 Similarly, the autist Donna Williams describes a sense of oneness: 
It was this side of me that felt part of the things around 
me, not with them, but as them. In sensing them, yet 
sensing them without the selfhood of interpretation, 
significance and realisation, I became “one” with the 
things I sensed.155 
Williams continues: 
Classical music poured out of me; music spoke the force 
and variation of wind and rain, sunshine through clouds, 
the contrast and magic of dusk and dawn and flying.156  
The city lights and reflections playing upon the river … 
statues, beautiful parks, old wooden cathedrals, and 
marble sculptures, paintings by Renoir or scenes by 
Monet, captured me and brought home the beauty of 
‘the world.’ … The frosted trees and icy fields … the 
beauty moved me so deeply I found myself crying.157 
Some things hadn’t changed much since I was an infant 
swept up in the perception of swirling air particles, a 
child lost in the repetition of a pattern of sound, or a 
teenager staring for hours at coloured billiard balls, 
trying to grasp the experience of the particular colour I 
was climbing into.158 
The autistic artist Wendy Lawson also comments about fascination: 
I find colour simply fascinating and it stirs all sorts of 
feelings in me. The stronger and brighter the colour, the 
more stirred up I become. My favourite colours are rich 
in emerald green, royal blue, purple, turquoise and all 
the in-between shades of these colours.159 
 
 
                                          
154http://www.ted.com/talks/temple_grandin_the_world_needs_all_kinds_of_minds?language=e
n, accessed 16/11/2014 
155 Williams, Donna, Autism - An Inside-out Approach: An innovative look at the mechanics of 
‘autism’ and its developmental ‘cousins’ (London, UK; Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2004 (1996)) 
p.249 
156 ibid. pp.245 
157 Ibid. p.59 
158 Ibid. Spirituality p.52 
159 Ibid. p.67 
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 “Useless” autistic fascination? Frith, Bregman, and autistic 
experience 
Joel Bregman’s language is dismissive of these phenomena:  
(with) Intense preoccupying interests … such individuals 
literally can become world experts on such topics, yet 
resist suggestions to transform this interest and 
knowledge into functional, meaningful or marketable 
skills.160 
This is ‘fascination’ which is not sensory; instead it is a focus of an 
extreme nature. Uta Frith describes the behaviour of autistic people with a 
narrow intense particular interest as follows: 
(Autistic people)’s special interest is often their sole 
topic of conversation … (a)utistic repetitions and 
obsessions appear to be different from compulsions as 
the autistic person does not try to resist them, but 
apparently greatly enjoys enacting them … (which) can 
lead to outstanding achievements.161  
Tony Attwood records examples of autistic fascination he encounters in 
his clinical work: “the young child may develop an interest in collecting specific 
items ... the lids of tubes of Smarties ... the labels from bottles of beer ... 
butterflies or keyrings ... yellow pencils, vacuum cleaners or toilet brushes.162 
The next stage of development is “fascination with a topic rather than an 
object. Common topics are transport ... dinosaurs, electronics and science. The 
person develops an encyclopaedic knowledge ... a common feature is a 
fascination with statistics, order and symmetry.”163 The autistic adults explains 
how this continues in adult life: 
"If you put two or more people together who have 
Asperger's syndrome, the question is bound to come up. 
Translated, it means, "So, what one single thing have 
you been focusing on all your life?" 
Not everyone with Asperger's syndrome will be able to 
relate to such a question, but when you take the 
repetitive nature of this unique group, along with their 
narrow, restricted interests, and mix that together with 
an intense curiosity or profound devotion to whatever 
strikes their fancy, a lifelong interest in one particular 
                                          
160 Bregman (ed. Zager), Definitions and Characteristics of the Spectrum, p.14 
161 Frith, Autism: Explaining the Enigma, p.14 
162 Attwood, Asperger's Syndrome: A Guide for parents and Professionals, p.89. 
163 ibid. p.90 
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subject is often the result. Even more amazing, this 
special interest typically begins at a very early age.  
 
Without a doubt, my focus has been on all things 
futuristic. Robots are a big deal for me, along with 
architectural designs of a futuristic nature. I could sit 
and stare at a drawing of a futuristic city all day long. 
Come to think of it, I have.164 
Another autistic blogger, Sunfell, relates that  
My Special Subject is systems- any kind of system-  ...   I 
have many other deep interests, too ... Life for me is 
one vast puzzle-box, a huge system to explore and 
exploit- and I have found a place of contentment in this 
world.165 
 
The Sensory Connoisseur 
A place of contentment suggests that Francesca Happé’s ‘sensory 
connoisseur’ might be occupying a fascination which responds in delight, 
whether to colour, sound, touch, taste, or to collections or special interests. 
Happé writes: 
Repetition is not repetition, for example, if you have 
expert levels of discrimination. Listening to different 
recordings of the same symphony might strike some as 
repetitive, but these sound entirely different to an 
expert. The child with autism who would happily spend 
hours spinning coins, or watching drops of water falling 
from his fingers, might be considered a connoisseur, 
seeing minute differences between events that others 
regard as pure repetition.166 
 
Alistair Clarkson further develops this idea: 
Within discussion of an alternative view of “pure 
repetition” in ASD, let us try to think more expansively 
regarding what is ‘repetitive,’ by considering behaviour 
within the neurotypical world. Can we form an 
alternative behavioural view of the neurotypical person 
who typically watches television for many hours a day – 
a person who may sit every day staring at a flickering 
                                          
164 http://thinkingautismguide.blogspot.co.uk/2011/07/special-interests.html, accessed 25 April 
2012. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Happé, Autism and Talent p. xvi, quoted in Clarkson p.4.  
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screen, displaying limited communication with others as 
a result? Or can we consider the over-anxious and 
neurotic house-cleaner, repeatedly cleaning away 
invisible dirt? A key question remains: “how far is our 
notion of ‘repetitive’ actually influenced by sociological 
value systems?167 
To return to St Francis, G K Chesterton’s description of him ‘strikes a 
chord’ with a classic WCC attention to detail, as a glorious, holy fascination: 
St Francis was not a lover of nature ... as ... a sort of 
sentimental pantheism ... the hermit might love nature 
as a background (but) for St Francis nothing was ever in 
the background. We might say that his mind had no 
background, except perhaps that divine darkness out of 
which the divine love had called up every coloured 
creature one by one. He saw everything as dramatic, 
distinct from its setting, not all of a piece like a picture 
but in action like a play. A bird went through him like an 
arrow; something with a story and a purpose ... In a 
word, we talk about a man who cannot see the wood for 
the trees. St Francis was a man who did not want to see 
the wood for the trees. He wanted to see each tree as a 
separate and almost a sacred thing, being a child of God 
and therefore a brother or sister of man.168  
Not wanting to see the wood for the trees is reverence for the trees, and 
holy disregard for the wood of the pragmatism of the ‘normal’ world. WCC is a 
‘pathology,’ but holy autistic fascination recasts it as a gift. 
 
 And metaphor? 
It might seem that metaphor has been a long way away from this 
discussion of foolishness and fascination, but in fact these are essential to the 
literary-theological hermeneutic which might be able to see itself as autistic. 
The important point at issue has been how very creatively different autistic 
imagination and creativity can be from the neurotypical, so that an autistic 
relationship with metaphor might be considered as equally creatively 
distinctive. This is a case which needs to be argued against much of the clinical 
narrative.  
                                          
167 Clarkson p.11 
168 Chesterton, Francis of Assisi, pp.98 – 99 
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For example, Peter Hobson sees autism as an impairment which prevents 
the autistic child from "using symbols creatively," adding that "nor do their 
symbols transport them to a world of the imagination."169 The argument of 
autistic fascination is that “symbols” do not “transport them to a world of 
imagination,” but are, in themselves, the “world of imagination.” It is easy to 
see why autistic modes of response could be seemingly unimaginative in spite of 
the accounts of Williams, Lawson, Grandin and Howson. Autistic ‘special 
interests’ can seem prosaic, but perhaps this is, to return to Gernsbacher and 
Pripas-Kapit’s question, Who’s missing the point? 
Before exploring how this might work in practice, one short example 
gives a clue. God tells the suffering, barren woman who is Israel: 
behold, I will set your stones in antimony, and lay your 
foundations with sapphires. I will make your pinnacles 
of agate, your gates of carbuncles, and all your wall of 
precious stones. (Isaiah 54. 11-12). 
An autistic hermeneutic of this passage from Isaiah might well delight in 
the images of these stones, and worship God for the bringing together of these 
shiny objects. A neurotypical hermeneutic might pass over the richness of this 
image as ‘mere’ allegory – the autist alternatively might delight in it more fully. 
This delight in the image is a golden thread. Looking back to the a-
theological thinking of earlier in this chapter, art as Taylor’s “site of the 
disaster” offers an autistic reading the opportunity to find honest, atheist faith 
within the site of the art work. This delight, as a fascination which is presence, 
will run through the poetic readings in each chapter. Thought as presence, 
metaphor is in the inaccessible centre, and thought as absence, it is 
simultaneously utterly outwith, and both are modes of autistic literal 
metaphor’s outwitting of the hermeneutic circle.  
 
 
 
                                          
169 Hobson, Peter, The Cradle of Thought: Exploring the Origins of Thinking (Reigate, Surrey, 
UK; Pan books, 2004) p.122. 
75 
 
 
1.2. The ‘privilege of pathology’ 
Towards an autistic theological hermeneutic 
Unavoidably, ‘taking things literally’ when figurative language is used, 
often leads to misunderstanding and even bafflement. When an idiomatic 
metaphor is taken ‘at face value,’ it is ridiculous, and does not make sense.170 
However, if the introduction’s Dasein embodied in Chauncey Gardener is borne 
in mind, perhaps the ‘mistake’ might make profound sense beyond sense. 
Thinking of an autistic ‘Being There,’ the strategy of an autistic hermeneutic 
might theologically be extremely ‘coherent’ (holding together) in the sense of 
entering two spaces, the autistic and the mystical/a-theological, and finding 
that they can ‘read each other.’ The coherence (co-inherence) of this chapter is 
its bringing together of two sites of ‘bafflement,’ where the autistic 
hermeneutic meets a theological bafflement of language.171 This reading of each 
in the light of the other creates the possibility of a theological autistic 
hermeneutic, which creates the theological possibility of a particular kind of 
incarnation. The aim of creating a theological autistic hermeneutic is to develop 
it to be used as a fully incarnational autistic hermeneutic in subsequent 
chapters. 
Neurotypical hermeneutics 
An autistic hermeneutic, to the degree that it is autistic, will differ 
radically from a non-autistic (‘neurotypical) hermeneutic. This section sets out 
the background for this distinction, with a brief overview of what constitutes 
hermeneutics as a discipline. 
Werner Jeanrond defines hermeneutics as ‘the theory of interpretation,’ 
adding that 
The word contains a reference to Hermes, the 
messenger of the Gods in Greek mythology. Hermes’ 
task was to explain to humans the decisions and plans of 
their Gods. Thus, he bridged the gap between the divine 
and the human realm [so that] hermeneutics is 
                                          
170 This section uses the word ‘coherent’ to describe a paradoxical sense beyond sense. However 
it is worth noting at the outset that, when the autist hears something which, taken literally, 
doesn’t make sense, from an autistic point of view it is the neurotypical speaker who is actually 
being incoherent. 
171 Which also becomes an (equally coherent) language of bafflement. 
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concerned with examining the relationship between the 
two realms, the realms of a text or a work of art on the 
one hand, and the people who wish to understand it on 
the other.172 
Jeanrond gives a useful way to think about becoming hermeneutically 
self-aware: 
The hermeneutical problem may become clearer to us 
when we recall the odd experience of reading a book for 
the second time. Such a re-reading often opens up a 
new reception of the text. We may discover something 
new, something different in the text, and we may say 
now that we see the book with different eyes. … our 
perspective has changed … This experience teaches us 
that understanding is in fact not an automatic and 
unproblematic exercise of deciphering a set of 
consistently identical signs on paper … it demands that 
we lend of our reality to the text so that it can become 
real for us.173 
 
If we can “see the text through new eyes,” by re-reading it, the implicit 
logic is that ‘eyes’ are always required, and that “text-understanding always 
demands our active participation in recreating the text in question. It demands 
that we lend of our reality to the text so that it can become real for us.”174 
If different eyes bring different realities to the text, different 
hermeneutics create different textual worlds. This is a question not only of 
technical approach but also of epistemology. For example, the purpose of a 
historical-critical hermeneutic of the Bible is to bring out the stylistic 
differences between different parts of Scripture, which make it possible to 
construct a redaction history. However, underlying this is an (implicit or 
explicit) set of philosophical, theological or epistemological assumptions. In this 
case, it might be that, for example, ‘the word of God is a human construct,’ 
‘the Bible contains the Word of God but is not itself the Word,’ or ‘we cannot 
postulate any divine authorship, but only what can be demonstrated in 
empirical historical terms.’ The science of hermeneutics establishes that “we 
                                          
172 Jeanrond, Werner G, Theological Hermeneutics: Development and Significance (London, UK; 
SCM Press Ltd., 1994) p.1  
173 ibid.  
174 ibid.  
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never read a text ‘objectively’ or ‘neutrally’ … no human reader has an 
unlimited perspective.”175 
This awareness opens up the possibility of allowing, and celebrating, 
diverse hermeneutical approaches to the text. Theologically, interfaith 
conversations work to nurture a sense of reverence for the other whose 
approach to the text is different from our own. A neurotribal autistic 
hermeneutic will be presented in the following argument, as a legitimate 
strategy, resting on a legitimate epistemology. This will be autism giving itself 
permission to see the world autistically, with the ability to discern an autism of 
the text. 
 
Towards incarnational metaphor: the trinity of attributes 
Postulating an autism of the text requires a language to mediate 
theological thinking in terms of autistic perception, and this can be done in 
terms of the ‘trinity of attributes’ defined in the introduction: mindfulness of 
separation, autistic fascination, and their synthesis in literal metaphor. Seeing 
the synthesis of this trinity theologically is incarnational metaphor.  
The introduction offered a model of autistic lived experience as absence 
and presence, in terms of Mindfulness of Separation co-existing with Autistic 
Fascination. Incarnational metaphor embodies this co-existence of absence and 
presence, incorporating it into a perceptual style which will see metaphor itself 
as the site of both absence and presence.  A new understanding of metaphor is 
key to the autistic hermeneutic.  
The clinical narrative rightly devotes considerable attention to metaphor 
as a problem, because of the disabling misunderstandings which happen when 
autistic people ‘take things literally.’ This is a question of interpretation (“what 
does she mean by that?”), and an autistic hermeneutic would be most 
distinctive in this ‘problematic’ relationship to metaphor. However, considering 
autism in the light of abnormal metaphor can be reframed as a creative 
divergence. “Getting it wrong” might actually be “getting it right” when the 
autistic mode of reading metaphor sheds light on theological hermeneutics 
                                          
175 ibid. p.2 
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which focus on a poetic dimension of language. Here, where this literal-
mindedness has been pathologised as a ‘lack of imagination,’176 the argument 
for a theology of incarnational metaphor as an autistic epistemology would be 
the very opposite. Theologically, it would be a privileged seeing of language as 
a ‘real’ embodiment, of the body of the kenotic incarnate Christ. 
 
Mindfulness of Separation – this is not a ‘conversation.’ 
Heidegger writes that “we – mankind – are a conversation. The being of 
man is founded in language. But this only becomes actual in conversation.”177 
Here, the autistic hermeneutic works not as the conversation of language, but 
as the silence of language. To return to the metaphors used in the introduction, 
this is a silent conversation, between silences, on the bridge. 
To see how literal metaphor works as a hermeneutic, firstly it will be 
considered here as mindfulness of separation. To distinguish between autistic 
and neurotypical hermeneutics in terms of a possible mindfulness of separation, 
a good place to start is Hans-Georg Gadamer’s familiar metaphor of the fusion 
of hermeneutical horizons. Gadamer states:  
In the process of understanding there takes place a real 
fusion of horizons, which means that as the historical 
horizon is projected, it is simultaneously removed …178 
Understanding is not to be thought of so much as an 
action of subjectivity, but as the placing of oneself 
within a process of tradition, in which past and present 
are constantly fused.179 
Werner Jeanrond expresses this meeting of horizons as being such that 
“language is the middle ground in which understanding and agreement 
concerning the object take place between two people.”180 
                                          
176 eg, Baron Cohen, Simon & Craig, Jaime, Creativity and Imagination in Autism and Asperger 
Syndrome, in Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders Vol. 29, No. 4, 1999, where 
children are ‘tested’ for creativity; see also Autism and Talent, Happé & Frith (eds.), where 
‘savant skills’ are viewed as repetition by rote  
177 Heidegger, Martin, Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry (Chicago; Henry Regnery, 1949) 
Poetry p.277  
178 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Truth and Method trans. Len-Doepel 2nd edn. (London, UK; Sheed & 
Ward, 1979 (1975)), pp.273-4, quoted in Jeanrond, Hermeneutics, p.66 
 179ibid. p.258f quoted in Jeanrond, Hermeneutics, p.65 
180 Ibid. pp.345-6, quoted in Jeanrond, Hermeneutics p.66 
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This is precisely what does not happen in autism. It is the first way in 
which Incarnational metaphor can be thought of as absence, because there is no 
effective conversation where metaphor is concerned. An autistic hermeneutic is 
not one which discerns the social context of a body of tradition so that horizons 
fuse. In autism qua autism, there is no “understanding and agreement.” 
If this is tantamount to saying that there is, then, no genuine 
hermeneutical fusion of horizons, attaining understanding and agreement, then 
it is in fact accurate to say that an absolute autistic hermeneutic is a non-
hermeneutic. The words are ultimately, in absolute autism, only words, which 
do not achieve the fusion of horizons. However, the space of a non-hermeneutic 
becomes interesting theologically if this is thought of as the hermeneutic of the 
non. This is precisely how the autistic hermeneutic will come alive as a 
theological hermeneutic, by situating itself within the non-language of mystical 
theology and a-theology. In this sense, the pathology becomes a privileged 
theological strategy. 
The autistic theological hermeneutic for which this thesis argues is one 
which takes the image, as it were, literally, straight out of the horizon without 
seeing “beyond the horizon” to the other’s horizon. In that case, there is no 
“fusion of horizons,” but only one horizon, seen through the autistic eye. 
Language is not a middle ground between two people, because there is only the 
autistic eye (in the sense of ‘autos’ = self). The figurative image is not 
something shared between conversation partners, resulting in a new 
understanding, but simply ‘is,’ in solitude.  
 
Fascination: Intuition divorced from conversation 
There is no fusing of hermeneutical horizons to achieve union with the 
other, in the sense of a breakthrough to grasp the meaning of the other’s 
intent. What there is, instead, is the union with the image itself, divorced from 
the intent ‘on the other horizon.’ This is an intuition of appreciating and 
inhabiting the image for its own sake. Being ‘divorced’ from conversation means 
being separated from the fusing of horizons of meaning. It is in that space, by 
definition only in that space, that an intuitive oneness with the image takes 
place. This works by the kind of intense fascination which stays with its object 
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in the terms Uta Frith attributes to the ‘autistic connoisseur’ discussed in the 
introduction.181 This fascination, when thought theologically, is the union with 
the ‘literal’ image.182 
Jeanrond points out that Schleiermacher, as “the father of modern 
hermeneutics,” was “the first thinker who appreciated the universal scope of 
the hermeneutical problem, and as a result demanded a philosophical theory of 
understanding.”183 Jeanrond adds that for Schleiermacher, “the theologian as 
interpreter of the Scriptures enjoys no special privileges, rather he is bound by 
the hermeneutical rules like any other text-interpreter.”184 There is a difference 
between being ignorant of the rules and breaking the rules. Ignorance of 
hermeneutical rules means naively assuming that there are no rules, and lacking 
awareness of the array of possible hermeneutical strategies and their 
limitations. The consciously autistic theologian knowingly breaks the rules, in 
the sense that s/he knowingly disrupts and exceeds the boundaries of 
grammatical propriety. The text in effect is not ‘interpreted’ at all. There is 
only a one-ness of being ‘in the text.’ This glory of metaphor can be seen in this 
second “face of the coin,” autistic fascination. This is, of course, impossible. 
How can a person ‘meaningfully’ read a text at all, if there is no attribution of 
meaning? It is impossible, it would seem, to call a lack of interpretation a 
reading strategy. Or is it? The child with echolalia repeats words ‘for no useful 
reason,’ but in her world, she is celebrating the musicality and pleasure of 
words at a higher level than merely ‘using’ them. 
For example, reading the erotic language of the Song of Songs, there is 
no problem in applying this erotic love to the same word in John’s gospel that 
‘God is love.’ Whether this is ‘storge’, ‘philia,’ eros or ‘agape’185  is irrelevant 
because God’s love, as love, encompasses all, including all diverse images. 
                                          
181 To recap, fascination a thinking of RRBI’s in terms of Uta Frith’s “sensory 
connoisseur” model. In this thesis, it also is pure affective empathy towards phenomena, 
manifest at times in intensity of sensory response as delight (or distress); and at other times as 
the affectivity of delight in the obsessive narrow interests common in high functioning autistic 
people. 
182 This paradox stands here for now, to be explored later. 
183 Jeanrond, Hermeneutics p.44 
184 ibid. p.49 
185 In terms of the distinctions which C S Lewis described in his study The Four Loves 
(London, UK; Geoffrey Bles Publishers, 1960) 
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Different images of God’s love, such as father and mother (‘storge’), friend 
(‘philia’), lover (eros) or provider (‘agape), are all aspects of this divine love.  
This is where the real nature of a theological autistic hermeneutic 
emerges, and why the introduction insisted that this is not at the level of 
everyday usage. The profusion of images where God is mother, father, friend, 
lover, provider, lion, lamb, are anathema to the literal-minded autist who 
wants to settle on one image of God, or even none, because this riot of plurality 
and paradoxical contradiction can’t be logically coded and makes no sense.186  
An autistic reader, typically in real life, in many cases would avoid the baffling 
nature of imagery as much as possible, and avoid both poetic and religious 
language. However, for a theological autistic hermeneutic, the impossible task 
of ‘making sense’ of this as propositional logic is not the issue, because it 
operates, ultimately, is an impossible ideal. If a good logical positivist autist 
steps away from this chaos, it is understandable (and common, perhaps 
necessarily). However, staying in this chaotic glory is the challenge of an 
autistic theological hermeneutic.  
This abnormal theological hermeneutic will now be developed by 
demonstrating what it is in practice, and how it works in different theological 
hermeneutic scenarios. 
 
 
Literal incarnation of the theological metaphor 
Another way to think about literal metaphor is as the autistic isolation of 
the image itself, when it is thought in a theoretical model of metaphor as self-
contained. So, in the Song of Songs, for example, as opposed to the metaphor as 
a useful way to think about God and Church, there ‘really is’ a marriage 
between them, in autistic theological terms.187 For this reason, an individual, 
real autistic person being theological in this sense will be baffled, trying to 
imagine how God and the Church could ‘really’ be carnally united (the Church is 
                                          
186 This is exactly the point – do neurotypical readings pass over too lightly the 
phenomenal profusions and clashes of God-imagery in Scripture?  How can it make sense for a 
loving shepherd to be a consuming fire?  
187 This is the perceived ‘naïveté’ of, for example, Origen or Bernard of Claivaux, who 
honour the image as ‘literally’ true, and this will be discussed in more depth later. 
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a plurality of people, and God is invisible). This is precisely the point, if faith is 
in ‘what is not seen,’ requiring faith in a different seeing of the figurative itself. 
The eye of an ultimate, absolute autistic faith can attain this, but, as 
subsequent chapters will argue, this is actually, finally, at the expense of 
sanity, which however becomes an autism of saintliness. The crucial point this 
chapter now proceeds to argue is that this insanity with the bafflement 
engendered by separation from the horizon of the other, is a genuine 
theological strategy. The claim this thesis makes is that this strategy of 
bafflement might be more authentic than a systematic theology which might be 
too quick to contain God in a doctrinal system. It will lead, in subsequent 
chapters, to a thinking of apophatic language as mindfulness of separation, 
fascination, and an ultimately incarnational literal metaphor. 
 
1.3  Metaphor as normal and abnormal – autistic 
divergence 
This section outlines how autistic processing of metaphor differs from the 
neurotypical norm. 
The word metaphor’s derivation from the Greek μετά (meta), "after, 
with, across" combined with φέρω (pherō), "to bear", "to carry" means that 
metaphor is a ‘carrying across,’ “a figure of speech, in which one thing … is 
referred to by a word or expression normally denoting another thing, so as to 
suggest some common quality shared by the two.”188 In normal language use, 
understanding the meaning involved in the ‘carrying over’ means decoding it by 
a ‘carrying back.’ So, for example, in ‘the road of life,’ to understand the 
intent, the reader brings the (imaginary) ‘image’ of ‘road’ back into the (real) 
‘meaning’ of ‘life,’  
This is a ‘common-sense’ neurotypical response to metaphor, but an 
autistic ‘literal’ metaphor offers a different response with potentially a new 
theological possibility. Literal metaphor resists the neurotypical common sense 
                                          
188 Baldick, C. (2008). Metaphor, in The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms, Oxford 
University Press at 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199208272.001.0001/acref-
9780199208272-e-712. accessed 2/07/2016 
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pragmatic reading. The argument for the power of literal metaphor is that it 
outwits neurotypical perception. ‘Neurotypical, normal metaphor’ (the non-
autistic common-sense processing of metaphor) ironically fails, because it kills 
metaphor’s power by reducing it to simile, as follows. 
 
Autistic Resistance to a reduction to simile  
In neurotypical common sense thinking, we know perfectly well that we 
are not ‘really’ talking about a road, but considering a possible imaginary road-
ness in our concept of life. The image of the road might offer aspects which 
‘road’ and ‘life’ share; progression, changing views, or destination, for 
example.189 In fact, common-sense reading of metaphor to extract meaning is a 
posterior reduction of metaphor into simile, as will now be argued. A crucial 
indication appears here; not all readings of poetry are of the ‘common sense’ 
kind that denudes poetic space by reducing it merely into the question “what 
does this poem mean?” If an autistic reading resists this denudation of 
metaphor, then so too does a certain kind of poetic response which simply 
revels in word, sound and image. In fact, this will be the subject of chapter 
four, looking at the rich autistic potential offered by an autistic hermeneutic’s 
response to Gerard Manley Hopkins’ work. The claim which will be made there 
is that in a sense, true poetic response in fact has the embodiment of autistic 
privilege in it. This point is alluded to here, simply to make clear that autistic 
metaphor differs from a prosaic neurotypical norm. That neurotypical pragmatic 
norm ‘fails,’ as it resists staying in the space of something as meaningless, 
pointless and useless as the space of literature, which is being in the image.190 
The Oxford Dictionary contrasts metaphor and simile:  
In metaphor, … resemblance is assumed as an imaginary 
identity [my emphasis] rather than directly stated as a 
comparison: referring to a man as that pig, or saying he 
                                          
189 Of course, the irony is that each of these common-sense words is in fact another 
metaphor – views, as metaphoric visual understood as opinions; opinions, etymologically 
traceable as o-pie, choice; the etymological roots are tangled, and this leads to Derrida’s 
thought of the supplement, which will be discussed later. 
190 “The Space of Literature” is Maurice Blanchot’s term, and it will be explored in 
chapter two. 
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is a pig is metaphorical, whereas ‘he is like a pig’ is a 
simile.191  
To inhabit the metaphor is to be in the imaginary space where a man is a 
pig. Staying within the metaphor is absurd, because a man is not a pig. What the 
metaphor ‘really means’ is that, in some respects, by sharing pig-like attributes 
the man is ‘like’ a pig. Obtaining meaning from metaphor is only possible by 
effectively using ‘common sense,’ reducing it to simile, and this is to kill the 
metaphor. So a neurotypical ‘common sense’ reading which rescues meaning is 
an exit into the space described by Grice’s relevance theory192. Reading the 
metaphor Neurotypically, the reader is perfectly well aware that resemblance is 
only that – resemblance – and a literal identification is ‘non-sense’ for the 
‘common-sense’ point of view. So, by using Relevance, metaphor is contained 
and sealed off from its ‘dangerous’ potential of deferred referentiality and 
stable meaning.193 Thinking of the ‘pigness’ of the man, or the ‘roadness’ of 
life, is rescued from an absurd confusion by thinking of ‘pigness’ as like the 
man, and ‘roadness’ as like life. This is the pragmatic avoidance of absurdity, 
through reducing metaphor to simile. 
The autistic ‘impairment’ of an epistemology of metaphor, seen in terms 
of a clinical narrative, sees it as a disabling pathology, and in pragmatic, 
everyday terms, this is true. However the disability itself will now be considered 
as a radical a-theological possibility, which is that of resurrection. 
 
 Incarnational metaphor as a Resurrection (a)theological  
  (im)possibility 
If autistic epistemology is the impairment of Grice’s relevance theory’s 
cognitive mechanism, an autistic hermeneutic approaching metaphor is the 
failure to decode ‘real’ meaning from its ‘entanglement’ in the imaginary. In 
‘everyday’ language use situations, this becomes a stumbling block for the 
                                          
191 Baldick, metaphor 
192 see introduction 
193 Aristotle’ Logic sees metaphor as a dangerous rhetorical strategy, leading both 
equivocal and analogical language astray 
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assumed conventions of ostensive metaphor.194 In ‘ostensive metaphor,’195 an 
‘ordinary’ or commonplace metaphor is ‘taken as read.’196 Because of its 
reduction to the commonplace, metaphor has moved out of poetic usage into 
pragmatic usage. This commonplace usage is so ‘obvious,’ that by being 
assumed as a ‘normal’ shorthand, it loses its status as living metaphor. The 
vehicle slides into propositional language, effectively losing the figurative power 
of an imaginative space. The original metaphor has effectively ceased to be 
metaphoric at all, with its origins of figurative reference changed into a shift 
into assumed literal meaning. Effectively, by being ‘taken as read’ in ‘ordinary’ 
decoding, it has become a dead metaphor. So, “much of our everyday 
language197 is … made up of metaphorical words and phrases that pass unnoticed 
as ‘dead’ metaphors, like the branch of an organization.”198  
Thinking through metaphor as dead or alive raises interesting possibilities 
for an autistic hermeneutic of Incarnational metaphor. The ‘dead’ metaphor 
example given by Baldrick would be particularly pertinent to Frith’s approach to 
autistic literal mindedness.199 The “branch of an organisation” is exactly the 
kind of figurative language where autistic literal mindedness would fail to 
function with an appropriate response, because the “branch” would be 
envisioned as part of a tree. In fact, for Incarnational metaphor in its poetic and 
theological potential, what clinical narrative calls ‘literal interpretation’ is 
actually the opposite. It is a withdrawal from the social convention of dead 
metaphor as a propositional assumption where ‘branch’ has lost its poetic roots 
as imagery, and a rehabilitation, back into figuration. So the autist who is 
thinking of the branch of a tree when the branch of an office is “really” meant 
                                          
194 ‘Ostensive’ metaphor in everyday, pragmatic use is very different to poetic 
metaphor. However, the argument for killing poetic metaphor by reducing it to simile is still the 
same in principle. Killing metaphor would be a reading which intends to extract meaning rather 
than enjoy the poetic space of the imaginary sharing performed by tenor and vehicle. In this 
chapter’s reading of Blanchot’s ‘Space of Literature,’ the argument is developed that true 
poetic reading can be viewed autistically, divorced from pragmatism, as an act of inhabiting 
Incarnational metaphor. 
195 See introduction 
196 Ironically, ‘taken as read’ means the opposite; it means ‘reading something into it.’ 
197 Paul Ricoeur, as will be discussed later in this chapter, argues that all language is at 
base metaphoric, as ‘Métaphore Vive’ (living metaphor). This is an excavation and resurrection 
of metaphor which would interrogate dead metaphor to bring it back to life. This is another way 
of thinking of the resurrection power of autistic Incarnational metaphor, as will emerge. 
198 Baldick, metaphor. Again, this anticipates Ricoeur’s métaphore vive and Derrida’s 
White Metaphor, which will be discussed later. 
199 See Introduction 
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is re-entering the figurative power of metaphor, to puzzle over how an office 
can be part of a tree.  
In pragmatic, ostensive terms, this is absurd in the same way that the 
inability to ‘decode’ metaphor into simile is absurd. It is, however, the 
resurrection of figurative power, from dead metaphor into living metaphor. 
Staying baffled at the absurdity of a space of pure living metaphor is the ability 
to inhabit an autistic space where language exceeds its containment in 
pragmatic, connotative meaning. 
Autistic ‘literal-mindedness’ resurrects dead metaphor. The crucial point 
here is that by bringing back its figurative, imaginative potential, this absurdity 
can become a powerful theological hermeneutic. This is the logic which 
underpins the theological thinking of this thesis, as demonstrated in the 
subsequent chapters. This works, crucially, as a theological resurrection of 
metaphor, which chapter three will show to be at once incarnation, crucifixion 
and resurrection. It is impossible outwith the foolishness of the gospel; the 
Gospel, the absurdity of the Christ event, ‘doesn’t make sense,’ just as 
metaphor, purely unresolved (‘solved’) doesn’t ‘make sense.’ In practice, 
autists often turn away from poetry because of an acute sensitivity to how ‘it 
doesn’t make sense;’ the unresolved absurd leap of imaginative pairing is 
baffling, and demanding.  
For this reason, when this ‘odd’ autistic hermeneutic is taken as a 
theological hermeneutic, Incarnation and Resurrection become clearly baffling, 
taking their full power of mystery seriously (this is also a question of autistic 
integrity, as will be discussed in chapter two). The Christ event in all its 
moments occurs as the baffling mysteries of Incarnation, Crucifixion, 
Resurrection and Ascension. The next section explores religious language as 
bafflement, oddness and excess. Its purpose is to argue that this hermeneutic 
which reads the Christ event as baffling, odd and excessive, can be read equally 
as an autistic hermeneutic. This is because ‘literal’ metaphor can become a 
‘literal’ presence which can be read theologically as Real Presence in a 
sacramental Incarnation of metaphor. This autistic theological language of the 
Christ event is one which offers an embodiment in ‘absurd’ language of the 
paradox of the God-man Incarnate Christ. The Christ of paradox is present by 
means of a literary-theological autistic baffled metaphor, enacting the baffling 
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theological potential of the events of Incarnation, Epiphany, Crucifixion, 
Resurrection and Ascension. 
In Incarnational metaphor, the process of decoding metaphor breaks 
down. Metaphor ceases to be a device which can be ‘used’ by the reader. 
Instead, there is no end point of ‘use’ in the writer-to-text-to-reader process. 
Metaphor becomes ‘uselessly trapped’ in an absurd hermeneutic.  
This is an ‘odd’ reading, and the next section now explores how it sits 
sympathetically with Ian Ramsey’s view of theological language as an ‘oddness’ 
of bafflement and excess. Whereas the clinical narrative pathologizes this 
inability/refusal,200 in radical opposition a view of ‘oddness’ as a privileged 
epistemology becomes a theological strength. To do this, a journey into 
language as excess now moves through Origen, doxological language, Descartes 
and Derrida. The end point and purpose of this journey is to vindicate the 
autistic hermeneutic, so that its ‘failure’ is inverted into a ‘pearl of great 
price,’ ultimately and potentially, it will be argued, the most theologically 
useful. 
 
1.4. Theological language as bafflement, oddness and 
excess  
 An early example: Origen 
An early theological hermeneutic providing establishing a language of 
‘literal-mindedness’ can be seen in Origen’s commentaries. Origen writes about 
the Song of Songs: 
It seems to me that this little book is an epithalamium, 
that is to say, a marriage-song, which Solomon wrote in 
the form of a drama and sang under the figure of the 
bride, about to wed and burning with heavenly love 
towards her Bridegroom, who is the Word of God.201 
                                          
200 Inability is Universal autism, and refusal is Conscious autism. 
201 Origen (184/185 – 253/254), The Song of Songs: Commentary and Homilies; Issue 26, Paulist 
Press, 195, P.21, e-book at 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Mjxy0Fl7VMsC&q=love#v=snippet&q=love&f=false 
accessed 14 July 2016 
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Origen is 
the originator of a 'dangerous' mode of interpretation (in 
the opinion of the Antiochenes) - the 'springboard' to 
'higher and more spiritual' meanings than are on the 
surface of the text.202  
(With the Old Testament) to be read not as a historical 
record but as a kind of message in cipher to be 
interpreted by those fit to do so, that is filled with the 
Spirit of Christ, for only so could the spirit of the 
scriptures be understood …it is the narrative which 
receives meaning in the light of Christ.203 
It might at first sight seem that an autistic ‘literal-minded’ reader would 
opt for a historical reading of Scripture, and this may be true. However this 
creates problems where the genre is poetic, as in this case. In fact, viewing 
Origen in an autistic theological light, it is the image which is real – the image 
does not so much “receive meaning in the light of Christ,” so much as actually 
be in the light of Christ.  
The ‘image’ is ‘real’. So in this case, there actually is a wedding of Christ 
and Church. This hermeneutic speaks to autism as a possible Incarnation of the 
word. This is a poetic word, which in subsequent chapters will be thought of as 
poetic sacrament, so that Incarnational metaphor is Real Presence. For a 
traditional neurotypical reading, the divine wedding is based on the human 
wedding. For Origen, this is reversed. The human wedding is a copy of the 
divine wedding, and the divine wedding is ‘more’ real. It is baffling to see how a 
church can be carnally related to God; but staying in that bafflement is the 
strategy of the privileged autistic theological hermeneutic. 
Doxological language: Ian Ramsay 
In Religious Language: An Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases, (1974 
(1957)), Ramsey describes the Christian revelation as a ‘disclosure situation.’ 
The word ‘disclosure’ in Ramsey’s argument has the meaning of an opening 
upon something utterly other and utterly given. It is an enigma, not in the sense 
of a ‘puzzle’ to be solved but a mystery to be inhabited. In the ‘disclosure 
                                          
202 Wallace-Hadrill, D S, Christian Antioch: a study of early Christian Thought in the East 
(Cambridge, UK; Cambridge University Press,1982) p.27; Wallace-Hadrill is referring to the early 
Church controversy between the historical hermeneutic of Scripture, by the church in Antioch, 
and the ‘allegorical’ hermeneutic of the church in Alexandria, with its Platonist influences. 
203 Wallace-Hadrill, Christian Antioch pp.28-9 
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situation,’ both (Scriptural) kerygmatic language and doctrinal language operate 
outwith a ‘normal’ propositional epistemology. This is not a situation where 
logic can reason towards assent through reasoned understanding:  
Christian doctrine … can only be justified on an 
epistemology very different from that which lay behind 
traditional views of metaphysics. In no sense is Christian 
doctrine a ‘super-science.’204 
Instead, ‘Prophetic language work(s) as disclosure language.’205 He 
describes this ‘disregard’ for logic in Peter’s preaching in Acts: 
Peter’s concern was first and foremost to evoke the 
distinctive Christian situation, and the logical behaviour 
of his words did not at all interest him. Here was the 
kerygma, the preaching, and its whole point was to 
evoke an appropriate situation of challenge and 
response.206 
Ramsay argues that true religious language, then, is doxological, and the 
point is to inhabit divine mystery with reverence. 207 This is a (non) sense 
beyond (not beneath or falling short of) logic. It requires a language other than, 
and beyond logic. This is the “foolishness of the gospel” and the skandalon 
(scandal/stumbling block);208 “neither Jews nor Greeks could formulate a 
credible language in which this preaching could be expressed.”209 This 
doxological language is a language of excess. Ramsey describes keygmatic 
prophetic language as: 
a riotous mixture of phrases … in effect a rough and 
ready attempt to secure that special logical impropriety 
needed to express the Christian message … St Peter’s 
concern was first and foremost to evoke the distinctive 
Christian situation, and the logical behaviour of his 
words did not at all interest him. Here was the kerygma, 
the preaching, and its whole point was to evoke an 
appropriate situation of challenge and response.210 
                                          
204 Ramsay, Ian, Religious language: An Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases (London, UK; 
SCM Press,1957) p.17 
205 ibid. p.152 
206 ibid. pp. 154-5 
207 ibid. p.185; Ramsay also sees disclosure as dependent on a quality of discernment, which 
could be compared to Newman’s concept of assent. 
208 1 Corinthians 1.23 
209 Ramsay, Religious Language, p.155 
210 ibid. pp. 154-5 
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He describes the anomaly of the disclosure situation in the ‘common-
sense’ world as ‘odd,’ and requiring an ‘odd’ language: 
Compared with ‘what’s seen’ and our appropriate 
attitude thereto, the characteristically religious 
situation – characterised by a ‘discernment-
commitment’ – (is) nothing if not odd … the currency for 
such an odd situation would have to be suitably odd 
language.211 
 
Bafflement as doxology and literal metaphor 
The ‘odd’ language of kerygma is not illogical but supra-logical. 
Encapsulating into doctrine what a poetic expression could describe “Our God 
contracted to a span/incomprehensibly made man”212 is baffling. Ramsey 
discusses how in doctrinal controversies, when opposing doctrinal statements 
are not resolved, their co-existence, even contradiction, is valid “in order to 
understand, as best they can, a mystery which is bound to exceed both their 
attempts.”213 If ‘odd’ disclosure in prophetic language is “riotous” and “rough 
and ready,” and ‘odd’ doctrinal language expresses “a mystery which is bound 
to exceed (its) attempt,” both of these discourses are discourses of excess. 
Bafflement is the expression of being faced with what cannot be contained, and 
the response to this mystery is praise. Praise as reverence is an attitude which 
keeps mindfulness of this mystery open. In an autistic hermeneutic this 
necessary “oddness” of doxological language is precisely the reverence where 
mystery is incarnate in the bafflement of literal metaphor. Theologically, the 
autistic hermeneutic keeps open the possibility of literal metaphor as the 
mysterious discourse which is the site of the Incarnation.  
The next step is to take autistic doxological bafflement as a way to 
outwit “the wisdom of the world.”214 To achieve this, language as this “odd” 
autistic incarnation will now be further explored in terms of post-Cartesian 
theology. This is the next stage of the journey towards deconstructive theology, 
                                          
211 ibid. p.151 
212 Charles Wesley, Let Earth and Heaven Combine (1745) 
213 Ramsey, Religious Language p.171 
214 1 Corinthians 3.19 
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which will work towards an autistic hermeneutic the mystical and the a-
theological. 
 
1.5. Incarnational metaphor and Wittgenstein 
Kerr’s critique of a totalising Cartesianism, thought as an autistic 
awareness 
To work towards an a-theological language for this autistic Incarnation, 
the end of Cartesian representation can be seen as a possibility of theology 
after Wittgenstein. Fergus Kerr’s Theology After Wittgenstein (1986) works 
towards this outwitting of the true theological foolishness of “the wisdom of the 
world.” Kerr brings Wittgenstein’s thought to bear on the philosophical 
underpinning of modern theologies. His argument is that Wittgenstein has been 
able to critique, disrupt and escape the Cartesian assumptions which create a 
totality which ‘boxes in’ theological thinking. Descartes’ cogito ergo sum (‘I 
think, therefore I am’) is in Kerr’s opinion theologically superficial, because this 
‘thought’ is in fact a totalising consensus of subjective thought as deductive 
reasoning. This deductive reasoning leads to the scientific rationalism which can 
represent being, as if in a graph of Cartesian co-ordinates. Thinking 
theologically within this Cartesian rationalism would be to reduce theology to a 
science limited to the parameters of human reason, with no place for mystery 
or excess.  
 
 
 Autistic hell, and the temptation to turn back 
Ironically, the Cartesian subjectivism of the ego is a communal consensus 
of the rules of scientific deduction, so that the isolated ‘I’ has become the 
consensus of the ‘we.’ The Cartesian co-ordinates used to plot a graph 
representing a mathematical formula are not only mathematical notation. In 
terms of representation thought in terms of a wider epistemology, Cartesian 
reason is an anthropocentric representational process where ‘we,’ the subject, 
create a world. 
92 
 
 
Thinking of Cartesian co-ordinates, there will be points in certain 
quadratic equations where infinity intrudes into the graph, so that co-ordinates 
cannot contain it. For example, it is impossible to calculate the precise value of 
π. Parmenides proves very simply that mathematically, infinity exists, because 
thinking of the largest possible number it is always possible to add one.  
 In the ‘graph’ of neurotypical subjectivity, assigned values could be 
considered as a function which assumes ‘certainty,’ side-stepping the points 
where impossible calculation disrupts the solution to the equation. The 
consensus of neurotypical reasoning becomes a totalising scientific ‘box’ which 
does not accommodate the radical otherness of autistic perception. Because it 
is the space of the incalculable, this stepping out of the box is ultimately an 
impossible, intolerable demand where absolute autism would inhabit the aporia 
of the parabola escaping representation. If I take the mathematical function 
‘literally,’ I enter infinity. Small wonder that this autistic ‘deviation’ is the 
spectre which therapeutic interventions work to mitigate, in person-specific 
autistic lived experience.215 Small wonder that as stated earlier, autistic people 
love science, where infinity can be contemplated and inhabited in the symbol ∞, 
but the ‘limiting concept’ of autistic literal metaphor is the destructive ‘fatal 
step’ of following logic to its ultimate conclusion. Interrogating Cartesianism 
‘too seriously,’ probing its aporias to push outside the neurotypical box, 
calculating it too utterly beyond ‘face value,’216 is the descent into autistic hell 
of infinite regression, where to calculate the value of π relentlessly and 
obsessively leads to inescapable infinity.  
Wittgenstein is a philosopher both of mathematics and language. His 
theory of language games exposes the ‘box’ for what it is – a game. It might 
seem logical that an autistic thinker would not participate in thinking of 
                                          
215 For example, the personal stories in Voices from the Spectrum often, and painfully, give 
accounts of intolerable situations where the autist does not fit into norms and expectations 
(Ariel, Cindy N. & Naseef, Robert A. (ed.)  
Voices from the Spectrum: Parents, Grandparents, Siblings, People with Autism, and 
Professionals Share their Wisdom (London, UK; Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2006) 
 
216 ‘Face value’ is an idea that will be developed in section 2.3.3, to argue that the exclusion 
from a ‘face value’ consensus is the possibility of an autistic deconstructive hermeneutic. 
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language as a game – surely a game is not literal at all? Perhaps, on the 
contrary, fascinated immersion in the game is a truer autistic mode. High 
functioning autists can be highly able mathematicians,217 and who is to say what 
kind of fascinating game is at work in the experience of RRBI’s? 218 Thinking 
Wittgenstein autistically, this as such does not fit into the security of Descartes’ 
cogito. Here it is necessary to think of two autistic scenarios. In one case, the 
security of the scientific method’s calculable logic could be seen as one reason 
for the preponderance of autistic talent in the sciences.219 It could be viewed as 
a refuge from the other autistic scenario.  
The other autistic scenario is the storm of absolute autism, as the 
anguished awareness of a looming mental world of endless wandering in the 
aporia of the infinite value which disrupts Cartesian co-ordinates. To inhabit 
this game is the theological thinking of an absolute autism where presence is 
known only as absence. The following sections will argue that the demands of 
this faith offer not security but glory and pure erotic ecstasy. Theological 
thinking which is willing to face this ultimate ‘marriage of heaven and hell’ 
needs the courage to look outside the box, in divergent strategies of thought 
and discourse. 
 
 Kung and Cupitt 
This speculation on a possible autistic disruption of Cartesianism can be 
thought theologically, and this section now returns to Kerr’s thinking of possible 
theologies which might take stock of this disruption.  
Kerr argues that Hans Küng and Don Cupitt’s theologies attempt to 
escape the ‘box’ of Cartesian rationalism, but fall into difficulty by remaining in 
its subjectivity. Thinking of strategies for an autistic theological possibility here, 
initially, Küng’s reading of Descartes, Pascal and Kierkegaard seems to offer a 
                                          
217 See Fitzgerald, Michael & Walker, A, Unstoppable Brilliance: Irish geniuses and Asperger’s 
Syndrome (Dublin, Eire; Liberties Press, 2014) 
218 See ‘sensory connoisseur’ in glossary. 
219 This concerns the discussion in the Introduction regarding WCC attention to detail, and 
fascination as repetition (Happé on practice, in ‘Autism and Talent’), WCC as difficulty ‘forming 
the bigger picture’, and ‘black and white thinking’ generate relentless obsessive thinking. 
Detail, pursued relentlessly, finds a ‘safe haven’ by its resolution in an unproblematic ‘physics’ 
which is not ensnared in the interrogation of ‘meta-physical’ critique. 
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promising theology of ‘escaping the box’ as autistic absence. Küng writes: “as 
there is no logically conclusive proof for the reality of reality, neither is there 
one for the reality of God.”220 This move away from “proof,” in an autistic 
reading of Küng, would be an absence from the box in a radical unknowing. This 
is untenable if one is to live in any kind of rational world. However, Kerr points 
out that this untenable position221 of utter doubt is escaped from only by a 
solitary ‘king ego;’ “the individual seems to be free to put what construction he 
will upon the surrounding world. The supposition is always that one is able to 
view the world from somewhere else – as if one were God, for example.”222  
Does this freedom of the individual to assert her/himself as a solitary 
creator of meaning not seem to answer to an autism of autos? It does, in fact, 
raise that possibility at the level of a ‘simplistic’ autism as considered earlier – 
but viewing the world as “from somewhere else” or “as if one were God” takes 
this solitary creator into another difficulty, which is a deeper autism.  
Kerr argues that Don Cupitt also offers a theology where “individualist 
libertarianism of the self-conscious autonomous individual (becomes) a solitary 
individual with the God’s eye view.”223 A Cartesian subjective systematisation, 
‘becoming God’ with a ‘God’s eye view’ in this emancipation of the subject, is 
in Barthian terms an idolatrous betrayal of the radical ‘No.’ It also raises the 
question of how the subject would in fact adequately attain a “God’s eye view,” 
“from somewhere else.” Nobody can really do this – and so, what is required is a 
“nobody.” This is the “nobody” which will now be explored. 
 
Kerr’s reading of Wittgenstein as Absolute Autism 
Kerr’s critique is of the Cartesian subject whose thinking ‘ego’ can 
produce an ‘ergo’ to secure assumptions of ‘scientific objectivity.’ Kerr’s aim in 
                                          
220 Footnote 28, ch. 1 in Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein p.16 
221 Untenable: un-tenable – what cannot be held (Latin tenere, ‘hold’); as ‘grasping,’ this 
indicates a way towards Heidegger’s ideas of receptivity where one cannot grasp, but only be 
‘grasped by.’ ‘Grasping’ is also resisted in Jean Luc Marion’s thinking of the gift, as the erotic 
phenomenon which outwits ontological difference (See Marion, (God Without Being: Hors-Texte 
(Dieu Sans l’être: Hors-texte) (trans. Thomas A Carlson), (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago/London, (1982)) pp. 97-99, where in the parable of the prodigal son, the father’s 
economy of gift surpasses the grasping quality of being as known by his sons’ desire to possess.  
222 Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein p.16  
223 Ibid. p.17 
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this is to argue against it, to give a context for his project of ‘Theology After 
Wittgenstein’. This theology is based on a claim that “the most illuminating 
exploration of the continuing power of the myth of the worldless (and often 
essentially wordless) ego is to be found in the later writings of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein.”224  
This “myth of (a) wordless and … wordless ego” forms the basis of a 
language which might bring to a theological absolute autistic metaphor a 
potential realisation, as a ‘post-Wittgensteinian theology.’ To think of ego as 
“wordless and worldless” is to disrupt the subject’s place, depriving it of voice 
and being in the world. This gives the possibility of a (non)ego, sliding, as it 
disappears, into what could be for an autistic hermeneutic a (non)ego which is 
‘autos.’ Thinking grammatically, ego (‘I’) is the active, interactive self of the 
first person personal pronoun. ‘I’ speak. To render ego wordless and worldless is 
to displace ‘I’ from ‘ego-ness.’225 The autistic hermeneutic here can explore the 
possibility of reading (non)ego as ‘autos,’ starting from this grammatical point 
of view. ‘Autos’ is self, but as a noun – it is not a personal pronoun, let alone a 
first person one. Instead, it has the sense of the same isolation and wordlessness 
which might suggest it could be a reading of this (non)ego.226 
This section will now argue that for literal metaphor, the ‘worldless and 
wordless ego’ offers this way to think of autos distinct from ego. A theological 
Wittgensteinianism, if thought in terms of absolute autism, loses even 
subject/object dualism in pure absent presence. To arrive at this claim, it is 
first necessary to establish what Kerr means by a theological thinking of the 
Wittgensteinian subject as a ‘worldless and … wordless ego.’ 
 
 
                                          
224 Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein p.23 
225 In chapter two, the sense of Blanchot’s writing that “the reader gives up saying I” 
expresses how this ‘escape from the box’ can be thought of as being in the space of poetic 
discourse. 
226 Elsewhere in this thesis it has been noted that the American charity Autism Speaks 
has been notorious for its stance which casts autism as the enemy to be not merely ‘cured’ but 
‘eradicated.’ This is not only offensive but ironic. In this case, it is precisely not autism which 
speaks, but its ‘enemies.’ The pint made earlier in connection with this still stands here; pure, 
essential absolute autism does not ‘speak’ at all, and paradoxically, in theological thinking, 
speaks by not speaking, as will be considered later in chapters Three and Four. 
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Kaufman and ego 
Turning to attempts at a post-Wittgensteinian theology, Kerr discusses 
Gordon Kaufman’s project of ‘transcendence without mythology’ where the 
theologian can “learn to acknowledge his metaphysical prejudice and disclaim 
it.”227 Kerr explains how Bernard Williams’ thinking undermines this claim. 
Eliminating prejudices is impossible. Ego cannot simply ‘step outside itself’ 
because we cannot escape our own personal mythologies.228 Williams’ critique 
of Kaufman therefore opens up the necessity for a (non)ego which could offer a 
space for a discourse for absolute absence. Kerr’s reading of Williams reasons 
that since presupposition-less objectivity is impossible, it requires “the 
elimination of the observer … To want the [Cartesian] absolute conception of 
reality is to aim at a description of things as they would be in our absence.”229 
This is an absolute irony and paradox, where Cartesian subjectivity 
deconstructs itself. Subjectivity (where the ego of the observer describes 
things) and objectivity (the description of things “as they would be in our 
absence”) are both utterly necessary yet both negate each other.230 
Wittgenstein (like a good autist) thinks through this paradox by a thought 
experiment in the idea of absolute solipsism.  Solipsistic total subjectivity would 
obliterate objectivity and therefore knowledge would both completely cease 
and yet simultaneously emerge in an absolute subjective realism, where ‘my 
cogito’ (think) becomes both ‘sum’ (‘I am’) and ‘est’ (‘It is’). 
In fact, with the important caveat that it is only metaphor, however 
tempting a speculative identification would be, quantum thinking again appears 
attractive in thinking of this as a singularity.231 This is a good illustration, 
because Wittgenstein describes the absolute knowing and absolute non-knowing 
                                          
227 Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein p.21 
228 This is the point Derrida makes in “White Mythology,” which will be considered in the next 
section. 
229 Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein p.24 
230 A quantum parable; subjectivity/momentum and objectivity/position can both be 
determined, but not simultaneously; see Hilgevoord, Jan and Uffink, Jos, "The Uncertainty 
Principle", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/qt-uncertainty/>. 
231 Another quantum parable; Infinite concentration of matter in a single point; see Curiel, Erik 
and Bokulich, Peter, "Singularities and Black Holes", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/spacetime-singularities/ . 
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as the elimination of self at the very moment of its fullest being: “The self of 
solipsism232 shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality 
co-ordinated with it.”233 234 
This is also Heideggerian because, as Kerr remarks, “as the self 
withdraws, the world in itself emerges.”235 World emerges only because 
ontological difference has been overcome in the withdrawal of metaphysical 
Being.236  
This can be read as the thought experiment of Absolute Autism. An 
autistic hermeneutic of the self withdrawing is pure mindfulness of separation 
into being, in Happé’s terms, ‘in a world of her own.’237 The emergence of the 
world in this (non)space is fascination. This is literal metaphor because 
Wittgenstein describes this reality as one where ‘he will regard humans and 
beasts quite naively as objects.’238  Reading this autistically, in terms of a 
literary-theological hermeneutic, this is the inhabitation of metaphor in which 
connotative meaning is absent, and pure, absolute autistic perception relates to 
the ‘object’ devoid of signification. The literal metaphor as a reading of this 
world composed of objects devoid of interpretation is not ‘stupid,’ unless it is 
the ‘stupidity’ of the holy fool. This comes back to Ramsay’s argument for 
religious language which was described earlier as overwhelming.  
Similarly, the apparent ‘stupidity’ or absurdity of Wittgenstein’s paradox 
of the logical conclusion of absolute solipsism is a way to express the aporia of 
                                          
232 As a thought experiment, Wittgenstein’s use of absolute solipsism in this example is useful as 
a comparison with absolute autism. They differ however: in solipsism, one believes only in one’s 
own reality; but in autism, one knows that there is the other’s reality, but that other reality is 
baffling, through Mindblindness. 
233 Ludwig Wittgenstein (ed. G H von Wright/ G E M Anscombe), Notebooks 1914-1916, 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1961, quoted in Kerr, Fergus, Theology after Wittgenstein (Oxford; 
Blackwell, 1986) p.26 
234 This is a language which could interestingly link the (non)ego with Iser’s virtual work of 
literature, discussed in the next section. as it is also rethought in Roland Bathes’ assertion of 
the coincidentia oppositorum of absence/presence, death/life in his remark that “literature, 
like phosphorus, shines with its maximum brightness at the point of its extinction,” and this 
connection will be explored later in this chapter where the literal metaphor of the autos is a 
paradox of both literary and theological thinking. 
235 Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein p.26; Heideggerian aletheia will be discussed in a later 
section. 
236 This will be discussed in chapter two, as Blanchot’s Space of Literature opens up the 
possibility of poetic being as Dasein. 
237 See autistic isolation and fascination, in glossary 
238 Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916 p.82, quoted in Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein p.27 
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the way in which Cartesian scientific thought undoes itself. Literal metaphor 
inhabits this space by rendering language incapable of representation (“quite 
naively as objects”) and holding ‘object’ as pure presence, paradoxically also 
the pure absence of giving or receiving meaning. A language which operated as 
pure autism would be total communication and total silence, ‘communing’ with 
the object in naïve reception of it as presence, yet also at the same time 
inhabiting the absence in which connotative meaning withdraws. This paradox 
would be expressed in the discourse of ‘bafflement’ and overwhelming of the 
holy fool discussed in the Introduction. 
 
 “Wittgenstein’s Autism” 
This is strikingly brought back ‘down to earth’ in a remark of 
Wittgenstein’s which could be read almost as a definition of ‘actual real, 
everyday autism.’239 Baron Cohen’s Theory of Mind mechanism, as was discussed 
in the introduction, is the inability to intuit the intentionality of the other 
person, which resonates with an account of Wittgenstein’s approach, as 
reported in his students’ notes. Kerr recounts: 
Wittgenstein sought to bring out the power of ‘the 
strange illusion’ which possesses us ‘when we seem to 
seek the something which a face expresses whereas, in 
reality, we are giving ourselves up to the features 
before us.’240 It is as if, when we look at a man’s face, 
we had to check the outward expression against ‘a 
mould made ready for it in our mind.’ … We cannot take 
anyone at face value; the meaning is concealed behind 
the phenomena.241 
 
Wittgenstein, for the autistic reader, is here offering a discourse in which 
a conscious autism can situate itself, to challenge the (absolute) neurotypical242 
assumption that there is no (innate) ‘autistic-ness’ in the world; that 
understanding the other is unproblematic in a perfect marriage of subjectivity 
                                          
239 This is not to attribute clinical autism, as a speculative retrospective diagnosis as 
practised by Fitzgerald, Baron Cohen and others. Instead, it is to credit Wittgenstein with 
insight which sheds light on the perspective offered by the autistic theological hermeneutic. 
240 Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, (Oxford UK; Blackwell, 1958), p.166 
241 Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein p.164 
242 See absolute autism and autistic spectrum in glossary 
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and objectivity. This would be the (absolute) neurotypical assumption that total 
Mindreading can offer a genuine objective understanding to the subjective 
Mindreader. “We cannot take anyone at face value; the meaning is concealed 
behind the phenomena” reads as a classic conscious autism in its awareness of 
Mindblindness. 
Kerr draws attention to another passage from Wittgenstein which could 
read, for the purposes of an autistic hermeneutic, as an invitation to become 
aware of universal autism (consciously understood or strategically adopted) in 
another sense. This is the issue of extreme attention to detail, resonant with 
autistic fascination manifest in savant talent.243 As the introduction explained, 
Weak Central Coherence (WCC) theory sees this as a pathology where ‘common 
sense’ fails to integrate detail into a ‘bigger picture,’ but here Wittgenstein 
appears, to the autistic reader, to invite a celebration of this ‘weakness’ as 
another kind of awareness. Wittgenstein’s remarks, and Kerr’s comments on 
them, are worth quoting at length: Kerr writes that 
The voice of common sense assures us that we describe 
things as well as we need to; but the idea of a 
description that is infinitely finer than our clumsy 
powers can ever achieve is not as easily expelled. 
According to students’ lecture notes, Wittgenstein once 
made the following suggestion: 
‘One often has the experience of trying to give an 
account of what one actually sees in looking about one, 
say, the changing sky, and of feeling that there aren’t 
enough words to describe it.244 One then tends to 
become fundamentally dissatisfied with language. We 
are comparing the case with something it cannot be 
compared with. It is like saying of falling raindrops, ‘Our 
vision is so inadequate that we cannot say how many 
raindrops we saw, though surely we did see a specific 
number.’245 
Kerr comments on this: 
                                          
243 The ‘Rain Man/Forrest Gump/holy fool’ archetype as discussed in the Introduction. 
244 [Language as (social) cultural construction betrays the limiting power of social 
consensus. The ‘Eskimo words for snow’ example, although frequently exaggerated, is not 
totally discredited: ‘In short, no matter the type of term it uses to refer to a particular type of 
snow or ice, Inuktitut has a far superior ability to distinguish between them than most 
languages.’ (http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/inuktitut-words-for-snow-and-
ice/ (2015 edit)] 
245 Wittgenstein’s Lectures Cambridge 1932-1935, ed. Alice Ambrose, (Oxford; 
Blackwell, 1979, p.63 
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The fact is that, since it makes no sense to talk of the number 
of drops we see during a shower of rain (people would smile 
patiently if we did), we need not reproach ourselves for being 
powerless to say precisely how many we saw … it startles us 
into realising that we do have an ideal of exactitude or 
completeness at the back of our minds which very easily 
imposes itself inappropriately. (After all, I must have seen a 
specific number of raindrops).246 
 
Kerr’s language of ‘common sense smiling patiently’ at 
‘inappropriateness’ echoes the neurotypical difficulty in appreciating the value 
of autistic fascination’s attention to fine detail. The point here, however, is not 
to digress into the temptation of the ‘retrospective diagnosis’ genre, and to 
speculate on a notional ‘Wittgenstein the autist,’ but to think about how 
Wittgenstein’s remarks about faces and raindrops make sense if appropriated in 
a specifically literal autistic hermeneutic. In the ‘face’ passage, the issue is that 
of the ‘meaning concealed behind the phenomena,’ which, in the last analysis, 
is unavailable. Again, this is bafflement, and language seen as phenomena with 
unavailable meaning, for literal metaphor, is the inscrutable face. In the 
raindrops example, the issue for Incarnational metaphor is to see the ‘ideal of 
exactness’ (perhaps not of completeness, though) as absent presence made 
possible in a total seeing of phenomena as pure ‘things.’ This is theological as 
the autistic literal metaphor which is the Incarnation of Christ Crucified, absent 
presence in the text, as can now be explored.247 The ‘common sense’ 
perception of a shower of rain is displaced by the absurd and impossible 
attention to each drop of rain as a fascination of reverence and communion. 
Kerr expresses this when he states: “Philosophy, traditionally, begins in 
wonder. There is a sense in which Wittgenstein’s work puts an end to 
metaphysics by inviting us to renew and expand our sense of wonder.”248 
Wittgenstein writes, in a letter to Paul Engelmann: 
The poem by Uhland is really magnificent. And this is how it 
is: if only you do not try to utter what is unutterable then 
                                          
246 Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein p.165 
247 This will be also thought as’ haecceitas’/’ecceitas’ in Chapter Five 
248 Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein p.141 
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nothing gets lost. But the unutterable will be – unutterably! – 
contained in what has been uttered.249 
 
There are three points to make about this comment. Firstly, it of course 
echoes the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Proposition 7: "Whereof one cannot 
speak, thereof one must be silent," and this has been the assumption underlying 
the aporia Kerr has drawn on, as discussed above. Secondly, which Kerr finds 
hard to understand, it is not only the paradox and the holy place but also, 
surely, in the context of a personal letter, an appreciation of an economy of 
poetic style as exact, weighed, allusive and evocative.250 Thirdly, and perhaps 
most usefully for what follows in thinking through Incarnational metaphor, it is 
(un)saying within poetic discourse,251 which Kerr discerns in Augustine’s sermon 
where he thinks poiesis as music: 
At the harvest, in the vineyard, wherever men labour 
hard, they begin with songs whose words express their 
joy. But when their joy brims over and words are not 
enough, they abandon even this coherence and give 
themselves up to the sheer sound of singing. What is this 
jubilation, this exultant song? It is the melody that 
means our hearts are bursting with feelings which words 
cannot express. And to whom does this jubilation 
belong? Surely to God, who is unutterable. And does not 
unutterable mean what cannot be uttered? If words will 
not come and you may not remain silent, what else can 
you do but let the melody soar?252 
 
The setting of the vineyard betrays a conscious or unconscious permission 
for the Dionysian to disrupt Augustine’s Christian orthodoxy, risking 
transgression,253 and this excess of joy reflects, again, Ramsey’s thinking of 
religious language as excess.  Crucially, it is excess as musical/poetic language, 
which will be explored as Incarnational literal metaphor in more fully in the 
following chapters. In the a-theological thinking of this chapter, this is excess as 
                                          
249 Paul Engelmann, Letters, pp.6-7, quoted in Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein p.167  
250 Poetic style as a means to indicating the site of the holy will also be discussed further 
in chapter five, with reference to Gerard Manley Hopkins’s work. 
251 Not the common-sense perception of a shower of rain (dead, conventional metaphor) 
but the excess which counts the raindrops to observe and catch them poetically 
252 On Psalm 32, Sermon 1, 7-8, quoted in Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein p.167 
253 Elsewhere, Augustine, aware of the danger of music as a seductive force, wrestles 
with the difficulty of relating to the sensual as excess. [See Confessions XXIII.49-50]. Sensuality 
is an issue which will return in chapter three, as “experientialism.”  
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an unsaying, which thereby escapes metaphysics. To make this deconstruction 
of metaphysics more explicit, the next section now following is an autistic 
reading of deconstruction.  
 
1.6. Towards Incarnational metaphor as deconstructive 
a-theology 
The previous section has examined how incarnational metaphor might be 
approached in Wittgenstein’s thinking of the end of Cartesian metaphysics. This 
section now examines briefly how a deconstructive theology, building on this, 
can further approach a fully thought theological incarnational metaphor. To 
conclude this chapter as a groundwork for the following chapters, it is necessary 
now to explore briefly what is meant by the “trembling,” as indicated by 
Derrida, with which this chapter began. 
 
Disaster 
 Autistic disaster relates the sense of ‘not making sense’ of autistic 
bafflement to a similar sense of ‘not making sense’ described by Derrida: “The 
hesitation of these thoughts (here Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s) is not an 
‘incoherence’: it is a trembling proper to all post-Hegelian attempts and to this 
passage between two epochs.” 254 This ‘trembling’ is a fundamental instability 
in the terms Mark C Taylor discerns in the binary oppositions which attempt to 
fix language in place: “foundational couples like constative/performative and 
mimesis/poiesis are unstable or “undecidable.” Each passes into the other, 
thereby creating an irreducible obscurity that both beckons and frustrates 
thought.”255  
Frustration in the face of the world’s norms is a hallmark of living with 
autism, where an “irreducible obscurity” of the social world is baffling and 
overwhelming. The aim of bringing an autistic hermeneutic into literary-
                                          
254 Derrida, Jacques (trans. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, The End of the Book and the Beginning 
of Writing, in Of Grammatology (Baltimore/London; Johns Hopkins Press, 1997 (1974)) p.24  
255 Taylor, Mark C, Tears, p.215  
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theological hermeneutics is not to sanitize or heal this bafflement and 
overwhelming, but to listen to how it speaks to a kenotic (a) theology which 
embodies the wound that ‘tears’ and involves ‘tears.’ So where Taylor has 
written about “an irreducible obscurity that both beckons and frustrates 
thought,” this is where an autistic hermeneutic honours this frustration and 
obscurity with the insight of its presence. This will be expressed in chapter two 
as an (im)possible (a)-theology.256 The instability of language will be read as an 
autistic hermeneutic which finds itself in the writing which is the end of the 
Book, and for this reason, its ‘inability to make sense’ will be its strength, as it 
is read into Derrida’s words about this undecidability: 
The very oscillation of undecidability goes back and forth 
and weaves a text; it makes, if this is possible, a path of 
writing through the aporia. This is impossible, but no-one 
has ever said that deconstruction, as a technique or 
method, was possible; it thinks only on the level of the 
impossible and of what is still evoked as unthinkable.257 
Derrida’s words are written in a memorial of Paul de Man, and this 
connection is relevant in two ways. Firstly, this is a kenotic hermeneutic of 
sacrifice and loss; de Man’s post-holocaust writing precludes a simple 
resolution, and this is why frustration and bafflement persist. Secondly, de Man 
is celebrated as a poet, and this autistic hermeneutic works within the 
bafflement which is a universal poetry. This lack of sense will unfold in the 
subsequent chapters, but the reason for highlighting this now is to point out 
that any autistic hermeneutics will be utterly other than ‘normal’ thought would 
allow. 
 
The Disaster of White Mythology 
As this chapter has argued, neurotypical (non-autistic) metaphor operates 
by assuming a fixed and simple relationship between signified and signifier. This 
is so because it is straightforward to decode and appropriate the figurative (‘my 
sister of stone’) by effectively quarantining it (it is ‘only’ a metaphor). It does 
                                          
256 Mixing a poetics and a theology, where in Aristotle’s impossible possibility/possible 
impossibility, the latter is to be preferred. 
257 Derrida, Jacques, (eds. Avital Ronell & Eduardo Cadava), Memoires for Paul de Man (New 
York; Columbia University Press, 1989) p.135, quoted in Taylor, Tears, p.215  
104 
 
 
not perplex or disrupt the propositional (‘my sister has is impassive/hard-
hearted,’ etc., results from assuming that metaphor pragmatically indicates 
some quality ‘suggested’ by ‘stone’).258   
When metaphysics uses language, it also rests on this (neurotypical) 
distinction. Derrida argues that metaphysics’ certainty as propositional language 
works by forgetting its origin in metaphor. This works by using linguistic 
constructions of the world and forgetting that they are subjectively thought 
models. Ricoeur uses the term métaphore vive to indicate the inescapable 
nature of metaphor. Ricoeur argues that onto-theology as a master narrative 
exists only by betraying its origin in language: 
[The Thomist doctrine of analogy’s] express purpose is to 
establish theological discourse at the level of science and 
thereby to free it completely from the poetical forms of 
religious discourse, even at the price of severing the 
science of God from biblical hermeneutics.259 
 
Derrida sees this complacency about language as a ‘White Mythology:’ 
What is white mythology? It is metaphysics which has 
effaced in itself that fabulous scene which brought it into 
being, and which yet remains, active and stirring, inscribed 
in white ink, an invisible drawing covered over in the 
palimpsest.260 
 
Western metaphysics as a master narrative is a forgetting of the fact that 
it is also a mythology: 
What is metaphysics? A white mythology which assembles 
and reflects Western culture: the white man takes his own 
mythology (that is, Indo-European mythology), his logos - 
that is, the mythos of his idiom, for the universal form of 
                                          
258 In fact these examples also demonstrate the inescapability of metaphor after metaphor in 
discourse: ‘hard-hearted using the metaphor of ‘hardness’ and ‘impassive’ using the metaphor 
of passage, and this is Derrida’s point, as discussed below. 
259 Ricoeur, Paul (trans. Robert Czerny, Kathleen McLaughlin, John Costello, SJ), The Rule of 
Metaphor: The Creation of meaning in language (La métaphore vive) (London, UK; Routledge, 
2003 (1975)) p. 322 
260 Derrida, Jacques (trans. F C T Moore), White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy, 
in New Literary History, Vol. 6, No. 1, On Metaphor (Autumn, 1974), pp. 5-74 Published by: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/468341  p.11  
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that which it is still his inescapable desire to call 
Reason.261 
The key point here is the metaphor Derrida uses of white mythology, 
relevant to an autistic hermeneutic in both its homonymic senses of ‘white.’ 
‘White’ as race critiques imperialism and this will be considered in terms of 
capitalism in the next section. First, in this section, Derrida’s use of the colour 
‘white’ is examined in his sense of its being invisible ink on the page. White ink 
on a white page is the inescapable ubiquity of signs, with no black/white 
subject/object dualistic referential stability, playing in endless referentiality. 
The complacency with which language is used is critiqued by the idea of the 
trace, which is the continuous supplement, the inevitable step always 
backwards and forwards of linguistic reference in the endless tissue of 
narrative. There is no fixed place, because there is no anchor of the 
metaphysical God, as the transcendental signified. With no absent referent, 
presence is meaningless. The trace indicates the end of metaphysics.  
Thinking of autism as the trace means that the suppression of absence 
can be articulated, much as the guilelessness of the boy in the folk tale The 
Emperor’s New Clothes. Autistic literal metaphor resurrects the dead metaphor 
indicated by white mythology, actually by its very black and white thinking. A 
useful way to explain this is to refer back to the role of myth as it was 
described, in the introduction, in Kubo and the Two Strings. Kubo knows that 
the mythical power of ancestor worship is as the magical force of the singing of 
memory, and he also knows that the magical force of the singing of memory is 
as the mythical power of ancestor worship. White mythology reduces this 
pairing of myth and song into a play of signification which tries to equate; it 
looks for clarity (white light) to be the referee (adjudicator, and means of 
reference) – does singing ‘mean’ myth, or does myth ‘mean’ singing? The white 
myth is the myth of making a decision or a pronouncement, ironically having 
lost myth itself, as the spiritual discernment of the power of song as worship, 
and worship as song.  Dead metaphor is the forgetting of metaphoricity, and 
autistic literal metaphor is the re-problematising of it, which will be seen to be 
the outwitting of white myth, keeping writing open.  
                                          
261 ibid. 
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Coinage 
Derrida draws on Nietzsche’s metaphor of metaphysics as worn out 
coinage,262 and this metaphor conflates the use of coinage, in white mythology, 
as capitalist imperialism with the use of the currency of words. He adds: 
Moreover, to "usage" we may append the subtitle "wear and tear," 
and it is with this that we shall concern ourselves. And first of all 
we shall direct interest upon a certain wear and tear of 
metaphorical force in philosophical intercourse. It will become 
clear that this wear is not a supervenient factor modifying a kind 
of trope-energy which would otherwise remain intact; on the 
contrary, it constitutes the very history and structure of 
philosophical metaphor. But how can we make it discernible, 
except by metaphor?263 
The problem is that a ‘worn out’ metaphor can only be replaced with 
another metaphor, itself subject to usage as wear and tear. In anti-capitalist 
terms, in a capitalist society coins keep circulating, regardless of how defaced 
and defacing they are. The faceless consumer and the faceless producer lack 
value, because the only value is the worn-out face on the coin. 
The autistic coin – resisting tokenism 
In the introduction, mindfulness of separation and autistic fascination 
were described as two faces of a coin. This section returns that metaphor, in 
terms of autistic coins with autistic faces. This is useful because Derrida’s 
writing on defaced coins can suggest a way for incarnational metaphor to be 
thought alongside Derrida’s thinking.  
The trope of the token minority representative in film and television 
indicates that the black, or gay, or disabled character has no value except as a 
token gesture to a politically shallow form of inclusivity which keeps the 
marginal other under control or appeased. Tokenistic autism now appears 
                                          
262 “What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and 
anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations which have been enhanced, transposed, 
and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and 
obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they 
are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their 
pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.” [Nietzsche, Friedrich, On Truth and 
Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense part 1, On Truth and Lie in a Non-Moral Sense, CreateSpace 
Independent Publishing Platform 2015]  
263 Derrida, White Mythology p.6 
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perhaps to have been overtaken by a genuinely neurotribal assertion of autism 
as valued in its own right, if Silverman is right.  
In terms of white mythology, an autistic non-tokenism means that autistic 
metaphor has always absented itself from circulating defaced currency, and 
given that all currency defaces itself in its usage, this means that it has not used 
currency at all. Autistic people are drawn to shiny, spinning objects. When a 
coin ceases to be a coin, it becomes an object which can be polished to a 
(faceless) shine, and can be spun. A dead metaphor in endless circulation is 
‘polished up’ and ‘spun’ by autistic value which sees the image of value only as 
itself. A £1 coin doesn’t ‘mean’ £1, but only a coin, of value as a piece of 
metal. A transcendental signified which is dis-credited has never been taken on 
credit, because the transcendent is transcendent, and has always been, in 
mindfulness of separation.  
 
The Emperor’s New Coins 
In the second sense of the homonymic ‘white,’ white mythology is an 
imperialist master narrative, and its use of coinage is capitalism.  
In a Marxist reading, capital-ism decapit-ates itself by amassing capital 
without the value of the human face except as the face of a coin. The loss of 
the human face is the reduction of ‘thisness’264 into a mere pragmatic sign. 
Autistic metaphor resists capitalist decapitation by having always already been 
penniless in terms of pragmatic purchasing power. Joel Bregman, describing 
what this thesis terms autistic fascination, writes 
(with) Intense preoccupying interests … such individuals 
literally can become world experts on such topics, yet 
resist suggestions to transform this interest and knowledge 
into functional, meaningful or marketable skills.265 
Fascination is cherishing “thisness,” for its own sake, as chapter four will 
discuss. Incarnational metaphor as fascination inhabits the metaphor (the 
poetic) without ‘cashing it out.’ It escapes capitalist decapitation because it 
                                          
264 Translating haecceitas,’ ie., the value of the individual, which will be discussed in 
chapter four. 
265 Zager et al, p.14  
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‘has no capital’ (as finance, as the Capital Letters of a name,266 as a capital 
city, as the capital of a column, as ‘capus’ (head). In a sense, being ‘headless,’ 
it has always already been decapitated in terms of what Mark C Taylor calls art 
as the site of the Disaster, where metaphysics trembles in the irreducible 
obscurity that both beckons and frustrates thought.”267  
 
Barthes and Iser – “where your treasure is” 
Incarnational metaphor’s abnormality contains the privilege of already, in 
its penniless freedom, understanding the glory of the clash of 
unresolved/decoded meanings described earlier as excess and bafflement. This 
is a privileged insight into the disaster as it is prefigured in the death of the 
author. This is Roland Barthes’ phrase from his thinking of the death of God: 
‘We now know that a text is not a line of words releasing a 
single ‘theological’ meaning (the ‘message’ of the Author-
God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of 
writings, none of them original, blend and clash,’ and once 
the author is removed, the claim to decipher a text 
becomes quite futile. To give a text an Author is to impose 
a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to 
close the writing.’268 
Because autistic literal metaphor stays in the image, refusing to decode 
the branch of an organisation into a bureaucratic structure, it similarly refuses 
the “final signified,” and is living resurrection which does not “close the 
writing.” 
Wolfgang Iser, writing even before Barthes’ anticipation of Derrida’s 
deconstruction, also foresees the anarchic power of the living text as the death 
of metaphoric stability. Iser’s Implied Reader seems at first sight to exist in a 
neurotypical relationality, where the work of literature is realised in “an arena 
in which reader and author participate in a game of the imagination.”269 
                                          
266 In chapter five, autistic fascination will be thought of as namelessness in Pirandello’s novel 
Uno, Nessuno e Centomila (One, No-One and One Hundred Thousand) 
267 Taylor, Tears, p.215 
268 Barthes, Roland, The Death of the Author, in Image, Music, Text Image, Music, Text (trans. 
Stephen Heath), (London, UK; Fontana Press, 1977) pp.146-7. 
269 Iser, Wolfgang, The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan 
to Beckett (Baltimore, Maryland; Johns Hopkins University Press,1978) p.257 
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However this “arena” is not real, but virtual. The work of literature in fact 
exists in autistic separation from both,270 where reading is the reader’s utter 
separation from authorial intent; reading is using “our own faculty for 
establishing connections – for filling in the gaps left by the text itself.271 The 
reader is, then, ultimately a solitary figure, and reader and author are both 
separated by the implicit separation within the work itself, in its gaps. So Iser 
states that to perceive, “a beholder must create his (sic) own experience.”272 
The writer becomes absent, leaving the reader to “engage his imagination in the 
task of working things out for himself (sic),”273 and this is conscious autism when 
read as mindfulness of separation. This autism in the text itself seen as 
mindfulness of separation is equally autistic fascination occurring precisely in 
the separation. In the supreme authority of the novel as a rich text which 
withholds the ‘prize’ of configured meaning, “awareness of this richness takes 
precedence over any configurative meaning.”274 This richness-in-absence is read 
autistically as autistic fascination, and in subsequent chapters it will be seen 
theologically as a fascination in/of the incarnate crucified Christ in the kenotic 
realisation of the text. A fully incarnational metaphor is a kenotic theology of 
the Disaster instantiated in the work of art, where the trembling of the epoch 
indicated by Derrida is poetry, thought as “trembling on the edge of prayer.”275 
This is being absent from the economy of the sign, laying up no treasure on 
earth. On this basis, incarnational metaphor can now be considered in chapter 
two as an autistic discernment of apophatic fiction which is contemplative 
prayer. Its theological import will become increasingly clear in chapters two and 
three, progressing towards a theology of autistic incarnational metaphor.  
Thinking of autism in this very specific theological way draws on a wider 
narrative of thinkers such as Frith and Trevett who speculate on the autism of 
the (truly wise) ‘holy fool.’ This leads logically into the argument of this thesis 
as one key aspect of incarnational metaphor as seen in the autistic trinity. This 
                                          
270 This separation will be examined further with regard to Maurice Blanchot’s Space of 
Literature in chapter two 
271 Iser, The Implied Reader p.280  
272 Ibid. P.288 
273 Ibid. 
274 ibid. p.285 
275 Enda McDonagh, Prayer, Poetry and Politics, in Language, Meaning and God: Essays in Honour 
of Herbert McCabe OP, ed. Brian Davies OP (London, UK; Geoffrey Chapman Publishers, 1987), 
p.231 
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can be reasoned to be the autistic fascination which is the privileged insight 
belonging to the ‘holy fool.’ 
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Chapter two: Apophatic Fiction as 
Incarnational metaphor 
Introduction 
This chapter is the next stage in the journey towards Incarnational 
metaphor. Chapter one argued for a progression towards an autism of the 
deconstructed (a)theological text. This offered a discourse where an autistic 
hermeneutic of literal metaphor (with its fascination and mindfulness of 
separation) could give a reading where universal autism could support the 
validity of an (a)theological reading of the text. 
The next stage in the journey towards a full Incarnational metaphor is to 
step back from the 20th/21st century, and to consider an apophatic theology 
which can be read in a postmodern hermeneutic. The aims this chapter will 
work towards are arguments of mutual validation between apophatic and 
autistic theological thinking. This is firstly because this apophatic discourse can 
be read as an authenticity which receives new power when read through the 
theological voice of an autistic hermeneutic. Both modes of thinking, the 
apophatic and the autistic, are marginal voices, deserving to be heard as 
theologically significant. Secondly, it is an important forebear of the 
(a)theological thinking which was read autistically in the previous chapter. 
This is to read a more fully considered theological thinking of the autistic 
hermeneutic as a validation of apophatic discourse. As the Introduction to this 
thesis explained, arguing for universal autism as a validation of theological 
thinking is a big claim to make. However this is done by arguing that autistic 
perception is a legitimate hermeneutic which, in the ways each chapter 
explores, brings each chapter’s (deep, divergent, marginal) theological thinking 
to life in a new way. This is a reciprocal relationship where the concepts of each 
chapter’s theological discourse also validate autistic perception as a legitimate 
hermeneutic. 
An autistic postmodern reading of apophatic theology emerges through a 
series of connections which this chapter develops. The postmodern hermeneutic 
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used in this chapter is that of Maurice Blanchot’s thinking in ‘The Space of 
Literature,’ because the autistic hermeneutic will be shown to resonate with 
Blanchot’s thought. The apophatic discourses chosen to be read through 
Blanchot are Dionysius the Areopagite’s The Mystical Theology, Teresa of Àvila’s 
The Interior Castle, and John of the Cross’ The Interior Castle. These three 
writers of apophatic theology are chosen because they express a progression of 
narrative strategies which this chapter terms ‘apophatic fiction.’ This apophatic 
fiction will yield possibilities for an autistic hermeneutic to validate a particular 
type of authenticity which can be discerned when they are read through 
Blanchot’s thinking of the text. These connections are how the trinity of 
apophatic discourse, Blanchot’s ‘space of literature,’ and the autistic 
hermeneutic will relate to each other. 
Apophatic theology is distinguished from cataphatic theology. 
Translations of the Greek preposition kata is translated as ‘Down from, through, 
out, according to, toward, along.’276 These are all prepositions of material, 
spatial or conceptual relation. “According to” is a prepositional phrase which 
functions as a metaphor of physical connection to indicate the object partaking 
in the quality of its subject. 
So cataphatic discourse expresses a direct connection between subject 
and object which can be affirmed. It can be used to develop systematic 
theology which is constructed by affirming predicative statements.277 The 
                                          
276 Strong’s lexicon of New Testament Greek, online access at  
http://www.biblestudytools.com/search/?q=kata&rc=LEX&rc2=LEX+GRK&ps=10&s=References,   
accessed 25/1/2013 
277 Much Biblical commentary works by the reduction of the poetic power of metaphor to 
doctrinal formula. For example - Referring to Isaiah 49:23, “And kings shall be thy nursing 
father, and their queens thy nursing mothers, in a letter to William Cecil (May 1559), (Hastings 
Robinson, ed., The Zurich letters: Comprising the Correspondence of several English Bishops 
and others with some of the Helvetian reformers, during the early part of the reign of Queen 
Elizabeth, (Second Series. A.D. 1558-1602), (Cambridge, UK; Cambridge University Press, 1845, 
p. 35), Calvin writes that “God promised by the mouth of Isaiah that queens should be the 
nursing mothers of the church.” Calvin ‘does the job for the reader’ by interpreting the 
narrative – the queens are nursing the Church. Isaiah’s prophetic genre, which as prophecy 
would require the reader (or hearer) to question what this narrative means for her (thought 
probably, for him) or even for us, as a soul-searching response. Calvin as a theologian closes 
down the poetic space by appropriating the metaphor’s ambiguity and reducing it to a dead 
metaphor, which propositional language; the state has a duty to safeguard the Church. In this 
way an ‘apo-’opening is closed down into a ‘cata-’resolution. This is the ‘task’ of theology as 
theo-logy: to classify and organize ‘ho theos’ into a (quasi-scientific) ‘-logy.’ This section 
establishes the distinction between the two different strategies of metaphor here to clarify how 
apophatic theology is distinctive. A useful remark on this is Teresa of Àvila’s account of her 
divergent theological method, where she meditated on “the living poetry of this (Bible) verse” 
‘The Interior Castle trans. Starr p.57) 
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reader relates ‘directly’ (unproblematically) to this statement (in fact accepting 
spatial metaphors unconsciously, as ‘dead metaphors.’278  
The Greek preposition ‘apo’ is translated as follows: ‘Of separation, 
distance physical, of distance of place; temporal, of distance of time or origin 
of the place whence anything is, comes, befalls, is taken of origin or 
cause.’279Again the metaphor is of spatial relation, but a relation which is 
interrupted. Theologically, this discourse arises from a theology of the 
transcendence of God.  
Apophatic discourse, as separation, is the breakdown of the relationship 
which cataphatic discourse employs. For this reason, apophatic theology is also 
called ‘negative theology’ or ‘mystical theology.’ In fact, the two are 
inseparably related, because systematic theology affirms through cataphatic 
language the site where apophatic language needs to disrupt it, in order to 
explore the paradoxes which are implicit within it. In fact, cataphatic theology 
without the complement of the apophatic would probably not truly be theology, 
in that it would fail to consider the issue of the transcendence of God. 
Straight away, this indicates a potential autistic reading of apophatic 
discourse as mindfulness of separation; discourse itself as distancing, and 
Mindblind in the face of the transcendence of God. The following sections now 
argue that the apophatic discourses of the mystics it considers can be read in 
terms of an ‘apophatic fiction’ which has resonance both as Blanchot’s 
authenticity of the space of literature and, from there, an autistic theological 
integrity of Incarnational metaphor. 
This chapter creates the neologistic term ‘apophatic fiction’ to explore 
how the genre of fiction might be a strategy for ‘expressing what cannot be 
expressed’ by cataphatic discourse. It argues that the three mystics considered 
are all using fiction as a narrative strategy to outwit the limits of cataphatic 
theology. They are writing apophatic theology ‘as’ fiction, and fiction ‘as’ 
apophatic theology, in the confluence which is termed ‘apophatic fiction.’ This 
is similar to Michel de Certeau’s thinking of mystical writing in this period as 
“the mystic fable,” where eros, not only in the secular Courtly Love genre but 
                                          
278 Without the creative problematisation of dead metaphor which the autistic hermeneutic of 
literal metaphor involves [see chapter two]. 
11. Strong’s Concordance of New Testament Greek   
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equally in mystical writing, has become “a “nostalgia” connected with the 
progressive decline of God as One, the object of love.”280 
Developing the concept of apophatic fiction will be considering how 
strategies of metaphor can ‘indicate what cannot be indicated.’ Working 
towards Incarnational metaphor in section five, apophatic fiction will be read in 
terms of a ‘literal’ metaphor which can only be theological. This will be where 
the (unreal) ‘real’ of the text will be ‘literally’ more real than the ‘real’ 
referent which chapter two’s neurotypical common sense ‘reduction to simile’ 
would ultimately fail to truly theologically think. 
 
2.1 The Mystical Theology as apophatic fiction 
Dionysius as a theological thinker 
In his introduction to Dionysius the Areopagite’s ‘The Mystical Theology 
and The Divine Names,’ C E Rolt encapsulates the need for apophatic discourse 
very simply; apophatic discourse arises as “merely a bold way of stating the 
orthodox truism that the Ultimate Godhead is incomprehensible: a truism which 
Theology accepts as an axiom and then is prone to ignore.” 281 This is so in 
Christian theology because “the various Names of God are … mere inadequate 
symbols of That Which transcends all thought and existence.”282 This means 
that, far from annulling or contradicting orthodox theology, apophatic theology 
expresses what is implicit in orthodox theology. Therefore negative theology is 
best understood not as the negation of theology, but the theology of 
negation.283  
In the inadequacy of these “names,” it relies on a narrative strategy of 
metaphor which deviates from the strategy of cataphatic theology, but is still a 
crafted discourse profoundly rooted in and expressing theological thinking. It is 
                                          
280 De Certeau, The Mystic Fable p.4; one could also see the emergence of new religious 
movements as a response to this religious crisis, and as de Certeau points out, “heresy 
abounded” (The Mystic Fable p.18) DETAILS 
281 Dionysius the Areopagite (trans. C E Rolt), The Mystical Theology and the Divine Names (New 
York; Dover Publications, 2004) p.7 
282 ibid. 
283 See Turner, Denys, The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge, UK; 
Cambridge University Press, 1999 (1942)) p.22 
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this strategy of abnormal metaphor which qualifies Dionysius as a creative 
writer, reworking language as follows.  
Dionysius is an original and creative thinker. Denys Turner writes: 
‘mystical theology’ in the West is in itself unintelligible 
except against the background of [Dionysius’] writings … 
if and insofar as ‘mystical theology’ is the product of 
the convergence of sources in Plato and Exodus … then 
it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that Denys [sic] 
invented the genre for the Latin Church.284  
Dionysius draws on the story of Moses’ ascent of Mount Sinai, where 
Moses confronts the darkness which hides the face of God. He combines this 
Scriptural imagery with the Platonic myth of the cave, where Socrates describes 
the prisoners in the cave who “deem reality to be nothing else than the shadows 
of (unseen puppets).”285 Turner argues that by fusing the imagery of the Exodus 
and Platonic narratives, Dionysius “made a theology out of these metaphors 
without which there could not have been the mystical tradition that there has 
been: ‘light’ and ‘darkness,’ ‘ascent’ and ‘descent,’ the love of God as eros.”286 
Thinking autistically, when the story of Moses on Mount Sinai is thought 
through an autistic hermeneutic, the darkness hiding God’s face is pure 
mindfulness of separation. Similarly, the Platonic myth of the cave is pure 
Mindblindness, because seeing ‘only shadows’ is the inability to understand the 
face of the other. 
 
Dionysius’ rhetoric of negation: “by a rejection of all 
knowledge, he possesses a knowledge that exceeds” 
However, Dionysius’ apophatic theology is not simply ‘of’ a hidden God, 
but of what the ‘hiddenness of God’ means for, and in, language. Turner 
explains that ‘apophasis’ means “the breakdown of speech, which, in face of 
the unknowability of God, falls infinitely short of the mark … [if] theology 
means “discourse about God,” or “divine discourse,” so the expression 
“apophatic theology” ought to mean something like: “that speech about God 
                                          
284 Ibid.p.13 
285 Plato, Republic 515C, quoted in Turner, The Darkness of God p.14 
286 Turner, The Darkness of God p.13 
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which is the failure of speech.”287 Dionysius’ linguistic strategy for ‘apophasis’ is 
for metaphor itself to become a distancing from or even within itself. He does 
this by conjoining metaphors which consume each other by negating themselves 
in their combination. This is why Dionysius employs light as darkness, for 
example:  
where the mysteries of God’s Word/lie simple, absolute, 
unchangeable/in the brilliant darkness of a hidden silence 
… [where thou] shalt be led upwards to the Ray of that 
divine Darkness which exceedeth all existence.288  
Dionysius draws on the narrative of Moses on Mount Sinai as a way to 
express the apophatic opening which is achieved not by rejecting intellectual 
theology but by using the mind to advance to its limit: 
His incomprehensible presence is shown walking on the 
heights of His holy places which are perceived by the 
mind; and then It breaks forth, even from the things that 
are beheld and from those who behold them, and plunges 
the true initiate unto the Darkness of Unknowing … united 
by his highest faculty to Him that is wholly Unknowable, of 
whom thus by a rejection of all knowledge he possesses a 
knowledge that exceeds his understanding.289 
Expressing this paradox of “a knowledge that exceeds his understanding 
by a rejection of all knowledge” is the attained by the linguistic strategy of the 
self-negation of language itself, as knowledge as the renunciation of knowledge. 
Denys Turner calls this a “self-subverting utterance” which “first says something 
and then, in the same image, unsays it.”290 Dionysius’ theological thinking is 
that God as absolute origin is beyond even any language of being: requires a 
strategy beyond affirmation or negation. He explains that this is because of the 
nature of God as absolute origin: 
 We do not say that the fire which warms or burns is 
itself warmed or burned. Even so if anyone says that 
Very Life lives, or that Very Light is enlightened, he will 
be wrong.291 
                                          
287 ibid. p.20 
288 Mystical Theology p. 191-2 
289 ibid. p.194 
290 Turner, The Darkness of God p.21 
291 Dionysius, Mystical Theology p.75 
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This is expressed as self-subverting utterance, to go beyond the powers 
either of affirmation or negation. The need for this strategy is discussed at 
length in the discursive ‘learned’ narrative of Dionysius’ Divine Names, and it is 
a carefully reasoned work of 140 pages. In contrast, The Mystical Theology, in 
only 11 pages, puts this strategy to work as an experiment in the creative 
practice of metaphor as self-subverting utterance. 
This creative writing of theological thinking has potential to be thought 
of as autistic literal metaphor. In Dionysius, metaphor as separation is utterly 
radical, with the self-subverting strategy of metaphor cutting off every 
connection except to its own paradox; Very Life ‘does not live,’ and Very Light 
‘is not enlightened.’ This moves towards the coincidentia oppositorum where 
theological thinking might see literal metaphor as an ‘impossible possibility,’ 
where Life and Light do not ‘refer’ to living and enlightening. They are ‘shut up 
inside’ the metaphor, in autistic failure/refusal to decode them as an ostensive 
intent. 
2.2 The Interior Castle as apophatic fiction 
This section puts forward an argument for Teresa of Àvila’s The Interior 
Castle as apophatic fiction. First, its apophatic theological thinking needs to be 
established, then its narrative strategy as fiction. The two can then be related 
as apophatic fiction, amenable to Blanchot’s authenticity of the text, and in 
turn autism’s integrity of literal metaphor. 
Fact or fiction? 
This section argues that Teresa’s mysticism is grounded in apophatic 
theological thinking. This is an argument which rescues her work from an 
experientialist hermeneutic. Denys Turner defines experientialism as “a rival 
practice which displaces that Christian ordinariness [of “worship, prayer and 
sacrament”] … It abhors the experiential vacuum of the apophatic, rushing to 
fill it with the plenum of the psychologistic … [resulting in] deformations of the 
spirit.”292  
                                          
292 Turner, The Darkness of God p.259 
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Both Turner and Starr note that Teresa’s pupil, John of the Cross, felt 
that there was a danger of experientialism in Teresa’s writing,293 and the 
extreme sensory physicality of her narrative, along with her use of the word 
‘supernatural,’ support the view that Teresa views supernatural experiences as 
‘real;’ however this begs the question of what ‘real’ could mean in this context.  
This chapter’s strategy follows the thinking of Bernard McGinn and Denys 
Turner, both of whom read Teresa as a theological writer.294 The logic of this 
chapter is, primarily, to disregard the complex and ultimately unverifiable 
question of Teresa as an experientialist writer. Instead, a non-experientialist 
reading can look for ways that the text works as a theological thinking and a 
narrative using the genre of fiction. However, this chapter also tends towards a 
reading of Teresa as a less straightforwardly experientialist writer than is often 
thought, on the grounds that Teresa is writing a highly creative, intellectually 
grounded narrative. This outwits the experientialism debate if the idea of 
‘experience’ in the text is rethought as a narrative embodiment of apophatic 
theological thinking. A useful way to consider this could be to bring Teresa’s 
work alongside Italo Calvino’s thinking on livelli di realtà (levels of reality). 
Calvino writes:  
La letteratura non conosce la realtà ma solo livelli. Se 
esista la realtà di cui i vari livelli non sono che aspetti 
parziali, o se esistano solo i livelli, questo la letteratura 
non può deciderlo. La letteratura conosce la realtà dei 
livelli e questa è una realtà che conosce forse meglio di 
quanto non s'arrivi a conoscerla attraverso altri 
procedimenti conoscitivi. E' già molto. 
 
(Literature knows no reality, but only levels.  If a reality 
exists of which the various levels are only partial 
aspects, literature cannot decide this. Literature knows 
the reality of levels, and this is a reality which perhaps 
recognizes this better than by way of other ways of 
                                          
293 ibid. p.250, see also Starr (trans) The Interior Castle p.13 
294 Drawing on McGinn, Bernard, Foundations of Mysticism Volume 1: The Presence Of God: A 
History of Western Christian Mysticism (London, UK; SCM Press, London, 1991) and Turner, 
Denys, The Darkness of God 
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knowing. And that, already in itself, is quite a lot.) [this 
author’s translation]. 295 
When Calvino writes that literature knows only levels, but thereby knows 
già molto (already a lot), this understated validation of literary epistemology 
sits well with Teresa’s literary-theological vision.296 Teresa the narrator 
sometimes laughs at her own inadequacy as a writer297 but this is possibly an 
ironic comment, as will be discussed later. It is also a theological statement, in 
the face of apophatic “expressing what cannot be expressed;” in the face of the 
greatness of God, she recognises the vital need for humility.298 It would be 
unthinkable to feel that her writing, or any writing, would be adequate. 
However she does not thereby lack writerly ability or sophistication. In fact she 
is operating on multiple levels, in a sophisticated way. Heart, soul, body, 
temporality, a-temporality, intellect, memory and imagination are all part of 
her conceptual array, and metaphor seems ‘confused’ with apparently 
‘experiential’ narrative, almost impossible to untangle. The levels seem 
indistinguishable. This is precisely the point. Livelli di realtà, about which 
literature “cannot decide,” are theologically irrelevant, ultimately, in The 
Interior Castle. Not only does the narrator “see the world for what it is: 
illusion,”299 but also she becomes able to see through the illusion, and discern 
the collapse of ontological difference: “what is revealed to the soul is that all 
things can be seen in God because God has all things inside himself.”300 So 
natural/supernatural/literal/literary/theological “things” all exist in God while 
                                          
295 Italo Calvino, I livelli della realtà, (1978), in Una pietra sopra, in Calvino, Saggi, (Milan, 
Italy; Meridiani/Mondadori, 1995), pp. 381, 398) (trans, R Dunster) 
See also Dunster, Ruth (2010), The Abyss of Calvino’s deconstructive writing: an apology for 
Non-foundational theology, http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1961/1/2010dunstermth.pdf  
296 As rough notes in the writing of this thesis abbreviated The Interior Castle to IC, it recalls 
previous work on Italo Calvino (see previous footnote) where another IC  stood for Calvino’s 
Invisible Cities. It would be possible, in future research, to explore similarities between both 
dwellings as non-foundational spaces of discourse. 
297 Eg, Interior Castle p.275: “These metaphors make me laugh at myself. I’m not satisfied with 
them, but I can’t come up with any others.” Often, at the beginning and end of sections, she 
begs for God’s help because she finds writing so difficult, and her writing as inadequate; 
humility, but also apophatic theological awareness. 
298 Humility can hardly be over-emphasised in Teresa’s work, as a fundamental truth and an 
essential practice – eg. Teresa of Àvila (trans. Cohen, J M), Life of Teresa by Herself (London, 
UK; Penguin, London, 1957) pp. 85, 88, 118, and Interior Castle pp. 80, 90, 141, 190, 226, 247, 
289  
299 Teresa of Àvila, Interior Castle pp.246-7 
300 ibid. p.244 
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simultaneously not existing in illusion. The text knows “all these levels,” and 
‘reality’ is irrelevant, through faith, as an illusion. 
If The Interior Castle is an ‘experientially’ rich apophatic fiction, then 
this offers real theological possibilities in terms of autistic literal metaphor, 
because the autistic ‘literal’ reading of truth,301 surpassing ‘normal’ reading, 
can discern this authenticity of the text as authentic apophatic truth-bearing. 
 
Teresa as a theological thinker 
This section presents an argument for Teresa’s theological literacy as 
follows. Her Life by Herself records that she travels widely, working to establish 
a reformed order, and converses often with ‘men of learning’ (theologians). 
When she expresses frustration with the theologians she meets, it is not that 
they lack theological expertise but that they are unaware of its apophatic 
potential.302 303 
An important statement in The Interior Castle from Teresa the narrator 
crucially sheds light on the question of Teresa as a theological thinker. Teresa 
writes that “Men of learning seem to get theology without much effort. But we 
women need to take it all in slowly and muse on it. We need to feel it.”304 This 
is a statement that needs to be considered with great care in the context of her 
rhetoric about her status as a theological thinker. She writes more than once 
about her ‘inferior status’ as an ‘unlearned’ woman.305 However a double irony 
                                          
301 This ‘literal’ reading can also be seen as a the ‘second naïveté’ discussed earlier (Ricoeur, 
Paul, The Symbolism of Evil) which echoes T S Eliot’s Little Gidding:  
“And the end of all our exploring  
Will be to arrive where we started  
And know the place for the first time.” 
302 See Teresa of Àvila, The Interior Castle pp.121, 123, also Teresa of Àvila (trans. Cohen, J M), 
Life of Teresa by Herself (trans. J M Cohen) p.100 
303 Peter Tyler in Teresa of Àvila writes that the teacher Fray Osuna is Teresa’s ‘spiritual 
maestro,’ and his language of ‘gustoes espirituales’ (spiritual ‘delights’ (tastes) influences her 
frequent imagery of ‘tasting’ the sweetness of Christ. This invites an experientialist reading in 
keeping with contemporary 16th century Charismatic movements, but Osuna actually explains his 
teaching as a ‘hidden theology’ to which ‘ordinary’ (cataphatic) theology is an introduction. His 
language of ‘hidden theology’ in this sense reads as an echo of Dionysius’ language discussed in 
section 1 (Tyler, Peter, Teresa of Àvila, Doctor of the Soul (London, UK; Bloomsbury Publishing, 
2013) p.40) 
304 Teresa of Àvila, Interior Castle p.44 
305 For example pp.250, 67; also Life p.75. Starr in her introduction to The Interior Castle states 
that she has edited the text to take away the extreme self-deprecating tone of many of Teresa’s 
remarks (see Starr pp.15-16) 
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can be read into these remarks. Firstly, they can be read as the irony of a 
woman subverting the dominant male perception that a woman can’t be a 
theologian, Secondly, the deeper irony would be that her very deviation from 
their cataphatic theology is actually more deeply theologically insightful.306 
“Feeling it” would be the meeting point of a (more) genuinely devout faith – but 
what is the ‘it’ which is being ‘felt?’ This ‘it,’ “taken … all in more slowly and 
mused upon”307 is actually the theology of the men of learning. This suggests 
the irony that women might in fact better theological thinkers, ‘musing’ more 
deeply and therefore more capable of apophatic theological thinking. The next 
section will now explore what her theological thinking might be.  
The irony of Teresa, the ‘unlearned’ theological thinker, being actually 
more deeply learned, resonates with the narrative of the autism of the holy 
fool, whose ‘naïveté’ enacts the boy’s ‘exposure’ of true nakedness in the story 
of ‘The Emperor’s New Clothes.’ Teresa, the ‘unlearned’ writer, performs the 
resurrection of metaphor in mystic fable, and the autistic hermeneutic of 
incarnational metaphor, in (but only in) the space of the literary-theological-
autistic bridge, can also resurrect Teresa’s ‘fabulous’ [splendid, fable-ous] work 
as ‘literally’ the wisdom of God, a divine eros which Teresa, like Origen, offers 
as ‘more true.’  
 
The Interior Castle as Augustinian theological thinking 
Teresa’s first experience of monastic life was in an Augustinian 
convent,308 and Rowan Williams writes about “her beloved Augustine.”309 Both 
Peter Tyler and Rowan Williams trace the influence of Augustine on her 
theological thinking. Tyler comments: 
Throughout the Life Teresa tells us how important books 
had been … Augustine, Jerome and Bernardino de 
Laredo had initiated her into the spiritual language of 
the Catholic Church.310 
                                          
306 See Life p.121 
307 Also, “for many years I read a good deal and understood nothing; and for a long while, 
although God taught me, I could never find words” (Life p.86) indicates that she has cultivated 
a theological education. 
308 See Starr, Mirabai, Introduction, The Interior Castle p.6. 
309 Williams, Teresa of Àvila p.140. 
310 ibid. p.102; see also pp.24-5 
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Teresa’s autobiographical Life records: “As I began to read [Augustine’s] 
Confessions, it seemed to me that I saw myself in them.”311 This is a theological 
thinking in the context of the alumbradismo movement as an influence on 
Teresa, where, with a “mind receptive to God,” it builds on “medieval 
Augustinian theology.”312 
It is therefore not unreasonable that “musing deeply,” she is performing 
an equally theological thinking of Augustine’s theological reworking of the 
Neoplatonic ‘anamnesis’ (un-forgetting of the pre-existing soul)313 as profound 
immanence. 
Augustine writes: 
do not go outward; return within yourself. In the inward 
man dwells truth) …314 You were within me, and I was in 
the world outside myself.315 
Teresa writes: 
I urge those of you who have not begun to go inside 
yourselves to enter now, and those of you who are already 
in: don’t let warfare make you turn back.316 
The trope of the interior castle, with a sequential narrative of ‘dwellings’ 
or rooms ever more inner, reads as an outworking of Augustine’s conviction that 
lacking spiritual consciousness is being ‘outside,’ but God is within. Augustine’s 
thinking of a transcendent God as being found most deeply and immanently in 
the self (also the self subject to original sin) is deeply paradoxical. Expressing 
interiority still requires self-subverting language for an apophatic thinking of 
God within yet absolutely beyond.317  Teresa’s apophatic theological intent in 
negotiating a similar paradox in The Interior Castle is clear throughout.318  She 
                                          
311 Life 9.7-8, quoted in Williams p.53 
312 Williams, Teresa of Àvila p.29 
313 See Turner The Darkness of God p.58; and Augustine reworks anamnesis as Christian theology 
when he writes that unforgetting is a spiritual union with God: memory is the faculty of 
unforgetting where” Our hearts are restless until they find rest in you.” (Confessions 1.1.1) 
314 Turner, The Darkness of God p.129 
315 Augustine, Confessions, (UK; Penguin 1962), p.231 
316 Interior Castle p.62 
317 See Turner, Darkness of God p.69 
318 For example: “In this moment of perfect clarity, the soul understands that God alone is truth 
… I wish I could say more about this, but it’s ineffable” (p.246); “God has made the soul into an 
utter fool so that he can replace false intelligence with true wisdom ... In a state of union, the 
soul sees nothing and hears nothing and comprehends nothing” (p.123); “Our intellects, no 
matter how sharp, can no more grasp (the concept of the soul and God dwelling in it) than they 
can comprehend God” (p.36); “Yet when he unites himself with her at last, she understands 
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also describes her ‘visions’ as “mystical theology,”319 and emphasis that a 
grounding in theology is her foundation.320 When God suspends the 
understanding,321 this echoes Dionysius’ surpassing of the intellect in apophatic 
theology. 
 ‘Innerness’ is separation from the world,322 which an autistic 
hermeneutic will read as autistic isolation. However it also echoes Francesca 
Happé’s words, discussed in the Introduction, about autistic bliss “in a world of 
her own.”323 In terms of Incarnational metaphor, the ‘innerness’ of autistic 
metaphor, closed in upon itself, is the site of the sacred which will be discussed 
in section four, regarding Blanchot. 
 
Stories of the ‘self’ or of the ‘soul?’ 
This section puts forward the argument that The Interior Castle is a work 
modelled on yet different to the Confessions. Augustine’s Confessions is the 
genre of autobiography, but in terms of intellectual, theological and moral 
exploration. So the Confessions could be said to be a theological statement 
written in the genre of autobiography, and for Augustine, his concept of self 
means that autobiography and theology are inseparable.324 
Williams comments that Teresa’s work “reproduces something of the 
technique of Augustine’s Confessions,”325and The Interior Castle has 
similarities, in that it is an ‘inner quest,’ but this chapter argues that it differs 
from the Confessions in ways that are crucial for the concept of apophatic 
fiction. This section argues, crucially, that The Interior Castle is primarily, as a 
text, not a narrative of the ‘self,’ but of the ‘soul.’ 
Perhaps a common understanding of The Interior Castle is that it is the 
story of Teresa’s mystical experiences. Turner calls this reading “a common, 
                                          
nothing. She loses her senses and her reason. in the “intensity (of) … such vivid knowledge, (the 
soul) feels estranged from God.” (p.263).  
319 Life p.71 
320 Life p.84 
321 Eg Life p.85 
322 Interior Castle, p.139; also extreme loneliness (see Life pp.139-40) 
323 see autistic aloneness, introduction 
324 See Turner, The Darkness of God pp.50-73 
325 Williams, Rowan, Teresa of Àvila (London, UK; Geoffrey Chapman, 1991)   p.45 
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informal view around that the ‘mystical’ [has] something to do with the having 
of very uncommon, privileged ‘experiences.”326 However he adds that “John of 
the Cross and Teresa of Àvila did make mention of ‘experiences,’ [but] attached 
little or no importance to them,327 and certainly did not think the having of 
them to be definitive of the ‘mystical.’”328 This tends to support the claim that 
was made above in section 2.1 that Teresa’s mysticism is something more than 
experientialism. If Teresa (the nun) does not think mysticism is defined by ‘her’ 
experiences, then what form does her mysticism take? 
A naïve reading of The Interior Castle could see it simply as a ‘spiritual 
autobiography,’ chronicling a series of inner ‘events.’ It would be difficult to 
argue that the story is not a narrative of events; in her preface to her 2003 
translation of The Interior Castle, Mirabai Starr’s rather effusive writing on 
Teresa sees it as an account of “religious fireworks and divinely altered states of 
consciousness” in which “God-states (start) to descend like a monsoon on the 
parched landscape of Teresa’s soul.”329  
However the crucial point at issue here is the nature of ‘experience.’ The 
question Starr does not address is that of considering in what kind of discourse 
the text operates. Teresa herself, as narrator, alerts the reader to the danger of 
overly ‘experientialising’ the narrative.330 
The point this section is making is that it is very important to be aware 
that metaphor is a narrative strategy, and that, in terms of a narrative of 
experience, Christ and the soul, not Teresa the nun, are the protagonists.  This 
is what Michel de Certeau calls “the fiction of the soul,” which he argues as the 
“foundation of The Interior Castle.”331 The text of The Interior Castle moves 
                                          
326 Turner, The Darkness of God p.2 
327 ibid. 
328 ibid. 
329 Interior Castle p.9 
330 Teresa writes: “Look. Try to understand what I’m saying.  We don’t actually feel heat or 
smell an aroma.” (ibid. p.99); See also pp.123-4: “how, you may ask, could the soul see this 
truth and understand it if she is incapable of seeing anything? Well, it is not in the moment of 
union that the soul is cognizant of this truth, but she sees it clearly afterwards. It isn’t some 
vision … it is an unshakeable certainty …. Don’t be mistaken. This conviction is not built upon 
any physical forms. It is not like the invisible presence of our beloved Jesus Christ in the most 
holy sacrament …. It has nothing to do with manifestation; it’s purely about divinity,” and 
p.225: “The soul didn’t experience this with the ordinary senses that tell us there is someone 
next to us, but in a subtler, more delicate way that transcends explanation.”  See also Life 
pp.174, 187-8 
331 De Certeau, The Mystic Fable p.188 
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between narrative strands. One strand is the story in which Christ and the soul 
are protagonists, and the other is the interjections of Teresa the narrator as 
protagonist, advising the reader regarding her reception of, and response to the 
text.332  In fact the bodily effects of contemplation tend to be suffering, and 
‘rapture’ and ‘ecstasy’ “have little to do with” the body.333 This is important, to 
establish that this is not the genre of autobiography. The difference between 
narrative techniques might be explained as follows. 
Starr writes that Bernini’s famous statue Saint Teresa in Ecstasy is “an 
unabashedly sensual image … the nun swooning blissfully backward while a 
clearly delighted androgynous angel plunges a flaming sword into her, leaving 
her on fire with love for God.”334 This is where the crucial point is. What Starr 
(but not necessarily Bernini) misses is that, although Teresa the narrator, Teresa 
the nun, may be in an ecstasy of “musing on” this theological imagery and 
experiencing the text,335 it is not ‘the nun’ (Teresa, the narrator) who is 
‘swooning in ecstasy,’ but the soul.  Crucially, the illustration about Bernini’s 
statue makes clear precisely why autistic literal metaphor works only as a 
theological (Incarnational) concept. This ‘literal’ metaphor is not ‘taking the 
story literally,’ in the way that Starr does. Instead it is the absolute inversion of 
that ‘literal interpretation.’ The theological intent of the metaphor, for an 
Incarnational theological hermeneutic, is more literally real than the ‘literal’ 
intent of reading the image as ‘the nun swooning in ecstasy. This is what Jesus’ 
disciples would call “a hard saying – who can understand it?”336  All too readily, 
a defeated believer will follow the honest atheist’s path to discredit the 
narrative: Teresa the nun is “only” describing the sexual experience of her own, 
rather bizarre erotic fantasy. Whatever the experience of Teresa the nun, 
Teresa the narrator, however, is in control of a tightly crafted mystic fable of 
                                          
332 The effects of contemplation which Teresa the narrator discusses are not the same as the 
objects of contemplation.  Teresa the narrator, in a didactic/pastoral role, alerts the reader to 
physical effects of intense contemplation (a ‘second order’ consequence of the practice of 
cultivating awareness of the mystical), for example “Pain … weak pulse, bones disjointed, hands 
rigid,” (Life p.140); “copious tears and splitting headaches,” (Interior Castle p.90) “Sobbing … 
chest constriction … nosebleeds” (Interior Castle pp.96-7) 
333 Regarding rapture, “It is all about love melting into love. Pleasures of the body have little to 
do with this union; the spiritual delights the Beloved shares with the soul are a thousand times 
removed from the pleasures married people must experience.” (Interior Castle p.145) 
334 Interior Castle pp.10-11 
335 If contemplation often has physical effects such as nosebleeds, meditation on erotic imagery 
can have physical effects too; but this is not in itself the role of the erotic in the text. 
336 John 6.60 
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Augustinian inner rooms, and the reader of the text as mystic fable is invited to 
envision the soul’s swooning as the ‘literally’ true in the mythical space of what 
can be seen also as Eliade’s kairos, becoming a kairos of the text. 
 
Allegory or fiction? 
This section argues that ‘The Interior Castle’ becomes a deeper 
theological thinking when read as fiction than it would as allegory. An allegory 
offers typological hermeneutics an environment where the text offers the 
coding of a type to be decoded. A typological hermeneutic would run aground in 
The Interior Castle because the text is too rich. The plot has too many strands 
interwoven: it is modelled on the quest genre, as the journey inward to both 
authenticity of self and of/as Christ, the idea of dwelling as a realisation of self, 
and the love story between the soul and Christ.337  
Its other main tropes, if offered for rich theological thinking, would 
include 
• garden (God as gardener – provider, loving care, fruitfulness, 
beauty, nature, creation);  
• butterfly (Augustine “our hearts are restless,” also fragile, short 
lived and beautiful – glory and fragility/smallness of self) 
• reptiles (the problem of evil – the snake in the garden of Eden) 
 These alone invite a reading which lingers in the richness of metaphoric 
potential, as polysemic but also organically ‘semic’ (‘seme’ = a seed to be 
planted). There is also the richness of a glorious excess of poetic crafted 
material which amounts to a cascade of metaphors,338  entirely surplus to the 
skeleton which allegory would offer for pragmatically constructing a 
(cataphatic) theological system.  
                                          
337 Which mirror exactly the chivalric concerns of the fictional Don Quixote and the chivalric 
reading Teresa read in her youth; see section 2.5.2 
338 For example “silent sandpaper,”(p.50) “clash of arms and explosion of mortar,” (p.57) “the 
desert of the soul,”( p.74)  “wounds, ointment,(p.78)” “journey,” fledgling birds,”(p.83) 
“storms,”(p.83) “stars hurtling across the heavens,”(p.92) “(the mind) wander(ing) from one 
extreme to another, like a fool who cannot find his assigned seat;”(p.108) (mere humans as) 
“worms”(p.150) life as a “tempestuous sea,”(p.150) spiritual strength as “streams of milk 
flowing from the divine breasts,”(p.271) (inauthentic thinking as) mud clinging to our 
boots,”(p.80) and there could be many other examples in this list. 
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Autistic metaphor is the literal ‘staying in’ the image, as the example of 
the ‘branch of an organisation’ made clear in chapter two. Decoding the branch 
out of the tree context is like decoding a pragmatic cataphatic intent from the 
apophasis of the poetic excess discussed here. Allegory, like dead metaphor, is 
anathema to incarnational metaphor, because this ‘disability’ which is autism, 
can now be inverted as a privileged sacred ‘ability’ to refuse to say, prosaically, 
that the castle (allegorically) ‘stands for’ the soul. Instead, impossibly, as with 
the bafflement of Ramsay’s religious doxological language, the caste ‘is’ the 
soul. 
 
True Erring: Monsignor Quixote, Teresa and the Novel 
Having rejected an autobiographical reading or an allegorical reading, 
this section is now able to argue for The Interior Castle as a work of apophatic 
theological thinking. The argument of this section is crucial. It is that it is 
fiction itself which is an apophatic strategy, and therefore can be termed 
‘apophatic fiction.’ This section is crucial, as the point towards which the whole 
of section two has been working, and this is the concept of ‘apophatic fiction.’ 
This term is created in this thesis to indicate that Teresa and John are both 
apophatic theologians and creative writers.339 More than this, their creative 
work is the discourse of their apophatic theology. A remarkable part the ‘story’ 
is that, when Jesus appeared to Teresa, he asked who she was, and she replied 
“I am Teresa of Jesus. Who are you?” Jesus replied, “I am Jesus of Teresa.” 
‘Teresa’s Jesus’ can thus be a creation of Teresa the narrator, giving her power 
to create theological fiction.  
A lateral way in to thinking of the idea of apophatic theological fiction 
will now demonstrate what apophatic fiction might look like, if Graham Greene, 
the ‘Catholic atheist,’340 can similarly be considered as a novelist grappling with 
the unknowable God. This is particularly relevant in Green’s novel Monsignor 
Quixote.  Its similarities with The Interior Castle will become apparent. 
                                          
339 Dionysius, in a sense, is also a creative writer, creatively reworking metaphor into a new 
form. 
340 Sweeney, Jon, Almost Catholic: An Appreciation of the History, Practice, and Mystery of 
Ancient Faith (San Francisco; Jossey-Bass Wiley, 2008), p.23 
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In Greene’s novel, Cervantes’ Don Quixote and Sancho Panza are recast 
as a Catholic village priest and a Communist atheist local politician. Cervantes’ 
Quixote becomes the Don as he enters into the alternative reality of imagined 
participation in the grandiosity of the world of chivalric romance. Greene’s 
Quixote becomes a Monsignor, erring bestowed on him by the deluded bishop 
who promotes him on slender and improbable grounds.  
However there is a deeper and more fundamental play on delusion at 
work. When Monsignor Quixote and Sancho embark on journey, Sancho 
exchanges Father Quixote’s book of moral theology for his copy of the works of 
Lenin. Sancho’s Marxist ideals have been found wanting in Realpolitik at the 
level of mundane local politics, but it is Quixote who enacts that idealism in 
acts of resistance against capitalism.  
Sancho in turn asks Quixote, “Do you really believe those stories?” of the 
faith. Quixote’s answer is revealing: “I want to believe, and I want others to 
believe.”341 Doubt is an inalienable part not only Quixote’s faith but also, he 
implies, even the Pope’s. If his faith is ‘only a fiction,’ does this render it 
‘untrue?’ His deluded quest ‘for the socks’ to make him a ‘real’ bishop is a 
comic reworking of the Don’s equally comic quest for chivalric glory, and both 
fulfil that quest to its logical (apophatic) conclusion of madness. As a ‘knight 
errant,’ like the Don he is erring at every level – wandering in the ‘cock and bull 
story’342 of shopping for the purple socks, wandering in the title of Monsignor 
given to him by the deluded, drunken Bishop of Motopo, and wandering in the 
space of fiction, as Greene’s creative reworking of the original. 
‘Monsignor Quixote-enacts Don Quixote-enacts the knight errant’ is a 
multiple play on levels of reality in the text, just as Calvino’s livelli di realtà 
does, as was discussed earlier. In an autistic hermeneutic, levels of reality in 
the text collapse and co-exist into one, ‘literal’ truth, just as they do in 
Greene’s novel. In the space of the text (and only there, in the ‘literal’ space) 
Monsignor-is the Don-is the knight errant. Autistic literal metaphor, by taking 
                                          
341 Teresa, like Don/Monsignor Quixote, wants ‘others to believe’ too, and her rhetoric is both 
poetry and persuasion. See above discussion of her motive to help her sisters to be better nuns 
[section 3.1.1] 
342 A cock and bull story is the title of Michael Winterbottom’s 2005 comic meta-narrative film 
about a film crew attempting to make a film of the novel Tristram Shandy, which is itself (as is 
the film) a purported autobiography which also errs absurdly. 
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‘the branch of the organisation’ as ‘the branch of a tree,’ is therefore the 
privileged entry into the text with its impossible reality. 
 
Teresa’s ‘soul’ as ‘Sister Quixote,’ the knight errant 
 ‘The Interior Castle’ is also a narrative of the journey as quest. 
Speculating on authorial intention, it could seem reasonable to think that 
Teresa, like the Don, is modelling her work on the same genre of chivalric 
romance. This is borne out in the biographical account that she grew up reading 
chivalric novels,343 and ‘believing in’ the chivalric values of the quest for 
romantic conquest could be suggested in the reason for her being sent to the 
cloister, to protect a chastity under threat from amorous adventures.344  
After her pivotal, transformative emotional reaction to the Ecce Homo 
(behold the man [my emphasis]) statue, Teresa’s love is transferred to the quest 
for Christ. The question of ‘erotic experience’ has been discussed above, but a 
reworked chivalric eros is now enacted in the story of The Interior Castle, which 
is also the enactment of the Scriptures as story. She is a ‘knight errant’ as she 
errs in the space of fiction, ‘taking liberties’ with theology. Teresa’s ‘soul,’ like 
the Don345 and the Monsignor, also, in her quest, becomes mad with love, 346 and 
her final destination and consummation can also only be death.347 
Teresa’s awareness of the apophatic theological dimension leads her to 
rework both the chivalric love quest of her youth and the sacred story of faith in 
a second-order story similar to both Cervantes’ and Greene’s. Teresa is 
Cervantes, not Quixote. She ‘spins a yarn,’ for example, in the trope of the silk 
worm spinning its own cocoon, to create an inner sanctum for the purposes of 
dying in Christ, in order to be resurrected in Christ as a butterfly.348 The soul as 
                                          
343 Interior Castle p.5 
344 Interior Castle (pp.5-6, 8) describes Teresa as a “wild child” having “adventures” which 
include being in a teenage relationship which is “more intimate than was socially acceptable” 
and even as a nun becoming “an inveterate flirt” who becomes “perilously intimate with a 
man.” 
345 Dulcinea becoming the for the Don object of the chivalric love; living out the justice of 
Sancho’s Marxism as Christian love for the Monsignor. 
346 Interior Castle pp.112, 113, 114, 115, 123, 210 
347 Teresa’s seventh dwelling discusses death at length, as the consummation of the divine 
marriage; both Quixotes die, happy in their madness. 
348 Interior Castle pp.126ff 
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a narrative character both casts itself poetically in the cascade of metaphors349 
and enacts itself in the narrative’s plot of experiences of the quest, the 
dwelling and their enabling encounters with God as sensory ‘gustoes.’350  
It was suggested earlier that Teresa was ironically ‘outwitting’ 
‘learning’351 inasmuch as she has an awareness of apophatic potential in 
theological thinking. It is for this reason that there is an argument that The 
Interior Castle can be viewed as an apophatic discourse. Her fiction is apophatic 
in the sense that it is a rhetorical strategy to outwit cataphatic discourse, with 
the same theological intent of that used by Dionysius’ strategy of self-subverting 
language.352  
Crucial to this argument is that her rhetorical strategy is itself apophatic 
when the definition of apophasis is recalled. ‘Apo-’ as a grammatical participle 
is the distancing of relationship where grammatical predication breaks down in 
discourse, in what Turner has called “that speech about God which is the failure 
of speech.”353 
The theology is expressed not as ‘hidden’ in the plot, but as the 
hiddenness which the narrative form creates,354 existing by not existing 
anywhere, except as the plot. In this way, fiction is an apo-phasis, disrupting 
the cata-phatic relationship in which theological discourse would operate. 
Cataphasis would carry theological doctrine ‘straight to’ the reader, but fiction 
instead creates an opening for the reader, and the theological is suspended in 
the text, ‘there for the taking,’ but not really ‘there’ at all, in the sense of 
‘telling the facts.’ Instead, it actually invites and questions the reader – ‘do you 
enter this world of the text, partaking of the story as a poetic sacrament of 
mystery?’355 In this sense, thinking theologically in the text is a wager of faith on 
the part of the reader. It depends on the reader to ‘let go’ of (cataphatic) 
                                          
349 See section 2.3.2 
350 The sensory metaphor is gusto (taste) 
351 In section 2.2 
352 For example “Our intellects, no matter how sharp, can no more grasp (the reality of the soul) 
than they can comprehend God.” (Interior Castle p.36) 
353 Turner, The Darkness of God p.20; see also section 1.3.3 above. 
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rhetorical security and enter a Coleridgean ‘willing suspension of disbelief.’356 
The story isn’t ‘real;’ but by faith it indicates a truth more real than ‘fact.’ 
Over and over, Teresa the narrator repeats that ‘gustoes espirituales’ 
cannot be ‘known’ but only ‘experienced.’357 They are ‘experienced,’ but 
experienced in another mode which is the apophatic which fiction offers by ‘not 
being real.’ They are experienced in the text. For fiction itself to be an 
apophasis speaks powerfully in the light of Incarnational metaphor. Literal 
metaphor is an apophasis where the reading of the metaphor, resisting 
decoding, exists in absence from cataphatic pragmatism, yet it is the full 
presence of the metaphor itself in the text. 
The text within itself also offers a clear formula, to alert the reader to 
be anything but theologically naïve regarding the self-subverting utterance of 
‘docta ignorantia’358 in the comment that “as (the soul) cannot comprehend 
what it understands, it understands by not understanding.”359 When it also 
states that “knowing is not experiencing,”360 a more meaningful reading of this 
than the experientialist understanding that ‘you will only know if you 
experience this’ is the possibility of reading it instead as ‘(true) knowing is ‘not-
experiencing.’’ This is utterly apophatic because, theologically thought, the 
non-existent space of apophatic fiction is superlatively existent, as what 
Dionysius describes as, in fact, “this hidden Super-Essential Godhead.”361 
In summary, the tropes of the soul’s journey and her love affair form an 
apophatic strategy to carry the ineffable into the non-existent space of 
literature. This is a progression to her pupil John’s development of her method. 
                                          
356 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 2.6, quoted in Jasper, David, The Sacred Community 
(Texas; Baylor University Press, 2012) p.106  
357 See section 2.3.2 
358 Referring to Nicholas of Cusa (trans, Heron, Fr. Germeain), De Docta Ignorantia, (Of learned 
Ignorance) (London, UK; Routledge & Kegan Paul,1954 (1440)): Nicholas argues from geometry 
that scientific reasoning, for example about tangents, will lead to the incalculable (an analogy 
which was discussed in chapter one). Nicholas then goes on to apply the same reasoning to 
theology: “We, then, believers in Christ, are led in learned ignorance to the mountain that is 
Christ” (p.161); Nicholas also develops docta ignorantia into the term Negative Theology (pp. 
59-64) and this is also an innate feature of knowledge itself: referring to Aristotle’s analogy of 
owls trying to look at the sun, “since the natural desire in us is not without a purpose, its 
immediate object is our own ignorance. If we can fully realise this desire, we will acquire 
learned ignorance” (p.8)  
359 Teresa of Àvila, Life p.127 
360 ibid. p.93 
361 Dionysius (trans. Rolt), The Divine Names p.53  
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John’s poem, The Ascent of Mount Carmel, will be what the autistic 
hermeneutic views as a fuller poetic apophasis, where the ineffable as fiction 
carries great potential for literal metaphor to approach its fulfilment as 
Incarnation. To this end, apophatic fiction will be considered as expressed at its 
fullest in the work of John of the Cross. The next section will turn to considering 
his poem ‘The Ascent of Mount Carmel’ as apophatic fiction. 
 
2.3 Rhetorical strategies in ‘The Ascent of Mount Carmel’ 
Influence of Dionysius and Teresa 
This section can now use the conclusions of the preceding sections to 
argue for a fullness as the consummation of apophatic fiction in John of the 
Cross’ ‘The Ascent of Mount Carmel.’ The progression to The Ascent of Mount 
Carmel works as follows.  
The argument is that John learns from his mentor, Teresa, 362 to employ 
rhetoric as possessing the status of the ‘work’ (in Blanchot’s terms, see section 
five) but his poem becomes, for an autistic reading, a more fully absolute 
autism. John achieves this by following Teresa’s strategy, but then also bringing 
Dionysius’ self-negating language back to the poem. The important point at this 
stage is that this ‘fullness’ from Teresa and ‘emptiness’ from Dionysius363 fuse 
to creates a text which, in Blanchot’s terms, approaches the origin which is 
silence. This is why it is crucial to the conclusion towards which this chapter’s 
argument is working, that the fullest Incarnational metaphor is poetic silence. 
Turner makes the link back to Dionysius clear, that John and Dionysius 
both employ a doubled form of negation which is “a sense that negation 
operates in two roles or at two mutually interacting levels: at a first-order level 
of experience and at a second-order level of the critique of experience.”364 As a 
text, The Ascent of Mount Carmel has similarities to the form of reasoned 
                                          
362 See Turner Darkness of God p.250; also Teresa of Àvila, The Interior Castle p.13 
363 ‘Fullness’ in the sense that Teresa’s work is overflowing with imagery and poetic invention, 
and ‘emptiness’ in the sense that Dionysius’ images are tersely self-subverting. Teresa alludes to 
the ineffable and writes that there are moments when there must only be silence, but the main 
tropes she uses, of the inner journey and the spiritual marriage, are in a fullness of poetic 
discourse. 
364 Turner, Darkness of God p.270 
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persuasion Dionysius uses to ‘contain’ and argue for his apophatic ‘formulae.’ 
Following Dionysius, John combines Dionysius’ twin strategies of a) self-negating 
metaphors and b) reasoned argumentation for them.  However John infuses 
Dionysius’ strategies of self-negation and argumentation with Teresa’s strategy 
of apophatic fiction. 
When The Ascent of Mount Carmel combines a fullness of extended 
poetic narrative into a deeper partnership with self-subverting utterance, this 
begins to approach a genuinely theological Incarnational metaphor. A literal 
metaphor of a ‘full’ self-subverting text reads the fullness of presence and 
emptiness of self-subverted absence as the literal absent presence of the divine 
in the text. This will point towards theological, literal metaphor as a 
paradoxical kenotic Incarnation in and of the text. 
 
The text and the work 
In order to think through the potential for reading ‘The Ascent of Mount 
Carmel’ in terms of the art work’s autistic authenticity, it is important here to 
establish the poem as apophatic fiction.  
Like Dionysius and Teresa,365 John knowingly moves between narrative 
functions. The pure work of the poem is only sixteen lines long, but the 
introductory statement (‘argument’), prologue, and following three books all 
shift back into a prose register. This prose register of the argument, prologue 
and books uses the same strategy of ‘learned’ reasoned argument for self-
subverting language Dionysius has used in The Divine Names,366 and so is not the 
kind of poetic narrative that Teresa has used. The pure ‘work’ itself, of the 16-
line poem, however, is entirely poetic and everything outside it in the prose 
register is a commentary on it: 
All the doctrine whereof I intend to treat in this Ascent of 
Mount Carmel is included in the following stanzas, and in 
them is also described the manner of ascending to the 
                                          
365 Dionysius, as argued previously, moves between argumentation and metaphor; Teresa moves 
between the narrative of the journey/betrothal plot and the interjecting voice of the didactive 
narrator. 
366 See Turner The Darkness of God p.270 
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summit of the Mount, which is the high state of perfection 
which we here call union of the soul with God.367 
‘All the doctrine,’ then, is in sixteen lines of verse. In this sense, the 
‘text’ is 294 pages long, but the ‘work’ occupies less than a page. “Describing 
the manner of ascending to … union of the soul with God,” like Teresa’s story, is 
experiential language. However, again the same point applies – the ‘manner of 
ascending’ is a poetic manner, and not an ‘experientialist’ one.368  
Every line of the poem is composed of physical images, and the language 
is of darkness and hiddenness. Ascent is by means of a “secret ladder.” These 
are both very significant, but what is most striking is the erotic (lover, Beloved; 
breast; caress; reclining on the Beloved). 
Self-subverting utterance has become extended poetic narrative here for 
apophatic theology, but also expressing itself as a first level metaphoricity of 
eros and darkness. The combination of the two metaphors, eros and darkness, 
will later become, in regard to Blanchot’s authenticity of the apophatic, an 
autistic eros/darkness twinning when ‘eros’ is thought of as the integrity of 
autistic affective empathy in the face of impaired cognitive empathy.369  
 
 
 
                                          
367 John of the Cross (trans. Allison Peers, E), The Ascent of Mount Carmel (Radford, Vancouver; 
Wilder Publications, 2008 (1582-88)), p.63 S 
368 The poem reads as follows: 
On a dark night, Kindled in love with yearnings – oh, happy chance! 
I went forth without being observed, My house being now at rest. 
In darkness and secure, By the secret ladder, disguised – oh, happy chance! 
In darkness and in concealment, My house being now at rest.  
In the happy night, In secret, when none saw me, Nor I beheld aught, Without light or guide, 
save that which burned in my heart.  
This light guided me More surely than the light of noonday, 
To the place where he (well I knew who!) was awaiting me – A place where none appeared. 
Oh, night that guided me, Oh, night more lovely than the dawn, 
Oh, night that joined Beloved with lover, Lover transformed in the Beloved! 
Upon my flowery breast, kept wholly for himself alone, 
There he stayed sleeping, and I caressed him, And the fanning of the cedars made a breeze.  
The breeze blew from the turret As I parted his locks; 
With his gentle hand he wounded my neck And caused all my senses to be suspended. 
I remained, lost in oblivion; My face I reclined on the Beloved. 
All ceased and I abandoned myself, Leaving my cares forgotten among the lilies. (John of the 
Cross (trans. Allison Peers), Ascent of Mount Carmel p.65) 
369 See introduction 
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Eros 
As in The Interior Castle, the poetic work is not theological discourse but 
the theologically thought, poetic telling of erotic experience,370 and again, 
‘experience’ is within the poem. This is a fiction of union, similar to Teresa’s, 
but it is also a fiction of the negation Dionysius uses. Absolute divine eros is 
known only in absolute union with the Super-Essential God Dionysius has written 
about. For this reason, the pure erotic can only be known in the darkness of 
unknowing. John’s poem is, like Teresa’s both a journey and a love affair, with 
the journey towards the lover leading to the absolute union which can only be 
told as apophatic discourse. 
At this point, it is worth noting that the hidden, secret eros, even before 
it is read through Blanchot’s thinking of literature as a space of pure being, 
lends itself to an autistic reading. An autistic reading will recognise a discourse 
here which speaks to autistic empathy. The impairment/refusal of cognitive 
empathy here would be a strategy to understand the darkness as a mindfulness 
of separation, as will be discussed in the following section. However in terms of 
divine eros, autistic affective empathy functions precisely within autistic being 
which is also the mindfulness of separation. The poem’s combination of eros and 
hiddenness/darkness is, in fact, a ‘loving without knowing.’ This is the risk of 
autistic faith which practises love with no guarantee, because there is no way to 
‘assess’ the object of love. It is simply giving. 371 
This affective eros works as discussed in the previous summary above, in 
terms of affective/cognitive twinning. It also moves towards a thinking of 
Incarnational metaphoricity because literal metaphor, as chapter two argued, 
revels in the kind of religious language of excess where the metaphor simply 
‘is,’ and this delight is a pure eros. 
                                          
370 Scriptural also, in its following of the narrative of the Song of Songs (also, as its title 
indicates, a ‘narrative of a narrative’) 
371 This is also a discourse which Jean Luc Marion develops, where the gift outwits ontological 
difference in the parable of the prodigal son. See Marion, Jean Luc (trans. Thomas A Carlson), 
God Without Being: Hors-Texte (Dieu Sans l’être: Hors-texte) (Chicago; University of Chicago 
Press, 1991 (1982)) pp.97-99). Eros surpasses knowledge, because the father loves without 
knowing if the son ‘deserves’ forgiveness. In autistic terms, the father practises total affective 
empathy precisely in this space of impaired cognitive empathy. This will be explored in terms of 
the ontology of the art work in section five.  
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Darkness 
This section thinks through the imagery of darkness in The Ascent of 
Mount Carmel as apophatic theology, so that an autistic theology can read itself 
in the darkness. Darkness, hiddenness, non-appearance and secrecy dominate 
the first six lines, establishing their importance as ‘unknowing. In the last three 
lines, in the image of erotic union, John writes: “all my senses were suspended” 
and “I remained lost in oblivion; in the last line, “all ceased and I abandoned 
myself.”  
This is ecstasy, and as absolute ecstasy it takes place in the absolute eros 
of absolute unknowing [‘ex-stasis’ – displacement ‘out of-the space’ of 
normality]. This ‘carnal knowledge’ as complete unknowing takes on real power 
when it is read as apophatic fiction. Here, John is employing Teresa’s strategy 
of using story as an apophasis of union, but whereas Teresa merely explains that 
she is writing the ineffable, 372 John reworks the ineffable more completely in 
terms of Dionysius’ self-subverting utterance. 
This self-subversion is, as suggested above, the total unknowing of the 
most intimate knowing, and in this sense, it can be read as a paradoxical re-
expression of the pervasive imagery of darkness, night and concealment. If the 
poem “contains all the doctrine” of John’s theological thinking, Denys Turner is 
right to interpret the ‘dark night’ theologically. Turner comments that  
Faith, the darkness of unknowing, is the conviction – but 
also the practice of the Christian life as organised in terms 
of that conviction – that ‘our deepest centre is in God,’ It 
is the conviction that our deepest centre … is in us but not 
of us, is not ‘ours’ to possess, but ours only to be 
possessed by. And so faith at once ‘decentres’ us.373 
                                          
372 For example, in The Interior Castle: “In this moment of perfect clarity, the soul 
understands that God alone is truth … I wish I could say more about this, but it’s ineffable” 
(p.246); “God has made the soul into an utter fool so that he can replace false intelligence with 
true wisdom ... In a state of union, the soul sees nothing and hears nothing and comprehends 
nothing” (p.123); “Our intellects, no matter how sharp, can no more grasp (the concept of the 
soul and God dwelling in it) than they can comprehend God” (p.36); “Yet when he unites himself 
with her at last, she understands nothing. She loses her senses and her reason. in the “intensity 
(of) … such vivid knowledge, (the soul) feels estranged from God.” (p.263) 
373 Turner, Darkness of God p.251 
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Taking ‘the darkness of unknowing’ as a trope, this safeguards a place for 
the imagery as theologically thought, as a metaphor of negation. Turner argues 
persuasively for the fundamental distinction between experiential depression 
and the dark night of the soul which John dwells on much more in his work of 
that title.374 This is a fundamental safeguarding from experientialism. Turner 
explains the difference:  
in depression, it is the ‘self’ which causes the distress of 
the sense of its loss, but ‘the dark nights’ on the other 
hand are entered into as loss of that same self, for in that 
consists their pain, but the hope it acquires is of the non-
recovery of that selfhood in any form, for what is lost in 
the passive nights was never the self at all, but only an 
illusion all along. But in saying that this conventional self is 
an ‘illusion’ it is necessary to warn against an obvious, and 
tempting, misinterpretation. To say that the self is an 
illusion is not to say that it is not real, for, on the 
contrary, it is precisely in terms of such selfhoods that real 
people really live, most of the time … a live, dynamic 
falsehood.375 
The theological conviction behind this, of faith as a decentring, turns the 
question of ‘experientialism’ on its head. If the ‘experience’ of the self is the 
real fiction, as Turner argues, then the non-experience which can only ‘exist’ in 
its poetic telling is in fact the more theologically ‘true.’ This is why apophatic 
fiction can be read as a mute language of being in the section after this one. 
This is true in the sense with which Turner reads John’s theological thinking: 
My true self consists in my transformation in God. I know 
myself in my not-knowing my difference from God. And 
‘contemplation’ is the power to rest in that not-knowing. 
There is no experience, then, of which that selfhood is the 
object. The experience of the loss of experience of the 
self … is what John calls ‘the passive night of the spirit.376  
The reason that apophatic fiction offers a place to rest in that not-
knowing is that it operates theologically thought, but expressed only as 
‘poiesis,’ which is a text of what ‘is not,’ but is ‘only’ the image. This can now 
be thought through, in the following section, in terms of what Maurice Blanchot 
                                          
374 John of the Cross (trans. Allison Peers, E), The Dark Night of the Soul (Westminster, 
Maryland; Newman Press, 1953 (1577-78))  
375 Turner, Darkness of God p.244 
376 Ibid. p.245 
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calls ‘The Space of Literature.’ Section 5 is the destination point for being able 
to develop this understanding, and will now explore apophatic fiction as the 
language of mute being. This mute being of the work of art can then be read as 
the authenticity of autistic being, which exists in the silence of mindfulness of 
separation. 
The purpose of doing this is to be able now to view this fully apophatic 
fiction in terms of an authenticity of mute being in Blanchot’s terms. It will 
then be possible to use this mode of thinking, of the mute being of apophatic 
fiction, to work towards a fully kenotic autistic thinking of apophatic fiction as 
Incarnational metaphor. 
 
2.4. Mystical theologies in Blanchot’s “Space of 
Literature” 
This section is following a new trajectory in revisioning and even 
rehabilitating (as re-seeing) what this chapter has called apophatic fiction. In 
the introduction to The Darkness of God, Denys Turner indicates this kind of 
fruitful possible development, and this is the one towards which this chapter 
has been working. Turner writes: 
Though I do believe we have been misreading (the 
Medieval mystics) … within the rather closed, anti-
intellectual world of Christian ‘spiritualities,’ … (there is) 
the possibility that certain quite contemporary 
developments in Western thought, associated with ‘post-
modernism,’ contain a revival of that awareness of the 
‘deconstructive’ potential of human thought and language 
which so characterised classical medieval 
apophaticism.”377 
Chapter two looked at readings of postmodern writers, particularly 
Derrida and Barthes, and through the (a)theological thinking of Mark C Taylor. 
The aim was to think how a deconstructive (a)theology might offer an autistic 
hermeneutic the possibility to express itself as Incarnational metaphor. In this 
chapter, the ‘postmodern’ thinker who offers a particularly rich possibility 
                                          
377 Turner, The Darkness of God p.8 
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theologically, in the light of revisioning apophatic fiction, is Maurice Blanchot. A 
theological thinking of this choice can be explained by contrasting Blanchot’s 
(a)theology with Derrida’s, where Derrida’s ‘trace’ is less sympathetic to 
apophatic theology than Blanchot will be shown to be. 
 
Dionysius and Derrida 
In Denials: How to Avoid Speaking, Derrida writes an extended 
commentary on Dionysius’ Mystical Theology’ but insists “what I write is not 
negative theology.”378  
The difference is in how absence is thought, within or without the wager 
of faith which distinguishes John’s dark night of the soul as the "ontological 
wager of hyperessentiality" which is, he says in the same breath, “not the 
deconstruction” that he writes.379 Instead, the absence which “blocks every 
possible relationship to theology”380 is simply meaningless absence. Derrida 
writes: 
Only pure absence – not the absence of this or that, but 
the absence of everything in which all presence is 
announced – can inspire, in other words, can work, and 
then make one work.381  
  
This statement makes his commentary on Dionysius an ironic one where 
Derrida in fact is subverting its subversion and demolishing its theological 
power. This does indicate a potential for (a)theological discourse, but Derrida is 
not equating this with his deconstructive narrative project. 382 In contrast, 
Blanchot as a Heideggerian (a)theological thinker implies (namelessly) the 
hidden superabundance which apophatic discourse indicates and in its self-
negation embodies.  
                                          
378 Derrida, Jacques (trans. Frieden, Ken), How to Avoid Speaking: Denials in Budick & Iser 
(eds.), Languages of the Unsayable: The Play of Negativity in Literature and Literary Theory 
(New York; Columba University Press, 1989) p.8 
379 Ibid. 
380 Derrida, Jacques (trans. Bass, A), Positions (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1981) p.40 
quoted in Taylor, Erring p.6 
381 Ibid.  
382 Derrida, How to Avoid Speaking: Denials p.77  
140 
 
 
In ‘The Mystical Theology’ Dionysius writes of an absent trace: 
 “the understanding and contemplation of (this hidden 
Super-Essential Godhead)’s nature is not accessible to any 
being; for such knowledge is super-essentially exalted 
above all (names) unsearchable and past finding out, since 
there is no trace of any that have penetrated the hidden 
depths of Its infinitude.”383 
Dionysius writes of a trace which is not; Derrida’s trace is the ubiquitous 
lack of identity in a labyrinth of “everything always already inhabited by the 
track of something that is not itself.”384 Derrida’s trace is absence thought, in 
fact, as lack of absence in the collapse of subject-object duality. It is the denial 
of Dionysius’ denial. While this prompts Mark C Taylor to see the dissemination 
of the trace as a site where (a)theology can articulate, Blanchot instead is 
following Dionysius’ trace as absence itself, the space where being speaks. This 
can be read, for the autistic hermeneutic coming to this discourse, as autistic 
glory, as this chapter will explain when it reaches fruition in considering 
Blanchot’s apophatic fiction as mindfulness of separation.  
To bring together the conversation between Blanchot and the mystical 
theologians’ apophatic fiction of this chapter, a structure will now be followed 
first by explaining Blanchot’s concept of mute being in terms of the work’s 
space and the absence of the gods. From there, the ideas of negation and 
‘uselessness’ will be discussed as ways to think of apophatic fiction re-visioned 
as the language of mute being. Chapter two followed Mark C Taylor into the 
(a)theological possibilities of Derrida’s dissemination, but here a more deeply 
authentic possibility begins to open up for an autistic hermeneutic. This is 
because Blanchot, following Heidegger, thinks in terms of the departure of the 
gods. This is equally (a)theological, but the same time more deeply thought in 
terms of apophatic discourse as ‘mute being.’ This silence will be explored in 
this section as approaching the absolute silence of pure being. This is a move 
towards Incarnational metaphor as a theological understanding of the text as 
absolute kenosis. 
                                          
383 Dionysius, Divine Names, p.53 
384 Spivak, (Translator’s Introduction), in Derrida, ‘Of Grammatology’ p. lxix, quoted in Taylor, 
‘Erring,’ p.138 
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Blanchot and the work 
This chapter draws on Maurice Blanchot’s poetic ‘theology’385 of the work 
of art as he thinks it in his 1955 study ‘L’espace littéraire (the Space of 
Literature).386  
Just as Wittgenstein was shown in chapter two to celebrate the ability of 
the Uhland poem to magnificently ‘utter the unutterable’ (see Chapter two 
section 2.2.4), Blanchot writes about a ‘pure’ form of poetry which expresses 
what is evanescent, such as the work of Mallarmé. He writes about a place 
where language ‘expresses nothing’387 because the pure work of art does not 
exist to represent but to be. The work of literature is, for Blanchot, something 
more and other than the mere fact of the existence of the book; it is the realm 
where being speaks. To explain what this means, it is important to see how 
Blanchot is thinking in terms set out by Heidegger. 
Blanchot and Heidegger 
Blanchot is writing within Heidegger’s shadow, 388 so it is important to 
discuss here, at least briefly, what this means for Blanchot’s thought. In the 
essay ‘What is called Thinking?’ Heidegger asks a fundamental question about 
thinking, in the sense that unreflective thinking does not question the 
representational assumptions it makes. Stepping back from the assumptions that 
representation ‘simply works,’ would be to be aware of a withdrawal from the 
nexus of logic: 
The real nature of thought might show itself, … at that 
very point at which it once withdrew, if only we will pay 
                                          
385 This term is used advisedly, as will become clear. 
386 Blanchot, Maurice (trans. Smock), The Space of Literature   
387Blanchot (trans. Smock), The Space of Literature p.22 
388 Ann Smock brings out the fundamental but implicit nature of Blanchot’s Heideggerian 
thinking: “all of ‘l’espace littéraire is imbued with care [Sorge]: le souci de l’origine, le souci de 
l’oevre, anxious solicitude for a time before the time when beings supplant being and submit to 
the command of the objectifying, acquisitive subject; concern for a time other than the time 
measured by the gradual reduction of the irreconcilably alien to the homogeneity of all that is 
comprehensively mastered. To the extent that in the work of art the impossible is realised as 
such, art alone answers, with true fidelity, to the requirement of Heideggerian authenticity” 
[Translator’s Introduction, The Space of Literature p.7]; Blanchot rarely uses Heidegger’s name, 
but assumes that the reader will recognise what his use of the term implies in debt to Heidegger 
– for example “When I am on the worldly plane, which I share with things and beings, being is 
profoundly hidden. (It is the thought of this concealment that Heidegger urges us to welcome.)” 
[The Space of Literature p.251] 
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heed to this withdrawal, if only we will not insist, confused 
by logic, that we already know perfectly well what 
thinking is.389 
… “when we wait for the sun to rise, we never do it on the strength of 
scientific insight.”390 The issue of ‘stepping back from’ metaphysical 
representation/conceptualization is to step outside representational thinking, 
and being aware of its inadequacy in the face of being; in this sense, “science 
does not think.”391 Language that escapes the ‘trap’ of ‘scientific insight’ is 
poetry, and Heidegger’s ‘turn to the poetic’ indicates that poetry is akin to 
‘thought’ in its originary capacity preceding metaphysics. However “thought and 
poesy, each in its own way, are the essential telling, (but not that) thought and 
poesy use language merely as their medium.”392 Words are “not merely terms 
(but) wellsprings that are found and dug up in the telling.”393 Blanchot draws on 
Heidegger’s understanding of poetry as this originary ‘wellspring’ of pre-
reflective, pure thought.  
Heidegger has suggested that being is ‘in’ the work, and the poetic work 
is not the pragmatic representation of ‘text’ or ‘writing,’ when ‘used’ for 
anything, but being disclosed, as the ‘unthought thought’ itself. In this sense, 
Blanchot can speak about the work as the non-representative space of pure 
being. Heidegger’s thinking of the world falling silent as a withdrawal of all 
representation reads powerfully in an autistic hermeneutic. In an (impossible) 
absolute autism, metaphor ‘represents’ nothing, being only the pure being 
indicated by withdrawal. Theologically, this can be read as absolute 
Incarnational metaphor where the ‘Nothing’ beyond representation is the 
(being) All of God. 
 
 
 
                                          
389 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? pp.44-5  
390 ibid. p.36 
391 ibid. p.134 
392 ibid. p.128 
393 ibid. p.130 
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The Space of Literature as mute being 
Following Heidegger, Blanchot considers the possibility of the work of art 
as ‘beyond thinking,’ as pure being representing nothing. He writes: 
The work brings neither certainty nor clarity. It assures us 
of nothing, nor does it shed any light upon itself. It is not 
solid, it does not furnish us with anything upon which to 
brace ourselves. These values belong to Descartes and to 
the world where we succeed in living.394 
This is the Heideggerian withdrawal of being which speaks 
only by not speaking (not speaking as representation). In 
this sense, the work speaks by being-silent/silent-being: 
In (poetic) language the world recedes and goals cease; 
the world falls silent; beings … are no longer ultimately 
what speaks. Beings fall silent, but then it is being that 
tends to speak and speech that wants to be.395 
There is an essential apophatic nature of the work when it is thought of 
in this way. Blanchot writes: 
Why is art so intimately allied with the sacred? It is 
because in the relation between art and the sacred, 
between that which shows itself and that which does not … 
… (where they are) realised only as the approach of the 
unreachable – the work finds the profound reserve which it 
needs.396  
This sets ‘the sacred’ (apophatic discourse of the absolute holy) apart 
from ‘religion.’ ‘Religion’ (as cataphatic) does not produce the work, because 
“when art is the language of the gods, when the temple is the house where the 
god dwells, the work is reduced to the vehicle of representation, and the work 
invisible and art unknown. The poem names the sacred, and men hear the 
sacred, not the poem.”397 It is the absence which is the sacred which gives the 
work “the profound reserve which it needs,” and this must be the sacred of the 
divine as absence. This is the authenticity of the “wellspring” Heidegger has 
described. 
                                          
394 Blanchot, The Space of Literature p.223 
395 ibid. 
396 ibid. p.233 
397 ibid. p.230 
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Thinking through the apophatic works this chapter has considered, 
apophatic fiction is similarly the sacred of the absent god who speaks by being 
silent, and is seen by being invisible. This means that apophatic fiction can be 
understood as the language of mute being, “where beings fall silent and being 
speaks,” but only in the space of the work itself, which regarding all 
representation is silent, beyond all thinking. 
This can be outworked in ways which show that an utter authenticity of 
being in terms of Blanchot’s “work” can be discerned in the apophatic fictions 
of Teresa and John. To show how this authenticity speaks in these works, 
Blanchot’s ideas of ‘uselessness’ and ‘betrayal’ shed light on the mystical 
writings considered in this chapter. The apophatic quality of the authentic work 
(where Blanchot alludes to the need for the gods to be absent) here meets with 
the authenticities of this chapter’s mystical narratives which give self-
subverting utterance the power to speak. In the stories of Teresa’s ‘soul, ’and 
of John’s ‘lover,’ this power of the work of fiction is seen as follows. 
 
Apophatic ‘uselessness’ in the space of literature 
This section considers ‘uselessness’ as a mark of authenticity in 
Blanchot’s terms, which can give a reading of John’s and Teresa’s apophatic 
fiction as authentically useless. This is an inversion of worldly values enacting 
the Kingdom of God in the Beatitudes; yet at the end of this section this 
inversion will reveal this authenticity to be the only thing of any use that there 
is.  
Teresa’s text is written to be of ‘use,’ but of ‘dubious use,’ only as 
inspiration, suggesting images which are, using the term advisedly, erotic 
fantasies. The book is ‘useful,’ but she explains this ‘use’ as nothing more 
consequential than ‘consolation’ and ‘delight.’398 However, what use is the story 
(the pure work) as within itself? Teresa interjects again and again about ‘good 
works,’399 and there is a mutual interplay, in the holism of the charism, where 
contemplative prayer, sisterly love and loving service are ‘useful,’ each 
                                          
398 Interior Castle p.297 
399 For example, Interior Castle pp. 293, 294, 288; Life p.19 
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supporting the other. However, what is the ‘use’ of love itself? Referring back 
to Monsignor Quixote’s politically naïve rethinking of social justice as an act of 
love, Teresa’s stance towards political praxis is simply for the furthering of 
goodness, not ‘civilisation,’ empire or any achievement at all.400 What use is 
love?  
At another level, one could outwork love without contemplation, and 
Teresa the narrator makes it clear that this is equally valid as a means to 
achieving love.401 So this begs the question again of what ‘use’ the Castle is. Its 
‘use’ is to indicate a journey which has no use at all, because it doesn’t even 
exist at all. The contemplative orders ‘do’ plenty,402 but in contemplation – 
what do they ‘do?’ Teresa the woman, and John the man, do plenty,403 but 
Teresa’s ‘soul’ and John’s ‘lover’ as narrative protagonists can only wait, in 
Taylor’s terms, ‘After God.’ What ‘use’ is the dark night where John’s lover 
“abandons himself” (abandons his self)? Both journeys lead nowhere – by 
definition, to an ineffable ‘no-where.’ 
Blanchot honours this quality of ‘uselessness’ as the authentic nature of 
the work. When the work speaks, it speaks not as, or in the service of, anyone; 
it simply speaks: 
The writer belongs to a language which no-one speaks, 
which is addressed to no one, which has no center, and 
which reveals nothing. He may believe that he affirms 
himself in this language, but what he affirms is altogether 
deprived of self.404 
 
                                          
400 Life pp.76, 147, 150-1, also Interior Castle pp.47, 294 
401 For example, Interior Castle p.113 
402 “Carmelites speak of contemplation as a gift of God that can be nurtured by a life of prayer, 
community, and service. These three elements are at the heart of our charism. 
In prayer (or worship) we build up a friendship with 'the God whom we know loves us', as St. 
Teresa of Avila described it. 
In community building (or fraternity) we encounter God in our brothers and sisters, who comfort 
and challenge us. 
In service (also known as mission, apostolate, or ministry) we open ourselves to be God's hands 
in the world, responding to the needs of others, especially the poor and marginalised.” (The 
British Province of Carmelite Friars: ‘Carmelite Spirituality - The Carmelite Charism: 
Contemplation), online access http://www.carmelite.org/index.php?nuc=content&id=236 
13/8/2016) 
403 See Life pp.18,74,79, Interior Castle p.12; ‘The Life of Saint Teresa by herself’ not only 
prefigures the metaphoric structure of The Interior Castle, but also recounts a life story of 
tremendous activity. However, the goal of the activity is to further the Kingdom of God, which 
is ‘useless’ in earthly terms, as the ‘foolishness of God.’  
404 Blanchot, The Space of Literature p.26 
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This ‘nothing’ place “reveals nothing” in a “pure passivity of being.”405 
This “pure passivity of being” is the place where the work of art – the pure 
poem – does not act, but is. Action would be a mimetic function which the pure 
poem resists. So the authenticity of the ‘useless’ apophatic discourse is also the 
authenticity of Blanchot’s ‘useless’ art work. Similarly, incarnational metaphor 
is ‘useless;’ it does not respond to pragmatic demands for what ostensive intent 
requires (the branch of the tree needs to be the branch of an organisation for 
business to function).  
 
Negation, error, and betrayal as authenticity in the space of 
literature 
Teresa and John are both rebels, running the gauntlet of heresy,406 and 
audaciously going beyond merely reforming their own orders but establishing 
new ones, and these new orders are unconventional enough to suggest walking 
barefoot in the park.407 John is actually denounced, incarcerated and tortured 
as a traitor to his order. At the level of the text, they are also traitors by 
deviating from propositional ‘common sense’ theological narratives. Negation 
itself is a betrayal of affirmation. Erring (as used by Mark C Taylor, and also as it 
was earlier suggested of Teresa/Cervantes’s knight errant) is also a betrayal. 
Erring is risky, and there is not an ironic tone when Teresa the narrator inserts 
comment on the dangers of ‘grave error.’408 
Teresa is often censured, even ridiculed, as a hysterical or deluded 
person. (“hysterical” – the instability of the womb-an). Taking her ‘literally’ and 
emulating the book is a recipe for facilitating the distress of psychosis.409 If 
‘experience’ is read outwith a metaphoric, poetic space, fanatical devotion is 
the danger. This chapter has argued that this is a seriously dangerous 
misreading, which deviates entirely from Teresa’s frequent interjections into 
the poem of warnings about precisely this – humble service, in the spirit of love, 
                                          
405 ibid. p.27 
406 See Tyler ch.1 and Starr’s introduction to Interior Castle 
407 The Discalced order (founded by Teresa) literally means those who have renounced footwear  
408 Interior Castle pp.41, 42 
409 However, an interesting consideration on delusion/psychosis is the contemporary movement 
in the mental health world which listens to delusional voices for their message, befriending 
rather than attacking the enemy (see www.hearing-voices.org) 
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as a spiritual (religious) discipline creating the (only) conditions for the poem’s 
reception.410 However, she runs the risk of misleading others, if she is not 
misled herself. By writing as they have done, John and Teresa are both erring, 
perhaps not on the side of caution.  
Blanchot’s thinking of the work itself as betrayal adds a deeper 
substratum to this idea. A reading bringing the respect accorded by Blanchot to 
figurative language does not rescue Teresa or John from ‘error,’ but validates 
their ‘error’ as authenticity. Blanchot recounts that Hölderlin (“already veiled 
by madness”) describes the necessary betrayal which enacts the “infidelity” of 
the gods who depart. In an act “less facile than humanism,” “man forgets 
himself and forgets God: he turns back like a traitor, although in a holy manner 
… in the form of infidelity where there is a forgetting of everything.”411 
This language, which reads as an echo of Meister Eckhart’s ‘taking leave 
of God for God’s sake,’412 is describing a ‘holy treachery.’ It is holy in its 
authenticity which reckons with how ‘facile’ humanism is, precisely in the terms 
Blanchot (following Heidegger) has used about ‘science’ which ‘does not think.’ 
Apophatic fiction then becomes an act of authenticity which enacts the 
infidelity of the gods. It is only in the absence of God (itself a betrayal), that 
faith is made possible, because as Turner writes about John’s ‘dark night,’   
“Faith, the darkness of unknowing, is the conviction – but 
also the practice of the Christian life as organised in terms 
of that conviction – that ‘our deepest centre is in God,’ It 
is the conviction that our deepest centre … is in us but not 
of us, is not ‘ours’ to possess, but ours only to be 
possessed by. And so faith at once ‘decentres’ us.”413 
In other words, to have faith at all, it is necessary both to be both 
betrayer and betrayed, as in this ultimate faith it becomes possible, and 
necessary, to follow Meister Eckhart, as God takes leave of us, to find ourselves 
also, in absolute faith, “taking leave of God for God’s sake.”414 
                                          
410 The ‘ordinariness’ of Christian practice discussed in section 2.1 
411 Hölderlin, The Poet’s Vocation, quoted in Blanchot, The Space of Literature p.272  
412 Meister Eckhart, (trans./ed. Davies), Qui audit me non confundetur, Selected Writings 
(London, UK; Penguin, 1994) pp.176-7 
413 Turner, Darkness of God p.251 
414 “Therefore Paul says: ‘I would be willing to be eternally separated from God for the sake of 
my friend and for God’s sake (Rom. 9.3) …Taking leave of God for the sake of God is the 
greatest act of renunciation that someone can make. Now St Paul renounced God for the sake of 
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David Jasper thinks through these betrayals in his meditation Evil and 
Betrayal at the Heart of the Sacred Community,415 disrupting comfortable 
assumptions about the community of faith with ironic insight. The problem of 
evil presents itself not only in the crucifixion, and in the post-holocaust world, 
but in the simple act of choice facing Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor as he 
betrays Christ: 
Not a bad man in the end, I have often thought, in his 
concern to protect the church from harsh reality … but 
one who never faced his own demons, let alone dared 
look evil in the face, lest he saw his own reflection, and 
therefore could not believe in God.416 
Similarly, incarnational metaphor, indifferent to the world’s pragmatic 
demands, betrays the ‘common sense’ business contracts of the world. Neither 
can it conform to the expectations of community, with its autism ‘cured, (the 
shadow of evil lurks also in the eugenic ‘cure’ narrative of I am Autism, with 
which this thesis began). It is literally ‘other-worldly,’ with the autist 
irremediably (yet also, as Eckhart understands, salvifically) “in a world of her 
own.” 
 
Distress: ridiculous amounts of suffering and authenticity 
Betrayal is distressing, and this is another sense in which Blanchot’s 
thinking of the art work sheds light on apophatic fiction. 
Teresa might be a hypochondriac, manufacturing the symptoms of the 
Passion (the famous image of her heart’s (phallic) piercing by God mimicking 
the spear in Christ’s side). Equally, Teresa might be genuinely chronically ill,417 
so possibly therefore the venerated saint who endures suffering with courage 
and ‘long’-suffering. ‘The Jury is out.’ At the level of the text, suffering is a 
huge element of the soul’s necessary experience. Reading her text as the work 
                                          
God: he left all that he could get from God … he never gave anything to God, nor did he ever 
receive anything from God.” (Meister Eckhart, (trans./ed. Davies), Qui audit me non 
confundetur, Selected Writings pp.176-7)  
415 Chapter Three, pp.31ff, Jasper, The Sacred Community 
416Jasper, Sacred Community p.44 
417 She discusses (bodily, physical) illness in both the Interior Castle’s didactic narrator voice 
and in her Life, most often using the anonymity trope “a certain woman …”  (see eg. Interior 
Castle pp.8-9, 159-60, and Life p.140) 
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of art, the suffering in it becomes both ‘spiritual’ and ‘aesthetic’ (if the two 
can be discriminated – however, in a reading which honours the text in terms of 
authenticity/art, the answer would be no, in a “spiritual classic,” whatever that 
is taken to mean).  
Suffering in the struggle for/of authenticity would read the suffering in 
Teresa’s text in terms of enduring in the absence which John poeticises as the 
‘dark night of the soul.’ This would read the narrator character Teresa’s 
suffering as the embodiment of (a)theological faith. Negative theology is a 
theology of ‘not;’ it is the privation which Hölderlin describes as the ‘lack’ 
which ‘helps’ poetry.418 Hölderlin (as Blanchot points out, approaching madness) 
“calls the empty, distressful present “bountiful suffering.””419 Teresa also, 
numerous times, describes her suffering as a blessing and even a delight.420 Like 
Hölderlin, she writes that “the joy she felt in that pain (in the context of 
‘becoming a poet’) …(was) agony.”421 
Welcoming of suffering echoes Paul’s entering the suffering of Christ 
(Colossians 1.24: in Young’s Literal Translation, “I now rejoice in my sufferings 
for you, and do fill up the things lacking of the tribulations of the Christ in my 
flesh for his body, which is the assembly”). In fact, reading Teresa as an 
apophatic theologian, it is tempting to read “the things lacking of the 
tribulations of the Christ” not as the (rather awkward) notion that Christ’s 
sufferings are somehow ‘not enough.’ An intriguing possibility might be to read 
Christ’s suffering as the things lacking, in the cry of desolation.422 So “filling up” 
this “lack” would be, in apophatic terms, entering into the nothingness (the 
lack of God) of the Crucifixion. 
Exactly the same point applies to John’s ‘dark night,’ which is 
indistinguishable, Turner argues, from ‘clinical depression’ except in how it is 
construed theologically. It is clear that John suffers not only in the ‘literal’ 
sense of the incarceration and torture recorded in his biography, but also with a 
‘dark night’ which is (not merely, even if also manifested in) clinical depression. 
                                          
418 Blanchot, The Space of Literature pp.246-7 
419 ibid. p.246 
420 Suffering as bliss is the pervasive concept throughout the dwellings which become 
increasingly inner in union with Christ. 
421 Teresa of Àvila, Life p.113 
422 Which Teresa echoes in the soul’s experience; see Life pp.140, 157 
150 
 
 
Both Teresa and John write a lot ‘about’ suffering. Even in the erotic bliss of 
the night time tryst, the lover in John’s narrative is ‘wounded’ by the caress of 
the beloved. This makes sense in terms of the work of art, in Blanchot’s terms. 
It might mean the following. 
Blanchot, discussing Hölderlin’s words “what use are poets in the time of 
distress,” writes  
Forgetting, error, the unhappiness of erring can be linked 
to an historical period: to the time of distress when the 
gods are absent twice over, because they are no longer 
there, because they are not there yet.423 This vacant time 
is that of error … and nevertheless error helps us … the 
force, the risk proper to the poet is to dwell in God’s 
default, the region where truth lacks. The time of distress 
designates the time which in all times is proper to art.424 
This is, however, what Hölderlin calls a “bountiful suffering, bountiful 
happiness.”425 This is a self-subverting strategy as has been seen in Dionysius, 
and John on almost every line of ‘The Ascent of Mount Carmel’ describes the 
dark night as “O happy night!” Teresa too employs self-subverting language of 
exquisite pain.426 At the level of the work, is there an authenticity which 
conflates suffering with happiness? Blanchot argues that “when Hölderlin speaks 
of poets who, like the priests of Bacchus, go wandering from country to country 
in the sacred night, is this perpetual departure, the sorrow of straying which 
has no place to arrive, to rest, also the fecund migration, the movement which 
mediates, that which makes of rivers a language and of language the dwelling, 
the power by which day abides and is our abode?”427 
This is certainly how Mark C Taylor views Derrida’s dissemination, as 
fecund migration, invoking the parable of the Sower and the Seed,428 so that a 
new a-theological thinking can be ‘assured.’ Blanchot is slower to ‘out himself’ 
as an a-theologian (perhaps thereby being one), and rests his case in his identity 
                                          
423 Teresa describes the extreme suffering of her ‘soul’ as being ‘suspended between earth and 
heaven (like Christ on the Cross); see Life pp.138-40, Interior Castle pp.249-258 
424 Blanchot, Space of Literature p.246 
425 Hölderlin, ‘Dichterberuf,’ quoted in Blanchot p.246   
426 Teresa of Àvila, Interior Castle pp. 140, 167-8 
427 Blanchot, Space of Literature pp.246-7 
428 Taylor, Erring pp.118-120 
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as a poet: “To this question there can be no response. The poem is the answer’s 
absence.”429 
There can similarly be no answer, ultimately, to the question of 
‘experience’/experientialism in the apophatic fictions of Teresa and John. She 
might be hysterical and deluded,430 and he might be chronically depressed; or 
both might be superlative apophatic theologians, writing knowingly in a crafted 
poetic register. The poem, solely and entirely as the poem, is the answer’s 
absence. Fundamentally, the point here is to think of autism as 
Mindblindness/zero degree of cognitive empathy/mindfulness of separation, and 
precisely at the same time fascination/affective empathy/presence. This is to 
be in that decentred place of faith which Turner describes, and to be 
‘suspended between earth and heaven’ with Teresa (and with Christ). It is true 
of autistic metaphor, suspended in the space of fiction, as chapter one argued. 
This deeply theological space of apophatic fiction can be embodied in autistic 
metaphor because autistic poet-faith understands the impossibility of ‘cure,’ 
and finds great joy in its being. In an act of autistic authenticity, the betrayal of 
God and by God is the inhabitation of absolute mindfulness of separation. In this 
space, it is necessary to read on, and see where Meister Eckhart’s words lead: 
When (St Paul) took leave of these things, he renounced 
God for the sake of God, and yet God remained with 
him, as God exists in himself, not according to the 
manner in which he is gained or received but according 
to the being which he himself is.431 
This is, again, fascination/mindfulness of separation in the forgiveness of 
betrayal, and the acceptance of its necessity. Autism has a privileged insight of 
this, as follows. 
 
 
 
                                          
429 Blanchot, Space of Literature p.247 
430 this is the dubiety at the heart of Ron Hansen’s novel Mariette in Ecstasy (Hansen, Ron, 
Mariette in Ecstasy (London, UK; Harper Perennial,1992); is the novice Mariette a true stigmatic 
(and does that mean bearing the wounds of Christ inflicted by the society [and the reader] 
judging her also?) or is she ‘simply another neurotic emo kid’ who would listen to SOAD and self-
harm? Would Pilate find her “innocent?” 
431 Meister Eckhart (ed. Davies), Qui audit me non confundetur, in Selected Writing p.177 
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Authentic apophatic discourse: Towards Incarnational metaphor 
Each section of this chapter has indicated how it is a stage towards 
Incarnational metaphor. In a sense there is little more to say, but in a deeper 
sense, there is Nothing to say. Autistic metaphor can be thought of as 
Incarnation, when the mystery of the Incarnation is the absolute apophasis of 
mindfulness of separation. In the paradox which apophatic discourse expresses 
in self-subverting utterance, it is also the union of total absence in and as total 
presence. This total presence is indicated in discourse as the expression of 
autistic fascination. Autistic fascination, in saintly terms, is absolute autistic 
affective empathy as eros. That eros is also, in saintly terms, the absolute 
unknowing of faith, in the face of the mindfulness of separation in the darkness 
of God. The literal metaphor discussed in chapter two becomes a theology of 
the Incarnation as apophatic language, thought also as the authenticity of mute 
being. Self-subverting apophatic fiction is a metaphor which is ‘real,’ and 
actually, theologically, more ‘real’ than anything else.432 When an autistic 
hermeneutic takes apophatic discourse ‘literally,’ as chapter one argued, the 
distance between figuration and theological thinking collapses. This is, 
paradoxically, in the light of I livelli della realtà, precisely also the very 
opposite of ‘taking the story literally,’ and for this reason the pure Incarnational 
metaphor can only work as a theological autistic thinking. In this sense, the 
saints are absolutely autistic when they ‘literally’ see God in mystic beatific 
vision. Apophatic discourse indicates this vision, but the vision itself is ‘dazzling 
darkness’ and the words are silent. Pure autistic apophasis, as the Incarnation 
itself, is silent, and ultimately, in absolute purity, ‘cannot be spoken of.’ This 
would be an absolute autism, which will now be explored in chapter four. 
  
                                          
432 Teresa indicates this inversion of ‘reality:’ “there is nothing in the world but the soul” (Life 
p.91) and the world is, in the end, illusion (Interior Castle pp. 246-7) 
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Chapter Three: Incarnational 
Metaphor as the Autism of God  
Introduction: Incarnational metaphor, Autism and Altizer 
This chapter continues the journey towards Incarnational metaphor, 
bringing it to a halt which is its fruition, by envisioning its completion. This 
completion is absolute, expressed in this chapter as the autism of God. Chapter 
two worked towards it by showing that apophatic fiction could offer a 
hospitable refuge for the narrative of autistic fascination, unharried by the 
demand to leave its haven of separation. It was suggested that this refuge could 
exist only as a theological one, seen by the world as madness but in fact a 
profound inhabitation of the foolishness of the gospel. The metaphoric 
strategies of the mystical theology of chapter two were read in the light of a 
mythologised autism.  This mythologised autism can now be rethought in terms 
of a Christian myth of the post-Christian world, where an absolute autism of 
total incarnational metaphor is expressed as the death of God. With this 
absolute autistic incarnational metaphor in place, this chapter will provide the 
language which will then be able to discuss an absolute autism at work in the 
discourses of chapters four and five.  
Absolute autistic Incarnational metaphor as the death of God will now in 
this chapter be shown to be paradoxically both utterly impossible and utterly 
necessary, by being of supreme value as a radical thinking of the depth and 
fullness of the Incarnation itself. This absolute impossible autism finds a 
hospitable discourse offering a ‘homeless home’ for its absolute autistic 
hermeneutic of (non)being in Thomas Altizer’s work. This is because, for a 
Christian autistic hermeneutic, Altizer’s “Gospel of Christian Atheism” expresses 
a mythologised theological thinking of the Gospel. This offers a discourse where 
the autistic hermeneutic might find a hospitable place to express the deepest 
mythological absolute autism. The reason for this is that pure Incarnational 
metaphor will be shown to work as mindfulness of separation only when it is 
radically and deeply thought a-theologically. Altizer’s Christian atheism offers a 
metaphoric thinking of the Incarnation, which is likewise and conversely a 
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profoundly Incarnational thinking of metaphor. This has potential for autistic 
incarnational metaphor to function as a perception of Christian atheism, as the 
theological power which gives it its fullest life. William Hamilton writes that 
Altizer’s work is “evangelical and even pastoral,”433 and it is with this concern 
that Altizer is read here, as offering an authentic path for autistic theological 
thinking. It requires to be considered carefully, in order to give an Incarnational 
autistic hermeneutic a space where it might, with theological integrity, ‘lay its 
head’ (recalling Blanchot’s words about ‘getting a footing’ in the groundless).  
 
3.1 Modernism and myth: the death of God movement 
The Death of God Movement 
This chapter argues that the much maligned ‘death of God movement’ of 
the late twentieth century has been misunderstood and undervalued, because 
its nature as poetic existential statement has been perhaps mistaken for 
systematic theology. The specific aim of this chapter, with this in mind, is to 
read Altizer’s death of God thinking in the light of autistic myth as a neurotribal 
revisioning which could rethink its value if it is read mythologically. 
The April 8, 1966 (exactly fifty years ago, at the time of writing this 
thesis), the cover of TIME magazine was the first ever in the magazine's history 
to feature only type, and no photo.434 The cover – with the traditional, red 
border – was all black, with the words "Is God Dead?" in large, red text. This 
brought the ‘death of God movement’ into the view of the American public, 
creating public controversy most famously played out a year later in the debate 
between Thomas Altizer and John W. Montgomery at the Rockefeller Chapel, 
University of Chicago.435 Looking back, Altizer writes of the period: 
I think that I became one of the most hated men in 
America, murder threats were almost a commonplace, 
                                          
433 ‘A lucid, joyous, wise, evangelical – even pastoral – piece of theological work.’ (Cover 
matter, Altizer, Thomas J J, The Gospel of Christian Atheism (Pasadena, USA; Westminster 
Press,1966) 
434 TIME magazine, 8th April 1966, Time Inc., New York 
435 Altizer, Thomas J J & Montgomery, John Warwick, The Altizer-Montgomery Dialogue: A 
Chapter in the "God Is Dead" Controversy (Chicago; Intervarsity Press, 1967). 
155 
 
 
savage assaults upon me were widely published, and the 
churches seemed possessed by a fury against me.436 
 
In the UK, earlier in the 1960s Bishop John Robinson had done something 
similar in achieving public prominence through his SCM paperback Honest to 
God, arguing for a Christian atheism.437 
Theologians including Harvey Cox, William Hamilton, Gabriel Vahanian, 
Paul van Buren and Thomas Altizer came to be known as proponents of the 
‘death of God movement’ which had generated the writing in TIME magazine 
and also in Honest to God: as early as 1961 Altizer was arguing for a non-theistic 
Christianity in Oriental Mysticism and Biblical Eschatology.438 Death of God 
theology was not simply atheism, but a deeply theologically thought response to 
secularism. In The Secular City, Harvey Cox envisioned a harmony between the 
secular and the religious, which celebrated both: “God can be just as present in 
the secular as in the religious realms of life, and we unduly cramp the divine 
presence by confining it to some specially delineated spiritual or ecclesial 
sector.”439 
William Hamilton draws on Bonhoeffer’s ‘religionless Christianity’ as a 
forebear of the death of God, quoting Bonhoeffer’s letters from prison: 
So our coming of age forces us to a true recognition of 
our situation vis-à-vis God. God is teaching us that we 
must live as men who can get along very well without 
him. The God who is with us is the God who forsakes us 
(Mark 15:34 [‘My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken 
me?’]). The God who makes us live in his world without 
using him as a working hypothesis is the God before 
whom we are ever standing. Before God and with him 
we live without God. God allows himself to be edged out 
of the world and onto the cross. God is weak and 
powerless in the world, and that is exactly the way, the 
                                          
436 Living the Death of God: a Theological Memoir - Memoir Two (New York, SUNY Press, 2006) 
(online stable online url http://www.altizer.narod.ru/memoir/memoir.html  
437 John A.T. Robinson, Honest to God, (London, UK; SCM Press, 1963) 
438 Thomas Altizer, Oriental Mysticism and Biblical Eschatology (Westminster, Philadelphia, USA; 
Westminster Press, 1961) 
439 Harvey Cox, The Secular City 25 Years Later, Introduction to second edition of The Secular 
City, Macmillan in The Christian Century, November 7, 1990, pp. 1025-1029. Online access 
http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=206 accessed 29/09/2016 
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only way, in which he can be with us and help us. 
(Letter of 16th July 1944)440  
… Man is challenged to participate in the sufferings of 
God at the hands of a godless world’).441 
 
Even while appropriating Bonhoeffer, however, Hamilton then goes 
against Bonhoeffer’s belief that God, even while forsaking us, “can be with us 
and help us.”442  Hamilton writes: 
There are thus no places in the self or the world, 
Protestants who listen to Bonhoeffer go on to say, 
where problems emerge that only God can solve…. The 
world itself is the source of the solutions, not God.443 
Hamilton seems to be advocating a secular humanism where God has 
become redundant. He envisions a “movement away from God and religion … 
towards the world, worldly life, and the neighbour as the bearer of the worldly 
Jesus,” affirming “both the death of God and the death of all theism.”444 
Paul van Buren also thought through the implications of secularisation for 
theology, also thinking through the consequences of historical, de-mythologising 
Biblical criticism. Hamilton sees van Buren as, in the service of Bonhoeffer’s 
“non-religious interpretation of the gospel,” engaged in a “linguistic analysis … 
(such that) Bultmann, taken seriously, means the end of the rhetoric of neo-
orthodoxy and the so-called biblical theology.”445 This means, in Hamilton’s 
reading of van Buren, “the rise of technology and modern science, the need in 
our thinking to stick pretty close to what we can experience in ordinary 
ways.”446 Wolfgang Saxon adds to this that van Buren was ''trying to find an 
utterly nontranscendent way of interpreting the Gospel.''447 
                                          
440 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Hamilton, William, in Radical Theology and the Death of God, ed. T J J 
Altizer, T J J & William Hamilton, William (Middlesex, UK; Pelican Books, 1968) p. 120 
441 ibid. p.123, quoting Bonhoeffer, letter 18 July 1944 
442 This reads as an echo of the Dark Night of the Soul discussed in chapter two; John of the 
Cross, like Bonhoeffer, writes from the experience of torture and imprisonment. 
443 Altizer, Thomas J J & Hamilton, William, Radical Theology and the Death of God p.121 
444 ibid. pp.49, 121 
445 ibid. p.33 
446 ibid. p.45 
447 ''The Secular Meaning of the Gospel: Based on an Analysis of Its Language'' Macmillan, UK, 
1963, in Wolfgang Saxon, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/01/us/paul-van-buren-74-death-
of-god-exponent.html  
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Gabriel Vahanian saw the death of God in terms, like Bonhoeffer’s, which 
resonate with the mystics. Vahanian expresses faith as paradox: 
The Christian era has bequeathed us the 'death of God,' 
but not without teaching us a lesson. God is not 
necessary; that is to say, he cannot be taken for 
granted. He cannot be used merely as a hypothesis, 
whether epistemological, scientific, or existential, 
unless we should draw the degrading conclusion that 
'God is reasons.' On the other hand, if we can no longer 
assume that God is, we may once again realize that he 
must be. God is not necessary, but he is inevitable. He 
is wholly other and wholly present. Faith in him, the 
conversion of our human reality, both culturally and 
existentially, is the demand he still makes upon us.448 
Where Hamilton writes of a “new optimism” which is “‘not an optimism 
of grace, but a worldly optimism,”449 Altizer’s radical sacred profane argues for 
a subverted and inverted theology, nonetheless and even consequently deeply 
theological, so that he can honour “Georges Bernanos’ dying country priest 
(who) can joyously if feebly announce that everything is grace,” in a thinking 
which can “celebrate the presence of the Word in a new world that negates all 
previous forms (my emphasis) of faith.”450 Altizer is profoundly Christian, and 
when he writes The Gospel of Christian Atheism in 1966, he is articulating a 
vision of new “forms of faith” which attempts to rescue an authentic 
Christianity, paradoxically, by subverting it. His thinking is in fact not ‘secular’ 
but ‘profane,’451 and this important distinction comes from his reading of Tillich 
and Eliade, as will be explained below. His Christian atheism offers a 
mythological thinking which ironically re-mythologises what Bultmann has de-
mythologised, and this makes his work a hospitable discourse for an autistic 
hermeneutic. To demonstrate how he arrives at this mythological stance, it is 
necessary briefly to look at the influence of Tillich for how Altizer will take 
Eliade’s thinking of mythology as sacred vis-à-vis profane, and create a new 
mythology of the sacred profane. 
                                          
448 Gabriel Vahanian, The Death of God: The Culture of our Post-Christian Era, (Eugene, Oregon; 
Wipf & Stock Publishers, 1961 (1957)), p.49 
449 Altizer & Hamilton, Radical Theology and the Death of God p.168 
450 ibid. p.140 
451 ‘Secular’ meaning within the confines of a worldly vision; ‘profane’ etymologically as ‘pro-
fanus,’ ‘outwith the temple (the temple still in sight) but also with overtones of profanity as 
blasphemy/obscenity/offense – in other words, as heresy. 
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Tillich 
If Bonhoeffer writes a ‘religion-less Christianity’ from the shock of the 
existential threat of Nazism, Tillich also writes from the existential threat of 
the First World War, so that he can write of The Shaking of the Foundations.452 
He is also writing within a theological context where Existentialist thought has 
raised questions of threatenedness. George Pattison argues in his essay Fear and 
Trembling and the Paradox of Christian Existentialism453 that twentieth century 
Christian existentialists including Tillich, Bultmann, Marcel, Berdyaev and 
Bultmann share a “relation to a number of key Nineteenth Century sources, 
most notably Schelling, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche.”454 Pattison 
adds that “it is from Kierkegaard that such central concepts as anxiety, 
repetition, the moment of vision, despair, and being-toward-death derive their 
distinctively existentialist meaning – as does the term “existence” itself.”455 
Tillich’s theology of culture is a response to threatenedness which listens to 
Existentialist thought and argues that  
the human condition always raises fundamental 
questions which human cultures express in various ways 
in the dominant styles of their works of art, and to 
which religious traditions offer answers expressed in 
religious symbols.456 
The correlation between art as fundamental question and religion as 
symbolic answer moves religious discourse into an existential tension where art 
takes on weight and religion must answer authentically. This lifting of art 
beyond a mimetic function in service of religion is a secularizing one, but by no 
means a dilution of religious thought. Tillich has been called an atheist, but his 
“atheism” is not the rejection of God-language, in fact the very opposite. When 
he writes that “The modern way to flee God is to rush ahead and ahead … But 
God’s Hand falls upon us,”457 this is an existential statement, because “The God 
                                          
452 The title of the 1949 collection of Tillich’s sermons 
453 George Pattison, Fear and Trembling and the Paradox of Christian Existentialism, in 
Situating existentialism: Key texts in Context, ed. Judaken & Bernasconi (New York; Columbia 
University Press, 2012) pp.211-236 
454 Ibid. p.212 
455 Ibid.  
456 Kelsey, David H, The Fabric of Paul Tillich’s Theology (Eugene, Oregon; Wipf & Stock, 
Eugene, 2011) p.64  
457Tillich, Shaking of the Foundations p.48 
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whom he cannot flee is the Ground of his being.”458 Tillich’s atheism is the 
expression of the majesty of God conceived beyond theism. David Kelsey 
comments that God cannot “be a “supreme being” for, by definition, any entity 
is finite. Hence, Tillich refuses to speak of the “existence” of God.459 
Kelsey expresses Tillich’s thinking of the personal authenticity of faith as 
“the question about our “ultimate concern.” Whatever concerns us ultimately, 
says Tillich, is our “god.””460  Religion can easily displace a thinking of this, so 
that  
… religious ritual, myth or institutions are ambiguous, 
‘functioning religiously’ to express the unconditioned … 
(but) they invite for themselves the ultimate concern 
appropriate only to the unconditioned. Thereby they 
become “demonic,” powerfully destructive of the life 
trying to “transcend” itself.461 
False gods, when we form religion carelessly, then, can mean that 
religion can be demonic, and this is something to which Altizer will return. 
Tillich provides a thinking of theology as ‘a-theist’ existentialist authenticity, in 
the light of Modernism, and the death of God movement can be seen to rely on 
this. 
 
Altizer and Tillich 
The collection of meditative essays ‘Radical Theology and the death of 
God,’462 written by Altizer and William Hamilton in 1966, is dedicated to the 
memory of Tillich, and his influence is central to the emergence of the radical 
a-theological current. Graham Ward has remarked that Altizer “reverses 
Tillich’s priorities – judging God in the darkness of modern culture rather than 
culture by the ultimate revelation of God.”463 This tends to imply that Altizer is 
not fundamentally grounded in Christian theology, and this is far from the case. 
His subversion of theology is itself deeply theological, engaging with Protestant 
                                          
458 ibid. p.54 
459 Kelsey, Fabric of Paul Tillich’s Theology p.66 
460 Ibid. p.65 
461 Ibid. pp. 70-71 
462 Altizer & Hamilton, Radical Theology and the Death of God,  
463 Ward, Graham, Postmodern Theology, in Ford, David F & Muers, Rachel (eds.) The Modern 
Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology Since 1918 (Massachusetts; Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005 p.136 
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and Catholic theologies along with Buddhist thought. What Ward is picking up on 
is the way in which Altizer writes.  
Where Tillich thinks of authentic being so that art and culture asks 
questions which theology answers, Altizer thinks of this authenticity differently. 
In Altizer’s work, art is not the question to which theology can respond, but art 
itself is the mode where theological thinking is situated. The same can be said 
of Altizer’s reading of Hegel, who is thought theologically as a thinking of the 
poetic.  
His a-theology is not written in the genre of systematic or dogmatic 
theology, but can be read as a poetic form which has similarities to what 
chapter two called apophatic fiction. Although both are a-theological thinkers, 
Altizer differs from Hamilton. Where Hamilton’s concern is chiefly to dwell on 
the death of God as the waning of Christianity as a socio-political-cultural 
phenomenon, Altizer is more concerned with a theologically thought cosmic and 
existential death of God which culture does not create, but rather expresses. 
Where Tillich correlates art as question with religious symbol as answer, Altizer 
goes beyond correlation to fusion. Like Teresa of Àvila and John of the Cross, he 
employs metaphorical strategies to approach the deeply thought paradox of the 
death of God in Christ. 
His theology is an evolution of Tillich’s thinking of the “non-existence” of 
God, in the existential sense meant by Tillich, and if a Biblical theology often is 
more implicit than explicit in Altizer’s narrative, this is not to conclude that 
culture ‘judges’ God. More accurately, God and culture articulate each other, in 
an inseparable identification which could be called a theological poetics or 
equally a poetic theology.  
The key to this synthesis might be thought of as lying in Altizer’s reading 
of Mircea Eliade. Eliade views religion within an anthropological religious studies 
viewpoint when he writes that 
In imitating the exemplary acts of a god or of a mythic 
hero, or simply by recounting their adventures, the man 
of an archaic society detaches himself from profane 
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time and magically re-enters the Great Time, the sacred 
time.464 
Altizer employs a mythologising strategy where the secularizing narrative 
in Western art and particularly literature is the expression of the mythologised 
Biblical narrative, sacred profane. So Altizer reads James Joyce’s irreverent 
textual games with Catholicism in terms of a mythic retelling of the sacred. 
Where Eliade has designated separate places for sacred time and profane time, 
Altizer’s idea of the sacred profane thinks of all as sacred, and all as profane. 
The narrative of authenticity in secularisation is as sacred as Biblical narrative, 
and in fact is an enactment of Biblical narrative.  
Altizer writes about his “three prophets,” Hegel, Blake and Nietzsche,465 
and his argument is that by listening to these writers and inhabiting, rather than 
“answering” them,466 the gospel becomes more deeply authentic Christian 
thought. He does this by taking the gospel as mythical narrative of authenticity, 
in such a way that the kenosis of the Christ event to can be read also in 
Modernism as an authenticity of the end of Christendom. These “prophets” 
make it possible to read an ultimate kenosis as the death of God. This radical, 
absolute kenotic thinking is Altizer’s ‘Christian Atheism,’ and by reading it 
autistically, this chapter can form an Incarnational metaphor which is the death 
of God. The death of God in absolute incarnational metaphor will become the 
autism of God. 
 
Is this blasphemy? 
Carers (but perhaps not so often autists) have been known to claim that 
God ‘heals’ autism, or that God can be known ‘in spite of’ autism, so that 
autism remains an impairment which needs to be ‘managed,’ or even, if 
possible, removed (‘healed’) in the faith community.467 The faith community, 
and by implication, God, are the ‘safe,’ normative world of non-autism. Is the 
idea of God’s autism absurd? This absurdity is irreverently depicted with cruel 
but undeniable humour in the satirical animation series Family Guy, when 
                                          
464 Eliade, Mircea, Myths, Dreams and Mysteries (trans Philip Mairet) (New York; Harper Row, 
1967), p. 23 
465 Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, p.23 
466 Thereby moving beyond Tillich’s theology of correlation 
467 Examples of this will be discussed in the conclusion. 
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Peter, Quagmire, Cleveland and Joe go to heaven to meet God. God, here, is 
the archetypal old man with a beard, mild, doddery, and an ineffectual 
meddler. As they leave, Peter goes to give God a hug, and Quagmire tells him “I 
wouldn’t do that. God doesn’t like people touching him – he’s mildly 
autistic.”468 An “autistic God” is everything Christian theology wouldn’t want 
“Him” to be. 
Family Guy’s God is funny, and part of an all too incisive commentary on 
the ineffectiveness of much contemporary religion. Autism is the butt of humour 
here too. Turning both these perceptions upside down is the different, holy 
blasphemy which this chapter aims to express. What preceding chapters of this 
thesis have argued is that an autistic theological perspective is a privileged one, 
speaking from the margins but with a truth which the neurotypical world misses 
to its cost. To suggest the autism of God is to offer praise for a God at the 
deepest ground of our being. If it is perceived as heresy, and all the more so 
because it reads itself in terms of death of God theology, it is a divergent 
heretical view which has the honour of integrity,469 and is, in fact, profoundly 
Christian, as this chapter will now argue. 
 
3.2 Altizer, metaphor and autism 
Altizer’s Sacred Profane 
This offers possibilities straight away for Incarnational metaphor, because 
the poetic and the theological are not available for pragmatic ‘appropriation’ 
(as Tillich would envisage) by each other. Instead, if anything, it is a confluence 
where theological thinking ‘listens to’ the poetic as the discourse of its being. If 
it is true that the Christ event is incarnate in the poetic, this does not mean the 
poetic ‘is’ a metaphor ‘for’ the theological. Instead, the poetic-theological 
simply is, and there is no theistic referent for metaphor to ‘carry between’ the 
                                          
468 Family Guy S12 E13, Acts of God, Seth MacFarlane, Fox TV, 2014 
469 Chapter six will consider the autistic hermeneutic as a ‘holy fool’ narrative, and in the 
Conclusion its role as validation and validate will be considered. 
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two. The function of theistic referent disappears,470 and Altizer calls this living 
within metaphor the ‘sacred profane.’ 
For an autistic hermeneutic, a ‘sacred profane’ of metaphor-as-atheism-
as-the-Incarnation offers a way to validate its way of seeing. Sacred profane can 
be thought in two senses. Firstly, the sacred profane is honouring a sacrality of 
the space of the secular, divorced from religion [archaic ‘pro (outside)-fanus 
(temple)], and secondly, it is the profanity (blasphemy) of ‘taking God’s name 
in vain’ by speaking the death of God. The second sense, the ‘profanity’ of the 
death of God, will be discussed in detail in the following sections. However, at 
this point the context of this ‘profanity’ is now explained as the first sense of 
profanity, as ‘outside the temple’ and ‘irreligious.’ This “pro-fanus” will now be 
read autistically as autistic fascination in the space of mindfulness of 
separation. 
 
The ‘irreligious’ sacred profane as fascination 
Literal metaphor, as chapter three argued, does not allegorise metaphor 
into a ‘useful’ theological schema, referring ‘to’ that which theology 
formulates.471 Instead, literal metaphor was read as being ‘in’ the space of 
apophatic discourse, which does not formulate but inhabits that ‘object.’ 
Looking at the sacred profane as ‘outwith the temple’ offers another way 
to think of the marginal space of apophatic theology, which operates ‘outwith 
the temple’ of theology. This can be read autistically as fascination. Reading 
autistically, fascination can be discerned as a reading of the sacred profane 
                                          
470 This follows on, in this thesis’ thinking, from chapter three’s concept of apophatic 
fiction, and Altizer’s work also refers to the connection between Christian atheism and 
apophatic theology; for example, “the naming of the anonymity of God) echoes the highest 
expressions of our mysticism in its call for a total transfiguration, and possible only by way of a 
full union with the depths of anonymity itself” (Altizer, Godhead and the Nothing, p.2)  
471 Chapter five will develop this idea further, by reading a fully Incarnational literal metaphor 
in Manley Hopkin’s ‘ecceitas’ (poetic Scotist ‘haecceitas). In chapter five, at that point, this will 
be a fuller space of autistic fascination. Here, though, regarding Altizer, this reading prepares 
the way for chapter five’s reading fascination as an ‘ecceitas’ of the sacred profane. The reason 
for this is that the possibility of reading back into Hopkins’ ‘ecceitas’ autistically is made 
possible in the light of Altizer’s sacred profane death of God.  
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because art does not ‘lead to’ a theological outcome but ‘is’ the theological 
object, and this is in fact a non-theological object without meaning.472  
To approach this connection, it is useful to go back to how fascination 
was introduced at the beginning of this thesis. Fascination was described as 
joyful immersion, being overwhelmed in the object of fascination. This is the 
phenomenon of ‘RRBI’’s 473 – it could be as an Asperger’s obsession or a 
‘severely impaired’ autistic behaviour of repetitive, restrictive behaviours of 
touch, smell, hearing, tasting. For example, what could be more ‘profane’ (in 
the archaic sense of non-religious) than deep fat fryers, shiny spinning objects, 
twinkling lights, electric pylons, a running tap, a piece of velvet cloth? Yet this 
is the sacred space of ‘meaningless meaning.’ It is the place most fully to ‘be.’ 
A sacred profane of meaningless communion does not theologise this into 
symbolic appropriation – water could be thought in Biblical tropes, but electric 
pylons? (stretching metaphors to think of electric pylons as carriers of the power 
of the Spirit, for example, would be absurd). Fascination simply ‘is,’ full of 
spiritual power in sensory delight.474 The clear distinction here is that in the 
autistic sacred profane, the symbols of the sacred [the absolute kenosis of God 
into the world, as universal sacrament] clear a space for the profane [my 
delight in ‘seeing’ the wonder of deep fat fryer design]. The converse does not 
hold – theology has recognised and honoured the sacrality of my love of deep fat 
fryers, but my deep fat fryers don’t symbolise anything at all, including the 
theologically thought sacred. 
In the same way, fascination as literal metaphor comes closer to the 
theological thinking of Altizer’s sacred profane. For example, Altizer writes that 
the sacred profane is embodied in 
                                          
472 This is the opposite of Otto’s thinking of the numinous as ‘Mysterium tremendum et 
fascinans’ (Rudolf Otto, ‘The Idea of the Holy (Eastford, Connecticut; Martino Fine Books, 2010 
(1917)). This is not a sacred which overwhelms in an eerie unknown which causes trembling 
terror and mesmerisation. It is instead joyful being in the sacred mystery which remains mystery 
precisely because it does not need meaning. Autistic fascination as sacred profane is not a 
fascination of encountering the other, but a fascination of being in what representation would 
convert into the other. This seems the opposite of mindfulness of separation at first glance, but 
it is the mystical union of separation which was indicated by chapter three’s autistic 
hermeneutic of apophatic discourse. The next section will explore this paradox. 
473 Introduction –see ‘RRBI’s’ and ‘Sensory Connoisseur.’ 
474 Or horror, in the distress of being overwhelmed in a too stimulating, crowded, noisy, too 
bright environment. 
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the greatest landscape paintings of Monet and Cezanne, 
and even in the late landscapes of Van Gogh, wherein the 
very incarnation of chaos in the dazzling space before us 
poses an inescapable call for union with that chaos.475  
The “incarnation of chaos” indicates the moment which Modernism 
presents, as chapter two discussed, and the role of art is to invite an 
apocalyptic chaos, to dazzle, not to signpost. For this reason, the landscapes 
are manipulated into form and texture which catches rather than represents the 
landscape. The distortions which prevent a simple image emerging in fact 
capture more of the landscape, but as an ‘ecceitas,’476 not a representation.477  
To see the “dazzling space” of the art work as autistic fascination would 
mean that a theologically thought fascination is honoured by a mythically 
thought theological narrative. This would be because literal metaphor, not 
‘signposting anywhere,’ might find itself in the space where, increasingly in 
Impressionist, Expressionist and abstract Modern art, representation is eclipsed 
by the pure power of the work which “dazzles.” In this way, these landscapes 
function as literal metaphor because they do not ‘fold back to’ pragmatic 
interpretation, staying instead in the mute power which was indicated by 
Blanchot, discussed in chapter two. 
The “chaos” for which Altizer is arguing, as the site of these works, is the 
chaos of the death of God, as the next section will explain, but this death is 
enabled by Modernist abilities to articulate an emancipation of the profane. Its 
relevance to literal metaphor is firstly, that being ‘in’ the profane as a sacred 
space is ‘literally’ the fascination which autistically inhabits art which breaks 
free of representation. Secondly, this sense of profanity’s relevance to 
                                          
475 Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism p.2 
476 See chapter five; here, ‘ecceitas’ indicates absent presence in the poetic. It articulates how 
Altizer’s thinking of art as Incarnation relates to a theologically thought Incarnational metaphor. 
477 Similarly, many of William Turner’s watercolours “enter into chaos” as being, not 
representation; The Victoria and Albert’s guide discusses this: “William Hazlitt commented that 
Turner's 'pictures are...too much abstractions of aerial perspective, and representations not 
properly of the objects of nature as of the medium through which they are seen...they are 
pictures of the elements of air, earth and water' … Turner was less concerned with painting 
specific places than with the dramatic possibilities of sea and air, and with the motion of the 
elements. Light was his theme … Joseph Farington noted that 'Turner has no settled process but 
drives the colours about'.” (British Watercolours 1750-1900: J M W Turner and John Ruskin: 
Turner's 'golden visions'”” online access http://www.vam.ac.uk/content/articles/b/british-
watercolours-turner-and-ruskin/ accessed 3rd September 2016 
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Incarnational metaphor is also a mindfulness of separation, where autistic 
fascination as the profane is marginalised from religious discourse, ‘cast out’ 
from the temple by the blasphemy which speaks the Incarnation in a deep fat 
fryer. 
This sacred profane, then, is irreligious, but Altizer’s argument is that, 
precisely by being so, it is profoundly Christian. This second sense of the sacred 
profane explains this, and an autistic reading of this is the next stage of working 
towards Incarnational metaphor as a theological thinking of the autism of God. 
 
Profanity as blasphemy: the end of Christendom 
When Christian atheism is read as the blasphemy of the death of God, 
this blasphemy is articulated as, and because of, the end of Christendom. So the 
sacred profane in both senses, as ‘outwith the temple’ and as holy blasphemy, 
can be envisioned in a Western culture which is living the end of Christendom. 
Modernism both articulates and makes possible the end of Christendom; Altizer 
argues that “it cannot be denied that there is an epiphany of nothingness in full 
modernity which is unique in history.”478 Altizer writes about “seers” who bring 
this end into view and into being: it is “deeply and comprehensively envisioned 
by Blake, Goethe, Dostoyevsky and Mallarme … called forth by Joyce, Kafka, 
Stevens and Beckett.”479  
Being ‘outwith the temple’ entails living the death of Christendom, and 
Altizer reads this death in terms of Modernism, but also in Blake, Hegel and 
Nietzsche. 
 
 
 
 
                                          
478 Altizer, Gospel of Christian Atheism p.51 
479 Altizer, Thomas J J, Godhead and the Nothing (Albany, USA; State University of New York 
Press, 2003) p.13 
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Blake’s “honest indignation” 
A starting point is Blake’s words in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell: 
“The voice of honest indignation is the voice of God.”480 In the vast symbolic 
universe Blake creates, the kingdom of Luvah is the repressive weight of the 
edifice of the Christian tradition. Altizer, like Blake, sees Christ as the heretic 
who overturns the structures of religion, and both see their task as a recovering 
of that heretical Christ. Blake’s indignation is against Christendom as a loveless 
oppressive structure. In The Garden of Love, 
the gates of this Chapel were shut 
And "Thou shalt not," writ over the door … 
And I saw it was filled with graves, 
And tombstones where flowers should be; 
And priests in black gowns were walking their rounds, 
And binding with briars my joys and desires.481 
An autistic hermeneutic reads Blake’s “honest indignation” and the 
poem’s defence of Christ as pure Love in terms of autistic integrity. Pure 
autistic affective empathy disregards the neurotypical cognitive structures of 
the “chapel,” and the autistic truth telling of a ‘garden of fascination’ does not 
recognise any compromise in its indignation. This is also a dangerous, anarchic 
thinking of Jesus482 because it also emancipates the artist; Blake writes: “I know 
of no other Christianity and of no other Gospel than the liberty of both body & 
mind to exercise the Divine Art of Imagination.”483 This is ‘dangerous,’ because 
the artist, as chapter three discussed, errs. Who knows where the “Divine Art of 
Imagination” might lead? It might lead to deep fat fryers, or Tracy Emin’s 
                                          
480 Blake, William, A Memorable Fancy, Plate 12, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, 
1790, in http://www.gailgastfield.com/mhh/mhh.html, accessed 23/01/2015 
481 Blake, William, The Garden of Love, Songs of Experience in 
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/175220, accessed 25/01/2015 
482 Altizer writes about the Incarnation of Jesus, rejecting the Messianic theology of the 
names “Christ” or “Lord.” 
483 Blake, William (eds Erdman, David et al), Complete Poetry and Prose ( New York; 
Anchor Books, 1982) Jerusalem, 77, quoted by Searle, Joshua T, The Divine Imagination: 
William Blake’s Vision of Theosis and the Theology of Hope, in Luvah: Journal of the Creative 
Imagination,  in https://www.academia.edu/8358853/The_Divine-
Human_Imagination_William_Blake_s_Vision_of_Theosis_and_the_Theology_of_Hope_pp._1-
14_Link_Luvah_Journal_of_the_Creative_Imagination, accessed 23/01/2015 
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unmade bed. Autistic faith might be dangerously unconventional, and the autist 
might be a disturbing alien presence in the community of faith.484 
 
Profanity as blasphemy: Nietzsche 
For Altizer, Barth’s Krisis of the divine “No” is subverted to become a 
Nietzschean No-Saying. Where Barth argues that theology is “a service serving 
the church – an “ecclesiastical science,””485 Altizer follows Blake in assaulting 
Christendom as the place where “The footsteps of the Lamb of God were there; 
but now no more.”486 Altizer argues that “Luvah’s sepulchre, most simply 
interpreted, is the repressive body of the Christian Church – as Nietzsche 
remarked, Christianity is the stone upon the grave of Jesus.”487 This, however 
subversive, is not alien to even an apparently more orthodox Tillichian thought: 
… religious ritual, myth or institutions are ambiguous, 
‘functioning religiously’ to express the unconditioned … 
(but) they invite for themselves the ultimate concern 
appropriate only to the unconditioned. Thereby they 
become “demonic,” powerfully destructive of the life 
trying to “transcend” itself.488 
The autistic literal hermeneutic reads this ‘literally’ (at face value, 
seriously, with integrity) as an absolute No. An autistic ‘serious’ following 
through of the critique of Christendom as Blake’s “sepulchre” sees Christ dead, 
here, in our midst. The metaphor is “real,” here, as the instantiation of God’s 
absence.489 The autistic hermeneutic ‘takes Altizer seriously’ when subversively, 
Altizer writes: 
Karl Barth was the first theologian to maintain that the 
“secret” of the creation can only truly be known by faith 
                                          
484 Reading George Eliot’s ‘Felix Holt the Radical’ in an autistic hermeneutic, Felix Holt’s 
uncompromising stand for justice makes him out as odd and inconvenient, and autistic faith asks 
the awkward questions of ‘elephants in the room,’ disregarding tactful conventions. Holt is an 
interesting parallel, in the context Of Eliot’s theological and political radicalism, where he is 
critical equally of both ecclesial power and (a)moral pragmatism. (Eliot, George, Felix Holt the 
Radical (Ware, UK; Wordsworth Classics, 1997 (1866)) 
485 Hardy, Daniel W, Karl Barth, in Ford & Muers (eds.), The Modern Theologians, p.24  
486 Blake, Jerusalem 24.23, quote in Altizer, Gospel of Christian Atheism p.42 
487 Ibid. p.43 
488 Kelsey, The Fabric of Paul Tillich’s Theology pp. 70-71  
489 Altizer’s Memoir is entitled “Living the death of God,” and that impossible, intolerable 
paradox, read autistically, will become the narrative of intolerable, impossible absolute autism. 
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in Christ … it beautifully illustrates the quandary of the 
modern theologian who is forced to speak about God in a 
world in which God is dead.490 
Barth expresses God as known through Christ, but Altizer shifts the 
emphasis so that ‘what is known’ is the crucified Son of God, actually (for the 
autistic hermeneutic, ‘literally,’ as a Trinitarian thought of homoousios) as the 
death of God.  
In Altizer’s thought, Nietzsche, like Blake, is a “modern Christian seer”491 
of this death. God, for Nietzsche, is “the deification of nothingness, the will to 
nothingness pronounced holy!”492 and the parable of Nietzsche’s Madman reads: 
Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away 
from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, 
sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or 
down? Are we not straying, as through an infinite nothing? 
Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not 
become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do 
we not need to light lanterns in the morning? Do we hear 
nothing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are 
burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet of the divine 
decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God 
remains dead. And we have killed him.493 
The death of the metaphysical God is both chaos and gospel, as 
emancipation. Altizer writes: “to know an alien and empty nothingness as the 
dead body of God is to be liberated from every uncanny and awesome sense of 
the mystery and power of chaos,”494and “only by means of a realisation of the 
death of God in human experience can faith be liberated from the authority and 
the power of the primordial God.”495 
This means that the demonic nature of Luvah is taken ‘absolutely 
seriously’ by the autistic reader who is able to follow Blake’s honest indignation 
into Altizer’s theological thinking.  
                                          
490 Altizer, Gospel of Christian Atheism p.99 
491 ibid. p.95 
492 Nietzsche, Friedrich (trans. R J Hollingdale) Twilight of the Idols/The Antichrist (London UK; 
Penguin Classics 1990 (1889/1895)) section 18, quoted in Altizer, The Gospel of Christian 
Atheism p.93 
493 Nietzsche, Friedrich (trans. Common, Thomas), The Joyful Wisdom (New York; 
Ungar/Continuum, 1973) quoted in Gospel of Christian Atheism (citation not given) p. 95-96  
494 Altizer, Gospel of Christian Atheism p.96 
495 Ibid., p.112 
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A Short ‘Deviation’: Chop Suey’s betrayal 
A twenty-first century deviation from the narrative here perhaps helps to 
work into thinking of the fully radical nature of this thinking of the demonic. 
This deviation is the deconstruction of any possible theodicy in the music of 
System of a Down’s Chop Suey.’496 System of a Down (SOAD), an American thrash 
metal band of Armenian ethnic origin, express ‘honest indignation’ as raw rage, 
where reflecting on the Armenian genocide leaves religion as a shallow formula 
which mocks the actual carnage by offering any sanitising power: “I don’t think 
you trust in my self-righteous suicide.” Yet its ‘self-righteous suicide’ formula is 
also a ‘literal’ enactment of the insane choice of the ‘suicidal self’ of the 
‘righteous’ Christ in Gethsemane.497 Autistic integrity, with its black and white 
thinking, will grapple with this dubiety/duplicity, and refuse to ignore the 
betrayal upon betrayal (“Jesus, be sensible [we would say] and grow up, we do 
love you, you don’t need to do this …”) inherent in it. 
Betrayal is an important concept because, as chapter two argued, it is 
the ‘entry price’ to the space of fiction which ‘takes liberties with’ narrative. 
Monsignor Quixote, like Teresa, like Don Quixote, is “mad out of duty to the 
truth of the book.”498 In every hermeneutic, Hermes is both the messenger of 
the gods and a liar.  This is an understanding of Coleridge’s “willing suspension 
                                          
496 System of a Down, ‘Chop Suey,’ Written by Daron Malakian, Shavo Odadjian, John Dolmayan, 
Serj Tankian • Copyright © Kobalt Music Publishing Ltd., Sony/ATV Music Publishing LLC, 2004; 
(online access https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSvFpBOe8eY 3rd September 2016):  “I don't 
think you trust 
In my self-righteous suicide 
I cry when angels deserve to die 
In my self-righteous suicide 
I cry when angels deserve to die / Father, father, father, father 
Father, into your hands I commend my spirit 
Father, into your hands 
Why have you forsaken me? 
In your eyes forsaken me 
In your thoughts forsaken me 
In your heart forsaken me, oh 
Trust in my self-righteous suicide.” 
497 See David Jasper’s theologically ironic chapter, Evil and Betrayal at the Heart of the Sacred 
Community,: “we prettily talk of paronomasia while this poor guy is dying on the cross, for 
Christ’s sake” (The Sacred Community p.39); “We have to step outside this fictive nonsense, 
this mythical realm, confronting two worlds whereby the banality of evil (“Jesus, be sensible 
[we would say] and grow up, we do love you, you don’t need to do this …”) is exposed in its 
truly mythic dimensions” (ibid., p.37) 
498 Jasper, The Sacred Community p.36 
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of disbelief”499 which means that reading and writing are acts of collusion. 
Regarding ‘Chop Suey,’ who are the “angels (who) deserve to die,” and why? It’s 
impossible to say, because, in the end, it’s ‘only a song,’ articulating betrayal – 
of angels, or of angelhood? Or both? It’s possible to sing along without knowing. 
It is possible, in pure affective empathy bereft of cognitive empathy, to be 
utterly beyond making sense of atrocity, and sing by howling in the death of 
God, at the existence of a culture’s felt need for “self-righteous suicide” as 
escape or atonement. 
David Jasper points out that the apostle Peter is both betrayer and 
betrayed: “his hopes dashed – for which he had given up everything? To hell 
with everything, we understand very well how once can prefer the banality of 
everyday evil … to this awful, overturning, unbearable, unnecessary 
violence.”500 
This all happens within the text, because it is within the gospel narrative 
as narrative that words function as “living powers, by which things of the most 
importance to mankind are actuated, combined and humanised.”501 Jasper 
points out that the omniscient narrator of Mark’s gospel privileges the reader 
with another layer of Peter’s betrayal, which is that the reader knows what 
Peter does not; “In betraying his dearest friend, (Peter) admits that he has no 
idea who that friend is [“I know not this man of whom ye speak”]; he cannot 
know the fissure that has been opened on the mythic shadows of evil as the 
clouds of heaven are rent by the coming of the Son of Man.”502 
Jasper links this back to the idea of the reader “confronting two worlds 
whereby the banality of evil (“Jesus, be sensible [we would say] and grow up, 
we do love you, you don’t need to do this …”) is exposed in its truly mythic 
dimensions,” and these “two worlds” are where the reader chooses which 
betrayal to make: “Through the looking glass of fiction, the question is how we 
tell the difference between real and unreal. Or perhaps the real question is, in 
                                          
499 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 2.6, quoted in Jasper, The Sacred Community p.106 
500 Jasper, Sacred Community p.35 
501 Coleridge, quoted by Jasper in The Sacred Community p.80; see also Jasper, David, The 
Study of Literature and Religion, 2nd ed. (London, UK; Palgrave McMillan, 1992) p.xix 
502 Jasper, Sacred Community p.35 
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a world where finally only truth really matters, should we even try to do so, and 
simply remain content to be mad out of duty?”503 
If Christ’s kiss on the lips of The Grand Inquisitor is a Judas’ kiss, it is 
necessary to agree with the Grand Inquisitor that Christ’s gift of freedom is evil, 
in that “In respecting man so much you acted as though you had ceased to have 
compassion for him … had you respected him less you would have demanded of 
him less, and that would have been closer to love.”504 Yet even to ‘sign up too 
quickly’ for Ivan Karamazov as an authority on the death of God505 is to overlook 
another layer of betrayal, which is that of the author betraying words. Rowan 
Williams alerts his reader to Bakhtin’s ““polyphonic” dimension of Dostoevsky – 
the coexistence of profoundly diverse voices, making the novel itself a constant 
and unfinished interplay of perspectives.”506 Bakhtin’s reading alerts the reader 
that it is Dostoevsky, following the Grand Inquisitor’s Christ, who enacts the 
death of the author, in a betrayal which is also a “self-righteous suicide.”  
Chop Suey is also singing a double betrayal, blaspheming Christ who fails 
(betrays) the Armenians by remaining ‘self-righteous’ in indifferent absence, 
while expressing the idea of the Crucifixion as the death of God, who kills and 
betrays Love requiring the suicide of the righteous self, and this is a cosmic 
enactment of their suffering. 
If this is dismissed as ‘mere emo music’ (as which it certainly also is 
perceived, for a certain audience), this dismissal is perhaps because the 
authentic (and autistically sensitive) ‘emo’ teenage questions are unheeded,507 
and teenage rebellion is honest indignation. SOAD’s discography also includes 
critiques Western indifference to the Tiananmen square massacre, for example, 
in ‘Hypnotise’ (2005), or the Iraq war in ‘Boom’ (2005). Their concern for social 
justice is expressed as the music of rage, and its scrutiny is relentless.508 ‘Chop 
                                          
503 ibid. p.38 
504 Dostoevsky, Fyodor (trans. David McDuff), The Brothers Karamazov (London, UK; Penguin 
Books, London, UK, 2003) p.334  
505 As Rowan Williams accuses William Hamilton of doing (Williams, Rowan, Dostoevsky: 
Language, Faith and Fiction (London/New York; Continuum, 2011) p.2) 
506 Williams, Dostoevsky, p.3 
507 Doesn’t Heidegger remark that children are the true philosophers, when he writes of “The 
Geschick (art) of being: a child that plays” in Heidegger, Martin (trans Reginald Lilly) The 
Principle of Reason (Indiana; Indiana University Press, 1991 (1956)) 
508 Like Blake, SOAD also have a liberated view of sexuality, which they see as oppressed by 
Christian morality. 
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Suey’ questions Christendom’s claim to goodness, exposing its demonic nature 
and simultaneously suggesting the possibility of trusting the demonic ‘self-
righteous suicide’ as a necessary betrayal.  
  
Holy Blasphemy  
The reason for digressing into this strange reading of 
Mark/Cervantes/Jasper//Dostoevsky/metal music is to approach the moral 
power of shocking holy blasphemy as a ‘mythical dimension’ of truth telling 
where autistic integrity can be ‘mad out of duty’ in facing layers of betrayal.  
 It articulates the consequences of Altizer’s radical deconstruction of the 
‘salve’ of Christendom, which is also a shocking holy blasphemy. The 
Nietzschean No-Saying for Altizer issues from a reading of Blake’s ‘Jerusalem’ 
where “the Great Selfhood, Satan … the Devouring Power.” 509 Nietzsche’s God 
of Christendom is the Christian God as “the embodiment of an absolute No-
saying, because it is the only epiphany of the sacred which is a total reversal of 
a forward-moving divine process.”510 
In this sense the ultimate paradox of Barth’s Krisis is, radically and 
heretically, inverted by taking the theological position that Christ, becoming sin 
for us, does so to the point of being an embodiment of sin, and God is Satan, as 
the negation which is itself (as SOAD have expressed, in sacred, profane rage) 
negated in the Crucifixion as the death of God: 
(T)he Christian God can be manifest and real only by 
means of a faith engaging in an absolute world and life-
negation, a negation that must occur wherever there is 
energy and life. When the radial Christian confronts us 
with the liberating message that God is Satan, he is 
stilling the power of that negation, breaking all those 
webs of religion with which a regressive Christianity has 
ensnared the Christian, and unveiling the God who had 
died in Christ.511 
SOAD’s God is the “self-righteous” Satan in whom “I don’t think you 
trust,” and yet, for Altizer thinking theologically, and SOAD thinking equally 
                                          
509 Blake, Jerusalem 33:17-24 in Altizer, Gospel of Christian Atheism p.100 
510 Altizer, Gospel of Christian Atheism p.101 
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authentically, there is a strange meeting of this evil and death with the 
suffering of John of the Cross in the apophatic discourse of The Dark Night of 
the Soul. Altizer writes: 
All our deeper Christian vision has known the presence of 
God as the presence of an absolute abyss, as here total 
presence can only be the total presence of an absolute 
abyss.512 
Inverting the model of clinical depression, this is not an abyss of suffering 
but a suffering of abyss. Thinking of the necessary betrayals of Peter, Quixote 
and the Grand Inquisitor, SOAD’s lyrics invite a reading of God as abyss. Altizer 
writes: 
Is an absolute abyss possible apart from a realisation of 
God, and a realisation of the very voice of God, a voice 
that is a pure and absolute abyss, one whose realisation 
silences every other voice, or silences every voice that is 
not the voice of abyss?513 
The abyss is the place of the gospel. When it is possible glibly to assent 
that Christ is “made sin for us,”514 what is harder to consider is the utter self-
righteous suicide where God is in Hiroshima, Auschwitz, Armenia, as Satan. 
Altizer’s mythology is outrageous, but it is outrage at Christendom, whose God 
is perhaps indeed a little too self-righteous. Justly, His angels as agents 
(Lucifer, the angel of light) “deserve to die,” and so, in holy blasphemy, does 
“He.” 
Altizer knows full well that he is mounting an assault on the religious 
establishment, and frequently says so. So how can he be “evangelical” and 
“pastoral?” 515 His concern is to be faithful to the truths of twentieth (and now 
twenty-first) century Christianity. He argues that nineteenth century textual 
criticism has effectively destroyed the credibility of a unified and literally 
inspired Biblical voice, undermining the Church’s authority. He writes: 
A century and a half of historical scholarship has 
demonstrated that the Bible contains a diverse body or 
                                          
512 Altizer, Godhead and the Nothing p.129 
513 ibid. p.131 
514 2 Corinthians 5.21 
515 ‘A lucid, joyous, wise, evangelical – even pastoral – piece of theological work.’ (Cover 
matter, Gospel of Christian Atheism.) 
175 
 
 
series of traditions and imagery that resists all attempts at 
harmonisation or reconciliation. No longer is it possible to 
speak of a Biblical faith or a Biblical religion or even of a 
distinct and singular Biblical God; nor is there any 
possibility of rationally or logically uniting the self-
contradictory Biblical images of God. Nevertheless, a 
radical and dialectical theology can lead us to grasp the 
necessity of the contradictory language of the Bible.516 
The end of a (straightforwardly) “Biblical faith” opens an abyss which is 
the death of God, and yet as such is the epiphany of the cosmic Jesus. Altizer 
expresses this abysmal Incarnation as the self-exile of God. For an autistic 
hermeneutic, this section has offered first and foremost a discourse which can 
be read autistically as the autistic integrity of ‘black and white thinking’ which 
resists compromise. The self-exile of God will now offer this integrity a way to 
read itself into this self-exile as total mindfulness of separation, and this exile’s 
embodiment will enable a thinking of total Incarnational metaphor as 
embodiment to come into view. 
 
3.3. The self-exile of God: Altizer, Hegel and autism 
Altizer and Hegel 
At the start of this chapter, the sacred profane was read autistically as 
fascination, and literal metaphor became the dazzling presence of light in art 
which does not represent. The sacred profane can now become a fully 
theologically thought Incarnational metaphor of, and as, mindfulness of 
separation, when it is read as the embodiment of God’s self-exile in Altizer’s 
narrative. This draws on Altizer’s reading of Hegel which will offer Hegel’s 
‘Geist,’ theologically thought, as an incarnation of metaphor. Altizer thinks a 
Hegelian reading of Biblical myth where the utter kenosis of salvation history as 
the death of God is told as the dialectical outpouring of Geist. This mythological 
synthesis arises out of an existentialist theological background, where Tillich’s 
theology of correlation, as noted earlier, is transmuted from correlation to 
fusion.  
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Altizer’s ‘The Gospel of Christian Atheism’ is dedicated to Paul Tillich, 
and rethinks Tillich’s theology of culture. Tillich has already sown the seeds of 
an ‘existential faith’ which listens ‘outwith the temple.’ In George Pattison’s 
words, an existential faith requires “as a prerequisite the “shaking of the 
foundations”517 of being by the shock of non-being.”518 Pattison is describing an 
existentialist theology which is an expression of Modernism but at the same 
time, anchored in a Christian humanism of Tillich’s ‘theonomy’ where “the 
“Will of God” … is not a strange voice that demands our obedience, but the 
“silent voice” of our own nature as man, and as man with an individual 
character.”519 The “silent voice” of “our own nature” is thought by Altizer as a-
theological, expressed in Hegelian terms, where the “silent voice” becomes the 
voice of God in Scripture, which is also the silent voice of Hegelian Being or 
Geist. 
Hegel presents the dialectical unfolding of Being as the Becoming of Mind 
or Spirit (Geist). Altizer quotes Hegel: 
This incarnation of the Divine Being, its having 
essentially and directly the shape of self-consciousness, 
is the simple content of Absolute Religion. Here the 
Divine Being is known as Spirit; this religion is the Divine 
Being’s consciousness concerning itself that it is Spirit … 
520 
Spirit alone is reality. It is in the inner being of the 
world, that which essentially is, and is per se; it 
assumes objective, determinate form.521 
In Altizer’s reading, that “inner being” is known in and as the sacred 
profane. Hegel’s dialectic is the process of Spirit’s becoming, and in this he has 
a definite teleology where history is the self-realisation of Spirit in 
consciousness. As Ernst Cassirer remarks, 
The true life of the idea, of the divine, begins in 
history. In Hegel’s philosophy, the formula of Spinoza, 
Deus sive Natura, [God as nature] is transformed into 
Deus sive Historia [God as History]. Yet the apotheosis is 
                                          
517 Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, 1948 
518 Pattison, Fear and Trembling p.227 
519 Tillich, Morality and Beyond (London, UK; Routledge, 1964) p.24, quoted in Pattison, 
Fear and Trembling p.228 
520 Altizer, Gospel of Christian Atheism p.66, citation not given 
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not concerned with particular historical events, but 
rather with the historical process as a whole.522 
The unfolding of Being in Becoming is ‘Geist’ in the form of ‘God as 
History.’ There is here, however, an interesting reversal in Altizer’s use of 
Hegel. Hegel writes: 
In the Christian religion God has been revealed 
as truth and as spirit. As spirit, humans can receive this 
revelation. In religion the truth is veiled in imagery; but 
in philosophy the veil is torn aside, so that humans can 
know the infinite and see all things in God.523 
In Altizer, truth is not ‘veiled in (an) imagery’ of religion, but History 
(which would become a socio-economic narrative in Marxist Hegelianism) 
becomes a cosmic Story where the Christian narrative is not a veil but an actual 
enactment of Hegel’s Being and Becoming.  This is not actual as a historical 
process, although the history of consciousness enacts the cosmic story, in 
religion not as Hegel’s ‘veil’ but as the embodiment of Spirit in (crucially, in, 
not by) the metaphors of Biblical narrative. “Living the death of God” is an 
exercise in existentialist poetics, not theological doctrine. 
The aim of following this embodiment of the self-exile of God in 
metaphor is two-fold for the autistic hermeneutic. Firstly, this self-exile will be 
viewed as absolute mindfulness of separation in the autism of God. Secondly, 
this embodiment of God’s self-exile will be viewed as absolute Incarnational 
metaphor. To approach the autism of God as a reading of Altizer’s thinking of 
the self-embodiment of God, God’s self-exile needs to be explained. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
522 Cassirer, Ernst, Werke 15, p.368, quoted in Hans-Christian Lucas, Spinoza, Hegel, 
Whitehead: Substance, Subject and Superject, in Hegel and Whitehead: Contemporary 
perspectives on Systematic Philosophy, ed. George R. Lucas, p.40  
523 Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/259378/Georg-Wilhelm-Friedrich-
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The self-embodiment of God 
When Altizer draws on the third of his “prophets” of the death of God, 
Hegel, he re-enters the “religion” which Hegel has described as the “veil,” and 
thinks through Hegel’s dialectical philosophy of Spirit in terms of Biblical 
narrative. Effectively, Biblical narrative becomes Hegelian dialectic, and for this 
reason, this philosophical dialectic of Geist (Spirit) as Becoming is made deeply 
Christian as the death of God.  
A simple statement of Hegel’s dialectical philosophy is that Spirit is 
realised as Becoming by the embodiment of being in its dialectic synthesis with 
nonbeing. This dialectical interaction between pure being and pure nothing is 
their mutual negation for new being to emerge, in sublation. 
In dialectical becoming, pure being and pure nothing sublate into 
‘impure’ determinate being, and the being and nonbeing of determinate being 
sublate into new determinate being in continuing dialectical synthesis, which 
itself has its own new opposition and union of being and nonbeing. A 
‘primordial’ speculative sublation and becoming means that pure being becomes 
‘impure’ by entering into a relation with the other and its descent into the 
dialectical process.  
Spirit descending entering into dialectical process is what Altizer casts as 
the Fall. A cosmic fall from the silence of pure being into dialectical process is 
not only fall, but also Creation, by the production of determinate being from 
that Fall: 
Mythically envisioned, the advent of speech is both 
creation and fall. For speech is simultaneously both the 
origin of all meaning and identity and a fall from the 
quiescence and peace of silence.524 
Recalling Tillich’s thought of the Divine as Ground of Being which is 
known authentically as the inner speech of a theonomy, this inner speech is 
Hegelian Spirit, at the same time mythically as the totality of God’s acts in 
Scripture. 
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Speech as the voice of God 
The acts of God in the Biblical narrative are the sublation of pure being 
and nonbeing into determinate being, and this dialectical history is the myth 
which is spoken by God in sacred history.  
Altizer observes that in the times of the Hebrew Bible prophets and of 
the New Testament, there are obstacles to authentic speech, out of which 
prophecy emerges as a new authentic speech. The fullest speech, in authentic 
response to the Divine, arises from the deepest silence. The language of faith 
needs to be not “merely repeating the words of faith”525 but something new. 
Speech is the way in which faith emerges; faith is the fullness of speech and not 
just any speech (‘chatter’) but, in Tillichian language, “speech embodying its 
own ground.”526  Speech is fundamental and not a mere vehicle but something 
more profound, which actually creates faith; “faith responds to the mystery of 
speech.”527  
Silence is “both our origin and our end,” and as such it is actually present 
in speech and is “speakable in speech.”528 Silence passes into speech when 
speech emerges out of silence. It is a presence in speech. “Silence can dwell in 
speech, but its emptiness is negated by the presence of speech. When silence is 
present in speech it is not a mere emptiness, just as it is not a simple absence, 
it is far rather a presence.”529 This is an echo of the apophatic discourse of 
mystical theology, where apophatic self-negating strategy indicates that 
authentic speech moves to and comes from silence. 
At this point, an autistic hermeneutic, as a legitimate theological voice of 
absolute autism, can now be seen as a possible way to validate Altizer’s 
Hegelian reading of the narrative of God’s acts. Firstly, autistic integrity and 
black and white thinking has no place for “chatter.” Its absolute mindfulness of 
separation, which is also absolute fascination, recognises a fundamental 
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authenticity of the silence of pure being as the voice of God, Absolute Spirit, as 
silence within speech. This, again, is the silence which is indicated in apophatic 
theology. Now, in the light of the myth of the death of God, it can now be 
thought of as pure autistic affective empathy in absolute kenosis. To do this, 
the following section will now explain what Altizer’s Hegelian reading of 
Scripture means by kenosis, so that absolute the absolute autistic affective 
empathy of sainthood can then be seen theologically as the absolute kenosis 
which is the autism of God.  
 
Incarnation as kenosis 
Exile as kenosis 
The mythical salvation history of Biblical narrative forms an epic telling 
of the outpouring of pure Being into determinate being. This Hegelian descent 
of the absence which is pure quiescent being, into presence which is 
determinate being, is the universal Fall enacted in the total salvation history as 
embodied in the mythology of Creation, Exodus, Incarnation, Crucifixion, 
Ascension, Resurrection and Apocalypse. Ascension to heaven is viewed as a 
Hellenistic accretion, and instead the ascension is subverted into utter, absolute 
descent of being into Hell. This is an apocalyptic kerygma of the death of God, 
and Jesus is known in the Incarnation which is also Crucifixion. Resurrection is 
the emptying of the crucified Jesus into the world in the death of God. This is a 
return to a primitive gospel without Messianic or Hellenistic elements. This is 
the embodiment of the Christian myth in faith, and Altizer’s The Self-
Embodiment of God traces Christian myth as the following Biblical archetypes: 
… to embody the fullness of the biblical moment of faith, 
and it evolves by way of an evolutionary yet interior 
movement of the biblical moments and movements of 
Genesis, Exodus, Judgement, Incarnation and Apocalypse. 
The sacred history of the Bible here becomes interiorised 
and universalised …530 
The universal cosmic Fall is the fall of God, and the myth of Exodus is not 
only the Exodus of the people of God. When God enacts their redemption by 
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God’s presence in the burning bush, this is God’s choice to exile God as 
determinate being from God as pure being. This is therefore God’s exile: 
God is the name of exile … the name of God makes exile 
manifest in its source, and thereby in its finality, a once 
and for all finality eradicating every possibility of the 
nonbeing of actuality. And to speak the name of God is not 
simply to speak the name of the ground of actuality, it is 
to sanction actuality, it is to speak that name whose 
utterance seals the finality of the actual.531 
This self-embodiment of God as exile is an absolute kenotic choice, and 
in all its moments is enacting the apocalyptic gospel of God with us in death. 
This is both terrible and wonderful; as Nietzsche writes, "Even God hath his hell: 
it is his love for man." 532 The death of God which liberates the world is God’s 
self-emptying, so that also in Nietzsche’s words, for the atheist Christian, “I tell 
you: one must still have chaos in one, to give birth to a dancing star. I tell you: 
ye have still chaos in you.”533 The gospel of Christian atheism is ‘a hard saying,’ 
but it is ultimate hope, of God with us, even in our hell, and this is the faith of 
John of the Cross’ dark night of the soul. 
 
Autistic kenosis 
This kenosis is absolute love, and again, this speaks through an autistic 
hermeneutic in all its dimensions. Firstly, as fascination, it is God utterly 
present, all in all, in the world as full Incarnation, known as the liberation of 
the dancing star, the glittering object which fascinates the autist in joy. 
Secondly, as pure affective empathy, utter kenosis gives unconditionally, even 
in the unknowing of the lack of cognitive empathy which is the death of the 
omniscient God. Thirdly, mindfulness of separation is the kenotic self-exile of 
God, and the faith which chooses to affirm itself as faith in God, even the 
absent, dead God, in the chaos where we are “straying, as through an infinite 
nothing … (with) night continually closing in on us … (because) God is dead. God 
remains dead. And we have killed him.534 Faith for the autist is difficult. Black 
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and white, literal thinking does not find a resolution to the question of faith 
when it applies positivist logic. Pure affective empathy in the face of the 
bewilderment of impaired cognitive empathy is painful and costly. Mindfulness 
of separation is inescapable. The supreme validation for autistic faith would be 
faith in an autistic God, which is now suggested as a way to think the 
embodiment of God’s self-exile.535 
 
3.4. The autism of God.  
Universal autism as Hegelian nonbeing 
Taking absolutely its radical separation as an existential thinking of the 
ground of dialectical being, absolute autism as mindfulness of separation 
actually becomes the creative dialectical Hegelian nonbeing. As such it is the 
nonexistence which is the necessary opposite of being in Becoming. Ultimately, 
a mythic thinking of dialectic leads back to a return to the origin of Pure Being 
in apocalyptic consummation of the Divine. Beyond the embodiment of 
Becoming is total absence which is total presence in an apocalyptic 
consummation. To return to the trinity of mythic autism, this consummation of 
synthesis will view this consummation as an absolute apocalyptic revelation of 
pure absolute autism in its trinity of absence (separation), presence 
(fascination) and paradoxical absent presence (incarnational metaphor). Each 
one of these is the expression of the others. First, thinking this Hegelian telos 
theologically as apocalyptic consummation needs to be seen in Altizer’s 
language as a new Plenum. The resolution of being and nonbeing which is the 
silent speech of a new Plenum, is achieved only by the absolute absence (death) 
of God which is God. Living in kenotic death, death is life536 and the presence of 
God is the absence of God. In the trinity of mythic autism, presence (absolute 
fascination) and absence (absolute mindfulness of separation) coincide, finally 
and apocalyptically, as the consummation of incarnational metaphor. 
Incarnational metaphor is the final absolute kenosis where silent speech is total 
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metaphor, beyond being as fullness of joyful poetic being which has no referent, 
Becoming nothing. This is total presence as total absence. 
In this way, mythic absolute autism can be expressed as the Hegelian 
negation which Altizer expresses as the death of God. With autism as negation, 
as manifestation of the kenotic fullness of the death of God, it is possible to 
arrive at an Autistic God. 
Altizer sees the mythical narrative of Creation, Exodus, Incarnation, 
Crucifixion, Resurrection and Apocalypse as the speech of God, and it is also 
possible to think of universal, absolute autism as a mythology of God. If 
absolute autism is the embodiment of an utter separation which is kenotic 
fullness, the death of God is the embodiment of a now universal autism. This is 
an autism which has ‘come of age’ by finding its autonomy as mindfulness of 
separation of the death of God. This ‘coming of age’ of a conscious autism was 
thought of earlier in terms of Modernism, and it is equally as a ‘felix culpa’ of 
emancipation in terms of the heretical vision of Nietzsche and Blake. 
In person-specific autism, as the introduction made clear, the 
fundamental separation is between (human) being and (human) being – there is 
a communication breakdown and a lack of meeting. The fusion of horizons 
envisioned by Gadamer is impaired. In absolute terms, this is a tear in the fabric 
of the human universe. The introduction explained that, in terms of the human 
autistic spectrum, this is a universal phenomenon. Even if it were not, its very 
existence as a phenomenon would speak as a way in which the human universe 
contains something which embodies disunity and separation. This is not the 
separation of the ‘sin’ of fallen humanity; this is independent of any apparatus 
of dysfunctional relationships or the disharmony of competing egos which might 
be the cause of the separations of ‘sin.’ Rather, this is a structural feature 
which cannot be ‘fixed’ but only ‘managed,’ or more helpfully, understood and 
accepted, and even celebrated and cherished.  
Altizer, as this chapter has explained, argues for God’s inner exile as the 
embodiment of God. Postulating a myth of the autism of God would mean that 
God’s inner exile is the tear in the fabric of the universe which is autism. Autism 
is that fundamental separation which isolates. Autism is the quality of exile in 
the negation of unity, and God’s exile is God’s inner autism. By the act of 
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speaking (relationality) God falls from a primordial Plenum into separation from 
that Plenum, so that Godself is exiled from Godself. So paradoxically, 
relationality (speaking) carries within it its own exile and so even relationality 
carries within itself its other as autistic separation. 
If the infinite is all (Hegel’s Good Infinite) then Absolute Spirit is being 
nonbeing. Altizer extends Hegel’s argument that Absolute Spirit is determinate 
being. This in turn means that, if God is determinate, speaking in the acts of 
salvation history, the transcendent primordial Godhead is dead, and apocalyptic 
consummation is thought of as the final telos of that death. Being nonbeing as 
Absolute Spirit is the kenotic totality of God’s acts, as Love poured out even 
unto death. Mythical absolute autism is then this creative absolute separation in 
determinate being itself. Sublation brings together being and nonbeing in 
determinate being, autism as the dialectical other is the perpetual existence of 
their separateness and negation which continually plays in the shimmering of 
Becoming. Being inescapably contains its other, and that other is other. The 
Becoming of determinate being cannot exist without the continual separation 
which creates the tension of nonbeing and being. Autism, as the phenomenon of 
separation itself, is this perpetual moment of separation. Autism is the moment 
of nonbeing which itself generates the separation of being-nonbeing and it is 
also, as a consequence, the distress of determinate being’s separation from the 
transcendent primordial plenum pure being.537 Autism is the embodiment of the 
primordial Fall which is the fall of God.  
 
 God as isolation 
Altizer describes a cosmic separation and isolation in God and 
consequently in all reality. An autistic hermeneutic would read the following 
almost as a textbook definition of universal autism: 
Now the fall can be envisioned as a fall of an original 
Totality or All; it is the centre or primordial ground of 
reality which becomes darkened and broken by the Fall. As 
a consequence of the movement and actuality of the Fall, 
alienation and estrangement penetrate the centre of 
                                          
537 Pure being, thought theologically, as what was earlier considered as Tillich’s atheism 
of the inescapable Ground of Being which Is Not. 
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reality, as the primordial Totality becomes divided and 
alienated from itself. Nothing whatsoever stands apart 
from the “descending” and chaotic movement of the Fall, 
as every individual entity now stands out in a new solitude 
and isolation. For with the loss of an original unity, 
harmony or coherence, distance arises and creates every 
new experience, thus bringing about a new and solitary 
selfhood which is its own individual centre or ground. From 
a radical Christian perspective, we could say that God 
Himself is the primary embodiment of a solitary and 
isolated selfhood.538 
Where this chapter has earlier discussed God as carrying an internal 
autism of inner exile, Altizer’s work here now discusses God as isolated. This 
cosmic and divine isolation emanating from the Fall is an utter separation; in 
the language I am using here, it is universal autism. The isolated God is autistic, 
and the autistic God is isolated. The death of God is the autism of God. 
 
 ‘It is finished’ 
Altizer writes: 
A fully self-actualised presence can only be total 
presence, and a presence in which speech and silence 
are one. A total speech must also and necessarily be a 
total silence … such silence speaks … insofar as presence 
is actually absent, or inasmuch as absence is actually 
present.539 
This is an apocalyptic speech where the All is realised in the total 
presence of total absence. The All is real presence – it is total presence – and 
yet what is the ‘where?’ There is no ‘heaven’ which would be separate from the 
All – what could be separate from the All? Total presence is everywhere and 
nowhere, and yet it is ‘here’ – it is an actual presence and ‘the’ actual 
presence. Yet we cannot ‘grasp hold of’ totality or total presence. So total 
presence is also total absence.  
This language employed by Altizer is utter paradox, echoing the 
apophatic fiction discussed in chapter two, and it is the paradox of the 
                                          
538 Altizer, The Descent into Hell: A Study of the Radical Reversal of the Christian 
Consciousness (New York; Seabury Press, 1979) p.183 
539 Altizer, The Self-Embodiment of God pp.91, 89 
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coincidentia oppositorum of presence and absence, silence and speech, which is 
the apocalyptic fulfilment of the death of God in the Incarnation of Christ 
Crucified. 
This fulfilment of the All is an act of fullness where the actuality of self-
identity empties and negates itself: 
this occurs not simply in the disappearance of presence, 
but rather in the disappearance of the self-identity of 
presence. And this can occur only in the act of that self-
identity … in which it speaks by actualising itself as 
silence.540 
It is profoundly Christological; an utter immanence of the Incarnation 
really does mean that Christ is ‘all in all,’ and saviour in the sense of being thus 
the total presence which not only dies but in so doing, in this absence which is 
self-silencing, completes the self-realisation of All: ‘It is finished.’ Now, where 
there has been the Fall from a primordial Plenum (which we cannot have 
known) into the particularity of the transcendent God, the apocalyptic reversal 
of this Fall is the death of the dualism of the transcendent God and humanity, 
and the gathering of all in fullness. As the All it is silence which speaks in its 
being. It is the completion of Christ’s total Incarnation. Rather than the book of 
Revelation’s ‘four horsemen of the apocalypse’ vision (although a godless world 
is a world of darkness) this apocalyptic consummation is a symbolic enactment 
of the fullness and completion (‘It is finished’) of Christ as something we can 
enter existentially in faith: “as we hear and enact that impossibility, then even 
we can say ‘it is finished.”541 
Faith enables us to speak by enacting this fullness, in living the 
sacrament of the death of God in faith. The gospel saying ‘I am the door,’ by 
seeing it differently as “The door is I” – Christ as pure subject - becomes the 
realisation of an existential self-negating self-identity which completes the 
(impossible) possibility of the All and the Nothing in an apocalyptic fulfilment: 
All self-identity is realised in this act: “The door is I.” “The 
door is I” when “I am the door.” Yet this is a door leading 
                                          
540 ibid. p.89 
541Altizer, Self-Embodiment of God p.96 
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to nowhere … presence loses itself as presence … “I am the 
door” only when “The door is I.”542 
Why is this important for an autistic reading? Simply because when “the 
door is I,” this is the total autos of pure subject, in kenotic Christianity as a 
wager of faith where absolute absence is absolute presence.  The door is I when 
I, present only to myself, in my own authentic choice independent of you, 
realise presence as the absolute subject’s act of faith. This is why faith as 
conscious autism is the ultimately impossible demand as absolute unknowing. 
The call to autistic discipleship means forsaking all and following Christ, where 
the all we let go of is all we know. 
 
Silent speech 
In terms of an apocalyptic gospel, which is completed in Jesus,543 what is 
the consummation which would be a fullness of autism come of age? What is the 
Autistic God? The autistic God is silence. The autistic God is silent speech. This 
is beyond the ‘garrulousness’544 of religion. The Autistic God is the fulfilment of 
absence (I have accepted my fundamental separation from you, become absent 
from you, and passed into a silence of pure presence). The Autistic God has 
ceased to speak, because by being all in all (total presence) the Autistic God is 
beyond all words and images. The Autistic God cannot communicate. 
Furthermore, God is not simply autistic but is actually autism itself. God is that 
silence which is beyond words. If the God of Totality is pure autism, then pure 
autism – its silence – is God. Here, it is vital to recall this is not discussing 
autistic people with a (relative) autism but the absolute quality of pure autism. 
Pure or absolute autism, as the introduction made clear, does not exist. But 
neither does Totality – as total Being, how can it have being? 
Yet the Autistic God is also speech, but a silent speech. This moves into 
the place of the presence of autistic fascination. The Autistic God is that pure 
                                          
542 ibid. p.88 
543 The title “Christ” holding messianic overtones is rejected by Altizer 
544 In degrees of fascination and wordlessness, the garrulous autist speaks obsessively about her 
special interest, but no-one listens, because no-one can tolerate it by entering that world. In 
more profound (or, in mythic terms, more profoundly self-validating) autism, ‘chatter’ is 
forsaken because deeper fascination in deeper isolation is the deeper silence. Similarly, Altizer 
distinguishes pure speech from chatter (Self-Embodiment of God p.3) 
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wordless object which holds the autist in fascination whereby the union of seer 
and seen keeps the autist within the world of the sensory of obsessive object. 
This is the sensory connoisseur’s incomprehensible joy, where Gunilla Gerlund 
takes refuge in the texture of the brown sofa,545 and the way in which Katie 
Bridges can ‘stare at a drawing of a futuristic city all day long’546 in rapt 
fascination. 
Is this union an ecstasy? People frequently say that the sensory or the 
obsessive are the autist’s ‘escape from the world,’ (ex-stasis) but fascination is 
more than this, it is joy (ex-stasis = ecstasy). This is a separation from the world 
which leads into the ecstasy of joy. The outpouring of the garrulous autist is the 
attempted return into language from the pure joy of the communion within the 
sensory and the obsessive which are fascination, just as religious language is the 
attempted return into language from that which cannot be spoken. Yet the 
object of fascination speaks to the autist in silence547, more powerfully than 
anything the words of the neurotypical world can offer. This is a kind of 
presence unlike anything in the neurotypical.  
The Autistic God, then, is the object of fascination, and the Autistic God 
demands fascination. In this very particular sense, chapter two demonstrated 
Teresa of Avila to be fascinated by God. Her fascination, beyond words, requires 
the non-language which has required her to express it as the non-being of 
apophatic fiction which is incarnational metaphor. 
 
 Fascination 
Is the Autistic God also fascination itself? Is God fascinated? Fascination is 
not only aesthetics but passion and love. The language of the moment of 
fascination is a mythic language of the holy. So God might not merely be ‘in’ 
that moment, but actually be it. In Altizer’s thought, the Incarnation as the 
utter kenosis of God is love, and not the love ‘of’ or ‘from’ a transcendent 
                                          
545 Gunilla “found the place to be left in peace – behind the armchair, where she was able to 
shut out everything and simply be – absorbed in the material of the brown armchair” 
(Bogdashina, Autism and Spirituality p.191) 
546 http://thinkingautismguide.blogspot.co.uk/2011/07/special-interests.html accessed 25 April 
2012. 
547 Recalling the autist Leneh K Buckle’s words that she was happier before she could speak (Is 
increasing functionality always good? in Autism, Ethics and the Good Life). 
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Godhead but the pure embodiment of love itself. So Jesus is anonymously 
present,548 and it is Blake’s poetic vision, not theology, which can be an 
articulation of it.549 This embodiment is ‘profane’ – utterly immanent and 
therefore secular – and yet, as Blake would argue, also holy. It is the 
embodiment of the sacred profane. 
The Autistic God’s love is the expression of love which is realised in 
death. This is the acceptance of the death of all the ‘normal’ (neurotypical) 
comforts of interaction, and yet remains love as fascination. God’s love is 
fascination, in the sense of being completely immanent, just as autistic 
fascination is an inner and immanent experience. “in a world of her own.” The 
Autistic God of Love is fascinated by the All in which Godself is embodied, and 
this all is God. God is fascinated by God’s own self and in love with all as that 
self. God, the embodied presence which is the active, present Geist, is the 
fascination inherent in the dialectical development of both creativity and the 
history of ideas, so that the process of pure idea is the immanence of God as 
Idea in history. The creative thinking generating this process of idea happens in 
a space of autistic separation.550 Paradoxically, the separation of the thinker 
creates the immanence of the independent thought. But that is another model 
of the autistic God, with God as ‘intimately part of’ the dialectical process. 
What is at stake here is an apocalyptic silence. The autistic God is absolute 
autism and hence absolute silence. In the absolute isolation of the dead 
transcendent God the Autistic God is absent, not present in any way. 
Furthermore, the inner exile of Godself means that God is isolated even from 
Godself. This isolation is so utter that there can be no speech. True, the God of 
exile speaks in revelation, but this is, in Auerbach’s terms, the alien speech of 
Yahweh.551 The prophets speak, repeatedly, and nobody listens. In terms of the 
inner exile as alienation, it as if this fissure widens and widens – Israel itself is 
cast out into exile. The fissure widens until Christ bursts it open in His death 
                                          
548 Drawing on Blake’s idea of Jesus as Universal Humanity; see Altizer, Gospel of Christian 
Atheism pp.69ff 
549 See Altizer, The New Apocalypse: The Radical Christian Vision of William Blake (Aurora, 
Colorado; East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1967); also reading Nietzsche’s 
aphorisms as poetry, so that the ‘three prophets,’ Blake, Nietzsche and Hegel, are read 
poetically with Scripture to form a mythic, existential telling of the gospel. 
550 See Baron Cohen et al. The Autistic Spectrum Quotient and Fitzgerald, Genius Genes 
551 See Auerbach, Erich (trans. Trask, W, ed. Said, W) Mimesis: the Representation of Reality in 
Western Literature (Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 2013 (1946)) and his 
chapter Odysseus’ Scar on the Hebraic versus Homeric literary world views. 
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which is the consummation of God’s absence, and yet simultaneously it releases 
a new presence which is, as has been explained, present in absence. The God in 
exile cannot even ‘talk to Godself.’ The Autistic God is silence, a silence which 
grows with an increasing degree of autism manifesting until in the Crucifixion 
there is the Autistic God’s total silence; Jesus cries ‘My God, my God, why have 
you forsaken me?’ and there is no answer. This is, as Blanchot expresses it, the 
place where “There can be no answer to that question. The poem is the 
answer’s absence.”552 
Yet the autism of God in Christ is also the manifestation of ‘other side’ of 
God’s autism; no less silent (“The door is I” when “I am the door.” Yet this is a 
door leading to nowhere” – an entry into silence) but yet speaking in the 
apocalyptic coincidence of silence and speech. Christ’s ministry in the gospels is 
speech, but it is a silence when he speaks in parables so that no-one can 
understand him. Understanding is possible only in devotion to the enactment of 
the parables of the Kingdom. The ministry of Christ now is silent and 
anonymous, where faith becomes the acts of Jesus absolutely “in His absence.” 
Yet the silent speech and total presence of Christ can be figured in the holy 
space of the autistic fascination of God, and it is a space of love and joy. 
 
3.5 Full Incarnational metaphor 
The goal towards which this and the previous chapters have been working 
is a statement of fully realised incarnational metaphor, and this section can now 
express incarnational metaphor in the light of the autism of God in the 
Eucharist. The speech of The Self-Embodiment of God becomes the embodiment 
of God thought at the deepest level, the level where Altizer has been aiming all 
along – the self-embodiment of God in Eucharist. The Eucharist of the epic553 is 
that of the sacred profane enactment. The epic of The Self-Embodiment of God 
culminates in the most sacred moment, the consummation of the death of 
Christ. Here, at its deepest level, it is sacred speech which embodies that 
                                          
552 Blanchot, The Space of Literature p.248 
553 Biblical narrative as epic, but also the sacred profane of Joyce, for example, in Finnegan’s 
Wake, or in Melville’s Moby Dick, as Modernism is the enactment of the death of God (see 
Altizer, eg. Gospel of Christian Atheism ch.1) 
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consummation, and so it is the voice of Christ who pronounces “It is finished.” 
Altizer writes of this as ‘the impossible possibility’ which is the actual death of 
God and the moment of Christ’s total entry into world, death and hell. This is 
the realisation of total absence (“My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken 
me?”) and total presence (It is God who dies in the Crucifixion) and as such it is 
a totality, and ultimately the pure speech of God. Altizer conveys the utter 
holiness of this moment as divine consummation, and that consummation as the 
sacrificial emptying which is divine love. It is divine perfection and the mystical 
paradox of the self-emptying and self-embodiment of God; it is both the death 
of God and the life of Jesus, a Jesus who is the embodiment of the death of 
God. So that Jesus can truly say, ‘It is finished.’ Does it end there? Of course, 
the answer is yes, but it is also no. Altizer asks whether we can enact this 
moment by hearing this silence. The answer is the hearing which is the 
embodiment of grace: 
The otherness of silence disappears and is reversed 
when silence is fully actual and immediate in its 
presence. Such silence is grace, the one grace that is 
possible in actual presence, and it is a grace that is 
everywhere in the actuality of total presence. Indeed, 
only when voice passes into silence.554  
This is what language can approach, but ultimately only express in a non-
language in mysticism. It is only at the finishing of language, and it is enacted 
again and again in the testimony of the mystics who articulate it as a finality of 
language which, being beyond language, is beyond time and participates in the 
‘once for all’ event of silence: 
Even if it happened fully and finally only once, it occurs 
again and again, and once again occurs even now 
because of the finality of that once and for all event. 
And it does occur even now, and even occurs to us, and 
occurs when we say ‘It is finished.’555 
It is also the enactment of the Eucharist of ‘Living the Death of God,’ in 
faith, as Altizer has expressed in his memoir of that title.  
The enactment of the death of God happens, in the outpouring of the 
Spirit of Jesus. For us, also, there can be an enactment in our lives through 
                                          
554 Altizer, The Self-Embodiment of God p.95 
555 Ibid. 
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mindfulness of the mystery implicit in the ‘impossible possibility’ which is the 
Incarnation. It requires a silent hearing of profoundly silent speech which enacts 
it in a mindfulness where only silence can embody that mindfulness, and we 
‘say’ in silence: 
That actuality is immediately at hand when it is heard, 
and it is heard when it is enacted. And it is enacted in 
the dawning of the actuality of silence, an actuality 
ending all disembodied and unspoken presence. Then 
speech is truly impossible, and as we hear and enact 
that impossibility, then even we can say: ‘It is 
finished.’556  
Incarnational metaphor is metaphor as kenotic incarnation of the death 
of God. It is a Eucharistic language where literal mindedness speaks as silence, 
because in “it is finished,” language is finished. Chapter one indicated the 
possibility of incarnational metaphor as the doxological religious language of 
excess which Ramsay describes, and the post-Cartesian language of 
deconstructive theology which discerns the gaps inherent in language, so that 
metaphor does not “do,” but “is.” Chapter two suggested that incarnational 
metaphor could be thought of in terms of apophatic fiction which can approach 
but not indicate its object. Now, a theological thinking of metaphor as the 
autistic death of God means that to say “It is finished” in Eucharistic enactment 
is language where metaphor is incarnate by meaning “nothing.” An absolute 
incarnational metaphor of absolute autism is silence, the silence of kenosis, 
absolute absence and absolute presence of Christ when “It is finished.” 
 
                                          
556 ibid. p.96 
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Chapter Four: Hopkins’ ecceitas and 
an autistic hermeneutic 
Introduction 
[An earlier draft of parts of this chapter was presented as an unpublished paper 
in the Glasgow University Theology and Religious Studies departmental seminar 
on 24th February 2016] 
 
The autism of God, the silence and the death of God, were the 
completion of theologically thought incarnational metaphor in the last chapter. 
Is there ‘nothing more to say?’ Is it possible to say ‘nothing,’ in the sense that it 
could be possible for ‘nothing’ to be said? The autism of God in the previous 
chapter was a ‘good’ autism of the poetic text.557 It attempted to bring an 
autistic mode of perception to bear on a mythical thinking of God. The 
mythological literary-theological autism of the text reached its consummation in 
the autism of God. “It is finished.”  
Perhaps it is not entirely, ever, finished, in the sense that Mark C Taylor, 
following Altizer, remains embedded in not the Book, but the book. Taylor notes 
that James Joyce’s words which are “almost the end of Finnegan’s Wake” are 
… p. s. fin again … 
Far calls. Coming, far! End here. Us, then, Finn, 
again!558  
 
So, following Taylor’s/Altizer’s/Joyce’s example, this thesis is not 
“finished” without entering the space of the book, at least provisionally, as an 
‘experiment’ in how incarnational metaphor might work in practice. This will be 
primarily as fascination in the poem (this chapter) and then primarily as 
mindfulness of separation (chapter five).  As always, however the poetic, 
autistic incarnational metaphor, thought as the presence of fascination, is also 
thought as mindfulness of separation. This chapter approaches the book of the 
poem as an inherent possibility for mythical autistic being as sacred, poetic 
awareness. This sacred, poetic awareness might be thought of by comparing it 
to the term ecceitas, as was considered in the example it provided for 
                                          
557 The ‘good autism’ of honest atheism 
558 Taylor, Tears p.72 
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interdisciplinary thinking in the introduction. To recap, ecceitas is the 
neologism created by the Victorian Jesuit priest and poet Gerard Manley 
Hopkins, which conflates two Latin terms. He creates ecceitas by conflating 
Duns Scotus’ metaphysical term haecceitas [individuation, thought of as ‘this-
ness’] with ecce [‘behold’, ‘here is’]. The significance of this neologism is 
argued for by the twenty-first century critic John Llewellyn, and Llewellyn’s 
reading will be an important part of this chapter’s argument for an autistic 
ecceitas. If ecceitas can be conceived as a silent speech of God, it will also be 
possible to think of it as another way to consider an autism of God. The further 
implication will also be that ecceitas, expressed as autistic fascination, will 
present incarnational metaphor as an underpinning of an autistic creative 
potential. The possibility of unsuspected autistic art will follow from this. The 
logical progression of this chapter is  
1. to explore the significance of Hopkins as a poet-priest, and his reading of 
Duns Scotus, as a way to argue for his poetics in terms of Scotist 
theological univocity and haecceitas; 
2. to frame this as Hopkins’ ecceitas;  
3. to consider the background of haecceitas as a univocal sacrament of 
language 
4. to read ecceitas theologically;  
5. to read ecceitas as incarnational metaphor;  
6. to speculate on an inherent autistic ecceitas present in art, potentially 
critiquing the clinical narrative of ‘who (and what) is autistic.’ 
 
4.1.  ‘Untying the theological knot’ 
Carol T Christ argues for the problem of Victorian poetics as an anxiety 
over the validity of Romantic subjectivity. She writes that Hopkins can be said 
to ‘untie the knot’ of post-Romantic subjectivity through his theological vision, 
as a poet-priest. Carol T Christ argues that Hopkins uniquely finds a way through 
the Victorian post-Romantic problem of subjectivity: “Hopkins is the only 
Victorian poet who resolves the tension between the meaning objects have for 
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themselves and our impressions of them.”559 She quotes an early poem from 
Hopkins’ notebooks: 
 
It was a hard thing to undo this knot. 
The rainbow shines, but only in the thought 
Of him that looks. Yet not in that alone, 
For who makes rainbows by invention? 
And many standing round a waterfall 
See one bow each, yet not the same to all, 
But each a hand’s breadth further than the next. 
The sun on falling waters writes the text 
Which yet is in the eye or in the thought. 
It was a hard thing to undo this knot.560 
 
Carol Christ’s concern is with poetics, not theology, but she discerns that 
Hopkins’ ‘solution’ flows from a theological source in his own quest for holistic 
integrity as poet-priest. She captures this poet-priest sensibility by describing 
how in Hopkins’ conception of God, there is a divinely ordained poetics inherent 
in creation. She explains his view:  
In the creation of the universe, God charges it with a 
rhyming capacity which enables man’s imagination, his 
capacity of instress, to realise the divinely ordained 
instress of the world.561 
The word “instress,” meaning the poetic potential or essence of the 
object seen in poetry, is another of Hopkins’ neologisms, and it is frequently 
used by him because it is crucial to his poetic vision. It will be discussed later in 
this chapter, but the reason for quoting Carol Christ on it here is to emphasise 
how theologically thought this poetics is: instress is a “rhyming capacity” not 
only as realised in “man’s imagination,” but also as something with which 
creation is “charged” by divine creation and ordination. ‘Instress” is thought of 
simultaneously as theological and poetic. Martin Dubois quotes F R Leavis, 
saying that Hopkins has a “habit of seeing things as charged with significance,” 
                                          
559 Christ, Carol T, Victorian and Modern Poetics (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1984) 
pp.69-70; citation not given 
560 Hopkins, The Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins ed. W H Gardner & N H Mackenzie, quoted in 
Christ, Victorian and Modern Poetics p.70 
561 Christ, Victorian and Modern Poetics p.70 
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so that this significance is “not a romantic vagueness, but a matter of explicit 
and ordered conceptions regarding the relations between God, man and 
nature.” 562 
However, instress as both theological and poetic might also, perhaps, 
mean that poetic vocation might be what leads him into danger of straying from 
doctrinal orthodoxy. Martin Dubois speculates on Hopkins’ attraction towards 
Scotus as “(an) opposition to the dominant mode of Catholic theology at the 
time, a rigidified Thomism which ran contrary to Hopkins’ instinct for discerning 
God’s animating touch in nature’s diversity as in human uniqueness … the world 
is charged with the grandeur of God.’’563 This argument for an attraction for 
Scotism might be seen in a reading of Hopkins’ Duns Scotus’ Oxford, and how it 
expresses a deep appreciation of Scotus, even approaching veneration: 
Towery city and branchy between towers: 
Cuckoo-echoing, bell-swarmèd, lard-charmèd, rook-
racked, river-rounded; 
The Dapple-eared lily below there; that country and 
town did 
Once encounter in, here coped and poised powers; 
 
The hast a base and brackish skirt there, sours 
That neighbour-nature thy grey beauty is grounded 
Best in; graceless growth, thou hast confounded 
Rural rural keeping-folk, flocks, and flowers. 
Yet ah! This air I gather and I release 
He lived on; these weeds and waters, these walls are 
what 
He haunted who of all men most sways my spirits to 
peace; 
 
Of realty the rarest-veinèd traveller; a not 
Rivalled insight, be rival Italy or Greece; 
Who fired France for Mary without spot.564 
This is a richly crafted sonnet, using the rhetorical devices which 
characterise much of Hopkins’ work when he is most lyrical;565 alliteration, 
enjambement, sprung rhythm, inversion and densely packed imagery. This is a 
                                          
562 F R Leavis, The Common Pursuit, [LEAVIS REF???] Leavis, F R, The Common Pursuit 
(Middlesex, UK; Penguin Books, 1969 (1952)) pp. 51-2, quoted in Dubois, Martin, Hopkins’ 
Beauty, in Bevis, Matthew (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Victorian Poetry (Oxford, UK; Oxford 
University Press, 2013), p.549  
563, Dubois, Hopkins’ Beauty p.552 
564 Wordsworth Poetry Library edition p.40 
565 see the sections later in this chapter, which discuss his poetic technique in more detail 
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powerful admiration of Scotus. One could suspect that by being in sympathy 
with Scotism as against Thomism, Hopkins is courting theological 
‘eccentricity.’566 
There is a sense of wonder in the journal entry where he names Scotus as 
the source of a possible “mercy from God:” 
After the examinations we went for our holiday out to 
Douglas in the Isle of Man…  Aug.3 At this time I had first 
begun to get hold of the copy of Scotus on the 
Sentences in the Baddely library and was flush with a 
new stroke of enthusiasm. It may come to nothing or it 
may be a mercy from God. But just then when I took in 
any inscape of the sky or sea I thought of Scotus.567 
If inscape is here thought of as somehow linked to Scotus as a ‘mercy 
from God,’ it can be considered as a theological-poetic possibility. 
 
4.2.  Ecce – instress and inscape 
Instress and inscape 
Inscape and instress are significant neologisms which Hopkins creates.  In 
his notebooks, examples of the term inscape are prolific. Two examples suffice:  
May 11th, 1871 -  It was a lovely sight – The bluebells in 
your hand baffle you with their inscape, made to every 
sense: if you draw your fingers through them they are 
lodged and struggle/with a shock of wet heads … then 
there is the faint honey smell568 
April 8, 1873 – The ashtree growing in the corner of the 
garden was felled … looking out and seeing it maimed 
there came at that moment a great pang and I wished to 
                                          
566 On the contemporary Catholic theological context: “Decisive support for (the revival of 
Thomist thought) came with Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879; “Eternal Father”). 
... Leo asked especially for a recovery of the wisdom of Aquinas, whom he hailed as “the special 
bulwark and glory of the Catholic Faith.” ... In 1880 Leo made Aquinas patron of all Roman 
Catholic schools. The Code of canon Law of 1917, the official compilation of church law, 
required that Catholic teachers of philosophy and religion follow the method and principles of 
Aquinas. This established Thomism as the official philosophy of the Roman Catholic Church.” 
[Thomas F O’Meara, Thomism, in Encyclopaedia Britannica online access 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Thomism, accessed 9/10/2016] 
567 Journal, June 29th – August 3rd, 1872, in Hopkins, G M (ed. House, Humphry) The Journals and 
Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins (London, UK; Oxford University Press, 1959), p.162 
568 Ibid. p.145 
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die and not to see the inscapes of the world destroyed 
any more.569 
Instress is hard to pin down as something separate to inscape except for 
perhaps having a different emphasis – for example 
Sept. 1, 1868 - The all-powerfulness of instress in mode 
and the immediateness of its effect (in the architecture 
of a chapel) are very remarkable570 
July 13, 1874 - The comet – I have seen it at bedtime in 
the west, with head to the ground, white, a soft well-
shaped tail, not big: I felt a certain awe and instress, a 
feeling of strangeness, flight (it hangs like a shuttlecock 
at the height, before it falls) and of threatening.571 
 
Charles Williams on Hopkins 
Instress/inscape can be seen as the ‘isness’ inherent in the object, but 
also as the subjective sensitivity which generates poetic response to the seen 
image. However the resulting poetic work does not ‘spontaneously flow’ without 
technique, although it might seem to do so.572 This ‘apparent effortlessness’ of 
the flow of much of his poetry could be compared to the novelist Italo Calvino’s 
ironic remark about the work that is needed to produce the effect of 
spontaneity.573 To analyse how Hopkins’ technique mediates inscape/instress, 
Charles Williams gives a useful insight, in his  1930 introduction to the second 
edition of Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins.574  
Williams expresses a sensitivity to technique in Hopkins’ poetry which is 
amenable to an argument that in his work haecceitas becomes ecceitas. He 
focuses on Hopkins’ use of alliteration as a way of poetic being. He argues that 
Hopkins’ sound is integral to bringing the ‘isness’ of its content further into life, 
achieving this by bringing words into a tight binding together which brings not so 
                                          
569 Journal, April 8, 1873, ibid. p.174 
570 Journal, Sept 1,1868 ibid. p.119 
571 Journal, July 13, 1874, ibid. p.198 
572 Hopkins’ journal entries record how instress occurs, in ‘the thing itself’ and in his response; 
however the poems differ from the journal entries in their craftedness. 
573 Calvino reportedly said that in his technique “a very patient elaboration of style is needed to 
produce the effect of spontaneity. Spontaneity is not the starting point but the destination.” 
[Ribatti, Domenico Omaggio a Italo Calvino - Autobiografia di uno scrittore. (Manduria-Bari-
Roma; Piero Lacaita Editore, 1995), p.12] [this author’s translation]. 
574 Charles Williams, Introduction, in Hopkins, G M (ed. Bridges, Robert) Poems of Gerard Manley 
Hopkins (Oxford, UK; Oxford University Press 1930) 
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much a poem of words but a poem of ‘thing.’ The ‘thing’ is a unity of response 
where  
‘Thou hast bound bones … fastened me flesh.’ It is as if 
the imagination, seeking for expression, had found both 
verb and substantive at one rush, had begun almost to 
say them at once, and had separated them only because 
the intellect had reduced the original unity into divided 
but related sounds …(t)he very race of the words and 
lines hurries on our emotion; our minds are left behind 
… because they cannot work at a quick enough rate. 
‘Cast by conscience out’ is not a phrase; it is a word. So 
is ‘spendsavour salt.’ Each is thought and spoken all at 
once; and this is largely (as it seems) the cause and (as 
it is) the effect of their alliteration. They are like words 
of which we remember the derivations; they present 
their unity and their elements at once.575 
Williams’ comparison to words and their derivations is a good one; words 
are ‘supercharged’ with content brought into them by the alliteration of the 
phrase which brings the sound of it, as a direct result, into the poem. In fact, 
this could also be seen as an intense sensitivity of poetic response and craft 
where alliteration also becomes onomatopoeic. For example, “cast by 
conscience out” brings the hardness of the ‘c’ sound in to embody the hardness 
of conscience which confronts the mind. Similarly, “spendsavour salt” embodies 
the ‘slipperiness’ of the poem’s “liar” who is evasive in staying away from the 
light. ‘Beamblind,’ too, works onomatopoeically as well as alliteratively by 
using ‘b,’ ‘m’ and ‘n’ sounds perhaps to suggest fumbling or muttering 
sounds.576 
                                          
575 Ibid., pp. xi-xii 
576 Second stanza, The Candle Indoors, ibid., p.46: 
 
Come you indoors, come home; your fading fire  
Mend first and vital candle in close heart’s vault:          
You there are master, do your own desire;  
What hinders? Are you beam-blind, yet to a fault  
In a neighbour deft-handed? Are you that liar  
And, cast by conscience out, spendsavour salt?  
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Although Williams is sensitive to how crafted sound embodies the nature 
of what it conveys, this thesis’ reading of Hopkins departs from his claim that 
“Hopkins was not the child of vocabulary but of passion.”577 Hopkins is indeed 
“the child … of passion,” as the intensity of alliterative response, like indeed all 
his poetic sensitivity, demonstrates. However, to suggest that he is less a “child 
of vocabulary” is perhaps misleading. He is a superb wordsmith, and this is 
better seen as a fusion of vocabulary and passion. The craft of poetic creation is 
rightly seen by Williams as resulting in the poem as a level of being into which 
the reader is drawn, and he expresses this graphically: 
Alliteration, repetition, interior rhyme, all do the same 
work: first, they persuade us of the existence of a vital 
and surprising poetic energy; second, they suspend our 
attention from any rest until the whole thing, whatever 
it may be, is said … (phrases) proceed, they ascend, 
they lift us (breathlessly and dazedly clinging) with 
them, and when at last they rest and we loose hold and 
totter away we are sometimes too concerned with our 
own bruises to understand exactly what the experience 
has been ... (his) experience (of inner wrestling’) is 
expressed largely in continual shocks of strength and 
beauty. 578 
In this fusion, an ex-centric reading of Manley Hopkin’s poetry as in fact 
the child of haecceitas discerns an enfleshment of words, or a wording of 
enfleshment, which will be considered in an autistic hermeneutic as a 
theologically thought incarnational metaphor in an intensity of fascination. 
Williams sees Hopkins as approaching, but not actually being mystical.579 
He sees a fusion in his work of two elements where poetic response (ie., the 
poet’s emotional response to the world which generates his poetry) and 
processing of that response co-exist – he refers to “a passionate emotion” and 
“a passionate intellect.”580 If Hopkins “approaches” the territory of mysticism, 
this might be seen in a theological thinking related to chapter two’s apophatic 
fiction. However, instead of absence being the main focus, presence is more 
                                          
577 Hopkins, G M (ed. Bridges), Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins p. x  
578 Ibid., pp. xxii-xxiii, xiv 
579 Ibid., p. xiv 
580 Ibid., p. xv 
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apt. This is because his “passionate intellect” and “passionate emotion” work in 
his poetry to be an (apparently spontaneous) outpouring of ecce! – ‘behold!’ 
 
Pitch and ecceitas 
Ecce draws on the vocabulary of the Latin of Hopkins’ scholarship as a 
classicist, but also invokes the ecce homo of Christ. Hopkins as poet-priest uses 
words with care, interrogating them as linguist, theologian and poet. 
A significant example of the fusion of theology and aesthetics is in his use 
of the term ‘pitch.’ In aesthetic terms, he uses it in his Lecture Notes on 
Rhetoric as a description defining a poetic quality: he points out that English 
language is not tonal, relying on stress rather than pitch, but French and Greek 
use pitch to accentuate word sound. As a reader of all three languages, he 
discerns these two characteristics, stress and pitch, and uses an interesting 
metaphor for their presence: 
We may think of words as heavy bodies, as indoor or out 
of door objects of nature or of man’s art. Now every 
visible palpable body has a centre of gravity round 
which it is in balance and a centre of illumination or 
highspot or quickspot up to which it is lighted and down 
from which it is shaded. The centre of gravity is like the 
accent of stress, the highspot like the accent of pitch, 
for pitch is like light and colour, stress like weight … as 
it is only glazed bodies that shew the highspot well so 
there may be languages in which the pitch is 
unnoticeable. English is of this kind, the accent of stress 
strong, that of pitch weak – only they go together for 
the most part.581 
He is able to explain this clearly because he has ‘an ear for language.’ 
But an aesthetics of theology also discerns accents in actions, and for this he 
uses the same term, ‘pitch.’ One could similarly say that he has ‘an ear for 
what theology writes,’ as it is spoken in action and spiritual practice. It is 
telling that he employs an aesthetic term (pitch) in a similar structure of 
contrasting aspects, when further exploring a moral theology/psychology (‘of 
personality) in his Prima Hebdomada meditation: 
                                          
581 Hopkins (ed. House), Journals & Papers pp. 223-4 
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Freedom of pitch, that is/ self determination, is in the 
chooser himself and in his choosing faculty; freedom of 
play is in the execution; freedom of field is in the 
object, the field of choice.582 
Pitch is contrasted with quiddity:  
Two eggs precisely like, two birds precisely alike: if they 
had been exchanged no difference would have been 
made. It is the self then that supplies the 
determination, the difference, but the nature that 
supplies the exercise, and in these two things freedom 
consists. This is what I have before somewhere worked 
out in a paper on freedom and personality and I think I 
used the terms freedom of pitch and freedom of play: 
they are good at all events and the two together express 
moral freedom.583 
Pitch is, it seems, equivalent to both a poetic and a moral/spiritual 
instress: 
It is to be remarked that choice in the sense of the 
taking of one and leaving of another real alternative is 
not what freedom of pitch really and strictly lies in. It is 
choice as when in English we say ‘because I choose,’ 
which means no more than (and with precision does 
mean) / I instress my will to so-and-so. And this 
freedom and no other, no freedom of field, the divine 
will has towards its own necessary acts. And no freedom 
is more perfect; for freedom of field is only in accident 
…. So that this pitch might be expressed, if it were good 
English, the doing be, the doing choose, the doing so-
and-so in that sense.584   
From here, crucially, Hopkins is now in a position to conclude, “Is not this 
pitch or whatever we call it then the same as Scotus’ ecceitas?”585 Seeing pitch, 
both moral-existential and poetic, as ecceitas (when he ‘really meant to say 
haecceitas’), could then be a real and powerful fusion and inner reconciliation 
for Hopkins as poet/priest. 
 
 
                                          
582 Ibid., p.326 
583 Ibid., p.323 
584 Ibid., p.328 
585 Ibid. 
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4.3.  Scotus and haecceitas 
Hopkins’ possible affinity with Scotus has been discussed, and to develop 
how this might result in a poetic ecceitas, this section will explore, briefly, two 
relevant and distinct Scotist terms, which are univocity and haecceitas. 
Univocity 
Univocity is important for understanding how a ‘Franciscan optimism’ 
might be discerned in Hopkins’ view of instress and poetry. As a member of the 
Jesuit order, Hopkins is moving away here from his own theological mainstream 
towards the Franciscan tradition where Scotus is situated. Univocity might be 
seen as a condition necessary for the theory of individuation which Scotus terms 
haecceitas, so it will be discussed here briefly. 
Univocity is a term in logic concerning predication, and its use for 
language concerning God is championed by Scotus in thirteenth century 
Scholastic debate in a dispute with Aquinas, who argues instead for the 
necessity of analogical language concerning God. Scholastic debates of the 
thirteenth century such as that between Aquinas’ analogical predication and 
Scotus’ univocal predication regarding God show the influence of the 
rediscovery of Aristotle in texts translated from Arabic to Latin.  
The problem for Aristotle, as a philosopher, is how to speak of the divine, 
and this requires a shift from physics (natural philosophy) to meta-physics, 
above natural philosophy. He does this by taking the analogical move from 
known to unknown as a conjecture. In effect, his logic is the extension of the 
scientific method without the facility of empirical testing. Jennifer Ashworth 
writes: 
Aquinas makes considerable use of his ontological 
distinction between univocal causes, whose effects are 
fully like them, and non-univocal causes, whose effects 
are not fully like them. God is an analogical cause, and 
this is the reality that underlies our use of analogical 
language.586 
                                          
586 Ashworth, Jennifer E, "Medieval Theories of Analogy", in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/analogy-medieval/>. 6. Thomas Aquinas 
accessed 12/05/2016 
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God as Prime Mover is utterly transcendent in philosophical terms; for 
human language, ways to talk about God  
(cannot) be purely univocal, for God's manner of 
existence and his relationship to his properties are 
sufficiently different from ours that the words must be 
used in somewhat different senses. 587 
In contrast to this, Scotus argues that language, in some terms at least, 
can be predicated of the divine and the human in exactly the same way, so that 
language is one, and so human and divine being can both, to some extent, 
partake in one linguistic world. Scotus writes: 
Univocity: Notwithstanding the irreducible ontological 
diversity between God and creatures, there are 
concepts under whose extension both God and creatures 
fall, so that the corresponding predicate expressions are 
used with exactly the same sense in predications about 
God as in predications about creatures.588 
 
 Universal sacrament 
 Scotus follows Hugh de Victor in a concept of sacramental participation. 
So Denys Turner writes that “truly, for Hugh, the sacramentality of things is 
universal.”589 The difference between sacrament and symbol is conflated into 
one, though, so that Turner can write that for de Victor “all nature, all history 
and all Scripture are, within the dispensation of grace, a complex of symbolic 
representations of the divine, a universe whose reality is sacramental.”590 
That being said, for Scotus univocity is a union in predicative terms, not 
ontological terms. Sacrament and symbol operate in such a way that, at least in 
some senses, human language is not separated from divine language, but 
language is one. This union at the level of language opens up the possibility of 
what Mary Beth Ingham calls a “Franciscan optimism” of language (see below). 
                                          
587 ibid. 
588 Scotus, Duns, Ordinatio in Five Texts on the Medieval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Duns 
Scotus, Ockham (trans. & ed. Spade, Paul Vincent) (Indianapolis, Indiana; Hackett 
Publishing,1994) 1, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, n. 163, quoted in Williams, Thomas (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Duns Scotus (Cambridge, UK; Cambridge University Press, 2003) p.578 
589 Turner, The Darkness of God p.106 
590 Ibid. p.107 
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This can then be argued in terms of a poetic dwelling which Hopkins will 
develop in his poetic haecceitas. 
 
Ingham’s ‘Franciscan Optimism’ 
In Mary Beth Ingham’s reading of Scotus, the creation celebrated in 
Franciscan love is God’s handiwork. God is artist, and creation is the art 
work.591 Where Aquinas’ Dominican metaphysics of analogy could be read as the 
pessimism of alienation from the prime Mover as the artist, Scotus’ Franciscan 
optimism sees the world as a poetry written by God, and able to be read 
directly as such in sacramental poetic participation. Univocity is the 
metaphysics of this audacious theological claim. Here the link to autistic 
fascination is that God’s loving delight in the art work of creation sidesteps 
pragmatic, ostensive language in a poetry of free flowing, unconditional love. 
This is a language of poetic being, leading to a metaphysics of individuation as 
Scotus’ neologism haecceitas.  
Aquinas stays within the Aristotelian predication of individuation in terms 
of natural philosophy. So in his metaphysics individuation is ‘quid-itas’ (that-
ness), amenable to classification and definition in the hierarchy of being. In 
radical opposition, Scotist individuation is ‘haecc-eitas’ (this-ness). This is utter 
theological optimism where the individual is amenable to a predication of 
supernatural philosophy. This is the ‘this’ particular and unrepeatable 
individual, which exists in the ontology of the supernatural art work. It is 
unrepeatable because it does not depend upon a quiddity which could be 
replicated. ‘This’ is the valued creature of the individual sparrow, not one of 
which falls without your Father knowing. Quidditas belongs to being and matter 
according to material properties. Haecceitas hangs freely in what Scotus calls 
less than numerical unity. 
Haecceitas is the non-qualitative nature of the individual: Scotus writes: 
Anything with a real, proper, and sufficient unity less 
than numerical is not of itself one by numerical unity — 
                                          
591 Scotus is writing as a Franciscan, not long after the order’s inception. ‘God as artist’ could be 
seen in terms of Francis’ love of animals as part of the created order (also preaching to the 
fishes) and in the canticle to the sun, where Francis himself is also the artist, as the poem’s 
author. 
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that is, it is not of itself a this. But the proper, real or 
sufficient unity of the nature existing in this stone is less 
than numerical unity. Therefore the nature existing in 
this stone is not of itself one by numerical unity.592 
Again, as in univocity, this is linguistic predication, not strictly truly even 
an ontology of esse but a kind of anti-ontology, close, even, to mysticism and 
poetics. In fact, it is emphatically not ontology because haecceitas stands in 
opposition to ontological quiddity. This non-attributive, non-quidditive being 
can in Hopkins become the being of poetic faith by which the art work of love 
exists. 
This is where an autistic fascination of poetic faith can be, inhabiting 
metaphor only as the truly real, beyond quidditive being. By being excluded 
from quidditive being it more truly inhabits being, and this, when it is read 
autistically, is the paradox of absolute autism existing as absence and presence. 
It hangs by a thread, impossibly. Thinking of absolute autism as an ecceitas, 
which this chapter will, in conclusion, do, is the impossible possibility of non-
quidditive sacred individuation, and this is possible as a poetic mode of being. 
Ellsberg gives an example of instress as a theological individuation surely 
haecceic: 
Hopkins described his own distinctiveness, and his taste 
for it in other things, as a mark of being “highly 
pitched.” The stress of a high pitch was toward God: the 
more a thing was isolated by its particularity, the more 
it would strive to share in the infinite.593  
 
Symbol and Sacrament 
In Hopkins’ thinking, haecceitas as real presence changes the dynamic of 
language, metaphor and symbol. Real presence in language is not quidditive, 
because it is vox, not esse. Cotter and Ingham both dwell on the argument that 
Hopkins rejects symbol in favour of sacrament: Ellsberg writes that 
Hopkins’ sacramental “physicality” proceeded mostly 
from his understanding of the status of sacrament as 
                                          
592 Scotus (ed. Spade), Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 1, q. 1, n. 8 7:395 
593 Ellsberg, Margaret, Created to Praise: The Language of Gerard Manley Hopkins (London, UK; 
Oxford University Press, 1987) p.91 
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distinct from symbol and revealed his effort to 
harmonise the details of the physical world and God.594 
Hopkins writes that “all things therefore are charged with love, are 
charged with God and if we know how to touch them give off sparks and take 
fire, yield drops and flow, ring, and tell of him.”595 This would be a univocal 
predication of God’s “isness” in creation, available for poetic instressed telling 
[‘uni-vox’] which is the sacrament of poetic participation. “Knowing how to 
touch them” so that they “give off sparks and take fire, yield drops and flow, 
ring, and tell of him” is a poetic vocation, or perhaps better, a mode of being 
and perception for the poet, priestly vocation or not.  
However Hopkins is a priest, and his thinking of that God-chargedness is 
utterly incarnational. Where nature can “give off sparks,” “all things, charged 
with love” have a haecceic significance.  
Haecceitas is a theo-poetic quality where symbol is much more than 
analogy, instead becoming sacrament. Ellsberg comments that “natural objects 
did not remind him of God, as they might have reminded the Neoclassic or 
Romantic poets, they were, in a sense, God.”596 597 He writes in terms of being 
lifted out of a trivialising of the world which arguably he sees in the logical 
                                          
594 Ibid. p.75 
595 Hopkins, G M (ed. Devlin, C) The Sermons and devotional writings of Gerard Manley Hopkins 
ed. Christopher (London, UK; Oxford University Press, 1959) p.195 quoted in Ellsberg, Created 
to Praise p.79  
596 Ellsberg, Created to Praise p.74 
597 See also Burgess, Michael, Gerard Manley Hopkins and Priest-poets: “What I think gives 
Hopkins his unique potency in vision and poem is that ability to look and see, and see to the 
heart of all that is. In 1872 Hopkins chanced upon Dun Scotus’ concept of haecceitas: the 
thisness of every individual being in God’s creation. This was a eureka moment or a Damascus 
experience for the poet. He wrote that “it may come to nothing or it may be a mercy from 
God”. It was a mercy for it harnessed his observation of the infinite detail of the natural world 
to his love of Christ. Hopkins looked and looked, and he somehow unravelled the complex 
beauty of creation by taking the time to stand and stare: to look, to ponder, and to find the 
words that express the reality he was seeing. We gather here 126 years after his death, and I 
think that is what can provide a beacon and a light in this hectic pace of life and movement 
and progress which many call “the hurry syndrome”. We easily get caught up in it, and it leads 
to an offhand way with words. It is the cult of immediate satisfaction that marks our world and 
prevents us from taking the time to look and think and express. Hopkins looks at sunsets and 
then he mines his repository of words to find exactly and precisely the ones that will convey 
the special quality of each sunset. As a result he likens them to yellow lilies, golden candle 
wax, the flowers of the wild mallow, pink and mauve, crimson ice and oil. It is part and parcel 
of his delight and wonder at creation around him. At Stonyhurst after a shower of rain he was 
often to be seen running down the path that led to the college to stare at the quartz in the 
pathway, glistening in the sun. “The slate slabs of the urinals even are frosted with graceful 
sprays,” he wrote in 1870.” [Talk delivered at St Bueno’s, online pdf access at 
www.newman.org.uk/upload/Gerard%20Manley%20Hopkins%20M%20Burgess.pdf accessed 
10/10/2016 
208 
 
 
positivism of his contemporary culture, and this is through an utter 
incarnational thinking. So he writes at the time of his conversion to Roman 
Catholicism “I think that the trivialness of life is, and personally to each one, 
ought to be seen to be, done away with by the Incarnation.”598 This is a clarion 
call for a poetic ecce of a theological haecceitas, and John Llewellyn argues for 
this, in his analysis of Hopkins’ term ecceitas, which can now be discussed as 
bringing them together. 
 
4.4.  Ecceitas 
Llewellyn’s argument for ecceitas 
It was explained earlier that inscape and instress are Hopkins’ neologisms 
related to the ‘pitch’ of identity, in three senses. Firstly, of the person as moral 
agent, secondly, as a quality of words as they are formed in language, and 
thirdly, of creation, natural and man-made, both in itself and in its reception in 
the person as responding agent. As shown above, inscape and instress are 
loosely equated by critics with haecceitas. However John Llewellyn refines this 
identification. He speculates on Hopkins’ neologism ‘ecceitas’ suggesting it 
would be, rather than a ‘haec-citas,’ an ‘ecce-itas.’ ‘Ecce’ (‘look, behold, here 
is’) could then be an ‘isness’ of the kind of showing-forth Llewellyn describes as 
epiphany.599 Llewellyn argues for Hopkins’ neologistic strategy as an 
“unorthodox orthography:” 
Hopkins’ unorthodox orthography gains some legitimacy 
from the fact that an earlier form of haec is haece, 
where ec is the root of the Latin word oculus, eye. … “Is 
not this pitch … eicceitas?”600 
‘Ecce’ is grammatically not nominative but vocative, not stating but 
appealing to the hearer, as an address. Llewellyn comments: 
Address is the appeal that the sheer existence of 
something or someone makes in which the goodness for 
that entity of its existence attracts our attention. The 
                                          
598 Ellsberg, Created to Praise p.77, quoting Hopkins, G M, Letters (III) in Gerard Manley 
Hopkins: Poems and Prose (ed. Humphry House) (Middlesex, UK; Penguin Classics, 1985) p.19  
599 See section 4.4, below 
600 Llewellyn, John, Gerard Manley Hopkins and the Spell of Duns Scotus (Edinburgh, Scotland; 
Edinburgh University Press, 2015) p.94  
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appeal is the call (appeal, geheiss, vocation) ‘Listen!’ or 
‘Look!’ It is the ecce that can be heard or seen in the 
haecceity of the individual singularity that according to 
Scotus, followed by Hopkins, is in a relation of formal 
distinction with a thing’s common nature.601 
This ‘address’ is the expression of a relationality which, again, can be 
thought theologically as participation in a universal sacrament of language. As 
such, ecceitas is also epiphany. 
 
Ecceitas as Epiphany 
Llewellyn observes that: 
In (a) journal entry Hopkins writes: ‘standing before the 
gateway I had an instress …602 This could lead one to 
think that having an instress is something like 
experiencing a hot flush or a throb of toothache. The 
experience could equally well be described more 
grandly as an epiphany. That Hopkins would describe it 
as an apocalypse and a grace is suggested by the 
apposition he makes in his sentence ‘The first intention 
then of God outside himself, as they say, ad extra, 
outwards, the first outstress of God’s power, was 
Christ.’ … Outstress is a person’s or persons’ expression 
of instress, an instance of the doing that expresses his 
or her being.603 
Llewellyn invokes Heidegger’s gaze,604 and following Heidegger, he can 
cast eicceitas as ontic rather than ontological:  
The whole inscape of (a) landscape, if an inscape could 
ever be whole, is what we might be tempted to call its 
essence, but that term is for Hopkins too liable to 
conjure up a traditionally philosophical conceptuality 
that freezes the flux, robs the ‘on a sudden’ flush and 
flash of its freshness and reduces the ‘move’ shot to a 
photographic still … Recall Heidegger’s ‘As for me, I 
never really stare at the landscape … to do that is to 
stunt the growth and to neglect the flush the flush 
implied in phusein, the Ancient Greek word for … living, 
active ... 605 
                                          
601 Ibid. p.91 
602 Hopkins, G M (ed. House), The Journals and Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins pp. 216-7 
603 Llewellyn, John, Gerard Manley Hopkins and the Spell of Duns Scotus p.14 
604 This is what chapter three discussed, when Dasein is able to see the tree in bloom, by ‘not 
thinking.’ 
605 Llewellyn, John, Gerard Manley Hopkins and the Spell of Duns Scotus p.25 
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“What is the running instress, so independent of at least 
the immediate scape of the thing, which unmistakeably 
distinguishes and individuates things?”606  
Llewellyn concludes that “No less than Hopkins, Scotus is concerned to 
provoke in his reader a sense of ‘as if for the first and last time.” That is one 
way of spelling out what they both mean by haecceity.”607 608 
 
4.5 Hopkins, ecceitas and autism 
Ecceitas has been established as a literary-theological category, and now 
this section provides the ‘litmus test’ as to how hospitable a discourse of 
ecceitas could be for the autistic literary-theological hermeneutic. 
 
Fascination in Hopkins’ poetry 
Before arguing for autistic fascination as a reading of ecceitas in an 
autistic reading of Hopkins’ writing, it will be useful to explore how that 
fascination operates in terms of the three traits discussed in the introduction. 
To recap, these three facets converge in a unity of the sense of immersion – 
firstly, immersion in detail, secondly, immersion in the sensory, and thirdly, 
immersion in metaphoricity,609 and Hopkins’ writing is immersive in all these 
three senses. A glorious “oddness” of autism610 might find resonance with 
Hopkins’ self-understanding: 
It is the virtue of design, pattern or inscape to be 
distinctive and it is the vice of distinctiveness to 
become queer. This vice I cannot have escaped.611  
                                          
606 Hopkins (ed. House), Journals and Note-books pp.153-4 quoted in Llewellyn, John, Gerard 
Manley Hopkins and the Spell of Duns Scotus p.20 
607 Llewellyn, John, Gerard Manley Hopkins and the Spell of Duns Scotus p.7 
608 Further research, beyond the scope of this thesis, could look at Hopkins’ essay on 
Parmenides, the thinking of the ontological and the ontic, and think about how this would relate 
to Marion’s saturated phenomenon, and Heidegger’s Dasien. Dennis Potter’s and James Joyce’s 
stretched language could also be compared to MH’s enjambement and neologistic combinations.  
609 Which becomes Incarnational metaphor. 
610 See glossary – autistic personality types  
611  Hopkins, G M (ed. House, Humphry), Gerard Manley Hopkins: Poems and Prose (Middlesex, 
UK; Penguin Classics, 1985) vol. I, p.66, quoted in Ellsberg, Created to Praise p.90. Thinking of 
the word queer anachronistically could perhaps also find evidence to support its use for a 
theological queer narrative, but this is not the aim of this thesis’ project. 
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Reading this “oddness” in an autistic hermeneutic makes it possible to 
argue for an “oddness” which autistic being might recognise as the potential of 
autistic art, in the following terms. 
 
Attention to detail – ‘the geek’ 
Returning to the concept of autistic fascination discussed at the start of 
this paper, an autistic hermeneutic can recognise its own autism in terms of 
fascination in Hopkins’ writing. Before thinking this theologically, it is useful to 
revisit the traits of fascination, and see how they might play out in a reading of 
his work. 
Firstly, absolute autism is present in ‘geeky’ extreme attention to detail.  
The ‘geek’ archetype of autism612 draws on the first aspect of autistic 
fascination, which is an immersion in phenomena through extreme attention to 
fine detail, often to the point of obsession. Hopkins’ notebooks are full of his 
detailed observation of what he sees – art, architecture, music, science, (his 
paper Statistics and Free Will is sadly lost) and most of all the natural world. 
His sketches are in fine detail, complementing his writing and as a fusion of 
scientific curiosity and aesthetic appreciation.613 Attentiveness is key to this. 
For example, a stream merits a detail-rich stanza in Inversnaid: 
Degged with dew, dappled with dew 
Are the groins of the braes that the brook treads 
through,  
Wiry heathpacks, flitches of fern,  
And the beadbonny ash that sits over the burn. 
 
Sensory sensitivity 
Inversnaid also embodies the second facet of autistic fascination, sensory 
sensitivity. It is inseparable from attentiveness to detail because both are 
extreme sensitivities to the environment. Sensory sensitivity means that what is 
                                          
612 A reference to Luke Jackson’s influential autistic teen autobiography (Jackson, Luke; Geeks, 
Freaks and Asperger Syndrome: A User’s Guide to Adolescence (London, UK; Jessica Kingsley, 
2002) and Silberman’s Neurotribes: ‘geeks’ are inverted from figures of ridicule, pejoratively 
labelled ‘odd,’ to figures of creative, lateral thinking and of great value. 
613 There is a wonderfully diverse and eclectic proliferation of line drawings and maps in his 
notebooks, eg. Hopkins (ed. House) Journals & Papers pp.144-147, 448  
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perceived through the senses is so close as to be a source sometimes of torment 
and sometimes of delight. Immersion operates in the poem as not merely 
observation but union with the nature of the object. So, what is also evident in 
this example is the immersion in sound through alliteration. I have argued 
elsewhere that his alliteration has an onomatopoeic character, unlike what 
Charles Williams calls Swinburne’s ‘useless alliteration’614 So in this case, the 
parallelism and clustering of ‘d’ sounds could be the tricking of the stream, and 
in line three the ‘f’ sounds could be the rustling of the fern. This is an 
immersion in the sounds, as well as the visuals, of the minute observation of 
autistic fascination.  
Alliteration, rhythm, rhyme and conjoining poetic neologisms create a 
texture of attentiveness to sound-image which is a meticulous seeing of nature, 
a meticulous thinking of image, and a meticulous listening to language. The 
metaphors of groin and tread, and the neologistic joining of bead and bonny are 
also the fruits of attentiveness to groins, treads and beads so that the 
metaphoric relationship of groin and the cutting of a stream path into the brae, 
of treading and the descent of a stream, and beads and dew, work by an 
attentive seeing of phenomena. It will now be seen that these relationships are 
strange and atypical, and are also in deep sympathy with autistic fascination.  
 
 Autistic incarnational metaphor 
Hopkins’ abnormal thinking of analogy is sympathetic to an autistic 
hermeneutic in its deviation from metaphor as straightforward ‘carrying across’ 
of referent from referred, where by analogy the referent is a symbol by 
analogy. Autism’s relationship to metaphor is to take the metaphor literally by 
avoiding the ostensive, pragmatic intent of metaphors.  
Insistence on abnormality of the thinking of ‘taking things literally’ does 
not mean that metaphor dies. On the contrary, it lives more fully by inhabiting 
the metaphor in a creative relationship. For example in The May Magnificat, an 
autistic reading of metaphor would ask ‘why, how is the bloom on the apple a 
                                          
614 see above, section 2.2 
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‘drop-of-blood-and-foam-dapple?’’ and ‘why, how is the earth ‘mothering?’ 
Blood and foam apples and the earth mother can exist in the space of the poem 
– willing suspension of disbelief is thought autistically as taking things literally, 
and revelling in that autistic privilege. Hopkins’ metaphoricity differs from 
Coleridge’s symbolism, however, because of the poetic intensity which is driven 
by a theological conviction rooted in sacrament. Ellsberg writes: 
The particularity of what Hopkins said in his poems 
revealed more about his theology than most of his 
carefully groomed arguments: the poems stressed out 
his faith. Each poem became a credo, with words as 
sacramental elements, his experience as the 
transcendent force, and Hopkins himself as the 
celebrant.615  
 
But it could be wondered if the converse might equally be true – it could 
be that it is Hopkins the poet whose sensibility drives him to the need for an 
Incarnational theology. He is both poet and priest, and his poetry is the 
expression of instress and pitch, almost a guilty secret, written against his will 
as a ‘vice,’ making him, as noted earlier, ‘queer.’616 
Things “tell of (God)” but are also “charged with God,” so the telling is 
not analogy but univocity. In poetic univocal metaphor, which properly in 
Aristotelian terms ought to be a contradiction, an autistic hermeneutic revels in 
this impossibility by taking that charged-ness literally. 
 
4.6 The autism of the poet? 
Ecceitas and ex-centricity 
As this thesis has repeatedly emphasised for each of its literary-
theological primary sources, this reading does not try to make Hopkins or his 
work ‘autistic.’ The argument in this section proceeds by reading his work 
through an autistic lens. As ever, this is “a” reading, not “the” reading. This 
works in all the ‘trinity’ of autistic aspects, although in this chapter the focus 
has been on autistic fascination as a way to think of participation, in terms of 
                                          
615 Ellsberg, Created to Praise p.96 
616 Hopkins, Letters vol. I, p.66, quoted in Ellsberg, Created to Praise p.90. 
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ecceitas.617 It also works by thinking of Hopkins’ work as poet-priest in his 
organic, insolubly fused poetic and theological thinking, and how original, 
“odd,” and ‘ex-centric’ this is. Adopting a particular autistic thinking of 
Hopkins’ ex-centricity, the theological-poetic-autistic hermeneutic claims a 
privileged autistic insight into Hopkins’ poetry, in terms of a neurotribal 
creative contribution to theological thinking. The autistic theological thinking of 
this argument, firstly, might validate what seems an impasse of “eccentric’ and 
(merely) personal reality”618 by conceiving of it as the [odd, creative] 
solitariness of universal autism. This in itself could still, at first sight, leave the 
hermeneutic open to the charge of solipsism, but this is not so. Firstly, Hopkins 
is not writing ‘in a bubble’ of subjectivity. He is “isolated” inasmuch as he is a 
creative, original thinker, but at the end of the day he does not engage in 
“flights of fancy” without forgetting his religious vocation. His poetics of 
ecceitas may be isolated phenomenon by being an original, new concept, but it 
is theologically grounded, albeit in a marginal theological thinking.  
This chapter has argued that he is a poet-priest whose “eccentric” lyrical 
vision of “the thing in itself” is a seamlessly crafted resolution of his twin 
vocations, as poet and priest. Ecceitas has been considered through [and only 
through] an autistic hermeneutic and appropriation as autistic fascination; but 
now, a related question arises. Could autistic artists actually express an 
eccentric [ex-centric] ecceitas in their work? It is here that the glimmer of an 
autistic hermeneutic appreciates, in the ex-centricity of Hopkins’ thought, a 
move which will now speculate on poetic sacramental language as expressed in 
art which can operate successfully within an autistic hermeneutic.   
Celebrating the value of autistic literal metaphor requires moving away 
from stereotypes of autism. In place of seeing “failure” to decode ostensive 
metaphor as the end of the story, the divergence from metaphor as ostensive 
                                          
617 Space does not permit a fuller outworking of the autistic trinity in this chapter; 
however mindfulness of separation is implicit at those points where ecceitas has been compared 
to apophatic fiction. Likewise, incarnational metaphor is implicitly present in this chapter, 
inasmuch as ecceitas, as a theology of a universal sacrament of language, is a theological 
thinking which makes metaphor theologically ‘real,’ so that autistic theological literal metaphor 
is here thought of as instress. 
618 Thinking of this “impasse” of Victorian poetry is revisiting the discussion of Cartesian 
subjectivity in chapter one, and again, the argument is that an autistic theological thinking is 
able to outwit neurotypical “common sense” narrative; this time, by its thinking in terms of 
ecceitas. In fact the “thing in itself” of ecceitas could in a sense be seen as Kantian. 
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has been what is at stake. Here there will be objections from clinical 
understandings of autism. The autist as literary-theological hermeneut has to 
have developed the ability to read figurative language; precisely what the 
clinical definition says s/he can’t do. This section offers a radical critique of the 
clinical narrative’s diagnostic presuppositions. It could be possible to see a 
circularity of the logic of diagnostic thinking.  If we define autists as high 
systematisers of ‘Silicon-valley type’ ‘geekiness’ with non-poetic 
temperaments, this means that therefore we will define poetic temperaments 
as, by definition, non-autistic. This misses the possibility of an autism which 
takes its literal mindedness into a profile which can, and does, employ 
figurative language. This could be something precisely like the Incarnational 
poiesis which Hopkins offers, where touching things which give off sparks is seen 
as autistic fascination. Baron Cohen’s scatter graph of the empathy-
systematising quotient619 fails to speculate on the nature of the minority of 
diagnosed autists who are not systematisers (even allowing that systematisation 
is assumed to be an unpoetic, uncreative activity).620 There is also an argument 
that, just as the different female autistic profile has led to what is increasingly 
seen as a vast under-diagnosis,621 so autistic poets might also be missing from 
understandings of autism. The argument here is that these autists might engage 
in fact highly creatively with metaphor and symbolism, successfully negotiating 
the relationship of symbol and referent, by surpassing it. The argument goes 
further, that this relationship is an abnormal one which is a particular gift. It’s 
not merely the poet who is charged with love for things, it is the things which 
are charged themselves with love, which autistic fascination is able to discern. 
Autistic fascination is eccentric. Similarly, ‘taking things a bit too far’ is 
precisely the charge laid at the saint whose ex-cess makes her ecc-entric. 
Similarly again, ‘having his head in the clouds’ marks out the useless 
eccentricity of the poet.  Poetic autism is detached from normality as a social-
communicative pragmatic impairment of cognitive empathy, as the trinity of 
autism has explained in previous chapters. Conceivably, that detachment could 
be both cause and effect of a sacramental, poetic autistic fascination.  
                                          
619 See glossary in the Introduction 
620 See Baron Cohen, Autism and Creativity 
621 See Stewart et al., http://www.swanscotland.com/ 
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As Kingfishers Catch Fire 
To end this chapter, the best conclusion is simply to turn to a poem, as 
Hopkins’ quintessentially theological expression of inscape and instress, selving, 
pitch, univocity, haecceitas, in a poem employing all his rhetorical skills in 
sprung rhythm, rhyme, external and internal, parallelism, enjambment, and 
alliteration. In its incarnational nature it expresses the Franciscan optimism of a 
tortured Jesuit whose terrible sonnets622 are also the struggle of the priest 
finding salvation in poetry and whose lyric, sacramental poetry is praise. For an 
autistic theological hermeneutic, its fascination is an autistic haecceitas where 
God’s autism shines in sensory delight. An autistic union is possible not only in 
wordless sensory instress, but also in words, when these are metaphor read 
atypically as sacramental inscape. 
As kingfishers catch fire, dragonflies draw flame; 
As tumbled over rim in roundy wells 
Stones ring; like each tucked string tells, each hung 
bell's 
Bow swung finds tongue to fling out broad its name; 
Each mortal thing does one thing and the same: 
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells; 
Selves — goes itself; myself it speaks and spells, 
Crying Whát I dó is me: for that I came. 
 
I say móre: the just man justices; 
Keeps grace: thát keeps all his goings graces; 
Acts in God's eye what in God's eye he is — 
Chríst — for Christ plays in ten thousand places, 
Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his 
To the Father through the features of men's faces.623 
This selfhood is, as an autistic reading of Teresa of Àvila has made clear, 
the self of autos, not ego. 
  
                                          
622 Terrible, in the sense of the place of anguish; 'To Seem the Stranger', 'I Wake and 
Feel', 'Patience', 'My Own Heart', 'Carrion Comfort', and 'No Worst, There Is None'. 
623 Hopkins, G M, Gerard Manley Hopkins: Poems and Prose (Middlesex, UK; Penguin 
Classics, 1985) 
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Chapter Five: Luigi Pirandello’s novels 
and an autistic hermeneutic 
Introduction 
[Parts of an earlier draft of this chapter were published as The Consolation of 
the Green Blanket and an Autistic Theology in Consolation - Literary and 
Religious Perspectives 4 (15), Göteborgs Universitet, Göthenberg, Sweden, 2016 
(http://ojs.ub.gu.se/ojs/index.php/LIRJ/article/view/3466 )] 
 
This chapter is the last of this thesis’ exploration of mythical autism, the 
autistic hermeneutic, and incarnational metaphor. It uses the hermeneutical 
mode developed by this thesis to read a ‘test case’ study for the autistic 
literary-theological ‘litmus test.’ There would be an almost limitless number of 
poems, novels, plays, symphonies, songs, statues, paintings, films, video games, 
art installations, where an autistic hermeneutic could search for hospitable 
environments. This chapter, as space permits, chooses one ‘representative 
sample,’ although it will be argued that this is a particularly resonant one. So 
this last chapter brings an autistic hermeneutic to two novels by the Italian 
novelist Luigi Pirandello, to argue that the novels can be read, for the privileged 
reader armed with a conscious autistic hermeneutic, as an object lesson in the 
gift of being autistic. The chapter works as a comparative study between a 
lesser and a greater autistic potential for autistic incarnational metaphor. The 
comparison, for discerning ‘levels of autistic potential,’ is between an earlier 
and a later Pirandello novel. The first, earlier novel under consideration is The 
Late Mattia Pascal, (Il Fu Mattia Pascal), from here on abbreviated to Mattia 
Pascal.624 The second novel, Pirandello’s last, is One, No-one and One Hundred 
Thousand, (Uno, Nessuno e Centomila) from here on abbreviated to Uno, 
Nessuno.625 The argument put forward will be that Uno, Nessuno is a narrative 
offering the poetential (another slip of the pen – poet-ential, as poetic 
                                          
624 Pirandello, Luigi, The Late Mattia Pascal (trans. William Weaver) (New York; New York 
Review Books, 2005) 
625 Pirandello, Luigi, One, No-One, One Hundred Thousand (trans. William Weaver) (New York; 
Marsilio,1992) 
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potential) of the full gift of autism, as incarnational metaphor, while Mattia 
Pascal journeys towards this gift but turns back (like Lot’s wife) into 
neurotypicality, missing the theological power of conscious autism. 
There are good reasons for selecting Pirandello’s novels for this ‘case 
study.’ Firstly, Pirandello is foundational in the Theatre of the Absurd, and the 
Absurd’s emergence from Modernist writing is an arena where Mindfulness of 
Separation can be seen as increasingly conscious, as previously argued in 
chapter one. In fact, as will be explained, Pirandello’s radical, innovative, 
experimental technique could even be read as proto-postmodernist, and 
another aim of this chapter is, in a small way, to use the autistic hermeneutic 
to bring his generally overlooked significance to light. In fact, this is not least 
because in 1934 Pirandello was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature, and his 
contribution to European literature has perhaps been overlooked by the English-
speaking world, although his dramas are still popular as stage productions.  
Secondly, the theme of ‘madness’ and the presence of ‘schizophrenia’ in 
Pirandello the writer’s own family life might be seen as areas where a perceived 
‘pathology’ of autism might recognise some traits.626 
The novels are selected in contrast to Pirandello’s more widely known 
plays for two reasons. Firstly, it is little known that Pirandello spent many more 
years as a novelist than a playwright, and his novels are worthy of attention in 
their own right. However secondly, and more fundamentally, the novel offers 
something different to the play. In contemporary Western culture, ultimately I 
read alone and you read alone. We may discuss our appreciation of 
Middlemarch, but my Middlemarch is my Middlemarch and yours is yours. This is 
another aspect of innerness and solitude which predisposes the novel for giving 
a hospitable welcome to an autistic hermeneutic. Thirdly, both novels’ first 
person narrative offer an inner psychological space. Pirandello’s drama is much 
more celebrated, but it is the inner voice of the first-person narrator’s 
psychological space, rather than the acted words and actions in the social arena 
of drama, which lends itself to the success of an autistic hermeneutic. Autistic 
Mindblindess makes the ‘reading’ of a performance enactment difficult, with 
                                          
626 This is far from equating schizophrenia with autism, even though early diagnostic 
thinking in the first half of the twentieth century at times did so. Rather, the ‘madness’ of the 
holy fool in Pirandello’s work comes into dialogue with the gift of autistic seeing. 
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the difficulty of grasping ostensive action and the Mindreading needed to 
decode the actors’ expressions and gestures. The plays are discussed briefly in 
this chapter, to outline the context in a general discussion of Pirandellian 
thought and its possibilities for an autistic hermeneutic. For a close reading, 
however, it will be his novels which offer possibilities for a more detailed 
response. 
This chapter’s exploration of Pirandello’s thought also speculates on the 
influence of late nineteenth/early twentieth century early understandings of 
“schizophrenia” in his work.627 With this possible connection, there is room to 
consider whether this “schizophrenia” might have more to do with autism than 
might appear, in hindsight, when diagnostic labels have changed.628 Most 
importantly, his thinking of the absurd offers a divergent space for autistic 
thinking, offering ample room to think in terms of mindfulness of separation. In 
terms of fascination, the ‘green blanket’ trope in Uno, Nessuno offers a striking 
resonance with the ‘brown blanket’ phenomenon of the autist Gunilla Gerlund, 
as will become clear. The argument will be for an ‘autistic pilgrimage’ which 
can be read in the journey towards the ‘green blanket,’ for the autistic reader 
who understands absence and immersion as separation and fascination. As in 
previous chapters’ readings of literary texts, this is a mythical hermeneutic, re-
visioning the text in a creative enactment of the trinitarian autistic hermeneutic 
(Mindfulness of Separation, Fascination and Literal metaphor) with their related 
connections to affective empathy and autistic integrity. In this sense, 
Pirandello’s early novel Mattia Pascal and his last novel Uno, Nessuno will, in 
this chapter, be read as if embodiments of contrasting partial and total autism. 
In terms of celebrating mystical and a-theological autistic modes, this 
                                          
627 Pirandello’s wife, Antonia, suffered from severe schizophrenia. A reading of Büdel’s 
and Giudice’s biographies of Pirandello invite speculation that his relationship with Antonia, his 
‘beloved muse,’ might yield interesting possibilities for future research. This might be by 
reconsidering the dynamic as he ‘uses’ her schizophrenia as a narrative device (or inspiration, 
outworking/reflective writing practice, or even enactment?) for his anti-metaphysical textual 
games. There could even be argued to be a case, in these games, of the “who’s missing the 
point?” kind of pathologising issues discussed in chapter one. Could this be a transference which 
betrays itself, vocalised, for example, in Moscarda’s rant at the reader (pp.23-25) and his self-
hatred (p45). This is all the more attractive a reading in the light of Pirandello’s ardent fascism 
(see Büdel, Oscar, Pirandello (UK; Fletcher & Son, 1969) p.27; see also Giudice, Gaspare, 
Pirandello: A Biography (trans. Alastair Hamilton) (London, UK; Oxford University Press, 1975) 
628 Early diagnostic constructs for autism were ‘autistic psychopathy’ (Leo Kanner) and 
‘childhood schizophrenia (Loretta Bender) See Gil Eyal et al. The Autism Matrix 
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comparison of the two novels will read as their relative success or failure to 
attain the gift of conscious autism.  
There is, in Pirandello’s writing, something absurd and tragi-comic which 
offers a possibility of its being read through an autistic lens.  Carlo Salinari 
writes: 
Al fondo … si può trovare … il sentimento della 
condizione anarchica in cui viene a vivere l’uomo 
moderno, della mancanza di un tessuto sociale organico 
che lo sostenga e lo colleghi agli altri uomini, del 
dominio sull’uomo delle cose che sono estranee alla sua 
volontà, dell’inevitabile sconfitta a cui è condannato 
l’uomo nella società in cui si trova a vivere. 
 
(At the base (of Pirandello’s work) … one can find … a 
feeling of the anarchic condition in which modern man 
finds himself, of the lack of an organic social fabric 
which sustains him and binds him to others, of the 
mastery of man by things which are external to his will, 
of the inevitable defeat to which man is condemned in 
the society in which he finds himself living).629 
 
Straight away Salinari’s vocabulary of the individual who is unable to be 
“bound” (connected) to others speaks to the condition of autism and is a 
condition to which autism speaks. This lack of “being bound” will be explored in 
this chapter in Salinari’s sense, as the unfavourable lack of social cohesion 
experienced both in Pirandello’s technique and protagonists. However more 
importantly, “being bound” is read ultimately in this chapter as neurotypicality, 
in what Pirandello will call “the web of life.” Freedom from “the web” will be 
read as a figuration of the gift of autism. 
James McFarlane argues that Pirandello is foundational to the Theatre of 
the Absurd as it develops in the Twentieth century: 
By his insight into the disintegration of personality, 
Beckett; by his assault on received ideas, Ionesco; by his 
exploration of the conflicts of reality and appearance, 
O’Neill; and by his probing of the relationship between 
                                          
629 Carlo Salinari, Miti e Coscienza del decadentismo italiano (Milan; Feltrinelli, 1960), 
quoted in Pirandello, Luigi, Uno, Nessuno e Centomila (Milan; Mondadori, 1984), p. ix. 
(Translations by the author of this thesis unless otherwise indicated) 
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self and persona, actor and character, face and mask, 
the work of Anouilh, Giradoux and Genet.630 
McFarlane situates Pirandello’s work within “a distinctively second-stage 
Modernism, a ‘Neo-Modernism,’ in twentieth-century European drama,” through 
new methods of staging, particularly devices for destroying the fourth wall. This 
is also the case ideologically in  
a deeply and destructively ironic attitude to naturalistic 
reality, a determination to replace the illusionistic 
counterfeiting of reality by the recognition of the 
profounder reality of illusion (with, in Apollinaire, Yeats 
and Pirandello) an) obsessive preoccupation with 
masks.631 
A perception of fundamental illusion is the root of a ‘cataclysmic order’ 
in an ‘apocalyptic, crisis-centred (view) of history.’632 McFarlane and Bradbury 
quote Herbert Read’s similar appraisal of Modernism:  
There have been revolutions in the history of art before today. There is a 
revolution with every new generation, and periodically, every century or 
so, we get a wider or deeper change of sensibility which is recognised in 
a period – the Trecento or Quattrocentro, the Baroque, the Roccoco, the 
Romantic, the Impressionist and so on. But I do think we can already 
discern a difference in kind in the contemporary revolution; it is not so 
much a revolution, which implies a turning over, even a turning back, but 
rather a break-up, a devolution, some would even say a dissolution. Its 
character is catastrophic.633  
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the nature of this “catastrophic 
dissolution” as the site of a crisis which an autistic hermeneutic can read as the 
opening for the gift of conscious autism. 
Pirandello is best known for his plays such as Enrico IV (Henry the 
Fourth), Sei Caratteri in Cerca d’autore [Six Characters in Search of an Author] 
and Il Gioco delle Parti [The Rules of the Game]. What makes Pirandellian 
drama innovative and challenging is that he distorts form, innovatively breaking 
                                          
630 McFarlane, James, Neo-Modernist Drama: Yeats and Pirandello, James McFarlane, in 
Bradbury, R & McFarlane, J, (eds) Modernism: A Guide to European Literature 1890-1939, 
(Middlesex, UK; Penguin Books 1991 (1976)) p.569  
631 McFarlane, Neo-Modernist Drama: Yeats and Pirandello, p.651 
632 McFarlane & Bradbury, The Name and Nature of Modernism, in McFarlane & Bradbury 
(eds), Neo-Modernist Drama p.20 
633 Herbert Read (1915-1968), (citation not given), in McFarlane & Bradbury, Neo-
Modernist Drama p.20 
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the fourth wall in a metanarrative which makes the work subvert itself. It has a 
strong sense of anticipating Barthes’ death of the Author. 
In his drama, Pirandello’s most fundamental technical device is the play-
within-the-play. However this is more than the previous usage in the pre-Modern 
period. Where the Shakespearean play-within-a-play is a set piece, clearly 
bounded within the primacy of the play itself, Pirandello’s plays-within-plays 
‘take over’ the setting of the purported play to subvert it from within. 
McFarlane describes the play-within-the-play as “the spectacle of a spectacle 
which is … not so much a play within a play as a play beyond a play.”634 
McFarlane is right, but the even more subversive nature of this ‘beyond’ is the 
inversion where ‘beyond’ itself takes primacy.  
In Sei Caratteri, for example, a play begins, but six people come out of 
the audience and onto the stage. They announce that they are six characters in 
search of an author. They have a desperate need to make their story real, and 
proceed to replace the ‘original’ play planned by the director with their own 
play, which they then act. This play completely displaces any trace of the 
purported original play. It ends in violence and death, not resolving the 
problems the characters bring to the plot but enacting their tragedy. This 
device is an existential challenge to the audience, to enact this questioning of 
their own constructed realities. McFarlane calls this  
the discovery of the inner contradiction to which all 
mimesis is exposed: that reality is not immediately 
distinguishable from the imitation, and that 
spuriousness has a genuine and enduring reality which is 
not often recognised.’ (my emphasis).635 
“Spuriousness,” accorded value in this way, might invert the conventions 
of mimesis and by implication, as will emerge, metaphysical representation (as 
another ‘mimesis’).636 In this inversion, the play itself is invested with a fuller 
reality.637  
 
                                          
634 Bradbury & McFarlane, Neo-Modernist Drama p.567 
635 Ibid. p. 566 
636 This relates to the deconstruction of meta-physics as meta-phor in chapter one. 
637 This relates to a poetic haecceitas – ecceitas – as discussed in chapter four. 
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5.1.  Pirandello’s thought  
The loss of faith 
Pirandello’s essay Arte e Coscienza d’oggi articulates a profound sense of 
the loss of faith, with rhetorical style not unlike Nietzsche’s: 
I am amazed that something which is in fact pitch dark 
should be called God … science has assigned man a 
pitiful place in nature compared to the place he once 
thought he occupied … What has become of man? What 
has this microcosm, this king of the universe become? 
Alas poor king! Can you not see King Lear hopping 
before you, armed with a broom, in all his tragic 
comicality? What is he raving about?638  
 
As for the old … they return to God … The young present 
a still sadder spectacle. Born in a feverish moment, 
when their fathers thought less of love that of war to 
reconstruct the country; born in the din of debates … 
amid the swirl of opposed political and philosophical 
currents … we feel dazed, lost in a huge, blind 
labyrinth, surrounded by an impenetrable mystery639 … 
The old norms have vanished and new ones have not yet 
been established: so it is not surprising that the concept 
of the relativity of everything should have succeeded in 
making us lose our sense of judgement almost 
completely … Nobody manages to have a firm and 
unshakeable viewpoint … never before has our life been 
more disjointed ethically and aesthetically. 
Disconnected, with no principle of doctrine or faith.640 
Importantly, Diego Fabbri comments that this is not a project of reform 
but a suspension of belief: 
(Pirandello) is not a reformer. What is tragic in him 
comes precisely from this: he does not have any model 
to propose or suggest, let alone impose on anyone. On 
the other hand, what would such a model serve? He is 
like a policeman who has to be satisfied with shadowing 
and following and inquiring round after his suspects 
without ever being able to stop them and make an 
                                          
638 Arte e Coscienza d’Oggi (Art and Consciousness Today), in La Nazione Letteraria, 
Florence 1893, quoted in Giudice, Pirandello: A Biography p.55 
639 Similar sentiments to those of Matthew Arnold’s Dover Beach and Yeats’ The Second 
Coming 
640 Arte e Coscienza, in Giudice Pirandello: A Biography pp.55-6 
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arrest and handcuff them in the name of some law or 
other.641 
 
Son of Chaos 
Pirandello was born in the district of Cavasù in Sicily. Cavasù in dialect 
means chaos, digging things up and turning them upside down. Whereas 
contemporary Sicilian culture was oppressively conformist, Pirandello struggles 
with and challenges norms. He writes: 
Io dunque sono figlio del Caos. 
Nietzsche diceva che i greci alzavano bianche statue 
contro il nero abisso, per nasconderlo. Sono finite quei 
tempi. Io le scrollo, invece, per rivelarlo. 
(So I am the son of Chaos. 
Nietzsche said that the Greeks raised white statues against 
the black abyss, to hide it. Those times are gone. Instead, I 
shake them to reveal it.)642 
In Arte e Coscienza d’oggi Pirandello also anticipates Sartre’s nausea and 
ennui: 
Those who, to find even a momentary way out of the 
complete moral shipwreck of the world, have shut 
themselves into themselves, have cut themselves off … 
they start to feel themselves alien to life … (with) an 
invincible disgust for daily vulgarity; and the cold, 
dispassionate observation of the sentiments and actions 
of others, more or less always the same, makes them 
feel a heavy tedium and boredom … we are at the 
discretion of life.643 
                                          
641 Fabbri, Diego, Pirandello, poeta drammatico (Pirandello, dramatic poet), in Atti del 
congresso internazionale di studi pirandelliani 1961, 37-49, quoted in Bassnett-McGuire, Susan, 
Luigi Pirandello (London, UK; The McMillan Press Ltd., 1983) p.101 
 
642 Autobiographical fragment, 1923, quoted in Büdel, Pirandello (London, UK; Bowes & Bowes 
1969 (1966)), p.7 
643 Pirandello, Arte e Coscienza in Giudice, Pirandello: A Biography p.56 
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Much of Samuel Beckett’s work644 is also anticipated by Pirandello. 
Basset-McGuire writes about Pirandello’s play Tonight We Improvise: 
Tonight We Improvise is a play about the relativity of 
freedom … just as actors are doomed to the confines of the 
stage in order to have any being, so human beings are 
doomed to the spatial and temporal limits of their own life 
span. Freedom is therefore impossible, and all the escape 
routes such as dreams, imagination, illusion lead to dead 
ends.645 
Büdel rightly summarises Pirandello’s despair regarding freedom, and 
sees this bondage in terms of the kind of social pressure which Giudice has 
identified in the strictly reactionary conformist values of Pirandello’s Sicilian 
background, as well as in bourgeois society.646  In this non-conformity, 
Pirandello’s passionate rhetoric already starts to make him seem like a good 
autist, choosing “difference over indifference”647 in glorious ex-centricity and 
its authenticity and integrity. 
 
Relativism and irony 
Oscar Büdel devotes a chapter of his study of Pirandello to him as ‘The 
Relativist.’ He recounts the following story: 
When Pirandello toured Germany with his Teatro d’arte, 
Albert Einstein reportedly approached him after one of the 
performances and said: ‘We are kindred souls.’ 
This is anecdotal, but Martin Esslin also describes Pirandello as “the 
“Einstein of the drama,”’648 and this is certainly important, although subversive, 
deconstructive irony is perhaps equally vital to his work. Pirandello approaches 
anti-rationalist relativism through the lens of philosophical irony, which he is 
able to employ in and as his writing. In his essay L’idea Nazionale he writes: 
                                          
644 For example, in Waiting for Godot and Happy Days the protagonists wait for a 
deliverance, a purpose or a revelation, and the play ends with none of these materialising. See 
Bassnet-McGuire, Luigi Pirandello pp. 45, 69 
645 Bassnet-McGuire, Luigi Pirandello p.57 
646 See Giudice, Pirandello: A Biography pp.49-50 
647 A reference to the National Autistic Society’s 2015 campaign slogan. 
648 Esslin, Martin, Reflections: Essays on Modern Theatre (New York; Doubleday, 1971) 
p.47, quoted in Bradbury & McFarlane, Neo-Modernist Drama p.569 
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Hegel explained that the subject, the only true reality, 
can smile at the vain appearance of the world. It 
stipulates it, but it can also destroy it; it does not have 
to take its own creations seriously. Hence we have 
irony, that force which, according to Tieck, allows the 
poet to dominate his subject-matter. And, according to 
Friedrich Schlegel, it is through irony that the same 
subject-matter is reduced to a perpetual parody, a 
transcendental farce.’649 
Perhaps it is in looking at this idea of irony that it becomes possible to 
cut through the numerous cross-currents of critics who repeatedly affirm and 
deny Pirandello as a philosopher. If his philosophy is not merely ironic but 
actually irony itself, then this philosophy as irony cancels itself out, leaving 
Maschere Nude (Nude Masks)650 – ‘nude masks’ are not masks at all, or else 
nudity as un-masking is itself yet another mask. Similarly, the “nude mask” of 
philosophy is only another mask, which he deconstructs, and ironic 
(non)philosophy underpins and imbues his work. 
 
Being “Not responsible” for philosophy 
Pirandello remarks “I have never taken upon myself any philosophical 
responsibility. I have always intended to make art, not philosophy,”651 stating in 
another interview that “In Italy there is a trend started by some critics to see in 
my work a philosophical content that is not there, I assure you.”652 Setting the 
undeniable presence of philosophy in his work alongside his disavowal of being a 
philosopher raises interesting possibilities for the autistic hermeneutic of 
incarnational metaphor. It could be that the dead metaphors of metaphysical 
narrative are being deconstructed, so that Pirandello is, indeed, being 
“irresponsible” with them. These statements by Pirandello in fact sound similar 
to Derrida’s ironic denials, where Derrida’s point is to interrogate narrative.653 
 
                                          
649 L’Idea Nazionale (The National Idea), 27 February 1920, quoted in Giudice, 
Pirandello: A Biography pp.113-4 
650 The title of the collection of dramas published in 1919. 
651 Interview in DiGaetani, John (ed), A Companion to Pirandello Studies (Santa Barbara, 
California; Greenwood, 1991) p.17 
652 Bini, Daniela, Pirandello’s Philosophy and Philosophers in DiGaetani (ed) Companion 
to Pirandello Studies p.17 
653 See Derrida’s Denials: How to Avoid Speaking, discussed in chapter One. 
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Bini’s anti-philosophy and Vattimo 
In her essay Pirandello’s Philosophy and Philosophers, Daniela Bini 
writes:  
With his violent polemic, Pirandello was giving the final 
blow to an idea of philosophy on which Western thought 
had rested for two thousand years: philosophy as order, 
as systematic thought, 654 
quoting Pirandello’s 1893 essay ‘Arte e Coscienza d’oggi’ (Today’s Art 
and Consciousness): 
“The old laws having collapsed, the new ones not yet 
established, it is natural that the concept of the 
relativity of everything has widened so that … nobody is 
any longer able to establish a fixed, unshakable 
point.”655 
Bini then performs a fruitful retrospective reading of Pirandello through 
Gianni Vattimo. If this holds good, it can be argued that Pirandello’s work as 
farceur/philosopher in a sense has helped, alongside the philosophers she cites, 
to prepare the ground for Vattimo’s non-foundationalist thought. Bini writes: 
The Weak Thought of Gianni Vattimo’s school, which 
through Gadamer and Pareyson goes back to Sartre, 
Heidegger, and Nietzsche, has suggested the theory656 
that the only possible philosophy left to man is that 
which constantly questions itself, totally aware of the 
precariousness of each statement as of the weakness 
and limitations of his tool: thought.657  
 
 
 
                                          
654 Bini, Daniela, Pirandello’s Philosophy and Philosophers in DiGaetani (ed) Companion 
to Pirandello Studies p.17  
655 Pirandello, Luigi (ed. Taviani, F), Saggi e Interventi (Milan; Mondadori, 2006) quoted 
in Bini, Daniela, Pirandello’s Philosophy and Philosophers in DiGaetani (ed) Companion to 
Pirandello Studies p.18 
656 Bini’s choice of the word ‘theory’ betrays a reluctance to break with rationalism, 
whereas Vattimo’s work is perhaps more fruitfully read as an existential choice, taking 
cognizance of the subject-ivity of the living and thinking subject. 
657 Bini, Daniela, Pirandello’s Philosophy and Philosophers in DiGaetani (ed) Companion 
to Pirandello Studies pp.18-19 
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5.2.  Anti-metaphysics as art, and its sympathy to an 
autistic hermeneutic 
Pirandello and philosophy 
This is why Pirandello’s work is a place where an autistic hermeneutic 
can recognise and read itself. The non-foundational anti-metaphysics of 
Pirandello’s work offers the possibility of giving mindfulness of separation an 
existential home, just as earlier chapters have identified in Teresa, Altizer and 
Blanchot. Critically, this happens because Pirandello writes art, and short 
circuits the labyrinth of critics who, as the few examples above demonstrate, 
both alternately affirm and deny the philosophical implications of his work. 
Drama and fiction bear the heavy responsibility of rhetoric, but can deny 
philosophical accountability by offering the text as a living enactment rather 
than a formula subject to logical rules.658 This is the point Ricoeur will make in 
1975: 
‘Philosophical discourse sets itself up as the vigilant 
watchman overseeing the ordered extensions of 
meaning; against this background, the unfettered 
extensions of meaning in poetic discourse spring free.659  
Pirandello’s art deconstructs metaphysics by subjecting it to scrutiny in 
the form of art, which is able to stand outside it by ‘springing free.’  
The existential backdrop of Pirandello’s absurd is that, if philosophy is 
unmasked as rhetoric, then only rhetoric remains. Pirandello is not “un-
rational,” lacking philosophical ballast, but actually “anti-rational,” 
deconstructing philosophy by means of the rhetorical strategies of drama and 
fiction. 
Daniela Bini makes this point, drawing again on Vattimo’s Weak Thought: 
As Vattimo says, the borderline between philosophy and 
art has disappeared. Philosophical statements660 can 
often be made through art much more forcefully, since 
                                          
658 Pirandello, ironically referring to the ideological construct or ‘form’ of Fascism, 
states publicly that he aims for ‘life, not form’ in his work and thinking (Interview in L’Impero 
September 23, 1924, quoted in Büdel, Pirandello p.12 
659 Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor p. 308 
660 Bini’s language again betrays that she has missed the power of what theatre of the 
absurd achieves, and why it is so seminal. Art making a ‘philosophical statement’ becomes a 
mere vehicle, in the terms of what Jacques Rancière sees Mandelstam’s liberation has achieved 
away from, in resisting the symbolism of Stalinist art. (See Rancière, The Flesh of Words) details 
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it uses as a vehicle the synthetic power of imagination … 
having learned Heidegger’s lesson, (quoting Vattimo661) 
“the work of art can be an actual realisation (‘messa in 
opera’) of the truth, because truth is no longer a 
metaphorically stable structure, but an event.”662  
To return to a mythological autistic hermeneutic, autistic archetypes 
would be able to read Pirandello’s “anti-philosophy” as incarnational metaphor 
in the following terms. If Pirandello’s work is read as an embodiment of 
Vattimo’s assertion here that “truth is no longer a metaphorically stable 
structure,”663 mindfulness of separation will see this undermining of a stable 
relationship between reader and “truth.” Similarly, art is the presence-in-this-
absence which is fascination. Both these qualities are realised in the text when 
literal metaphor has the guileless inability/refusal to ‘decode’ into a “stable 
truth;” Pirandellian “anti-rationalism” is read here as the problematising of 
metaphor, to enter into the space of fiction, a-theologically, exactly as previous 
chapters have discussed. Incarnational metaphor might be seen here as an 
expression of Pirandello’s anti-philosophy. Incarnational metaphor, reading 
Pirandello, could be an anti-theology (equally as theological as theology, in the 
sense that apophatic theology is excess, precisely by its denial).  
The reading of Pirandello’s novels will now explore how this is worked 
out in his texts. 
 
“Pantheism?” 
Büdel sees the short story Quand’ero Matto (When I was Mad) and the 
play Lazzaro (Lazarus) as ‘permeated with pantheistic ideas.’664 Following 
Rauhut, he sees this ‘pantheism’ as “some kind of Pirandellian substitute for 
religion … practically identical with Gentilean Immanentist views according to 
which death is neither a limit nor an end of life.” The danger here is to confuse 
pantheism with mysticism. Pirandello calls himself a mystic665 (although it is 
                                          
661 Vattimo, Gianni, La Fine della Modernità, (Milan; Garzanti, 1985), p.84 
662 Bini, Daniela, Pirandello’s Philosophy and Philosophers in DiGaetani (ed) Companion to 
Pirandello Studies p.19 
663 This will be the argument in the reading of these novels which follows 
664 Büdel, Pirandello p.42 
665 ibid. (citation not given) 
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always important to bear in mind his ironic attitude) but if he uses mysticism, it 
is in the sense which views it as an unknowing immersion in what he has 
frequently called ‘Life, not Form.’666 Büdel returns to the essential point of 
Pirandello’s work as a subversive meta-narrative 
When we look for the origin of Pirandello’s relativism, 
we find, not surprisingly, that it comes to him from his 
anti-rationalist convictions and beliefs, consonant with 
contemporary philosophical insights. Pirandello sees the 
basic evil in ratio, in human reason, which creates, 
indeed fabricates all the fictions with which man 
lives.667 
A ratio, even of pantheist theology, would miss the point of Pirandello’s 
doubling of ‘fiction’ as the narrative of his writing and the ‘fictions we live by.’ 
This sets the stage for an ironic conscious autism, which consciously refuses to 
‘play the game’ (‘Il Gioco delle Parti’).668 
 
5.3.  One, No-one and a genuine autistic integrity 
Constructions, Mindreading, and their deconstruction 
Uno, Nessuno is a novel about the erosion of epistemological assumptions 
leading to a descent into madness, and this is an expression of the kind of anti-
metaphysical games discussed in section one. The first-person 
narrator/protagonist, Vitangelo Moscarda, journeys from the role of “toothless 
conformist”669 to the madness which is truly wise, by means of radical doubt 
leading to madness, and the madness is the cure for itself in his final identity as 
a holy fool. Pirandello’s comic irony operates at full stretch in the novel, but its 
final supreme irony of the holy fool can equally and thereby be read as the irony 
of ironies, where the biggest irony of all is the final ability to transcend irony, 
but in the biggest irony of all, the wisdom of the holy fool. The plot is comic 
and absurd. Following his wife’s comment that his nose is crooked in a way he 
had not himself been aware of, he looks at his nose in the mirror670 and from 
                                          
666 Interview in L’Impero September 23, 1924, quoted in Büdel, Pirandello p.12 
667 Büdel, Pirandello p.36 
668 Pirandello’s play of that name 
669 His wife’s pet name for him is ‘Gengè’ (‘Gummy’) 
670 The chronology of Moscarda’s nose yields a quirky speculation: Pirandello is working, 
intermittently, on Uno, Nessuno between 1909 and 1926. Before this, in 1836, thirty years 
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there, he descends into obsessive doubt of doubt, of himself, all identity, and 
ultimately of epistemology itself. He sees “the outsider, opposite me, in the 
mirror,”671  arriving at “the awareness of madness, fresh and clear… precise as a 
mirror.”672   
The descent into radical doubt is expressed repeatedly as a negotiation of 
constructions which Moscarda demolishes, one by one. Pirandello uses the trope 
of construction several times in the plot,673 until Moscarda states that 
everything “for (humankind) is building material,”674 and history is merely a 
construction.675 Identity, too, is a construction: 
Man takes as material even himself, and he constructs 
himself, yes, sir, like a house (and)… I accept the fact 
that for you inside yourself, you are not as I see you 
from outside.676 
 
The Neurotypicality of the One and the One Hundred Thousand 
The narrative’s critique of the construction of identity makes sense, in an 
autistic hermeneutic, as a critique of neurotypicality and the complacency of its 
assumptions of Mindreading:677 “No one doubts what he sees, and every man 
walks among things, convinced they appear to others the same way they are for 
him.”678 For an autistic reading, Moscarda’s critique resonates with neurotypical 
resistance of the challenge of a universal autism:679 “Solitude frightens you. And 
then what do you do? You imagine many heads. All like your own … the 
presumption that reality, as it is for you, must be and is the same for everybody 
else. “(p.25) These “presumptions” read as a refuge from the fear of autistic 
insight. The people Moscarda sees around him can be read as suffering from 
                                          
before Pirandello’s birth, Gogol’s satirical short story The Nose has its main character Kovalyov 
becoming co-protagonist with his own nose, and immediately after Pirandello has published 
about Moscarda’s nose in Uno, Nessuno, in 1927 Shostakovich writes his opera The Nose, based 
on Gogol’s Nose. This writer has so far found no references to this in the secondary literature, 
but wonders if there could have been something in the air. 
671 Pirandello, Uno, Nessuno p.17 
672 ibid. p.75 
673 ibid. eg. pp.25, 33, 34 ,37,  
674 ibid. p.41 
675 ibid. p.79 
676 ibid. p.31 
677 See glossary of original terms, in Introduction. 
678 Pirandello, Uno, Nessuno p.102 
679 see glossary of original terms, in Introduction. 
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unconscious autism, since they too, equally are victims of the gaps between 
differing views, but remain unaware of these differences.  
Moscarda’s awareness that epistemological certainty (neurotypicality) is a 
sham brings him to the moment of his own fear of this insight, where he realises 
that there is a fundamental separation even in the intimacy of his marriage. He 
becomes painfully aware that ‘her’ Gengè680 is not Moscarda himself, but only 
her image of him. So he comes to view himself as an enigma, simply because his 
wife’s trivial remark about his nose has led him to question the reality of his 
own perception when measured against the perceptions which others have. The 
moment of horror holds him, because at this stage he is still “hostage” to the 
need for a construction which is denied to him: “I was unable … to see myself as 
others saw me” 681 … “An outsider whom only the others can see and know, but 
not I.”682 The ‘One, No-one and One Hundred Thousand’ of (neurotypical) 
constructions is being ‘de-constructed,’ in his scrutiny of it: 
I still believed this outsider (himself as he sees himself 
in the mirror) was only one person: only one for 
everybody.  But soon my horrible drama became more 
complicated: with the discovery of the hundred 
thousand Moscardas that I was, not only for the others 
but also for myself.683 
Communicating adequately with others or even with himself has become 
an insoluble problem. William Weaver’s translation of this book in the 1992 
Marsilio edition has the following cover matter: 
It is Pirandello’s genius that a discussion of the 
fundamental human inability to communicate, of our 
essential solitariness … elicits such thoroughly sustained 
and earthy laughter. 684  
Pirandello’s novel is certainly humorous but he himself makes it plain 
that the novel’s aim is not only or merely to entertain, as there is a deeper 
agenda: so the same cover matter, quoting Pirandello himself, says that 
                                          
680 Pirandello, Uno, Nessuno p.42ff 
681 ibid. p12 
682 ibid. p.13 
683 ibid. pp.13-14 
684 Cover matter, Uno, Nessuno, Centomila (Milan; Oscar Mondadori, 1984) 
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One, No-One and One Hundred Thousand arrives at the 
most extreme conclusions, the farthest consequences.685 
The ultimate consequence is to expose the One and the One Hundred 
Thousand as constructions, to affirm the No-One in an act of ironic affirmation. 
In an autistic hermeneutic, Moscarda is breaking free of the complacency of 
neurotypical Mindreading. Mindreading fails even to be able to construct the 
self in the mirror of the one hundred others of social life: “I could see (my eyes) 
in me, but not see them in themselves … He (Moscarda’s reflection) knew 
nothing, nor did he know himself.”686 
The autistic nature of language as holding an inherent hermeneutical gap 
finds a further resonance in the novel when Moscarda says “the trouble is that 
you, my dear friend, will never know, nor will I ever be able to tell you how 
what you say is translated inside me.”687 This “loss in translation” is the 
hermeneutical gap which has been exposed in earlier chapters, and Moscarda is 
becoming so Mindblind that he cannot even read himself.  His journey is to 
travel from experiencing this as horror, to the recognition of conscious autism 
as an emancipation. 
Moscarda’s journey is to be liberated from his names - the impotent, 
toothless Gengè, the religiously constructed Vitangelo, and the irritating 
Moscarda688 all need to be left behind as he travels towards the Nessuno. 
 
Approaching conscious autism 
As Moscarda becomes “The outsider inseparable from (him)self,”689 
increasingly  he now exists “(w)ithout … giving any thought to the others.”690 
When he looks at people who have been coming into his garden for years, 
suddenly he sees their presence not as normal features of his everyday life but 
                                          
685 ibid. 
686 Pirandello, Uno, Nessuno p.18 
687 ibid. p.31 
688 Gengè, ‘Gummy’ (toothless) is Moscarda’s wife’s pet name for him; his ‘Christian’ name, 
Vitangelo, is the ‘living angel’ of the constructions of religion; ‘Moscarda’ in Italian echoes the 
noun ‘mosca’ (fly; the insect). 
689 Pirandello, Uno, Nessuno p.12 
690 ibid. p.15 
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as an “(i)nvasion by others.”691 Under the mosquito nets he feels happy, with 
“the bed isolated; the sense of being wrapped in a white cloud.”692 He becomes 
unconventional, an outsider to society’s norms. Where others go ahead ‘pulling 
the cart’ of their daily lives, Moscarda tells the reader “I wasn’t pulling a cart, 
no, not I; and so I had neither reins nor blinders”.693  
In an autistic hermeneutic, Moscarda can be seen in his journey to be 
travelling into the solitude of Mindblindness, excluding him, as autist, from the 
social world. This begins, now, to seem a liberation, where he has neither reins 
nor blinders, and in autistic terms, he is approaching autistic non-conformity 
and autistic integrity. 
The exclusion from the social world leads Moscarda into the gift of being 
“in a world of his own”.694 Moscarda exhibits the characteristics of being “in a 
world of his own” as the gift of autistic fascination. This is manifest in another 
autistic feature, namely his close attention to detail. This is reminiscent of how, 
in an earlier chapter, this thesis discussed St Francis who “was too busy looking 
at the beauty of individual tees to care about seeing the forest; he didn’t want 
to see the wood for the trees.”695  
So as early as p.3 Moscarda has become obsessed with detail, looking at 
his nose in the mirror. This quickly becomes a narrative of intense obsessive 
rumination -  
I … was made to plunge, at every word addressed to me, 
at every gnat I saw flying, into abysses of reflection and 
consideration that burrowed deep inside me and 
hollowed my spirit up, down and across, like the lair of 
a mole, with nothing evident on the surface.696 
 
I would pause at every step; I took care to circle every 
pebble I encountered, first distantly, then more closely; 
and I was amazed that others could pass ahead of me 
paying no heed to that pebble …  a world where I could 
                                          
691 ibid. p.26 
692 ibid. p.29 
693 ibid.  p.5 
694 See introduction 
695 Chesterton, Saint Francis of Assisi pp.89-9, 178; this also echoes Hopkins’ ecceitas, 
with the intense mindfulness to what is seen; equally, to Chauncey Gardener’s ability to see the 
tree instead of the White House. 
696 Pirandello, Uno, Nessuno p.4 
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easily have settled …  my spirit filled with worlds – or 
rather pebbles; it’s the same thing697   
 
The (de)construction of God: Marco di Dio 
Stepping back from the protagonist’s point of view, the plot’s narrative 
again plays games with names, this time for an allusion to the post-Christian 
ideas Pirandello’s essays and letters indicate, as discussed earlier. In fact, the 
novel enacts the eviction of God, which might be read as a precursor of the 
death of God, half a century later.698  In an autistic literary-theological 
hermeneutic, the deconstructive potential in the text reveals another game the 
narrative is playing, with the incident of the tenant Marco di Dio’s eviction. 
Moscarda’s experiments in shattering others’ expectations of him include 
his odd speech and primarily his experiment in being an active decision-maker 
at the bank where he has previously been only the passive, titular head. He 
does this by evicting Marco di Dio from his rent-free house and then giving the 
property back to him as a gift. It might be possible to see Marco di Dio as a 
figure for God – his name, “Mark of God” could suggest that Moscarda’s 
experiment is also an attempt to evict God, then to invert God as humanity’s 
gift, not God’s. Pirandello suggests elsewhere that God has been ‘living rent-
free’ for too long in Catholic Italy.699 
The Marco in the original Italian has the name not only of the evangelist – 
“(Mark) but also the meaning of “marco” as the note (mark) in the margin of a 
financial ledger – he is erasing the trace of God from the ledger. This will 
become significant when viewed alongside the spiritual material which emerges 
later in his madness. In the distress of madness, he finds salvation in absolute 
renunciation, divesting himself of this ownership of the same bank’s capital. 
The case becomes even stronger when Moscarda finds his ultimate spiritual 
rebirth in the novel’s conclusion, with its overtones of Christian death and 
resurrection, and the text’s close echoes of Paul’s remark that as a Christian he 
‘dies daily’ – precisely what Moscarda does, minute by minute, in order to 
escape the tyranny of images and names. A nameless God, free of the ‘ledger 
                                          
697 ibid. p.5; echoing William Blake’s words about seeing eternity in a grain of sand. 
698 Anticipating Altizer and Taylor 
699 See eg. the burlesque ‘holy stoup’ scene in Mattia Pascal, discussed below. 
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mark,’ is evicted and welcomed simultaneously, and this will be the madness 
ultimately of Moscarda as the holy fool. 
 
God within 
A God who has been evicted and erased becomes significant when 
Moscarda “finds God” by the discovery that this evicted, erased God is within 
him,700 but “hostile to all constructions.”701 Religion, which he embodies in the 
church building which people have built for God702 is as much a neurotypical 
“construction” as any other; he has instead “the sense of God inside, in 
(Moscarda’s) own way.”703  
This interior God is reminiscent of the inner fictions this thesis has 
previously discerned in the writing of Christian mystics. It is ‘madness’ because 
it has absented itself removed from the social fabric of material gains and 
losses. The “quick” of God within him could be interpreted as the “no one” 
which escapes definition and construction. This “God within,” “hostile to all 
constructions,” can be read in sympathy with the mystical theology of God 
which exists by not existing, beyond being, in the terms used by Dionysius and 
Meister Eckhart, as previous chapters have discussed.  
Moscarda’s act of surrendering all his assets to convert them to pure gift 
is resonant of Jean Luc Marion’s thinking of the father’s (true) prodigal 
generosity to the (falsely) prodigal son as the gift which outwits ontological 
difference.704 The conclusion of this chapter will argue that this pure gift is an 
embodiment of absolute autism in its total affective empathy. It looks like 
madness. 
 
 
                                          
700 “That quick wounded in me when my wife had laughed … was God, without any doubt: God 
who had felt wounded in me” (Pirandello, Uno, Nessuno pp.139-140). 
701 ibid. p.144 
702 ibid. p.139 
703 ibid. 
704 See Marion, God Without Being pp.97-99 
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Towards Incarnational metaphor – the Green Wool Blanket 
In his journey of discovery, Moscarda sets out to ‘undo’ the images others 
have of him, and people react by seeing him as insane: “Have you heard? The 
usurer Moscarda has gone crazy!”705  The play between sanity and insanity 
reaches a climax when the crowd denounce him as a madman, but he gives his 
own very sane reasoning: “All because I had wanted to prove … that I could be 
someone different from the man I was believed to be.”706  In fact it is Moscarda, 
penetrating the falsity of constructions, who is sane, and this irony persists, at 
the next level, when being is possible only as nonbeing. This is where 
incarnational metaphor can be seen in a theological thinking of fascination. 
The climax of Moscarda’s movement away from the human world to a 
mystical union with the non-human happens in chapter 8.II, in his description of 
his experience with the green wool blanket. Whereas Moscarda’s self has been a 
‘hundred thousand’ in his journey through self-doubt, at this point he says, “I 
found myself truly there.”707 This is authentic self-knowledge, but in 
Pirandello’s supreme irony, it takes the guise of apparently puerile fascination. 
In Moscarda’s contemplation, as he convalesces after being shot, a green 
blanket becomes a microcosm of an idyllic natural world in his imagination:  
“I stroked the green down of that blanket. I saw the 
countryside in it: as if it were all an endless expanse of 
wheat; and, as I stroked it, I took delight in it (p.155).708  
Ah, to be lost there, to stretch out, abandon myself on 
the grass to the silence of the heavens; to fill my soul 
with all that empty blueness, letting every thought be 
shipwrecked there, every memory!709 
From there on, there is only one place where he can continue to live, and 
that place is detachment and asceticism; because a life enmeshed in social 
conventions and material possessions would simply keep Moscarda prey to the 
workings of the One Hundred Thousand from which he needs to escape. So he 
gives away everything he owns and becomes a beggar and an ascetic.710 His 
experience with the green blanket has figured a kind of salvation (alleviation of 
                                          
705 Pirandello, Uno, Nessuno p.75 
706 ibid. p.95 
707  p.155 
708 ibid. p.155 
709 ibid. 
710 ibid. p.158 
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misery) and all his language is of delight – he is consoled. By stroking and 
touching the green blanket Moscarda finds a pathway out of obsession and into 
serenity – just as the autistic subject finds solace in an extraordinary 
relationship to the sensory world. In fact, there is a strikingly similar image 
from the autist Gunilla Gerlund: 
Gunilla found the place to be left in peace – behind the 
armchair, where she was able to shut out everything 
and simply be – absorbed in the material of the brown 
armchair.711 
Moscarda’s similar ‘green blanket’ experience is fascination – lost “in a 
world of his own,” he perceives the “expanses” of it in fascination. This is 
prefigured in his attention to detail as he contemplates the natural world as an 
escape from ‘constructions,’712 and fascination happens precisely in the place of 
the end of religious or metaphysical concepts which the narrative calls “no 
conclusion.” 
Büdel sees a dichotomy between tragedy and “mysticism,” where 
Pirandello apparently gives up his lifelong ironic stance and ‘plays it straight:’ 
A further way out for Pirandellian characters is to die 
the death of the unio mystica. Of the two modes of 
experience which … lead to a complete loss of the Self, 
the tragic and the mystic, Pirandello has chosen the 
latter … in the tragic experience the Self is destroyed at 
the very moment of its truest, highest, and most 
complete realisation and assertion; whereas the mystic 
in fusing – as it were – with the All and One, gives up, 
renounces his individual essence.1 
There are two problems with this. Firstly, Pirandello’s tragedy is always 
tragi-comedy, so that his characters do not in fact die as their “truest” and 
“highest” selves. Secondly, and in light of this, it is perhaps unwise to lose 
alertness to ironic strategies at work in the text. Religion is anathema to 
Pirandello (see earlier) and a conversion to “mysticism” seems improbable, as 
he is writing this, his last and greatest novel, immediately prior to his greatest 
output as an extremely ironic, tragicomic playwright. Perhaps Moscarda is a 
fool, addled and insane, and a figure of fun, stroking his green blanket and 
                                          
711 Gunilla Gerlund (1997) quoted in Bogdashina, Autism and Spirituality p. 191 
712 Uno, Nessuno pp.36-39 
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giving away his fortune.713 Yet in the end, after all his absurd, neurotic 
introspection, he becomes a sympathetic character in the unusually lyrical 
language of the final chapter.714 Moscarda states in his final, most “mystical” 
state, that the church bells, ringing for prayer, are irrelevant for him.  He has 
killed God by evicting Marco di Dio, and Pirandello has not suddenly become a 
Christian. This next section now argues that rather, in fact, the novel is playing 
yet another Pirandellian language game, where the “mystic fusing” which 
“renounces individual essence” is in fact closer to an a-theology of the text. 
 
No Conclusion 
The wording of Pirandello’s last chapter, 8.IV, “No conclusion,” is a 
paradox. “No conclusion” is the paradox of the dilemma of the author who must 
bring the book to a close while leaving its characters still alive beyond the book, 
since the imaginary construction of fiction leaves any arbitrary conclusion 
detached from the imaginary space where the characters might continue to live 
in the mind of the reader. So in this sense, the conclusion is “no conclusion.” 
However there is another possible reading of this title. “No conclusion” 
might mean a conclusion where “no” is itself the book’s conclusion. If this is the 
case, it is a profound conclusion because the “no” is the “no” of the “no one” 
of the book’s title. In the experience of the green wool blanket, Moscarda has 
arrived at a place where he wants to be no one. The one and the one hundred 
thousand appear to have been left behind; he tells the reader “I no longer look 
at myself in the mirror, and it never even occurs to me to want to know what 
has happened to my face and to my whole appearance.715 He discusses his old 
self which bears his name, in the third person. So he says, “No name … leave it 
in peace, and let there be no more talk about it. It is fitting for the dead … life 
knows nothing of names.”716  Moscarda’s name is dead – and this is the only way 
                                          
713 Pirandello’s output has to increase to salvage the family fortune after bankruptcy; he is 
unlikely to subscribe to idealism about poverty. (See Büdel, Pirandello, and Giudice, Pirandello: 
A Biography) 
714 Pirandello’s earliest writing was poetry, and he is ‘allowing’ poetic diction to enter the text 
here. 
715 Pirandello, Uno, Nessuno p.159 
716 ibid.; earlier, he has alluded to his name as an irritant, because ‘Moscarda’ is so 
close to ‘mosca,’ the irritating fly that buzzes around (p.49) 
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he can be alive. This life is a kind of death. In the loss of all names and 
constructions, he is free from ‘conclusions.’ His freedom from the selfhood of 
his name means he can experience life in any form – “I am this tree. Tree, 
cloud; tomorrow book or wind; the book I read, the wind I drink.” 717 718 
It is important to remember that Pirandello’s ironic subversion is always 
playing games with the reader. While the whole novel has worked to construct a 
character as the first-person subject, it has been easy to overlook that the 
character Moscarda, who works so hard to rid himself of constructions, is 
himself only a fictional construction. ‘No conclusion’ pulls the rug out from 
under the reader’s feet. Moscarda/non-Moscarda is not, in the end of the day, a 
pantheist, or anything else, but a fiction. He ‘gives the game away,’ finally, 
when he tells the reader that “I am ... this book.”719 The whole narrative 
construction of the selfless self collapses into a mere playing with words, 
bringing the first person to re-attach itself to “tree, cloud … book or wind,” so 
that the “I am” exists purely rhetorically as part of ‘the book.’  In a sense, this 
is nothing new. In Pirandello’s drama, the action tends to hinge of the 
disruption of the willing suspension of disbelief, as was discussed earlier.  
What is at stake here, however, is to consider Pirandello’s own words 
that Uno, Nessuno “arrives at the most extreme conclusions, the farthest 
consequences.”720 “The most extreme conclusions” are, in fact, “no 
conclusion;” because as universal subject, I/We/One/No-one/One Hundred 
Thousand draws “one’s own conclusions.” Moscarda is “no longer inside 
(him)self, but in every thing outside,”721 and this is, decades before Barthes or 
Derrida, the Death of the Author as the death of the transcendental signified, 
taking responsibility for ‘who’ or ‘what’ her/his protagonist ‘is.’722 Decades 
after Pirandello, Barthes writes: 
                                          
717 Pirandello, Uno, Nessuno pp.159-60; nb. It would be easy to read “the wind I drink” 
as a mis-spelling of “the wine I drink” but “the wind I drink” is a translation of “il vento che 
bevo” (Oscar Mondadori 1984 p. 224). 
718 It is easy to see here why Büdel would read this as pantheism (see section 1); but 
pantheism is a ‘theism’ and an ‘ism,’ and Moscarda is free from all ‘isms.’  
719 Pirandello, Uno, Nessuno p.160 
720 Cover matter, Uno, Nessuno, e Centomila, Oscar Mondadori 1984 edition 
721 Pirandello, Uno, Nessuno p.160 
722 The death of the author: “We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single 
“theological” meaning (the “message” of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in 
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… today the subject apprehends himself elsewhere, and 
subjectivity can return at another place on the spiral: 
deconstructed, taken apart, shifted, without anchorage: 
why should I not speak of ‘myself,’ since this ‘my’ is no 
longer ‘the self?’ 723 
 and Derrida writes: 
One must be separated from oneself in order to be 
reunited with the blind origin of the work in its 
darkness.724  
This act is mimed by Moscarda, who confronts the reader with what it is 
to be separated from oneself, in order that the pure work, the living of constant 
death and rebirth, can be experienced. Derrida adds that 
Only pure absence – not the absence of this or that, but 
the absence of everything in which all presence is 
announced – can inspire, in other words, can work, and 
then make one work.725  
Pirandello’s novel ‘works’ by exploring the absence of Moscarda’s self – 
finally Moscarda is able to function (or ‘work’) with some sense of authenticity 
by embracing pure absence, even from his own name.  
Derrida describes this ‘non-place:’ 
This universe articulates only that which is in excess of 
everything, the essential nothing on whose basis 
everything can appear and be produced within 
language. 726  
In this way, Pirandello’s most supreme irony is realised, that when the 
subject dies (“No Names”), the universal subject can speak in fullness (“I am” – 
“I am this tree. Tree, cloud; tomorrow book or wind; the book I read, the wind I 
drink.”).727 
 
 
                                          
which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash.” (Roland Barthes, The Death 
of the Author in Image, Music, Text, trans. Stephen Heath p.146 details 
723 Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes (trans. Richard Howard) (New York; Hill & Wang 2010) 
p.168 
724 Derrida, Writing and Difference p.8 
725 Ibid.  
726 Ibid.  
727 Pirandello, Uno, Nessuno pp.159-60; [a-theologically, we read I am that I am] 
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The Green Blanket as universal subject 
To return to the aim of seeing Uno, Nessuno in an autistic light, the green 
blanket offers a theological thinking which might bring an absolute autism of 
incarnational metaphor into view. Moscarda’s fullest life is as fullest death:  
I die at every instant, and I am reborn, new and without 
memories: live and whole, no longer inside myself, but 
in every thing outside.728 
This is the death of God and the death of the subject, and the 
resurrection and complete incarnation of both. It might be remembered, here, 
that the site of this death-unto-resurrection is the green blanket.729 It is as 
Moscarda strokes the green blanket that he becomes able to perceive ‘eternity 
in a grain of sand,’ and be liberated into ‘this wind I drink.’  
Thinking of (non)Moscarda as incarnational metaphor, he is the subject 
who is ‘mad’ – he is the holy fool who ‘makes no sense.’ As autistic metaphor, in 
terms of the pragmatism of language, by ‘making no sense’ and having no 
constructions, he is dead, having no name. Equally, as autistic literal metaphor, 
in terms of the resurrection of dead metaphors, he is alive to the image, in a 
state of ecceitas: 
I go out every morning, at dawn, because now I want to 
keep my spirit like this, fresh with dawn, with all things 
as they are first discovered.730 
This is theologically the incarnation of the kenotic Christ in the text, 
embodying nothing which is everything, poured out utterly in total autistic 
affective empathy which delights in the fascination of the text. It could be said 
that, in an autistic hermeneutic, the myth of absolute autism is read most fully 
at this “most extreme conclusion,” where the green blanket offers the sensory 
connoisseur the absolute death and absolute life of incarnational metaphor 
which is nothing and everything. 
 
                                          
728 Ibid. p.160 
729 Moscarda is wrapped in the green blanket as he convalesces after being shot by Anna Rosa – is 
this in fact (or fiction), life after death? 
730 Pirandello, Uno, Nessuno p.160 
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5.4.  The Late Mattia Pascal: the unsuccessful autist 
Il Fu Mattia Pascal, The Novel 
The aim of this section’s reading of Il Fu Mattia Pascal is to compare its 
potential to the autistic possibilities of Uno, Nessuno. This section now argues 
that in Mattia Pascal, the narrative stops short of a space where the absolute 
autism of God can recognise itself. This comparison will highlight the autistic 
‘badge of honour which belongs to the previously considered novel,’ in order to 
show that as Incarnational metaphor, the former novel has achieved what 
neurotypicality in this novel fails to do. The argument is that Uno, Nessuno’s 
Moscarda achieves what an autistic hermeneutic recognises as autistic integrity, 
in a way that Mattia Pascal’s eponymous protagonist does not. However, 
Pascal’s failure reads, equally incisively for an autistic hermeneutic, as a 
critique of neurotypicality. Here, a retreat from autism to neurotypicality is 
read as the failure to attain the spiritual insight which chapter four described as 
the autism of God. So where Moscarda has been shown to attain a full autism of 
incarnational metaphor, it will now be argued that Mattia Pascal travels towards 
it, but stops and turns back to neurotypicality. 
Il Fu Mattia Pascal narrates the story of how the narrator protagonist 
Pascal fakes his own suicide in order to escape family and financial problems. 
The novel turns on Pascal’s difficulty in constructing a new identity for himself, 
and ends with his return to his home and family, to resume his old identity. This 
is, as has been discussed earlier, a key Pirandellian theme, where the idea of 
identity is challenged in comic enactments of its difficult nature. Pascal re-
invents himself with the name Adriano Meis, only to return ultimately to the 
name Mattia Pascal, styling himself Il Fu Mattia Pascal (The Late Mattia Pascal). 
This means that the protagonist will appear under either or both names at 
different points. 
 
Mattia Pascal, the character 
The narrative chooses the protagonist’s first name to be Mattia 
(Matthias), not the more common Matteo (Matthew). Mattia is one of Christ’s 
disciples, easily confused with Matthew, the gospel writer. In contrast with 
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Matthew, all that is known about Matthias is that he replaced the dead Judas.731 
Playing with the name, the narrative casts Mattia Pascal as an obscure figure, 
aimless and marginalised, and as a ‘replacement Judas’ he also betrays Christ, 
commits suicide, and becomes, in the end, a true disciple, if an obscure one 
without identity. 
His surname, Pascal, suggests Blaise Pascal as an archetype, firstly for 
the wager of faith (Mattia Pascal’s wagers, instead, are both at the casino and 
in his choices to bet on the opportunities offered by outrageous coincidences); 
and secondly, for that wager’s significance in deconstructing philosophy. Both of 
these symbolic references to religion and philosophy will be picked up in 
fundamental to this section, but at this point it is also important that 
Pirandello’s narratives always use comic irony, so that the disciple Matthias and 
the philosopher Pascal are being used as figures of fun.  
 
Metaphysics and Religion 
As was discussed earlier, Pirandello can be seen as a proto-
postmodernist, challenging the conventions of fiction. This was argued above as 
an enactment of an anti-metaphysical project. This is evident in Mattia Pascal, 
as the ‘fiction of the fiction’ (the reader is reading the fictional identity of a 
protagonist who creates a fictional identity). ‘Uno, Nessuno’ contrasts 
Moscarda’s God as the ‘quick’ of his wounded soul with the ‘constructions’ of 
religion and philosophy. However, religion and philosophy are approached 
differently and more satirically in Mattia Pascal.’732  
Stepping back from the protagonist’s point of view to look at games the 
narrative plays with him, satire of religion is most obvious concerning the 
                                          
731 Acts 1.12; and even Matthias’ status as a (lucky or unlucky?)  ‘thirteenth apostle’ 
rests on mere chance, because he is chosen by casting lots; in the same way, Mattia Pascal, both 
character and plot, relies on the narrative device of chance, throughout the novel 
732 Names invite allusive possibilities: as already noted, Mattia is the lesser known disciple of 
Christ, and Pascal the philosopher of the leap of faith. Pascal is unable to think of a new name 
for himself, so he appropriates names from an overheard farcical conversation between 
theologians, and facetiously comments that “they’ve baptised me!” When a genuine suicide is 
mistaken for him, enabling his escape, he makes an allusive joke of Christ’s substitutionary 
death: “Fortune had strangely smiled on me … another man had died in my place” (p.72) Is his 
home village of Miragno something to ad-mire, or a mirage? 
245 
 
 
resurrection, when the narrative plays with echoes of it. For example, Mattia 
mockingly refers to himself as having 'come back from the dead' in chapter 17 - 
and the narrative echoes the resurrected Christ's words in John ch.20, when 
Mattia says "It's me, Mattia! Don't be afraid, I'm not dead ... can't you see me?... 
Touch me! It's me, Roberto! I've never been more alive than I am now!” 733 
Catholicism is lampooned most of all in the irreverent image of Meis using 
a holy water stoup as an ashtray, just as he has irreverently disposed of the 
sacrament of marriage by flushing his wedding ring down the toilet. In addition 
to these actions of the protagonist, the narrative has him working as a library 
housed in a deconsecrated church, where the books have “the smell of mould 
and old age.”734 Pascal immediately adds that “this fate befell me too,” with 
the joke turning on whether he means the fate of the previous inept librarian or 
the fate of the books. People don’t use the library because they believe the 
books are about “religious matters,”735 and when he returns to the library at the 
end to write his story, it is preserved by the curator there “as within a 
confessional.”736‘Books’ and ‘papers’ both suggest living ‘within the law,’ 
whether civic or religious, but in leaving the church/library and his name 
behind, he is ‘outwith the law,’ and can’t even buy a puppy for company, let 
alone remarry, because he doesn’t have his identity papers to buy a dog license 
or get a marriage license.737 
If Meis manages to discard Catholicism, or at least thinks he does, the 
next set of books to deal with is that of his landlord, Paleari, who sets out to 
convert Meis to theosophy. As a synthesis of theology and philosophy, theosophy 
was in vogue when Pirandello was writing in the early twentieth century, basing 
many of its claims on the paranormal as demonstrated in séances and 
developing a quasi-religious Gnosticism of ‘enlightenment.’ The narrative plays 
with its claims, as follows.  
 After undergoing corrective eye surgery, Meis has a forty-day 
recuperation738 in the dark where he becomes the captive audience for Paleari’s 
                                          
733 Pirandello, Mattia Pascal p.222 
734 Ibid. p. xiv 
735 Ibid. p.1 
736 Ibid. p.243 
737 Ibid. pp. 93, 226 
738 Another biblical echo, of Exodus and of Jesus in the wilderness 
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extended rhetoric on enlightenment and “the lamp of faith.”739 Meis undercuts 
Paleari’s arguments, exposing them to ridicule – but the narrative plays with the 
reader as the narrator himself is literally ‘becoming enlightened’ through the 
healing process in the dark. It also teases the reader by drawing her/him into 
the narrator’s suspense and doubt, and waiting for a verdict on whether the 
séance is bogus or proof of theosophical claims. The reader, waiting for Meis’ 
vindication as the rationalist sceptic, is confounded by the inconclusive end of 
the evidence. The narrative, and Meis, both hang in an emptiness where truth 
as a construction is always an empty concept, implicitly offering the kind of 
detachment from metaphysics which Uno, Nessuno achieves. So Mattia Pascal 
can be read, in the terms discussed regarding Uno, Nessuno, as a journey into 
the freedom of death of the world, through mindfulness of separation.  
However, the difference is whether this is an authentic understanding, 
because the protagonist and the narrator are both unreliable, and liars.740 In 
this sense, the novel functions as the failure to attain the truth-telling of 
autistic integrity. The question is whether to read him as a ‘true’ liar or not.741 
Meis tries to break free of the book (religion and civic law) but this chapter will 
ultimately argue that ultimately, he fails to do so. Where Moscarda in Uno, 
Nessuno has broken free of ‘constructions,’ it will be seen that Meis/Pascal fails 
to do so, not least because he constructs fictions which are not ‘true lies,’ but 
morally inauthentic lies. This will now be explored in order to examine his 
credentials as an autistic truth-teller. 
 
Mattia Pascal, the liar 
For Pascal, a lie is just a lie (see previous footnote above), part of the 
kind of construction Moscarda has truly renounced. Pascal has no awareness of 
the possibility of true fiction such as those of the kind discussed as apophatic 
fiction in this thesis. In no sense do his elaborate lies realise themselves as 
creative acts; Adriano Meis is “an absurd fiction” to be destroyed when he 
                                          
739 Pirandello, Mattia Pascal p. 116, 154ff. 
740 See next section. 
741 His view of the job of librarian as merely a “rat catcher,” conserving the book but oblivious 
to the text (p. xiv); “Novels, what do I care about any of that?  Copernicus, my dear Don Eligio, 
Copernicus has ruined humanity for ever” (p.3) – ironically, as a liar, (and a fictional creation – 
of the author, Pirandello’s) he has no insight into the truth of fiction. 
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becomes inconvenient.742 This section will now examine the lie of the text as a 
portrayal of inauthentic autism, because Pascal is a liar who works by cognitive 
rather than affective empathy. In terms of Baron Cohen’s theory of impairments 
of cognitive and affective empathy, Pascal (and the text) operates more as 
psychopath than autist.743 
The psychopath is an expert at reading people, with excellent 
Mindreading skills, but with cruel and manipulative intent. He lacks affective 
empathy. At the very outset, before his suicide, Pascal has excellent ‘people 
skills’ which he uses to exploit his friend Pomino’s gullibility, stealing Pomino’s 
girlfriend from him. Next, his entire reason for faking his own death is to escape 
his family responsibilities, filled with hate for them all.744 When he returns, at 
the end, back into the truth of his real identity, it is not out of remorse or a 
sense of responsibility but for his own comfort, to be able to live a normal life 
again. So his attitude to his family is still unloving: “I’ll come alive again! I’ll 
revenge myself!”;745 “Go to hell, you old shrew! I’m alive!”;746 “I want to have 
my papers in order. I want to feel alive, even if it means having to take back my 
wife.”747 When Meis’ lies to the Paleari family unravel, he is faced with a 
possible ‘moment of truth,’ to redeem himself morally. He has the chance to be 
honest with himself about his elaborate fiction: “to avoid lying to her now, must 
I admit that I had told her nothing but lies till now?”748 Instead of facing this 
potential moment of truth, he re-enacts the entire lie of his existence by faking 
a second suicide. 
He shows himself a psychopath also as he doesn’t take responsibility for 
his situation, but blames others: “they [his family] had got me into this 
situation.”749 This lack of self-accountability extends into lying not only to 
others but also to himself, where he defends the morality of his seduction of 
Mino’s girlfriend, and when he has abandoned his family states that he was 
                                          
742 Pirandello, Mattia Pascal p.213 
743 See cognitive and affective empathy, glossary, Introduction 
744 When his wife is in labour, he hurries home now to be with her but to run away from himself 
(p.45); when his brother sends money for their mother’s funeral, he spends the money on 
himself (p.47) 
745 Ibid. p.212 
746 Ibid. p.231 
747 Ibid. p.226 
748 Ibid. p.198 
749 Ibid. p.212 
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“forced to seem fickle and cruel.”750 An alert as to the unreliability of the 
narrator is the aside to the reader, only a single line, in the narrative: “But out 
of pique now, I won’t describe what happened.”751 
Of course, the deeper possibility is that it is the narrative, not the 
protagonist, which is lying; is Pascal lying to himself, or to the reader? An ironic 
reading of his self-justification would lift the narrative into using an unreliable 
narrator as a way of becoming a lying narrative, inviting the reader to examine 
its fictive status by casting doubt into the narrative itself. This is not unlikely, 
given Pirandello’s tendency to play games with the reader; does this make the 
text into a psychopathic narrative? In an autistic hermeneutic, the argument of 
this whole chapter lies precisely here. The issue is how much the portrayal of 
impaired empathy in Pirandello’s work invites a psychopathic interpretation, 
and how much it would in contrast be autistic. 
The narrative itself invites the reader to view not only Pascal’s actions 
but also the narrative itself as a tissue of lies. The plot rests on outrageously 
improbable deus ex machina devices. The success of his initial alibi of suicide 
depends on the highly improbable co-incidence of a mysterious stranger 
committing suicide on the very same day of his departure. The success of his 
new identity depends on the hugely improbable luck of winning a fortune at the 
casino. This raises the question of Aristotle’s theory of dramatic plot which 
argues that a plausible impossibility is better than an implausible possibility, 
and by this logic the novel would be a failure. However Pirandello writes in an 
ironic way about this in his epilogue, justifying himself (like Pascal) about his 
‘lies’ of fiction. Given the anti-Catholic subtext, it is reasonable in fact to read 
the entire story of a man who dies and comes back to life as a satire of the 
gospel narrative, and the fiction of Meis as a ‘lie’ which Pirandello wants to 
equate with the ‘mere story’ of Christ in the gospels.  
To see how this relates to an autistic hermeneutic, Mattia Pascal as a 
‘tissue of lies’ does play the kind of textual games which invited a resonance 
with mindfulness of separation in Uno, Nessuno. However the narrator is not 
embodying a necessary retreat from the known world (where Moscarda’s doubt 
                                          
750 ibid. p.190 
751 Ibid. p.242 
249 
 
 
about his nose leads him away from any epistemological security). Instead, 
Pascal the unreliable narrator is choosing to deceive, tricking the others in his 
life into an illusory mindfulness of separation. The reader knows throughout that 
Pascal is not dead, so any genuine mindfulness of separation is replaced by the 
portrayal of someone who is only pretending to enter the gift of autism. 
More fundamentally, in terms of mindfulness of separation as a concept, 
the next two sections will now argue that Mattia Pascal would be read in an 
autistic hermeneutic as an unsuccessful approach to the possibility of an 
apophatic fiction of Incarnational metaphor. 
 
Lacking a spirit of fascination 
Pascal may be an elaborate liar, but as a poet and a contemplative he has 
no ability. It was indicated above that he has no appreciation for story as a 
source of truth. His capacity for fascination is absent, because his entry into the 
story of Adriano Meis soon changes from bliss to lonely torture (see next 
section). Whereas Moscarda observes his environment and muses on it, and 
comes to cherish a haecceitas of the green blanket, Pascal/Meis refers the 
world always to himself.752 If Moscarda offers a narrative in sympathy with 
apophatic fiction’s fascination, Pascal/Meis has no sense of celebration. He 
‘tries the water’ of separation, but because it is an inauthentic act, his 
separation does not lead to any kind of union of fascination. In fact ‘trying the 
water’ is an apt comparison: if the fake drownings of Pascal and Meis are spoof 
baptisms, the resurrection of Pascal as Meis is as a “corpse,”753 like the 
“putrefied corpse”754 of the real suicide who is pulled from the water “in [his] 
place.”755 The fascination of the glory of the resurrected body, for him, is 
simply putrefaction, and Pascal is no poet.  
However the most important way in which he fails to attain the gift of 
autism is in his retreat from mindfulness of separation. 
                                          
752 Eg., The closed windows representing the world closed to him (211); the suicide of 
the gambler at the casino prefigures (perhaps inspires) his own fake suicide. (p.64) 
753 Ibid. p.181 
754 Ibid. p.69 
755 Ibid. p.72 
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Failing to be autistic 
This section examines the most important sense in which Pascal/Meis 
fails to attain the gift of holy autism. This will show the contrast between 
Mattia Pascal and Uno, Nessuno to argue that together, read autistically, they 
can demonstrate the difference between autism and neurotypicality, where to 
be neurotypical is to fail to experience the gift of autism. 
This chapter earlier discussed ways in which Mattia Pascal can be read as 
a narrative of resisting the book, in terms of religion and of the law. Initially, 
both suicides are blissful escapes, but separation soon becomes torture. 
Freedom is “a tyrant;”756 he must “kill that fiction,”757 and his dilemma 
becomes clear: 
I saw myself excluded from life forever … the fear of 
falling again into life’s trap would make me stay farther 
than ever from mankind; alone, utterly alone, 
distrustful, gloomy; and Tantalus’ torment would be 
renewed for me.758 
An autistic reading of Pascal/Meis which examines him as a candidate for 
apophatic fiction finds him wanting. Tempted by separation, he is unable to 
bear it, not least because it is morally inauthentic but also in its lack of 
fascination for him. A comparison with The Interior Castle’s soul makes this 
clear. Separation for the Interior Castle soul character is morally grounded (the 
whole point of the exercise is to be rooted more deeply in love which enables 
genuinely good works), whereas Pascal’s entry into separation is selfish and 
irresponsible. Separation for him is only, in the end, intolerable loneliness: 
“sentenced to lie, I could never have another friend … friendship means 
confiding.”759 [confiding: con(with)-fides(faith); his loneliness is intolerable 
because he is without faith] In contrast, The Interior Castle’s soul character 
suffers anguishes of loneliness, but it is also a blissful loneliness because it 
happens within the fascination of the presence of Christ. In Uno, Nessuno, 
Moscarda has in fact become closer to The Interior Castle’s soul, living a saintly 
                                          
756 Ibid. p.93 
757 Ibid. p.212 
758 ibid. p.191 
759 Pirandello, Mattia Pascal p.101 
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life of renunciation and charity empowered by the mystical experience of 
fascination in the green blanket. Where the Interior Castle’s soul enjoys holy 
madness as bliss, and Moscarda is similarly blissfully and holily mad, the joy of 
madness terrifies Pascal/Meis. Even at the very start, he says “I felt so drunk 
with freedom I was almost afraid I’d go mad, that I couldn’t bear it very 
long,”760 and eventually, facing “Tantalus’ torment, I left the house, like a 
madman,”761 and at that point he cannot endure madness, so decides to return 
from the fiction of Meis to the reality of Pascal. Pascal, in the end, only “played 
dead and ran off,”762 but The Interior Castle’s soul knows death as the 
consummation of the spiritual marriage, and Moscarda, too, lives only by dying, 
and thereby lives completely.  
Pascal’s retreat from the anti-metaphysical freedom from the book is 
indicated when with the Palearis, he realises that he is once again “caught in 
life’s net.”763 Seeking a second freedom through a second suicide, however, he 
can only return to the ‘slavery’ of the original identity he sought to escape, 
because freedom is “a tyrant”.764 Here, as in chapter four, there is a suggestion 
of the parable of The Grand Inquisitor.765 The freedom of living in Christ is, for 
the Grand Inquisitor, a torment too great for humanity. It is also beyond Mattia 
Pascal’s capacity. So Pascal returns to the deconsecrated church which is the 
site of lifeless religion, and his story is held in safekeeping by the ‘rat catcher’ 
custodian as if “in a confessional.”766 With a deft double meaning, the narrative 
at the outset prefigures this. When Pascal describes his job at the library, he 
writes that the previous incumbent “didn’t even have to look at [the books]; all 
he had to do was bear for a few hours a day the smell of mould and old age. 
This fate befell me too.”767 
Is this the fate of the custodian, or the fate of the mouldy old books? It is 
certainly the fate of the retreat back from freedom into the book and the letter 
                                          
760 Ibid. p.88 
761 Ibid. p.191 
762 Ibid. p.233 
763 Ibid. p.160 
764 Ibid. p.93 
765 Dostoevsky’s parable in The Brothers Karamazov 
766 Pirandello, Mattia Pascal p.243 
767 Ibid. p. xiv 
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of the law. This is most evident in the final persistence of the lie, which ends 
the book:  
Every now and then I go out there [to the cemetery] to 
see myself dead and buried … Who are you, after all? I 
shrug, shut my eyes for a moment, and answer: “Ah, my 
dear friend … I am the late Mattia Pascal.768 
This is a false death, but also a false name: the person in the grave is not 
Mattia Pascal, but the real unknown, who is nameless. Pascal has moved from 
false name to false name, unable to be nameless. This echoes Beckett’s 
Nameless, as was discussed earlier, and it also echoes Moscarda’s triumphant 
death-into-life where “I am alive and I do not conclude. Life does not conclude. 
And life knows nothing of names.”769 Mattia Pascal may affect to be ‘dead,’ but 
his ‘death’ is diametrically opposed to (non)Moscarda’s constant death and 
rebirth. Moscarda renounces names, but Pascal goes back to his dead, old name 
as the late Mattia Pascal, having learnt nothing of conscious autism. 
At this start of this chapter, Pirandello was quoted saying that Uno, 
Nessuno “reached the most extreme conclusions,”770 and as his last novel it 
might be seen as the goal towards which his work has been working. Thinking of 
it as a triumph of autism over psychopathy would make sense because 
(non)Moscarda has found humility, reverence and charity. In comparison, Mattia 
Pascal has been read in this chapter as the portrayal of the non-autistic, 
manipulative cognitive empathy which fails to attain the costly, selfless 
incarnational metaphor of apophatic fiction. This makes Mattia Pascal a salutary 
tale for the neurotypical reader. Recalling the earlier autistic reading of Karl 
Barth, the gift of an autistic Krisis is offered to the neurotypical reader, as the 
gift of failure. 
 
5.5 The “artist of failure” 
In an interview late in life, Pirandello reflects: 
When I was a child I had difficulties even with my 
mother, and as for my father, it appeared to be quite 
                                          
768 Ibid. p.244 
769 Pirandello, Uno, Nessuno p.159 
770 Cover matter, Uno, Nessuno (Mondadori edition) 
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impossible to communicate with him, not just when I 
was preparing myself to do so but when I had actually 
tried and had failed abysmally. As an artist I owe a great 
deal to him for the agony of those moments.771 
A good example of Pirandello’s art as the failure of communication is in 
the F/father’s words (‘F/father’ as the Autistic God), in Sei Caratteri: 
But if it is all here, the evil! In the words! … And how 
can we understand each other, dear Sir, if I put into the 
words I say the value of things as they are in me; 
whereas whoever listens to them inevitably understands 
them in the sense and with the value they have for him, 
of a world as he has it inside himself? We think we 
understand each other; we never do!772 
Pirandello (the man) is not being read as autistic here773 - but he is 
articulating a “failure” which autism might inhabit in a theologically creative 
way. To be an artist of failure is to return to the starting point of this thesis, 
and to think through Rowan Williams’ words that we must endeavour to be 
“learning ‘difficulty’ itself.”774 To be an artist of failure could be seen as a 
supreme ability for the articulation of what a universal autism can recognise as 
the authentic understanding of a tear in the (metaphysical) fabric. This is an 
endless “Chinese box” of enactment without the possibility of final answer.775 
Susan Bassnett McGuire writes that  
(In Sei Caratteri) Pirandello has created a play about the 
processes of artistic creation, a study of the relativity of 
form enclosed within a formal framework. It is therefore 
not only a play that contains within it another play, it is 
a play about the nature of the play constructed on a 
Chinese box principle, where the answering of one 
question merely opens the lid to another.776 
The ‘Chinese box’ is the play-within-the-play: 
Like Shakespeare, Pirandello is concerned with using the 
stage as a metaphor for life, but unlike Shakespeare 
                                          
771 L’Illustrazione Italiana, 23 June 1935, quoted in Giudice, Pirandello: A Biography p.6  
772  Büdel, Pirandello p.57 
773 In fact, although it is not germane to this thesis, an interesting future research direction 
could be the possibility of viewing Pirandello as he is portrayed in biographies such as Giudice’s. 
There would be a case to make for Pirandello’s obsessive use of his schizophrenic wife as muse, 
and the way he keeps her imprisoned, as a profile of the zero degree of empathy tending 
towards high cognitive empathy and low affective empathy; the mirror image of autism. 
774 Williams, The Edge of Words p.116 
775 Which can be seen as an influence in Samuel Beckett’s work – for example, Waiting for Godot 
or Happy Days, in the hoping for a definitive message which never arrives. 
776 Bassnet-McGuire, Luigi Pirandello p.47 
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there is the added ironical dimension arising from 
Pirandello’s particular vision of the dichotomy between 
art and life, between the fixed and the movable.777 
Bassnet-McGuire is right to see irony as the contrast between 
Shakespearean and Pirandellian absurd tragedy, but the issue is not of a 
dichotomy between art and life, but their confluence in the gestalt psychology 
of ‘construction’ used by Pirandello, as was seen in the construction trope in 
Uno, Nessuno. To think of this enactment of the tragi-comic, a surprisingly apt 
image takes this chapter, in conclusion, back to the metaphor of universal 
autism as a tear in the metaphysical fabric. In Mattia Pascal, the narrative 
relentlessly lampoons the theosophist Paleari’s imagery of enlightenment,778  
but the narrator Pascal/Meis remarks “Who could contradict him, after all?”779  
Paleari comes up with a strange image, connected with the comic event of “the 
tragedy of Orestes in a marionette theatre!”780 
Paleari speculates on this event, that if a hole were torn in the paper 
sky, “’(Oreste’s) eyes … would go straight to that hole, from which every kind of 
evil influence would crowd the stage, and Orestes would suddenly feel helpless. 
In other words, Orestes would become Hamlet. There’s the difference between 
ancient tragedy and modern, Signor Meis – believe me – a hole torn in a paper 
sky.”781 
It seems that Paleari, despite his quasi-Platonist metaphysics, has 
expressed something essential both to Pirandello’s thought and to the autistic 
hermeneutic. A “hole torn in a paper sky” works to “pierce” the illusion of the 
play – Orestes becomes Hamlet, tortured and rendered paralysed by doubt. This 
hole in the sky can be read in terms of Pirandello’s work as the fundamental 
interrogation prompted by his disruption of the willing suspension of disbelief, 
“tearing open” the conventions by which we live. The hole in the sky, for a 
universal autism, is the tear in the fabric which challenges all neurotypical 
mindreading complacency. Neither Pirandello nor the autistic myth-maker will 
let the reader off the hook, and as marionettes, readers are ‘left hanging’ 
                                          
777 ibid. p.69 
778 particularly in chapter XIII, The Little Lantern, pp. 154ff; Meis comments that Paleari’s 
eccentric fascination with the metaphor of enlightenment could be called lanternosophy (p.155) 
779 Ibid. p.160 
780 Ibid. p.139 
781 ibid. 
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irrevocably in the suspension of suspension. The absolute autism which 
Pirandello’s last novel achieves is its “no conclusion.” After that, Pirandello 
turns to play writing, because only play-acting is now possible. In the autistic 
hermeneutic, absolute incarnational metaphor is ‘black and white,’ ‘all or 
nothing’ immersion in the play. Taking the metaphor literally means inhabiting 
it because there is nothing else, and there is no possible ostensive intent 
towards which any decoding would turn. 
To bring this autistic thinking full circle, there is Pirandello’s remark, 
recorded by Büdel, that “tutto è favola a tutto è vero” (“everything is a story, 
and everything is true”). The paper sky has been torn, meaning that we now 
know it to be only paper, yet it remains our sky. Our paper sky is where we 
draw our paper fairies, and write our apophatic, absurd and haecceic stories. 
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Conclusion  
Pirandello’s Nessuno offered a space of the text where names are not 
fitting, and the conclusion is “no conclusion.”  For this thesis, which has 
travelled towards Pirandello’s ‘honest atheism,’ the task of this conclusion is to 
articulate what this non-conclusion means. It needs to come to a conclusion 
about (or in) a non-conclusion. To do this, a return to the initial metaphors set 
out in the introduction frames how each chapter has worked towards a 
conclusive non-conclusion. 
In the introduction, the initial premise was that if it seemed that ‘deep 
called to deep,’ in a meeting of LTA and autism, the thesis would be to explore 
if that were true and if so, how. Operating by means of literary discourse, a 
tissue of spatial metaphors opened this question up: trembling on a bridge; 
standing in a paradoxically dazzling darkness; finding identity at the margins 
which might in fact be a truer centre. The conviction the thesis set out to test 
out was that a particular authenticity might find itself sharing space on an inter-
disciplinary bridge, and the goal was to consider if that inter-disciplinary silent 
conversation between silences might become a new place in its own right. 
In order to build this bridge and argue for a new mode of being on it, 
there had to be a framework building from, and to, both sides. On the side of 
literature theology, Michel de Certeau’s mystic fable and Maurice Blanchot’s 
space of literature provided a register where a mythologising hermeneutic could 
be developed. On the side of autism, thinking itself as a literary form led to 
constructing a mythological autism. The mythology was drawn from archetypes 
which became mindfulness of separation, fascination, incarnational metaphor, 
autistic integrity, conscious autism and, finally, the absolute autism of the 
affective empathy of divine love. 
This absolute autism could become the voice of radical theology in the 
hermeneutical world of autism, where absolute autism, conceiving itself in the 
death of God, could become the autism of God. This autistic God was a mythical 
archetype, and exploring a poetics of this archetype was the project of chapters 
four and five. 
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What has this achieved? Firstly, it has created a space where literature 
might open itself up to autism. Secondly, it has offered a space where, equally, 
theological thinking might be possible for autism. Both of these are possibilities, 
offered to autism, perhaps to some autists who stand at that particular bridge 
over that deep calling to autistic deep. These are idiosyncratic possibilities, not 
as an attempt to create a definitive ex cathedra literary-theological autistic 
thinking, but as one speculative venture as to how the journey might be 
attempted. 
However, the third, and perhaps most politically significant achievement 
of this thesis has been to bring the divergent, creative modes of autistic being 
into view of theology, to hope that the theological reader will hear autism 
speak not as the monster of the “I am Autism” scaremongering narrative, but as 
a spiritual gift, in the terms suggested by John Swinton of autistic love. This 
will, perhaps, offer a deeper understanding of the kenotic Jesus, and of the 
beatitudes which invert ability and disability as we stand in the grace of God 
who stands with us. 
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Post-script – an anonymous, 
anecdotal, (non) conclusion 
The above is a linear, logical conclusion. It is, in fact, and necessarily, a 
successful ‘thesis,’ but perhaps thereby fails to capture the necessary ‘failure’ 
at its heart, which in fact gives it life. Perhaps a conclusion needs the 
counterweight of a non-conclusion. 
This is, as Raschke reminds us,782 forever a Barthian theologia viatorum, 
where autism is not ‘cured’ or ‘resolved,’ and we can never really draw 
conclusions. The poor (whose spirits are blessed in the Beatitudes) are, in Jesus’ 
words, “always with us,”783 and the gift is to return to Rowan Williams’ phrase, 
“learning difficulty itself.” 784 There will always be the glorious, subversive 
power of autism’s (dis)ability, in the universal autism of Blake’s and Altizer’s 
universal humanity of the anonymous Jesus. This will be the spiritual insight of a 
second naivete where we inhabit Little Gidding and “know the place for the 
first time” precisely by not knowing. Like (non)Moscarda we are free by having 
no name and no conclusion. Coming back to our uncured selves in our glory, we 
can inhabit the Wake where  
… p. s. fin again … 
Far calls. Coming, far! End here. Us, then, Finn, 
again!785  
 
To answer to the non-conclusion which, finally, Pirandello’s Nessuno led, 
an inconclusive conclusion might be possible, by returning to the beginning. 
Heather Walton’s thinking about the poetic as answering to that to which 
theology cannot answer. This might outwit the illusory compromise of a 
conclusion, and yet conclude. It is an answer, thereby, which, in Blanchot’s 
terms, is a non-answer. Moscarda relinquishes his name, but in so doing he 
becomes the pure ‘I’ of the text. Reluctantly, ‘I’ will follow Moscarda, as the I 
of the text, and I am now speaking to you, in the first person. I will count the 
                                          
782 Raschke, Theological Thinking: An In-quiry, (Atlanta, Georgia; American Academy of 
Religion/ Scholars Press,1988) p.2 
783 Mark 4.17 
784 Williams, Rowan, The Edge of Words p.125 
785 Joyce, James, Finnegan’s Wake, (Middlesex, UK; Penguin Classics, 1999 (1939))  
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ways of the improbable journey to the nexus of autism, literature and theology. 
I am an autistic voice. This is, in Aristotle’s terms, an improbable possibility. 786  
I am improbable, on multiple levels, or rather, as an autistic person, I have 
ended up in improbable places. Or perhaps not.  
Aristotle also writes: 
as Agathon says, 
One might perchance say that was probable -- 
That things improbable oft will hap to men. 
For what is improbable does happen, and therefore it is 
probable that improbable things will happen.787 
Things improbable also happen to women, and the confluence of 
improbable probability is perhaps also the place where moments of unexpected 
interdisciplinarity come to be. The “I” of this thesis’s author/creator would be 
(perhaps by chance?) a woman, a literary reader, a theological thinker, and an 
autist. 
The stereotypes of autism: 
1. Autism happens in children788 
2. Autism is a male condition789 
3. Autistic people only read non-fiction790 
4. Autistic people don’t believe in religion791 
And yet, here we are. Is this an outrageous improbability? Perhaps not: 
1. Catriona Stewart’s work with SWAN (Scottish Women’s Autism 
Network)792 has pioneered deeper understanding of autism and 
                                          
786 Aristotle, Rhetoric II.24.9 
787 ibid. 
788 but not exclusively - UK NICE guidelines for assessing adults for an autism diagnosis: “core 
autism signs and symptoms (difficulties in social interaction and communication and the 
presence of stereotypic behaviour, resistance to change or restricted interests) that have been 
present in childhood and continuing into adulthood” 
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/CG142/chapter/1-Guidance#identification-and-assessment 
789 Possibly not – eg., “New research suggests the disorder often looks different in females, 
many of whom are being misdiagnosed and missing out on the support they need,” Maia 
Szalavitz, Autism—It's Different in Girls, Scientific American/Mind/Mental Health March 1st 
2016, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/autism-it-s-different-in-girls/  
790 But special interests often include the imaginary worlds of TV dramas – texts which are read 
obsessively, avidly and perhaps more deeply than by neurotypicals 
791 The large number of people with autism who attended the ASPARRG (Autistic Spectrum 
People and Religion Research Group)/Glasgow University one day seminar on autism and religion 
in September 2013 suggested that this might be an over-generalisation. 
792 http://www.swanscotland.com/  
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gender, and argues persuasively that autism is under-diagnosed in 
women – we are socially conditioned to learn to adopt roles – we 
mask our autism, learning to mimic, at the cost of expressing our 
real selves.  
 
2. Autistic children grow up into autistic adults – diagnostic structures 
only came into general use around the 1970s, and only in the 
framework of looking for developmental delays in children. So, 
untold generations born before the 1970s have been creatively 
peppered with undiagnosed autists, and some of us ‘twigged’ that 
we might belong to that branch of the family tree.  
 
3. And oh, of course - Autistic people don’t do metaphor.  
But Oops, I just did – with the branches of the tree where I ‘twig,’ and 
relentlessly as the rhetorical base of this whole thesis. Which is 
4. in the end, really all about God. 
How improbable is it that somebody Mindblind, hyper-sensitive and 
woefully unconventional (asked at one point in life, why “someone so clever can 
be so stupid”), can be so clearly autistic and yet still – somehow – feel the 
irresistible need for poetry and for god? I didn’t come to poetry, or the novel, or 
film, or drama easily. They baffled me. Watching an episode of the police 
drama Z Cars as a child, I saw a scene where the police discovered a dead body 
in a boat. I was baffled by how the producers managed to find a dead body to 
use. And yet. Words, music, art held something, just as behind all the 
incomprehensible nonsense of religion, something was also there. Words 
described, and the world cried out to be described. The branch of an 
organization was the branch of a tree, and somehow trees, and organisations, 
and genealogies, and things to hang shoes on, all cried out to be described. To 
de-scribe is not to de-cipher. Ciphers are the conventions of the Neurotypical 
world, too easy for autistic creative perplexity.793 
                                          
793 An echo of Italo Calvino’s phrase ‘systematic perplexity;’ Calvino’s work, in its poetic 
taxonomies of the visible world, has also been a hospitable environment. See also 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1961/  
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In the Introduction, I spoke about darkness and quoted Dante’s pregnant 
words as he begins the journey: 
nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita, 
mi ritrovai per una selva oscura, 
ché la diritta via era smarrita. 
[Midway in the path of our life 
I found [rediscovered] myself in [by means of] a dark 
wood 
Whose right path was lost]794 
Deep calls to deep in the overwhelming of the waters, and in 
overwhelming darkness the urgency of Bishop Jenkins’ words, which permeate 
LTA as witnessed by both Walton and Jasper, becomes felt.  
A strange experience of darkness as personal reality became 
understandable as autism in mezzo del cammin, with an autism diagnosis not in 
childhood but “midway in the path of our life,” and I began to wonder whether 
autism might also be a way approach also the darkness of LTA’s abyss.795 This 
felt anything but negative (as the whole of this thesis has argued, 
negativity/disability is the paradoxical key), as it assumed a profoundly positive 
negativity. The hell of Milton’s darkness visible is to languish in the diminishing 
returns of the de-cipherment project. So, the decision to look at the dark wood, 
and the path in it. The decision to look at autism, and to look at the un-de-
cipherment of theology. Instead, permission to not understand liberated 
something. I think it was the Emperor’s New Clothes of “what the text means.”  
I’m not convinced that honest autistic atheists are spiritually “thin” 
people (to return to John Swinton’s considerations about autism). Listening to 
some young, bright autists, I sense that they have wonderful creative potential 
and need only to be given permission (which also means support). Like them, I 
‘need my own space.’ I’ll always be mindblind, I’ll always need to escape from 
noisy, overstimulating environments. Am I sad to miss the party? To be honest, 
it’s kind of boring, when I could be reading a poem instead. 
                                          
794 Dante Alighieri, La Divina Commedia [The Divine Comedy] – Inferno 1.1 [this writer’s own 
translation]; mi ritrovai suggests, perhaps (another direction to be reserved for future research) 
re-finding the self is as per the wood, not as an unfortunate error. 
795 This “I” was midway through writing on a literary-theological abyss in Italo Calvino’s work 
when the ‘thunderbolt’ of the autism diagnosis arrived (recalling Mark C Taylor’s use of the 
paysage foudroyé image, could this be both a shock and an illumination – a ‘light bulb 
moment?’) 
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Another level of autistic understanding emerged as the thesis progressed. 
The oft-sung lines from my childhood, of the Glasgow Victorian hymnist George 
Matheson came back again and again, from childhood: “Oh Love that wilt not let 
me go/I rest my weary soul in Thee.” Matheson’s lines can seem sentimental, 
with their images of oceans, rainbows and blossoms, but Matheson was a blind 
poet – comparisons with Milton would yield many dissimilarities, however.796 
When Matheson writes: “O light that followest all my way, I yield my flickering 
torch to thee,” he too is invoking a dazzling light in darkness; the light is behind 
him, not before him, and he has only a flickering torch. Too easy, perhaps, to 
conclude with the happy ending of “seeing” God in the darkness. Matheson 
“trace(s) the rainbow through the rain” (tracing it with his blind eyes), holding 
on only to the conviction that “Thy promise is not vain.” He does not sing in 
triumph that “mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord.”  
It did, however, come to me that just as God “would not let me know” 
(my slip of the pen at the keyboard, like Hopkins’ - I meant to say “let me go”), 
it was just as true that, despite every darkness, I would not let God go. Perhaps 
this was another aspect of autism, where we ‘simply won’t let go,’ following 
things relentlessly to their conclusion (even the autistic bafflement of the non-
conclusion). So I wrote my way into the search for the painful autistic integrity 
of self-knowledge and acceptance. 
When I see Jesus in a fallen sycamore leaf I am incomparably blessed. 
Like Matheson I stay (mind)blind, but the promise can exist, perhaps more 
profoundly, in the space of the lack of ciphers. Is this lonely, without belonging 
to the ciphering community of religion? Not really, when I have the un-
deciphering Osip Mandelstam as my friend.797 Mandelsam sees only the 
swallows, and when, as Hopkins would, I trace Jesus in the veins of a fallen 
sycamore leaf, the promise is not vain but vein. This vein is not only a seam in 
the rock, yielding precious stone. It also became the vein of the kenotic Christ, 
                                          
796 Where Milton writes “they also serve who only stand and wait,” Matheson is, with great 
difficulty, getting a Divinity degree from the University of Glasgow, and then, as an ordained 
minister, engaging in parish work. 
797 Mandelstam’s poetry of exile: Jacques Rancière examines the way in which Mandelstam’s 
poetry, is a reaction against a symbolist poetry co-opted to Soviet propaganda. In contrast, the 
swallows of Mandelstam’s poem fly free of constraint, exiled from referentiality - see Rancière, 
Jacques, The flesh of words: the politics of writing (trans. Charlotte Mandell) (Stanford, 
California; Stanford University Press, 2004)  
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blood poured out in communion with the suffering discerned by intolerable 
affective empathy.  Nevertheless, this is all emphatically word games, not 
theology. The promise is held in poetry, and Jesus does not ‘appear before me’ 
in an allegorical conclusion. So my truest autistic self, for all my patient 
teachers have taught me, resists the symbolic temptation and traces simply the 
fragility of the autism (another slip – the autumn) leaf with its colour, texture, 
shape, and, as irreligious as an Altizer or a Pirandello, I am incomparably 
blessed. 
I learned it all back to front. For a start, I was making heavy weather, not 
least of writing, when I learned I had autism, or received the name for it, so 
literature and theology was already the site of the disaster where autism, right 
at the end, entered the field.798 In the light of conscious autism seeking coping 
strategies, my teachers helped me learn to read, and ‘read.’ ‘Reading’ people 
can be learned when it is not intuitive.799 Learning that I didn’t know, and what 
I didn’t know, made it possible to adapt.  
In terms of reading, permission not to know meant that the reading 
journey was a back to front, archaeological historical project. Starting (as 
instinctively I did) with postmodern fiction, I found a hospitable space where 
the emperor’s new clothes were already out the window, and the game was to 
not know. This was a text I could enter. Moving backwards from there, 
modernist fiction’s unreliable narrator also gave me permission to not know, 
and to validate my Mindblindness. Armed with this permission, I could now 
travel back, forwards, and in any direction with permission to enter the text 
and wonder, and work at empathy with an act of conscious imagination. So I 
allowed myself to picture the read room (another slip – red room) where the 
child Jane Eyre is locked up by her cruel aunt, and to linger on the description 
of her distress, and imagine it happening. What was happening was the nuts and 
bolts of the learned pleasure of reading. My instinctive, fascinated awareness of 
ecceitas finally could be coherent because it had been liberated with room to 
breathe. My honest atheism with its longing for God finally validated that 
                                          
798 Dunster, Ruth M. (2010) The abyss of Calvino's deconstructive writing: an apology for non-
foundational theology MTh(R) thesis, University of Glasgow.  
799 Samuel Baum’s 2009 Fox TV series Lie to Me and Alex Gardiner’s 2015 UPI film Ex Machina 
are two imagined examples of learned Mindreading.  
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ecceitas. I am grateful to my teachers for making this ‘I,’ the text, able to read 
and write, drawing my own conclusions, inconclusively, so that in one small 
corner of the beautiful diversity of autistic world, this autism speaks. 
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